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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is unique in looking at Sudanese NGOs and not at the INGOs in Sudan. 
Most of the literature concentrates on the role of INGOs in Sudan and neglect the 
contribution of Sudanese NGOs. The research offers a corrective to these stereotype 
created by the literature on Sudanese NGOs.
This study focuses on important aspects of the voluntary sector in the Sudan. It describes 
informal traditional practices and indigenous associations, like communal labor, rotating 
savings and credit associations, and migrant associations. Although these social forms 
have been given some attention in the third world studies literature, the subject has never 
been dealt with systematically in the field of Sudanese studies. The study reveals the 
strengths and weaknesses of Sudanese NGOs. It doesn’t, however exaggerate the role o f 
Sudanese NGOs, given the local context. On the other hand we can not underestimate 
their contribution to poverty reduction efforts and peace process and in realization of 
rights in the last two decades.
The study focuses on the present political situation in the Sudan, including the regime’s 
institutions and its social organizations on the one hand and the position of social and 
political oppositions on the other. It shows how Islamic movement uses religion and 
power to sustain and protect a system which has lost its credibility and legitimacy among 
many Sudanese citizens. It focuses on the rise of the National Islamic Front (NIF), its 
growth and development from a small political party to the third political power, based 
on the election of 1986, and to a party of full ruling power as a result of the NIF military 
coup of 1989. It also discusses and analyzes the nature of the government organizations 
and the causes leading to the failure of the Islamic project in the country. The rise of 
Islamic movement in Sudan can be viewed as part o f the decline of local initiatives as the 
center of the social capital.
The rapid changing situation in Sudan since 1989 is gathering by new momentum with 
the government policies of control and restriction, on the one hand, and with the
I
increasing numbers of civil society organizations seeking to legitimize their identity and 
recognition, on the other hand. The study discusses the NIF-NGO relations and concludes 
by raising issues of concern and discussing the way out as an alternative approach 
contributing to development process.
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CHAPTER ONE
LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 Background to the Debate
The central theme of the studies of Sudanese politics in the last four decades has been the 
significant political change from democratic to authoritarian forms, which is known in 
Sudan as the vicious cycle of short democracy (1956-1958, 1964-1969 and 1985-1989) 
interrupted by lengthy dictatorship (1958-1964, 1969-1985, 1989-to date). During these 
periods and processes, the Sudanese Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) such as trade 
unions, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and Community-Based Organizations 
(CBOs), have played an important role. The relations between state and these 
CSOs/NGOs throughout these periods have never been easy, even during the democratic 
regimes.
The Sudanese NGOs and voluntary sector have survived and contributed to coping 
mechanisms of mutual cooperation, solidarity and support. Despite the impact of the 
colonial period: Pre-independence in 1956 and the social and political challenges of both 
democratic and military authoritarian forms. Sudan had also experienced drought, 
famine, civil strife, and displacement since 1970s. Because of these circumstances, and 
inadequate development policies, the ‘food- basket country’ relies on relief aid and 
international humanitarian assistance.
Sudan, however, has maintained rich social capital. Traditional structures and 
organizations whether introduced or transformed aggregate demands and capacities at the 
how to assist in the implementation of sustainable and locally managed development. 
Both NGOs and official agencies have no proper documentation of the contribution and 
role of NGOs and voluntary sector in Sudan. Poor literature and lack of documentation of 
CBO sector is a sound justification and rationale for conducting this research.
1
The 1990s witnessed an explosion in the number of NGOs and community-based 
organizations active in development and relief aid. The capacities and capabilities among 
NGOs and CBOs have gradually been strengthened. The content of their work have 
shifted from charity oriented activities to developmental issues. Within the development 
framework their dynamics evolved and expanded to address environmental, human 
rights, child protection, gender equality and social justice. The organizations have 
changed from simple local and traditional structures to institution structured bodies and 
networks. The signing of peace agreement on January 9, 2005 and the continuation of 
civil strife in Darfur, contributed to the rapid political changes and therefore shaped the 
work of the NGOs to focus on areas of peace and war such as; conflict prevention and 
resolution, peace culture and social inclusion. NGOs and CBOs were able to play a more 
effective and independent role in development.1 These changes led to new set of 
challenges and needs in institutional strengthening.
Yes, despite the complex set of challenges and constraints encountering NGOs in Sudan, 
the relation with the state has not been overlooked. On the contrary, the thesis allocates 
two case studies to illustrate the NGOs relations with the state. The thesis explains how 
promising organizations succeed in incorporating plans into the government national 
strategy and work together with governmental technical departments to meet the needs of 
communities such as street children and rural poverty. The peaceful rights based 
approach developed by these organizations demonstrates that working relations and 
partnerships with governments can be promoted even under authoritarian regime. These 
organizations are a good example of commitment to matters related to marginalized 
groups.
Unfortunately, these challenges have become more complicated as the government, 
instead of being neutral and supportive to voluntary work intensified mechanisms of 
control are used. The government created many organizations and assisted only those of 
similar historic origin or being politically affiliated to the regime. NGOs who show their
1 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government o f the Republic o f Sudan and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/ Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Available at: 
www.unmis.org/English/document/cpa-en. Accessed 21 November 2007.
2
own political standing have been suffering when coming to re-register or simply to 
implement their activities. The new NGOs Law Regulating the Voluntary Work (2006) is 
one of these measures taken by the regime to control the humanitarian work of NGOs.
The thesis’ chapters and the case studies show how the NGOs/CSOs -  state interface has 
grown and developed. It has been also observed how the Sudanese ruling parties used the 
apparatus of the state to set up a pattern of authoritarian rule in which CSOs and NGOs 
would be either restricted and controlled or included in the hegemonic framework of the 
ruling regimes. Those CSOs and NGOs which have not accepted the government agenda 
and demonstrated their own identity and independence have been excluded from the 
social, cultural and material privileges and facilities. NGOs, by virtue of their historical 
origin and political commitment to the government’s program, became deeply bound in 
this hegemonic process. As NGOs themselves were able to maintain identity, acquire 
resources, and provide social standing mechanisms to control them intensified. In some 
cases, the regime succeeded in manipulating and speculating within CSOs and NGOs to 
further its political agenda.
The other interesting aspect is the role of different social forces in the promotion of an 
effective environment for local institutional development. This issue is o f particular 
concern to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that look at the accountability of 
their interventions, scale-up the impact of their activities and contribute to the 
strengthening of civil society. The commitment of various development workers 
including public and private sector and their interest in supporting local institutions is of 
significance in maintaining local integrity and social cohesion.
1.2 Introduction to Chapter One
In the literature on NGOs, social change is the ultimate goal and the impact they want to 
achieve. It means a world free of poverty, discrimination, exclusion and injustice. In
2 The Voluntary Humanitarian Work (organizations) Act. 2006. Available at: www.hacsudan.net. Accessed 
28 December 2008.
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order to achieve this goal, NGOs must maintain values which are in harmony with the 
expected social change. To be an effective NGO, there is a set of democratic practices 
and approaches to follow, including participation, democratization and right-based 
approaches and equality. In comparison to governments and markets, NGOs’ role as 
described by Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler that they “must achieve elements of both 
these sets of goals -  efficiency, effectiveness and public support -  and use them to 
transform the worlds of economics, politics and social relationships through the prism of 
a different set of values.” Values must be reflected in the internal capacity of the NGO, 
including the organizational structure, service delivery, human resources, governance, 
strategic thinking, planning and financial management. Those values of transparency in 
information sharing, respect of all partners and cooperation with other NGOs and 
stakeholders must also be reflected in the NGO’s external relationships.
This chapter reviews literature relevant to boarder issues of civil society organizations, 
NGOs, capacity building, organizations of local institutions, definitions, roles and 
concepts. It focuses on the state and state-civil society relations. It touches on 
development and NGOs in some countries in the Arab and Islamic world.
The last section of this chapter presents the research methodology, including the research 
problem, selection of NGOs and research outline.
1.3 Civil Society/NGOs and Development
1.3.1 Introduction to Civil Society/NGOs
This introduction is about the definition and capabilities of civil society to achieve 
changes in a society where their members have sought through society priority needs, 
participation and actions. Have civil society in developing countries lived up to its
3
Introduction: Changing Challenges for NGDO Management. In: Michael Edwards & Alan Fowler ed. 
NGO Management. London, Sterling,VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002 p.6
4
ambitions in the generation since independence? Have they become strong civil society 
organizations?
In the mid-1980s, Milton J. Esman and Norman T. Uphoff studied local organizations as 
intermediaries.4 The relevance of such work studying local organizations and local 
institutional development depends on the continuing discussions about the experiences 
and lessons leamt and about the resolved and unresolved matters in most developing and 
developed countries in relation to the understanding of the local context, its environment, 
culture, dynamics and vulnerabilities.
In 1980s, NGOs capacity development was scarcely a topic of public debate. The 
development challenges during this critical period were characterized by drought, famine 
and civil strife and resulted in refugee influx and internal displacement. These challenges 
brought NGOs to worldwide attention and questioned their management capacities and 
credibility. In the absence of critical literature guidance and advice, some NGOs focus 
simply on blueprint instruments and tools instead of focusing on experiences, stories and 
approaches. These observations were visible in the writings of Edwards M. and D. 
Hulme,5 Edwards M. & Fowler,6 and Edwards M. (2008). The latter summarizes the 
conclusions of the first Manchester Conference in 1992 as that: “ ...there were different 
strategies suited to different circumstances, specifically: (1) working with government; 
(2) operational expansion; (3) lobbying and advocacy; (4) and networking and ‘self- 
spreading’ local initiatives”.7 The theme of the conference was “Scaling-up NGO impact 
on development: how can NGOs progress from improving local situations on a small 
scale to influencing the wider systems that create and reinforce poverty?” 8
During 1990s and 2000s, new thoughts have emerged in both analysis and policy. The 
need for greater specificity and sensitivity in terms of approach and methodology is
4 Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development. Cornel: Cornel University Press, 1984.
5 Non-Governmental Organizations: Performance and Accountability, Beyond the Magic Bullet. London: 
Earthscan, 1996.
6 NGO Management. London: Earthscan, 2002.
7 Have NGOs ‘Made a Difference?’ From Manchester to Birmingham with an Elephant in the Room. In: A. 
J. Bebbington, S. Hickey, and D.C. Mitlin, eds. London & New York: Zed Books, 2008, p.39.
8 Ibid, 2008, p.39
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stressed. Alan Fowler described the current discourse: “In other words while bonded to 
civil society, they use their value-base as a ‘springboard’ to interact with state, market 
and civil society itself -  which is far from homogeneous and is not inherently ‘civil’ or 
conflict free. They would have the competence to speak different ‘sector languages’ and 
to engage across diverse institutional boundaries and foster inter-organizational 
linkages”.9 The importance of integration has been emphasized by Michael Edwards: 
“NGOs cannot fulfill any of their new roles unless they agree to work together, both with 
other NGOs in other parts of the world and with other allies in civil society. They need to 
integrate themselves into wider civil society coalitions and cross-sectoral alliances that 
can reach further into the economic and political arena”. 10 It is probably an 
overstatement that NGOs always share the same broad goals. NGOs need in the first 
place to understand what they share in common. NGOs have tended to mask the 
distinctions while doing little to elaborate on the similarities. The necessity for NGOs 
integration requires personal change towards values of cooperation which cannot be 
imposed.
Sarah Michael11 defines NGOs that: “ ...as independent development actors existing apart 
from governments and corporations, operating on a non-profit or not -for-profit basis 
with an emphasis on voluntarism, and pursuing a mandate of providing development 
services, undertaking communal development work or advocating on development 
issues”. To distinguish CBOs from NGOs we can describe CBOs as less structured, not 
necessarily registered and they focus on specific local issues, such as water, education or 
health to meet the urgent needs o f their communities. CBOs are more familiar to local 
knowledge; therefore they are in a better position in terms of mobilization of available 
local resources.
9 Beyond Aid: NGDO Values and the Fourth Position. In: Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler, ed. The 
Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. UK and USA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002, pp. 13-26
10 International Development NGOs: Agents o f Foreign Aid or Vehicles for International Cooperation. In: 
Michael Edwards & Alan Fowler, ed. NGO Management. London, Sterling, VA: Earthscan 
Publications Ltd, 2002, pp.27-37.
11 Undermining Development: The Absence o f Power among
Local NGO in Africa. Oxford: James Currey, Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2004, p.3.
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With respect to the concept of civil society some western theorists exclude inscriptive 
associations based on for example, ethnicity because they belong to a category of primary 
units. Stephen Orvis12 describes an African perspective that: “We focus on the broad 
array of collective activity and norms, whether "democratic” or not, that constitute actual 
existing African civil society. This approach leads to an analysis of patron-client 
networks, ethnic associations, and some "traditional" authorities as part of civil society, 
demonstrating that African civil society is more rooted in and representative of African 
society as a whole than the pessimists have admitted, but also less internally democratic 
and less likely to support liberal democracy than the optimists assert”. Civil society 
organizations are democratically constituted and function as the foundation of a 
democratic society. This definition excludes deviant and criminal groups from being 
member of civil society membership. One controversial issue was what had been shared 
by western literature with regard to the role and impact of democracy. It was believed 
that only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society, only a democratic civil 
society can sustain a democratic state. The civility that makes democratic politics 
possible can only be learned in the associational networks; roughly equal and widely
dispersed capabilities that sustain the networks have to be fostered by a democratic state.
1 ^According to Julius E. Nyang’oro that Thomas Callaghy summarizes two basic 
definitions of civil society: “The first relates to autonomous societal groups that interact 
with the state but delimit and constrain its action; here associational life is seen as the 
core of civil society. The second and less common definition deals with the emergence of 
norms about the nature and limits of state power, including its role in the economy, and 
about the creation of a public sphere and the political rules that govern its functioning. 
These two meanings, separately or together, often merge with a third, more general
12 Civil Society in Africa or African Civil Society? Journal o f Asian 
and African Studies, Vol. 36, N o.l, 2001, pp. 17- 37.
13Civil Society and Democratic Development in Africa. Perspectives from Eastern and Southern Africa.
Harare: Mwengo. Background Paper on UNDP Decentralization and Local Governance, 
Policies, Legal Frameworks, Programmes, Lessons Learned and Good Practices, 
submitted to Local Governance Forum in the Arab Region, Sana’a Yemen, December 
2003.
7
usage-what...others have called the popular upsurge against despotism”. In the Sudanese 
context there is perhaps a correlation between the popular rise and crisis of the 
authoritarian regimes. In other words there are the strengths of civil society movement 
and the weaknesses of the state and its institution. These circumstances led to political 
strike and therefore the overthrown of two military regimes in Sudan in, October 1964 
and April 1985. This is similar to what Agbaje Adigun14 describes on his list of what civil 
society could do to the unfolding democratic experiment that: “Help to address what 
Cameroonian economist Celestin Monga calls civic deficit.... Given that life is one long 
fight against the state, the collective imagination has gradually conspired to craftily defy 
everything that symbolizes public authority.” These analyses begin to link the role of 
civil society organizations to debates on whether or not they influence state power and 
whether or not they are involved in taking-over state power.
B lair15 writes: “Thus we exclude such essentially single-purpose organizations as a 
business enterprise or a political party. The former main goal is to make a profit, while 
the latter's is to takeover state power {as opposed to influencing it, as with the institutions 
of civil society}”. Saad Eldeen Ibrahim understands civil society as a voluntary 
independent action that is not a family or relative initiated group, neither a government 
effort 16. Such contributions show the characteristics of civil society. One of these
14 Nigeria: Prospects for the Fourth Republic, in: Gyimah-Boadi
(eds). Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality o f Progress. London: Rienner, 2004, 
pp.201-233.
15 Donors, democratization and civil society, in D. Hulme and M.
Edwards, NGOs States and Donors: Too close for comfort? London: Macmillian 
Press, 1997, pp. 23-42.
16 The Changing Face of Egypt’s Islamic Activism. In: Phebe
Marr, ed. Egypt at the Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role. 
Washington, D: National Defense Press, 1999, pp.29-47.
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characteristics is that civil society is a collective organization or a number of 
organizations whose members voluntarily agree to establish an organization. Civil society 
comprises the collectivity of those social organizations that are independent from the 
state and have as one important goal among others to influence the state on behalf of their 
members. Civil society is defined as value-based or value-led organizations. The other 
characteristic is the acceptance of differences and diversity in society between the 
different social forces and between civil society organizations and state. As Alan 
Thomas17 writes that: “the values underlying development NGOs in particular are if 
anything even more varied, although many relate to participation or empowerment”. 
Other definition of Celestin Monga18 (1995:14) states that civil society: “includes all 
organizations and individuals whose actions have helped to amplify the affirmations of 
social identity and the rights of citizenship, often in opposition to those in’ power whose 
natural tendency is to repress such identities and rights”. Thomas M. Callaghy (1994:9) 
contributes to the definition as follows: “...civil society seems to mean the emergence o f a 
situation where societal groups assert their autonomy from the postcolonial authoritarian 
state in Africa and challenge its political hegemony. Teleological, civil society comes to 
stand for reinvigorated forms of participatory politics, for forces pushing toward some 
type of democracy. Society strikes back against oppression in the form of civil society”. 
In case of Sudan, for instance, the struggle for CSOs autonomy continues beyond the 
colonial period and under both authoritarian and democratic governments and the 
continuing debate of the role of CSOs and NGOs has not achieved its goal to engage 
them in the democratization processes and to contribute to social and economic reforms.
Ali, Hyder Ibrahim : Islamic Current and Democratic Issues -  centre of Arab Union Studies -  Beirut. 
1996, p.5
17 Thomas Alan. Whatever Happened to Reciprocity? Implications o f Donor Emphasis on Voice and 
Impact as Rational for Working with NGOs in Development. In: Bebbington A.J., Hickey S., Mitlin D.C. 
Can NGOs Make a Difference? London & New York: Zed Books. 2008, p.91.
18Monga, C. Civil Society and Democratization in francophone Africa. In 
the Journal o f Modem Africa Studies, 33, 3. 1995, pp. 359-379.
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Thomas M. Callaghy19 responded to the concept of civil society that: “Spending 
considerable time and energy grappling with civil society as what Crawford Young 
vividly calls "yet another child o f the anthropomorphic fertility of the social science 
imagination" and a metaphor masquerading as player" may impede this imperative”. It 
was hard not to be struck by the widespread view among development practitioners that 
there are fast changing attitudes in Sudan, which may be leading toward new underlying 
challenges for civil society. Will civil society, by its own, help to bridge cultural barriers 
of multicultural society and break down stereotypes? What indicators should be used to 
assess the quality of civil society? How do donors select CSOs with which to work?
There are two basic strategies, developed by donor agencies, in supporting civil society 
organizations to promote democracy. Blair20 (1997: 26) defines them as system reform, 
where the support for civil society focuses on the enabling environment and conditions in 
which it can work effectively. The second strategy, sectoral agenda, is the support given 
to specific SCOs. The former strategy interests in issues like: who benefits? Who is 
excluded? Who is included? The latter strategy implies questions such as: What 
happened? Who took decisions? Who made policy?
Fowler (1990) lists 16 NGO comparative advantages: 1) Reach the poor; 2) obtain true, 
meaningful participation of intended beneficiaries; 3) achieve the correct relationship 
between processes and outcomes; 4) choose the proper mix of assistance; 5) be flexible 
and responsive in their work; 6) strengthen local level institutions; 7) achieve outcomes at 
less cost; 8) tailor interventions to the needs of specific situations; 9) experiment with 
alternative ideas and practices; 10) employ long-term, strategic perspectives and time- 
scales; 11) undertake people-centered problem identification and research; 12) utilize
19 Callaghy, T.H. Civil Society, democracy, and Economic Change in 
Africa: A Dissenting Opinion about Resurgent Societies. In: Harbeson & N.
Chazan, Civil society and the state in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, 
pp. 231-53.
20 Blair, H. Donors, democratization and civil society, in D. Hulme and M.
Edwards, NGOs States and Donors: Too close for comfort? London: Macmillian 
Press, 1997, p.26
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indigenous knowledge and other local resources; 13) learn from and re-apply experience; 
14) analyze and identify with the reality of the poor; 15) motivate and retain personnel; 
16) promote sustainable development.
The Fowler list of NGO comparative advantages is a mixture of the roles that could be 
played by CBOs, local NGOs and INGOs. The latter is intermediary rather than 
implementers. CBOs and local NGOs have developed a space for themselves, providing 
development services, before other INGOs were at work. Other competitive advantage is 
their familiarity of local knowledge, culture and therefore needs and their novel approach 
to development in their work of participation, mobilization and management of local 
resources. This role of CBOs and local NGOs could match and complement with the role 
of INGOs that have pursued advantages for themselves, specializing in particular areas of 
development and gaining a level of skills, training and experience and contacts. The 
INGOs create a niche for themselves and expand it, capitalizing on donor funds and 
diversifying their areas of intervention.
Stephen Biggs and Arthur Neame 21 criticize Fowler’s analysis in three points:
First, one cannot exclude the role of the government from the NGOs’ success or failure. 
They write “The nature of the government, and what it does with its power and resources, 
determines whether an NGO might do development better. By the same token one has to 
look at specific NGOs in particular contexts to see whether they do better in these 
circumstances.” Second, the local institutional development vision argues that each actor 
in the society has a role and each one has to concentrate on what they are able best to do. 
This is also the origin of the theory of comparative advantage. Stephen Biggs and Arthur 
Neame argue that, “It is strange that the language and arguments of neo-classical theory 
appear so significant in making the NGO case”. Third, the list o f Fowler, in reality, is a 
romanticized view of what is expected from NGOs, rather than what they actually do and
21 Negotiating Room for Manoeuvre: Reflections Concerning NGO Autonomy and Accountability Within 
the New Policy Agenda, in: Edwards, M. & Hulme, D., ed. Non-Governmental Organizations:
Performance and Accountability, Beyond the Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan,
1996, pp.31-40.
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achieve. Biggs and Neame continue to criticize and question the quality of relationships 
that NGOs can foster with clients and the way they create and design their organizations. 
They write that, “The notion that NGOs select their development tasks hints at mythical 
autonomy, and it is highly questionable anyway if NGOs are supposed to be acting in 
response to local needs and as agents of empowerment”.
While Biggs and Neame criticize the role of NGOs described by Fowler in his analysis, 
they show also the powerful role of the government that “ ...determines whether anNGO 
might do development better”. Sarah Michael22 describes what governments do when 
threatened by the power of civil society: “Afraid of relinquishing political space or 
political power to civil society, they have actively worked to hinder the operations of 
certain NGOs in their countries and to destroy them”. But as we illustrated elsewhere in 
the thesis that even under the present authoritarian regime in Sudan, the government have 
moved from repressing NGO activity to incorporating some of its strategies into the 
national plan, or co-operating with NGOs on isolated activities. Therefore the civil 
society organizations are dealing with the current problems facing democratic transitions 
in the country and the broader issues of reforming social and political relations, rather 
than seeking to reinforce the existing relations.
Peter Morgan 23 introduces new areas on the concept of capacity and suggests five central 
characteristics or aspects of capacity: empowerment and identity; collective ability; an 
emergent property or an interaction effect; a potential state, elusive and transient; and 
creation of public value.
22 Undermining Development: The Absence o f Power among Local NGO in Africa. Oxford: James Currey, 
Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 2004, p. 164.
23 The Concept o f Capacity. A draft version paper. ECDPM. 2005, Available at: 
www.ecdpm.org/studv. Accessed 10 Feb. 2007.
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Echoing many of the definitions of capacity elaborated in this chapter, one has to mention 
a contribution made by an anonymous:”I can’t define capacity but I know it when I see 
it” . Others believe that capacity is everything we do everyday in order to better our life.
We may well put the cart before the horse, a balance between theory and practice is 
essential in development work in order to avoid the consequence of premature judgment. 
On the other hand and more important is that we are not trying here to approve or 
disapprove a theory of social change, but simply to find a way of talking about the links 
between the internal power, practice, organizational structure, behavior and the impact 
and change.
To sum up this discussion, the term civil society has had more confused meanings and 
conflicting usage and in this sense the term civil society should be used in a very 
restricted way. All the above observations and discussions raise legitimate concerns. 
What version of civil society is suitable for Sudanese perspective? Can we arrive at 
specific model of community-based civil society? To what extent civil society 
organizations are motivated by ethical ambitions and those elements of community are 
taken in consideration? Are they different from the individualistic elite version? Are they 
democratic, or developmental?
1.3.2 Organizations of Local Institutions
The importance of local NGOs in developing countries seems likely to grow given the 
increasing interest in NGOs by donor agencies. There is however much less literature on 
local NGOs than on NGOs. The literature neglects the role of the local organizations, 
their functioning and means of strengthening local integrity. As noted by Abbott and 
Miracle24 that disappointment encountered with government programs to implant 
cooperative systems, which was due to their being seen “as structures designed more for
24 Esman and Uphoff. Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development. Cornel: Cornel 
University Press. 1984: 38
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administrative and political convenience than for concrete local advantage”. The first 
sobering contributions are by Wharton & Mosher in 1969 who introduced the voluntary 
farmers associations i.e. cooperative societies, farmer clubs, and other organizations as 
‘accelerators of agricultural development.’ They continue to say that these have two 
advantages. One is that they get tasks accomplished where individual farmers, operating 
alone, cannot achieve. And by involving group discussion of new ideas and ad hoc 
organizations around specific interests, they can affect the local climate of public opinion 
with which the individual farmer must live and work.
Uphoff27 notes that local organizations are important for sustainable rural development 
because they:
- Can mobilize local resources and regulate their use with a view to maintaining a 
longer term base for productive activity.
- Put available local resources to their most efficient and sustainable use with 
specific knowledge, which is best, generated and interpreted locally.
Uphoff suggests that a local organization is an essential asset because:
- People's behavior is conditioned by community norms and consensus, so 
preserving or promoting practices required for sustainable development and 
natural resource management.
- Local institutions encourage people to take longer-term view by creating common 
expectations and a basis for cooperation that goes beyond individual interests. If 
local institutions are considered legitimate, people comply without inducements 
or sanctions.
25 Ibid, 1984.
26 Ibid, 1984.
27 Local Institutions and Participation for Sustainable Development. Gatekeeper Series, No. 31. London:
IIED. 1992b. Available at: www.iied.org. Accessed: 23 February 2008.
14
The neglect of local institutional development inhibits the development process and 
weakens the local capacity economically and technologically. Training, for example, is 
an area of concern for local organizations needed for the development of staff and 
members as well. To improve, for example poor resource management training is likely 
to be more effective with regard to practical skills like bookkeeping and maintenance of 
equipment. Training is considered as a contribution to reduce the risk of local 
organizations vulnerabilities such as subordination, ineffectiveness and internal divisions. 
It is found by Esman and Uphoff that: “too often, training is a top-down operation, 
assuming that the trainers know exactly what the trainees need to know. This one way 
transfer of knowledge is seldom effective for local organizational development”. It is 
also evident that the lack of guidance of how training can be a bottom-up approach and 
how two way transfer of knowledge can be practiced. Greater success can be achieved if 
training packages consider the importance of local knowledge, e, g. culture, norms, 
language and behavior which can help to improve tools and approaches to attract poor 
people with low level of formal education. There is also the practical problem of who 
does the training and who benefits from it. A yet more positive training approach would 
be to understand the sensitive local contexts and to strengthen local capacity.
The contemporary approaches on local organizations include five main schools of 
thought:
[i] Marxists define the workers’ organizations for the economic struggle as trade-union
90organizations. As Lenin writes:”Let every worker who understands the need to unite for 
the struggle against the employers and the government join the trade unions”. In 
response to the question how to make the trade unions as public as possible, Lenin30 
writes about the advantage of the legalization of the working-class movement and that: 
“.. .it is precisely our campaign of exposure that will help us to separate the tares from the 
wheat”. Lenin repeatedly however reminded that this working-class movement that 
accepts the principle of the Party programmes and renders the Party all possible support.
28 Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development. Cornel: Cornel University Press. 1984
29 What Is To Be Done? Moscow: Progress Publications. 1973, p .l 11
30 Ibid, p.l 11
15
This leads us to the question of centralism which is defined as the rule of the majority 
within its own party. Rosa Luxemburg arrives at conclusions that opposed to Lenin’s 
“It is by extreme centralization that a young, uneducated proletariat movement can be 
most completely handed over to the intellectual leaders staffing a Central Committee”.
[ii] Liberationists say that groups that represent the rural poor must not cooperate with the 
state and by no means be dependent on its incompetent and corrupt structure. Self- 
awareness, collective strength of the rural poor will lead them to confrontational tactics 
and then to liberation.
[iii] Technocratic school believes in an optimistic and individualistic approach that leads 
towards economic growth and technological modernization and those local organizations 
of purely voluntary nature may be useful for pooling resources so long as they maintain 
local integrity and do not distort local economy.
[iv] Esman, and Uphoff identify a perspective which they call structural reformist.33 They 
believe that this perspective concentrates on the institutional and organizational results 
that can cumulatively shift the balance of socio-economic and political power. The 
strengthening of local organizations is by mobilizing and managing rural people’s 
resources for their benefit. According to them this means building local power that limits 
and influences the actions of the state and the private sector. This peaceful approach of 
power transformation is rather theoretical based on the assumptions that governments 
have their limits of control, weaknesses and some degree of freedom. The two writers 
argue that the successes of local organizations in different parts of the world and under 
varying difficult conditions reflect that it is possible to utilize any feasible opportunities 
to struggle for improvement in any productive or human aspect o f rural population.
31 Luxemburg, R. Leninism or Marxism. 1904, p.4. Available at: httm://www.marxists. 
org. Accessed 11 Feb. 2008.
32 Ibid, 1984.
33 Ibid, 1984.
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[v] Participation as an approach and strategy should not only be seen as 'effective 
struggle' and free exercise but also peace building making and constructive conflict 
resolution. Participation is a principal social value that respects people’s talent and 
dignity and not something that one person does for another. People must do it for 
themselves or it does not happen. This is to say that the progress of a country relies on its 
relations to the people. Ultimately, mutual trust and respect must replace fear and 
suspicion. It has been observed that disadvantaged groups and individuals such as small 
farmers or displaced persons no longer sit passively at the outskirts of meetings, but 
participate actively and confidently.
Both the structural reformist approach as a multi-channel development framework and 
the participation approach as a key core of capacity building for various development 
stakeholders are relevant typologies to the research interest in the strengthening of 
capacity development and in the triangular relationship of CBOs, NGOs and the state. 
The concept of empowerment of communities through participation and the commitment 
of diverse social forces to improving living standard is crucial for the development of 
social capital, as an important element for nation-building that will be addressed in the 
subsequent chapter.
The concept of local institutional development has been originated in the early 1980s by 
international donor agencies such as USAID and the World Bank. The USAID policy 
paper34 on institutional development emphasized the importance of effective private and 
public institutions that provide a country with the self-sustaining capacity to critical 
development problems. The paper critically continues to address the development of 
institutional learning capacity and emphasizes that “institutions must have the ability to 
leam from and adapt to the environment in which they work”.35 The emphasis here is on
34 USAID. Policy Paper on Institutional Development 1983. Available at: 
www.usaid.gov/policv/ads/200/instdev/. Accessed: 9 Feb. 2008.
35 Policy Paper on Institutional Development. 1983. Available at: www.usaid.gov/policv/ads/200/instdev/. 
Accessed: 9 Feb. 2008.
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the organizational theory that has long recognized that the nature of an organization’s 
environment profoundly affects its structure.
The public aspect of the local institutional framework consists of; local administration as 
local government departments and staff of central ministries, and local government 
representing the district council or native administrations that have authority and 
accountable to local residents. This is essential in that they have the legitimacy and the 
resources.
The overall local institutional framework is strengthened when all social forces promote a 
system of organizations mediating between the local level and higher economic, 
administrative and political levels. Such institutions can build the capacity of the 
channels and forces involved and can be more promising than establishing any particular 
single effort.
The local institutional development, with its limited devolution of planning 
responsibilities to local government institutions, is a top-down approach which may 
undermine the local institutional capacity such as local integrity, values of civic culture, 
norms, transparency and accountability. This approach, however, overcomes the 
dominant conception and blueprinted manner, and if it stimulates the bottom-up levels 
aiming at strengthening local capacities and sharing the burden of local institutional 
development, it can be an effective forum and best solution to development problems.
Against this background of literature disabilities, Esman and Uphoff highlighted several 
key issues of local organizations and local institutional development in mid 1980s along 
with Alan Fowler, David Hulme and Michael Edwards in 1990s.. It will be reviewed in 
the following section with particular reference to some issues related to the research.
1.3.3 Definitions, Roles and Concepts
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The terms local organizations [LOs], community-based organizations [CBOs], 
intermediary organizations, non-governmental organizations [NGOs], and the concept of 
local institutional development [LID], reflect a huge diversity of organizations and 
institutions.
Local Organizations are defined by Esman and Uphoff as organizations accountable to 
their membership and involved in development activities. Examples of such 
organizations are cooperatives, farmers associations, health and water committees, and 
ethnic unions. A similar definition can be applied to community-based organizations 
and grassroots organizations. The term local organizations introduced here have a wider 
usage and seem appropriate for different purposes.
Local institutions, as introduced in Esman and Uphoff37 and Uphoff38 range from public, 
local administration and local government, to private sector, with an intermediate sector 
of a broad category of LOs cover the middle range of membership organizations, 
cooperatives, and service organizations. Membership organizations can be classified as 
follows: Local self-help associations whose members may seek to handle:
[i] Multiple tasks, e.g. local development associations or village development 
committees,
[ii] Specific tasks, e.g. water and health committees,
[iii] needs of members who have common interests and particular characteristics. E.g. 
mother clubs, tribal associations or tenant unions.
36 Esman and Uphoff. Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development. 1984. Cornel: Cornel 
University Press.
37 Ibid, 1984.
38 Uphoff. Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Sourcebook 
with Cases. 1986. USA: Kumarian Press.
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While organization and capacity building approaches can be traced back to the 1980s as 
NGOs grew in number and influence, approaches such as partnerships and coalitions, and 
support for CSOs have emerged in the 1990s.
Alan Fowler with Piers Campbell & Brian Pratt suggested that institutions are set of 
norms, behaviors and values that persist over time serving collectively shared purposes. 
These rules, norms and values influence people's lives. Organizations are collections of 
individuals who fulfill roles in order to achieve common goals. They can become 
institutionalized as they acquire social value and stability.
Fowler insisted that there is no commonly accepted definition of NGOs. He defines 
NGOs “as third- party, serving non-profit-based, legally constituted non-state 
organizations, directly or indirectly reliant on the system of international aid. In most 
cases they function as intermediaries to promote sustainable development, social justice 
and enduring improvement in the circumstances of poor and excluded groups”40.
Other broad definitions, rather loose and too narrow, describe different terms such as 
rural, peoples, community and participatory organizations. Other terms such as non­
governmental organizations [NGOs] describe both Northern NGOs [NNGOs, or 
International NGOs [INGOs], and Southern NGOs [SNGOs], which are also local NGOs 
[LNGOs]. LNGOs can be intermediary who support community work directly or support 
LOs by providing funding, training, or technical assistance or through network, lobbing 
and advocacy.
Fowler located NGOs between other actors in society: state, market and civil society. He 
described their behavior as follows:” l) resembles the state in terms of pursuing public 
agendas; 2) is associated with markets in terms of surplus generation and self-financing;
39Fowler, A., Campbell, P. & Pratt, B.. Institutional Development & NGOs in Africa’, UK: Intrac. 1992
40 Beyond Aid: NGDO Values and the Fourth Position. In: Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler, ed. The 
Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. 2002.UK and USA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, p.23
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but 3) expresses a civic identity in terms of roots, a values-based and propagating role 
and agenda and the participatory methods they apply”.41
Some crucial aspects of institutional development are described by European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECDPM) includes that: “Institutional development is 
a complex, messy, risky and experimental area, with tangible results emerging only over 
a long period of time.... Development agencies will have to rectify some of their ‘old 
habits’. If they do not, they may quickly lose their capacity to generate genuine value, 
based on adaptability and responsiveness” 42
This lead us to the important question to what extent donors are ready to support or even 
accelerate institutional development processes, without undermining their local integrity, 
local ownership and the responsibility of the stakeholder involved? As a long term 
process, it is client-driven, concern itself primarily with results on the ground. It is above 
all an exercise in social transformation and therefore needs systemic support. This means 
taking account of the political, economic and cultural factors that may affect institutional 
performance.
Michael Edwards and Gita Sen directed our attention to equally important ingredient to 
sustainable changes, the personal change. This missing ingredient according to Edwards 
“cannot be forced by self-righteous; when hearts and minds are brutalized into 
submission or silence there will be little energy left for social engagement”. 43 This is an 
accurate description for those alienated and marginalized to encounter authoritative and 
undemocratic system and oppressive regime, which is the case of many developing 
countries, particularly in the Middle East. In his contribution to what can NGOs do to 
foster personal change, Edwards debates the lack of integration of values into the practice 
of NGOs, and wonders whether NGOs are aware of their core values. Edwards writes:
41 Ibid, 2002:20.
42 Institutional Development Tools. ECDPM 2004:6-7. Available at: 
http://portals.wi.wur.ul/files/docs/msp/institutional dev tools ECDPM.pdf
43 NGOs, Social Change and the Transformation o f Human Relationships: A 21st-century Civic Agenda. In: 
Edwards Michael & Fowler Alan ed. The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. London, Sterling, VA: 
Earthscan Publications, 2002, p.43.
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“In other words, to show that it is possible to be an effective organization which values 
its employees as it does its partners, fights discrimination, practices internal democracy 
and always uses the organizational power it has in liberating ways”. 44
According to International Federation of Agricultural Development a farmer organization 
(FO) requires an effective management, negotiating and financing capacity in which the 
major source of revenue is obtained from its constituency. A self-supporting FO 
requires:45
- A clear definition of organizational goals and objectives ;
- A participatory decision-making process ;
- A self-management capacity ;
A process of accountability of the leaders to their constituency ;
- Clear lines of responsibility;
- Financial Transparency;
- Outside recognition and legitimacy.
These requirements reflect that IFAD projects aim to “improve the institutional 
framework that enables the development of the poor by using instruments 
[empowerment of grass-roots organizations and strengthening of locally-based 
institutions] which ensure that their interests and concerns are adequately heeded and 
reflected” 46 The challenging question for IFAD is to what extent its distinct mission 
and focus on grass-roots intervention complements or contrasts the work of the 
World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions which have focused on macro 
level and therefore have tended to support a top-down approach?
OXFAM Great Britain47, an international development organization suggests the 
following criteria for an effective local organization: a) Internal cohesion and solidarity: 
critical consciousness, active and critical participation, democratization of power and
44 Ibid, 2002: 47.
45 Resource Paper Role o f Government Institutions. Available at: www.fao.org/docrep/fao/006. Accessed 
February 3. 2007.
46 De Sand, Klemens van. Promoting Good Governance: IFAD’s Decentralized Approach .2000. Available 
at: www.un.org
47 OXFAM (GB) 1999. www.oxfamgb.org. Accessed 19 January 1999.
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collective responsibility, and self-management capability, b) Reduced dependence. 
Increased self-confidence and self- esteem; c) Linkages with other local organizations, 
and d) Ability to deal with government.
The key challenge expressed by OXFAM48 during a workshop held in Uganda on 
Capacity Building for Empowerment is to link the building of social capital at the local 
level with a process at national level [creation of and support to a variety o f national-level 
representative structures]. The joint efforts of both local and the national levels are 
necessary for policy influence and advocacy on poor rights and therefore reducing 
poverty.
OXFAM in Great Britain compared to IFAD for instance has achieved its success by 
creating innovative roles in policy debates internationally. Especially in issues such as 
international trade, its impact on poor segment, reforms, conditionality, and gender 
equality. OXFAM is one of powerful Northern NGOs that has “become institutionalized 
in the sense that they are a recognized and valued part o f society”49. OXFAM is also 
known of being helpful to Southern NGOs to develop their own advocacy work.
In spelling the role of NGOs as intermediaries, the World Bank50 states that: “....they can 
create links both upward and downward in society and voice local concerns....In doing 
this they can bring a broader spectrum of ideas and values to bear on policy making. 
They can also exert pressure on public officials for better performance and greater 
accountability” . The experience in The Third World has challenged these declarations of 
the Bank and queries like the extent the Bank's development practice have become 
bottom-up and whether local people have been empowered. The harsh winds of
48 OXFAM (GB). Report o f a Workshop on Capacity Building for Empowerment. Jinja, Uganda, 6-8 
March 2005. Oxford: Oxfam Publications.2005.
49 Michael, S. Undermining Development: The Absence of Power among
Local NGO in Africa. Oxford: James Currey, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2004, pp.23-24.
50 Fowler, A. Non-Governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization: An African Perspective, 
International Development Journal, Vol. 5, No.3. 1993, pp. 325-339.
23
alternative development approaches have clearly hit civil society organizations head on 
over the past two decades. Some international development organizations such as 
NOVIB, OXFAM has aligned with national organizations in developing countries to play 
a constructive role to achieve the following objectives:
- Building consensus for economic reforms and encouraging positive alignments within 
civil society and push for longer term development,
- Promoting institutional transparency and accountability, combating corruption and 
broadening the base on decision making,
- Combating inequality and exclusion, promoting and protecting human rights, and 
influencing the quality and distribution of economic growth.
- Delivering social and economic services using alternative values and methods.
- Improving natural resource management and environmental protection.
- Building constituencies for poverty reduction, sustainable development, and 
international co-operation.
World Neighbor51 defines capacity building as a self-managed process of organizational 
change by which leaders and members learn to identify critical problems and diagnose 
and strengthen their organizational abilities in order to take collective action to solve 
them. The end result is that people develop more effective, and legitimate forms of local 
organization that succeed in creating long-term solutions to meet local needs.
During its intervention in West Africa, World Neighbor organization develops essential 
qualities for effective NGO’s capacity to negotiate their interest with external agencies; to 
effectively mobilize and manage local resources; for broad-based leadership with 
mobilizing vision, spirit of initiative, ability to conceptualize, animate, and raise 
awareness. For organizations required to undertake ongoing community development 
activities such as farmer-to-farmer extension, identifying new technologies; for effective 
management of community self-development programme: problem diagnosis, needs 
assessment, planning, setting objectives, establishing indicators, budgeting, monitoring 
and evaluation, and reporting; for inter-village linkage, communication and collaboration
51 World Neighbour 2007. http ://www.wn.org. Accessed 10 February 2007.
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with other FO for cross learning and coordination of efforts to address common 
problems; and for democratic, transparent and representative decision-making.
Hussain Adam52 differentiates between three types of SNGO:
1. SNGOs founded on the basis of indigenous roots and knowledge. Adam describes 
them 'seize the past to gain the future' type.
2. SNGOs fight injustice, inequalities within own constituencies and outside and 
stress self-reliance. He calls them 'back to the source' type.
3. SNGOs that provide and improve services and resources which are lacking. These 
are 'transmission belts' type.
Ernesto D. Garilao53 understands that NGOs have followed a fairly well-documented 
pattern of organizational development, passing through three stages of growth’. The first 
stage is the formation and development stage wherein groups of individuals identify 
common needs and problems and organize themselves to respond collectively to these 
problems. The second stage is the consolidation stage. At this point, the NGO 
consolidates its gains. Leaders emerge and form a core whose decisions and positions are 
respected by members. It is at this stage that the NGO is able to develop an expertise, 
whether this is a service or a product which can be utilized in favor of its beneficiaries. 
Any NGO remain at this stage, and if they eventually become inactive, it is due to the 
leadership's inability to maintain membership interest in pursuing the organization's 
objectives or the inability to meet the changes in the environment in which they work. 
Some NGOs, however, move onto a third stage -  institutionalization. Here it can be said 
that the NGO has all the requisites needed for its survival as a long-term organization. 
Not only does it carry out its programs and projects well but these have a certain strategic 
impact in its geographic locality.
52 Adam, H. In Fowler, A. and James, R. The Role o f Southern NGOs in Development Cooperation. Intrac 
Occasional Papers Series, No. 2. UK: Intrac. 1994.
53Garilado, E. Indigenous NGOs as strategic Institutions: Managing with Government and Relationship 
Resource Agencies’, World Development, Vol.15, Supplement, 1987, pp.113-120.
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The organizational effectiveness requires consistency between the organization’s mission 
and vision and the actual tasks, behavior and practices. In other words the consistency 
between what it says it wants to become and what it does. According to Alan Fowler54 
there are three essential stages necessary for the organizational effectiveness and the 
consistency of the vision and action process:
- the coherence between vision, mission, identity and role; 
long-term strategic thinking, direction and expected results;
- moving from vision to tangible actions carried out by different stakeholders.
There are many lessons learned from the strategic planning sessions that some NGOs 
repeatedly respond to their priorities based on those of the donor agencies. Such exercise 
of strategic planning creates more dependency and does not allow such organizations to 
look for self-financial options and therefore be less dependent.
The whole process of the social changes must be participatory, involving all those 
affected through consultation and dialogue, relevant for those benefiting and sustainable.
Alan Fowler with Piers Campbell & Brian Pratt55 emphasizes the significance of 
institutional development for community-based organizations and NGOs that advocate 
for social change. They also see the need for interactions between the NGO community 
and other development actors such as the state, official aid agencies and commercial 
enterprise. Institutional development will therefore aim at bringing change by:
1. Building the foundations of voluntary sector. The issues here revolve around the 
number and diversity of nongovernmental organizations - as service provider, as 
community groups, as people's movements, etc., - furthering the role they play in socio­
economic development; ensuring greater accountability and responsibility; enhancing 
NGO ability to withstand external pressures, and so on.
54Fowler, A. Organizing Non-profits for Development. In Michael Edwards & Alan Fowler ed. The 
Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. UK and USA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002, pp. 74-85.
5SFowler, A., Campbell, P. & Pratt, B. Institutional Development & NGOs in Africa. UK: Intrac. 1992, p. 16
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2. Enhancing collaboration and cooperation. Supporting NGO networks, associations, 
Councils and other instruments to make NGOs a more cohesive force in national, 
regional and international development; stimulating and institutionalizing NGO-based 
analysis of developing countries’ problems and articulation of NGO perspectives on how 
they can be tackled.
3. Altering relations with the state, modifying NGO-state relations to give the sector 
greater autonomy of action;
4. Creating a more favorable policy environment for NGO work;
5. Limiting potentially negative impacts of official aid and gaining greater involvement 
of NGOs in national and local policy development.
Fowler mainstreams right-based approach into the goals and the tasks of NGOs, and that 
duty bearers are in compliance with human rights entitlements and developed risk 
mitigation strategy to reduce or redistribute it to those more capable ones. Based on these 
goals and tasks, Fowler56 suggested the following four roles:
-“re-negotiators and trusted mediators between actors and sectors;
- trusted validators of a duty bearer’s compliance with rights;
- respected watchdogs of behavior of duty bearers and of claimants, including 
themselves;
- acknowledged innovators in the public interest with a constant eye on adoption by 
bigger and more powerful actors and on enhancing the capacity of claimants”.
Opinions differ widely among NGO activists as to the practicality and acceptance of the
57rights-based approaches by the duty bearer and the claimant. Irene Guijt argues that: 
“Much of what is deemed to fit within a rights-based logic is considered ‘political’ and 
tackling structural causes of poverty, while the rest is considered ‘old style’ service 
delivery development that alleviates the symptoms of poverty”. Governments, in many
56 Fowler A. Beyond Aid: NGDO Values and the Fourth Position. In Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler, 
ed. The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. UK and USA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002, pp. 13-26
57 Guijt, I., Civil Society Participation as the Focus o f Northern NGO Support: The Case o f Dutch Co 
financing Agencies. In: Bebbington, A. J., Hickey, S., Mitlin, D.C. (eds) Can NGOs Make a Difference? 
TheChallenge o f Development Alternatives. London & New York: Zed Books. 2008, pp. 153-174.
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third world countries, are skeptical of the approach, arguing that, it is influenced by 
western countries and it has a political cause. Some activists argue the usefulness of an 
imposed approach and suggest the participation of all actors in the design and 
implementation of the approach. Perhaps the most effective way for NGOs and donor 
agencies to capture their own space in development is through dialogue, and discussions 
with partners on issues related to local knowledge and culture and how that affect or 
being affected by rights-based approach. A vivid debate was initiated by CIDA for 
instance, in Egypt in 2005 on the relevance of rights based approach, including the views 
of government, CBOs and NGOs. Unfortunately, the debates have not continued and the 
outcomes of the approach have not been known. Such debates on culturally sensitive 
issue require an outdoor approach where the debates expand to reach those who have an 
in-depth local knowledge and those who critically contribute to its development. Since 
that there are attempts by some donors like CIDA, for instance, to incorporate rights 
based approach into capacity building processes, they should widen the range of dialogue 
and support that they offer to local partners and they must also begin to accept mutual 
responsibility for their performance and impact on their success.58
In response to the division of labor between the various actors and the accusations and 
critique made by some donor agencies that some programs funded activities run by grass­
roots organizations which play a role of substitute for weak state. Alan Fowler59 
described the roles of NGOs as: “social entrepreneurs and civic innovators, rather than 
users and distributors of subsidy”. This will lead us to the question of accountability; how 
possible that NGOs can be publicly accountable, while depending on specific funding 
resources? And if diversification of resources can solve partially the problem for 
international NGOs, what will happen to local NGOs where resources are very limited?
58Fowler A. NGO Future -  Beyond Aid: NGDO Values and the Fourth Position, in Alan Fowler (ed), Third 
World Quarterly, Special Issue, Vol 21, No 4. August Carfax Publishing. 2000, pp.589-603,
59 Fowler A. Beyond Aid: NGDO Values and the Fourth Position. In Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler, 
ed. The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. UK and USA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002, pp.13-26
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A worrying element is that the local institutional development approach seems to 
romanticize the relationship between the state and society, assuming that governments in 
developing countries are democratic, open-minded and willing to cooperate with local 
organizations at grassroots level. In theory donor agencies can suggest balanced 
assistance that encourages structural adjustments in economic, administrative and 
political higher levels and changes in behavior of officials to overcome resistance, 
subordination and excessive control invariably practiced by governments.
Another factor is the relationship between donor agencies and local organizations in the 
sense that donor agencies should not compromise the local institutional integrity and 
capacity by avoiding dependency which is essential for local spirit, for mobilization and 
management of available resources and for the development of local institutions as well.
One of the unresolved issues is whether or not the concept of assisted self-reliance 
contradicts with the local institutional development strategy of independence of 
individuals and self-determination. This will need a close look and possibly joint efforts 
rather than just promoting blue-print in pencil.
Virtually all external agencies now recognize the limits of donor-driven forms of 
cooperation and are reformulating their cooperation policies accordingly. Greater 
emphasis is being placed on principles such as ownership, participation, decentralization, 
process approaches and budgetary support. However, still there is a gap between the 
language of the new development agenda and the control-oriented style of operation 
displayed by many donor agencies.
Emphasis on and commitment to values such as empowerment, participation, gender 
equality, diversity are also considered by researchers and practitioners as indicators of 
progress or retardation, the extent of common understanding and ideology among the 
team of the NGOs. Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler sent their cautions by saying: “But 
these innovations must be organized and managed with great care lest they overly impede
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decision-making-creating participation paralysis -  and introducing tensions that impede 
responsiveness, flexibility and impact”.60
1.3.4 Participation as a Means and Goal in Capacity Building Processes
The most prominent concept that has emerged from the debate on capacity development 
is community participation. Considerable evidence shows that development efforts from 
outside or above forced on communities without their participation are often not 
successful and are doomed to failure. The top-down approach must be matched by a 
bottom-up process of consultation, dialogue and negotiation with other stakeholders 
involved.61 In Sudan, the grass-roots approach, which recognizes the political, social and 
cultural contexts and differences and uses potential powerful local institutional 
development actors, including local councils, community-based organizations, traditional 
structures, and private sectors is relevant. The local institutional conceptual model 
embodies the people’s knowledge, the extent to which they exercise their civic rights and 
the level of participation of civil institutions.
On the other hand, the effective functioning of civic institutions will depend on the 
degree of state intervention, which in turn will depend on the nature of the powers 
devolved to local units.
Andreas Auprich writes: "The means to enhance participation fall under strategies for 
capacity building among and empowerment of the people. Capacity building is generally 
understood as a process by which individuals, groups, organizations etc. develop their
60 Edwards, M. and Fowler A. Introduction: Changing Challenges for NGDO Management. In: Michael 
Edwards & Alan Fowler ed.: NGO Management. London, Sterling,VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002,
pp. 1-10.
61 Organizing Non-profits for Development. In Michael Edwards & Alan Fowler ed. The Earthscan Reader 
on NGO Management. UK and USA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002, pp. 74-85.
62 Auprich, A. A legal Framework: NGOS and Human Right to Development. In: Hollands Glenn and 
Ansell Gwen, eds. Winds o f Small Change: Civil Society Interaction with the African State. Proceedings o f  
multilateral workshops on good governance, sustainable development anddemocracy. Graz, Austria 1995 -  
Kampala. Afesis-Corplan. 1998, p.67.
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abilities to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives. Empowerment 
suggests the expansion of peoples’ capacities and choices but implies more specifically 
the strengthening of the ability of the people to participate in decision-making about 
national democratic development and to exert demands on the state and its servants". The 
devolution of powers to grass-roots institutions directly influences both the level and 
nature of community participation as a major proximate factor with a direct impact on 
people-centered and sustainable development.
Majid Rahnema identified six reasons for the interest of governments and development 
institutions in the concept of participation:
1. The processes of economizations of people's lives, coupled with the gradual 
disintegration of vernacular spaces seem to have reached a point where governments and 
development institutions are no longer scared by the outcome of people's participation. At 
that level, a good number of people are manipulated into supporting those in power, 
hoping that the promised increase in the size of the national cake will ultimately also 
increase their share.
2. Participation has become a politically attractive slogan.
The peacefully negotiated forms of participation can take the heat out of many situations 
where development policies create tension and resistance on the part of their victims. The 
core institutional development problem is the unresponsiveness o f many institutions to 
the needs of the poor. Improving this is a long-term process, requiring the empowerment 
of the poor, open communication between all actors and better organizational 
performance. In this process, institutional development is much more successful when 
institutions are challenged from the outside by citizens than when projects often carried 
out by foreigners try changing them from the inside.
3. Participation has become, economically, an appealing proposition. In a situation where 
developing countries have to adjust their economies, nothing can accommodate them 
more than passing on the cost to their poor - who is done in the name of participation and 
its corollary, self-help. The possibility of earning additional income is often the best
63 Rahnema, M. Participation in Resource Centre, Chapter: In W. Sachs 
(ed.). Dictionary of Development. UK, 1992.
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incentive for people to challenge ineffective institutions, as this puts economic issues on 
the agenda as well.
4. Participation is now perceived as an instrument for greater effectiveness as well as a 
new source of investment. Participatory process bring to development projects what they 
need most in order to avoid the pitfalls and failures of the past, that is: (a) a close 
knowledge of the field reality which foreign technicians and government bureaucrats do 
not have; (b) networks of relations, essential both to the success of ongoing projects and 
long- term investments in rural areas; and (c) the co-operation, on the local scene, of 
organizations able to carry out developmental activities.
5. Participation is becoming a good fund-raising device:
According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) report, already in 1983, no 
less than $3.6 billion in NGO support was granted by European countries, a sum almost 
three times larger than the total funds allocated to developing countries through UNDP. 
The other side of the coin, however, showed the consequence of official adoption of 
NGOs, noted by Alan Fowler, while he was trying to contribute to his own question: 
Why beyond aid? Fowler64 wrote: “Meanwhile, a recent conference examined how 
official adoption of NGDO-promoted “participation” was evolving into a homogenizing 
“tyranny” around demands for the use of specific tools and techniques, irrespective on the 
Gods’ own competences and context”.
6. An expanded concept of participation could help the private sector to be directly 
involved in the development business. An interesting update on the involvement of 
private sector in development is observed by Michael Edwards: “...aid delivery and 
management are being penetrated increasingly by commercial private -sector companies 
and specialist non-profit consultancies which have the skills and critical mass to put 
together winning bids in competitive tendering”.65 While most participatory approaches 
may be poorly used in development at the moment are participation as means, it is
64 Fowler A. Beyond Aid: NGDO Values and the Fourth Position. In Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler, 
ed. The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. UK and USA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002, pp. 13-26
65Edwards. M. International Development NGOs:Agents of Foreign Aid or Vehicles for International 
Cooperation. In: Michael Edwards & Alan Fowler, ed.: NGO Management. London, Sterling,VA:
Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002, pp.27-37.
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important that development practitioners involved in participatory projects work with an 
eye to the future to create participation as an end, a long-lasting process which noted to 
be an active and dynamic form of participation.
Experience has shown that the efficacy of participation is mainly due to the presence of 
organized groups and that local organizations are crucial factors in development efforts. 
Organizations are therefore a strategic resource for effective management. Wherever 
possible, existing organizational capacity should be built upon. Failure to identify 
informal structure or indigenous groups leads to costly intervention, unnecessary risks of 
imported structures, and potential failure.66 Examples from the Third World demonstrates 
that organizations require continued purposes which the members value; those created by 
projects only to provide cash and labor inputs will not continue to exist once the 
additional resources of the project have dried up.
The roles and strategies described will probably see local institutional development as 
framework and strategy through the next development generation or so. The investment 
has got to be in strengthening civil society to seize social and decision-making roles in 
the administration in development planning. The growing emphasis on NGO and civil 
society performance and role must include the challenges of making them more efficient 
and effective. We consider these challenges next.
1.3.5 Challenges Encountering CSOs/NGOs
CSOs will grow in number and will also face a range of challenges pertaining to 
legitimacy, operational efficiency and accountability. In meeting these challenges the 
following discussion offers some suggestions for civil society organizations to ensure that 
they remain participatory, democratic and transparent. First, CSOs must maintain their 
identity and independence by changing the structures of governance for greater
66 Rasmussen, Lise Nordvig and Meinzen-Dick, Ruth. Local Organizations for Natural Resource 
Management: Lessons from theoretical and empirical literature. EPTD Discussion papers 11 .International 
Food Policy Research Institute. 1955.
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participation and democratization. Second, CSOs should advocate for good governance 
by pluralizing and strengthening grass root organizations. Third, CSOs must advocate for 
the rights of the poor by mitigating the negative impact of the macroeconomic policies on 
marginalized and vulnerable groups. Fourth, CSOs must be financially transparent by 
sharing information on financial sources and establishing systems and policies. Finally, 
one of the key elements that contribute to effective relationship between CSOs, 
government and private sector is the level of trust, knowledge and commitment shared 
between these social forces.
* 67Blair however describes how civil society organizations can influence democratization 
process: “... concern has grown that too much interest group influence on the state over 
too long a period may well lead to immobilism and a hardening of the democratic arteries 
or gridlock rather than to a rich and vibrant democratic polity. A debilitated state 
continuously pummeled by conflicting special interest groups may well then become too 
feeble to act in the interest of the citizenry as a whole”. Blair68 adds that: “....any real 
sense of the larger public good may be effectively suffocated in the rush of interest 
groups to appropriate societal goods for themselves. Civil society, then, is not an 
unmitigated blessing, and it may have deleterious as well as beneficial effects on 
democracy”.
In addition development practitioners have identified a specific risk related to the 
sustainability. The lack of sustainable funding to support civil society initiatives and 
networks, combined with the tendency of NGO/CSOs to operate in isolation creates a 
competitive environment that also threatens the sustainability of the program efforts. This 
can be managed largely through the networking component, stressing collaborative 
approaches and collective actions, as well as efforts to build capacities for dialogue and 
negotiation with the state, as one of the main partners in development processes.
67 Blair, H. Donors, democratization and civil society, in D. Hulme and M.Edwards, NGOs States and 
Donors: Too close for comfort? London: Macmillian Press. 1997, pp. 23-42.
68 Ibid, 1997, p.30.
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1.4 State
Many roads in development lead to the question of the state. The motivation of interest 
rose from the complex of the development issues, and theories of state and models. 
However the most challenging issue is the relationship between the state and other 
institutional development channels.
Pluralism is one of these theories which recognize the existence of diversity in social, 
institutional and ideological practices. Avoiding arbitrary interference by government 
with individuals' natural rights, pluralism advocates the separation of powers and 
federalism. The inclusion of heterogeneous social forces and territorial areas was crucial 
for any diverse political system. Pluralists started with an attack on state monism and 
debated the role of institutional and social checks and balances as preventive 
mechanisms. They agreed that group’s conflicts are unavoidable in any complex society 
and they understood the consequences of self-interested society and the absence of 
traditional social ties in the society. This particular awareness differentiates pluralism 
from individualism that used public choice theory to espouse new-right values. The most 
key feature of Pluralism was its value of group and institutional autonomy and diversity. 
The following pages illustrate that states must foster pluralism if they are to successfully 
promote development.
Pluralism was successful because it seemed qualified to respond to central issues of 
political science, like the question formulated by Harold Lasswell69 “who gets what, 
when and how?” Robert Dahl70 illustrated in his classic study of urban politics in New 
Haven, Who Governs? He explored the oligarchy-the rule of the few, the elite theory 
view and polyarchy-the rule of the many, the pluralist view. Political power therefore is 
in the hands of many in a polyarchy, and in the hands of few in an oligarchy and it is 
equally distributed in a democracy. Pluralism believes that individuals' interests are
69 Dunleavy, P. & O’leary, B. Theories o f the state: The politics o f Liberal 
Democracy. London: Macmillian. 1987, p.35.
70 Ibid, 1987, p.39.
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usually reflected in the policies and the individuals’ behavior that reveals their policy 
preference.
The positions on representative institutions are complex and valid in different political 
situations. Pluralism insists on the importance of multiple channels, for example interest 
groups, generation of information, and legislature, through which citizens can control 
their political leaders and change the development of public opinions. The interest group 
process is central to pluralist. The three factors felt by pluralism as legitimate democratic 
criteria to assess an interest group-its membership size, rate of mobilization and the 
intensity of members' preferences. In other words groups build up their size, mobilize 
their members and motivate them to express strong feelings.
As mentioned earlier that there are many roads leading to the state as central development 
issue. Pluralism, historically has been a theory of society addressing question such as 
who has power? Rather than what is the state? They do admit the existence of state 
organizations and the concept of the state. State regarded literally as a person of no 
importance, a passive vehicle and it mirrors or responds to the balance of pressure group 
forces in civil society. Latham71 described the state as 'cash register'. In cipher model 
state means set of organizations which are colonized by the strongest pressure groups in 
their domains. The second image is the neutrality of the state which described the state as 
mediator, balancer and harmonizer of interests. The third broker state model interprets 
public policy as the aggregate of pressure group activities going on inside the state 
apparatus.
It is true that in many developing countries, the state is too weak and already collapsed 
and doing little or nothing of significance for the middle and lower income groups. It 
would be naive to suppose that these groups are waiting for their disappointing states to 
improve, in fact and indeed they search for new alternatives and mechanisms of service 
delivery. In the agricultural sector, for example, the policy changes and public sector 
reforms introduced by donor agencies and states have not always stimulated attention to
71 Ibid, 1987, p.43
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alternative local institutional developments. And the public sector has simply been felt to 
get weaker and weaker by itself, without any attempt to involve other organizations or 
social forces.
The state officials play an intermediary and middleman role by facilitating the acceptance 
of policies amongst key groups. Policy-making is considered a well developed research 
area by pluralists. This is clear in the contribution of Hirschman’s theory of unbalanced 
growth and Charles Lindblom’s theory of incremental ism and muddling through.
77According to Ellerman David that “The Hirschmanian unbalanced growth approach to 
institutional change is an alternative to the planning approaches that try to ‘do everything 
at once’ for fear that piecemeal attempts will fail (as they undoubtedly might)”. In other 
words the emphasis is on the dynamics of the development process in the small. 
Lindblom argues, as explained by Ellerman73 that “ ...in most commonly occurring policy 
environments, sequential decisions are better made in this manner. When exploring a 
largely unknown environment, it is better to take small steps in the neighborhood of what 
is known than to take bold leaps into the unknown”. The general theory is that 
comprehensive rational decision-making, assessing all available options and choosing the 
best is impossible. Pluralism developed behavioral approach of decision making by 
avoiding the heroic assumptions of rationality and that only incremental changes will 
occur. Pluralism recognizes the complications of a collective decision on behalf of a 
group or a society cannot be made in any single best form. The other dimension is that 
because decision making is outcome of a group bargaining process, it is frequently 
disjointed.
In fact the form of the impact of policy changes has often been determined by the 
answers to a series of queries that these changes are suggesting. In this context John
72 Ellerman, D., 2001. Hirschmanian Themes o f Social Learning and Change. Policy Research Working 
Paper. Working Paper Series 2591. 2001, pp. 9-12. Available on: www.wds.worldbank.org/extemal. 
Accessed 9 February 2008.
73 Ibid, 2001, p. 11
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Farrington74 writes about functions to be carried over by public sector; responsibilities 
that to be passed over to the private sector; who does what; the role of private sector, 
NGO and CBOs; what the value added for those agents to do these functions incentive, if 
any, will those private agents need to encourage them to assume these new roles; and 
finally how might a reduced public sector best interact with these private agents?
Pluralism as well believes that all groups especially those who are less heard, can find a 
political leader to ensure their participation in the process. Despite the pluralist optimism 
about “Who has power in a polyarchy?”75 and the ruling of majority, they have always 
doubts about the pattern of social cleavages. A single social cleavage means insufficient 
social pluralism. Pluralism, however, does not regard the multiple cleavages in society as 
detrimental for state stability. Ross76 described it as follows: “A society.... ridden by a 
dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of 
being tom with violence or falling to split just along one line. Each new cleavage narrows 
the cross clefts, so that one might say that society is sewn together by its inner conflicts”.
There are some intellectuals who see the state as the public power, the ultimate source of 
ethical authority, a mechanism for realizing the common good and public interest. Ian 
Loader77 describes the role of the states: “We must recognize that states have indeed 
historically been involved as ordering devices, as sources of the rules, resources and 
administrative capacity necessary to the production of collective security. We must 
acknowledge that through the development of a sense of belonging, dignity and 
authenticity in the form of national identity, they have also been engaged in crafting 
social identities which provide the motivational force both for providing and maintaining 
the ordering infrastructure and for nurturing a social environment in which civility is
74Farrington, J., ed. Reluctant Partner? London and New York: Routledge.1993.
75 Dunleavy, P. & O’leary, B. Theories o f the state: The politics o f Liberal Democracy. London: 
Macmillian. 1987, p.42
76 Ibid, 60
77 Loader, I.. Necessary Virtues: The Legitimate Place of the State in the Production of Security. A 
Research Project funded by the Sixth Framework Research Programme o f DG Research (European 
Commission). 2005. Available at: www.libertvsecuiritv.org . Accessed 14 July 2008.
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relatively high, security risks are relatively low, and thus the ordering infrastructure is 
reasonably sufficient for its task”.
In practical political terms there are different ideological perspectives on state 
intervention. It is necessary to point out some development principles and values within
7ftthe social, political and cultural context of a developing country like Sudan : a) Equal 
treatment under the law; b) A compulsory educational system; c) Elimination of all forms 
of discrimination and prejudice; d) Gender equality; e) Equality between people 
regardless of their ethnic or religious background; f) Economic and social sustainable 
development; and g) Freedom of expression, organization and information. Increasingly, 
people in Sudan are expecting to see the translation of these values and principles in their 
life, particularly after the signing of CPA in 2005. The dream however has not come true 
and the CPA is facing huge challenges that can only be resolved by meticulous political 
will.
Anisur Rahman79 shared views on the role of the state: “The machinery of the state is 
constituted by structures which have enormous power over the people; such power 
inevitably invites bids to capture these structures or control them in some way or other to 
provide private interests. This is the central lesson of the present century's experiments 
with social governance through the instrument of nation states which has systematically 
undermined the people's own governing abilities and imposed social orders - e.g. 
capitalist, mixed, socialist which have predominantly served the interests of minorities in 
the society”.
Whatever the disappointments with the role of the state in development and in relation 
with civil society, we argue for the importance of negotiation and dialogue between the
ftOpublic and the civil society sector. Clarke , for example, sets out the case for relating
78 The Interim National Consitution of the Republic o f the Sudan, 2005.
79 Rahman, A.. Towards an Alternative Development Paradigm. Inaugural address at the biannual 
conference o f the Bangla Desh Economic Association. Dhaka, 23 November 1990 .1990, p. 14
80 Clark, J. Democratizing Development: The Role o f Voluntary Organizations. West Hartford: The 
Kumarian Press. 1991.
39
more closely to the state, whether to campaign against it and/or to transform it to 
advocate for reform or to find ways of working together to better the life of the
O l
community. During the same period of 1990s David Korten : “The strengthening of 
civil society to allow the people to mobilize and apply social energy to the improvement 
of their futures, with an accountable government assuming an enabling role, is one of the 
central themes of the people-centered development vision. The people, by right and by 
necessity, must be both the architects and engines of development”. Unfortunately, 
people are not joining hands in the spirit of global citizenship, as Korten hopes and the 
world after 9/11 is not one to define and implement an agenda for social transformation.
In using an ideal-type definition J. S. Migdal describes state as: “...an organization, 
composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership {executive 
authority} that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all 
the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a 
given territory, using force if necessary to have its way”.
The most important factor in strengthening the state and increasing its ability to survive is 
mobilization of the society. This involves channeling people into specialized units, build 
strong security and control system, create mechanisms to reach every village, and collect 
more taxes. Kugler and Domke83 write: “Governments acquire the tools of political 
influence through the mobilization of human and material resources for state action”. S.
QA
Burkey notes that: “Totally autonomous grassroots development, proceeding regardless 
of the wider context, is something of a myth. No serious development practitioner would
81 Korten, D. C. Getting to the 21st century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda. USA: Kumarian 
Press. 1990, p. 157
82 Migdal, J. S.. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society relations and State Capabilities in The 
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University press. 1988,p.l9
83 Kugler, J., Domke, W. Comparing the Strength o f Nations, Comparative 
Political Studies, Vol. 19, N o.l, April 1986, pp. 40.
84 Burkey, S. People First: A Guide to self reliant participatory rural 
development. London and New Jersey:Zed Books. 1993. pp. 211-244
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today dispute that the bottom-up approach is the only one that remains viable: all recent 
evidence points in this direction. But also, it is true that such developments cannot 
simply, on their own account, provide the roads, the transport, communications, or the 
water and fuel essential to their own success; or for that matter, the credit, agricultural 
inputs, marketing, or the basic education and health services. These can for the most part 
only be made available through government programme. Grassroots developments may 
point to the needs, but they cannot hope to meet the mall on their own”. Many of the 
state’s inefficiencies and biases in development policies and in resource allocations are 
fundamentally effects of the weakness and absence of mechanisms through which society 
can hold the state accountable for its actions. Most NGOs “argue that they constitute an 
interest group in society that at the same time provides support to grass-root 
organizations.”85
According to David C. Korten that “Conventional development assistance must bear a 
substantial share of the blame for the increases of poverty, environmental destruction, and 
communal violence experienced by Southern countries This assistance has failed to 
achieve the reforms that reduce or eliminate the economic and political dualism that 
makes a substantial contribution to creating and sustaining these conditions. To the 
contrary, it has all too often served to legitimate and sustain, or even strengthen, these 
dualistic tendencies”86. The international financial institutions, for instance, have been 
severely criticized for the impact of their structural adjustment policies on deteriorating 
services for the poor. Their policies of accumulation of debt and creation of condition of 
debt dependence have led many poor countries to political and social instability. The 
export-led growth and growth-centered vision tend to concentrate economic and political 
power in the hands of multinational companies and elite elements. In reality, it serves the 
interests of those who already hold power and who are thus positioned to capture the
85 Farrington, J., ed.. Reluctant Partner? London and New York: Routledge. 1993, p.l 1
86 Korten, D. C. Getting to the 21st century: Voluntary Action and the Global 
Agenda. USA: Kumarian Press. 1990, p. 59
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benefits of that growth. As David Korten87 notes that,” Unfortunately, this same vision 
now holds us captive to ways of thinking and acting that are increasingly inappropriate 
and self-destructive to the point of threatening to destroy our environment, push ever 
increasing numbers of people into exactly the condition of poverty it promised to 
alleviate, and tear asunder the social fabric of human society”.
On the other hand, the people-centered development vision advocates an equity-led 
strategy88 which clearly distinguishes from the economic growth strategy: “Stage 1: 
[Preparation for Change] seeks simultaneously to: a. Strengthen the forces supporting 
reform by introducing educational and organizational initiatives aimed at increasing the 
political participation of those who will stand to benefit by the more fundamental 
reforms; and, b. Reduce the barriers to reform by: 1) creating an appreciation among 
power holding elites of the economic opportunities that would open for them under an 
equity-led sustainable growth strategy and the increasing violence, environmental 
deterioration and economic stagnation they may expect for themselves and their children 
if they successfully oppose such a strategy; 2) increasing the impartiality of the courts 
and police in enforcing the law; 3) professionalizing the military as disciplined defenders 
of the constitution; and 4) strengthening press freedom to increase accountability and the 
transparency of decision making”. The key element of Stage 1 is people power which is a 
social movement including mass organizations, and civil society groups. This social force 
must be directed toward a peaceful transformation of existing undemocratic institutions 
and toward justice, sustainable and inclusive development.
1.5 State-Civil Societv/NGOs Relations
Traditionally, state-NGO relationships in most developing countries were fraught with 
suspicion, mistrust and conflict. Some countries have developed repressive and hostile 
attitude toward NGOs. Others have created mechanisms to support NGOs. Therefore, the 
question of governance takes centre stage, for it goes right to the heart o f the state-NGO
87 Ibid, 36
88 Ibid, 38.
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relations. One of the definitions of governance is offered by McCamey , as "...this 
relation of civil society to state ...that distinguishes the study of governance from other 
studies of government”. What are the recipes of good governance? Participation, 
consensus building and consultation are considered as a recipe of good governance. Who 
participates? The state has shown no proven commitment to genuinely involving people 
in decisions and actions concerning their development. The government's understanding 
of participation is essential. It understands participation as one of a means to control and 
mobilize local resources for its own interest. Migdal90 notes: "Mobilization involves 
channeling people into specialized organizational frameworks that enable state leaders to 
build stronger armies, collect more taxes (especially important in maintaining those 
armies), and complete any other number of complicated tasks". The mobilization power 
is used by the state as tools for political influence. In reality, the need for a particular 
degree and quality of participation has to be assessed within the social and political 
context of the system. In this respect participatory democracy is necessary to be clearly 
stated in the Constitution to encourage the involvement of communities and civil society 
organizations in development matters.
The strengthening of inter-governmental relations is crucial for governance. It is 
important to extend the principle of governance beyond the relations between state and 
civil society. The involvement of local governments and municipalities as main social 
forces is significant for local institutional development and for participatory democracy. 
The government must support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to self- 
manage their resources and to exercise powers to perform their duties.
It has been observed that some governmental officials are highly interested in voluntary 
work and supporting the efforts of NGOs in an unofficial as well as official capacity. It is
89 McCamey . Civil Society Interaction with the African State, in: Glenn Hollands and Gwen Ansel, ed., 
Winds o f  Small Change,, Proceedings on multilateral workshops on good governance, sustainable 
development anddemocracy, Graz, Austria 1995 -  Kampala, Uganda 1998, p.l 19.
90 Migdal, J. S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society relations and State Capabilities in The 
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University press. 1988,p.21
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also evident that NGO staff and trustees come from a broad range of public and private 
sector interest groups. The latter sector created its own partnership with the state. In most 
cases the state supported the establishment of profit making companies. As a result two 
conceptions of CSOs-state relationships have been in place: the corporatist and 
voluntary-pluralist. The former type's organizations are incorporated into decision­
making process by the state. The state manipulated and gained greater social control in 
return for giving functional representation to such groups in economic management.
There had been some controversy over the assumption that only democratic state can 
create a democratic civil society. In the absence of democratic state, civil society 
organizations can contribute remarkably to democratization processes including the 
creation of space leading to pluralist state. Nevertheless for the development and 
dynamics of the state-civil society relations, that the functioning of civil society will be 
more effective in the presence of a democratic state. Fowler 91 believes that “NGOs are 
expected to play an important role in fostering the democratic changes now argued to be 
needed. It is assumed that NGOs will function as agents of democratization through their 
increasing presence and ability to transform society. It is argued that NGOs are unlikely 
to have significant impact on political reform because (a) regimes have effective 
instruments to contain such a possibility and (b) the legal standing, typical development 
approach and the relations maintained by the NGO community are not sufficiently 
consistent with this aim. In order to effectively promote democratization in developing 
countries NGOs will need to adopt more complex development strategies and 
consciously include the issue of citizenship in their interventions”.
There is skepticism over the internal and external social and economic forces that are 
driving the trend of globalization and decentralization. The pressure of globalization in 
fact results in deflection of responsibility; currency devaluation, free trade and removal of 
price control, increase of taxation, removal of state subsidies, and central government 
find ways of relieving of the financial burden of providing basic services. By
91 Fowler, A. Non-Governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization: An African Perspective, 
International Development Journal, Vol. 5, No.3. 1993, pp. 325-339.
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decentralization they mean devolution of responsibility to local government without 
power and resources. On the other hand, the private profit-making sector gains 
considerable power by being contracted to deliver services. The increasing responsibility 
of the already powerful private sector will undermine the role of non-profit making 
organizations within civil society and will be little or no prospects of achieving good 
governance.
In an exhaustive debate about what is a recipe for good governance, the tendency is to 
prescribe the size of participation and consultation. In reality, the degree and quality of 
participation has to be assessed within the context of existing systems of democracy. As 
many analysts have pointed out, civil society and trade unions behavior during the few 
democratic experiences that result in the marginalization of elected representatives or 
neglect of democratic practices of formal political process is destructive of rather than 
conducive to democratization and good governance.
The views of the role of civil society organizations and the state are different. Most 
analysts admit the influence of civil society on the state but do not acknowledge the link 
between state and civil society. Robert Fatton 92 describes the dialectical interaction 
between state and civil society: “... the totalitarianism of the ruling class and the anti- 
statism of subaltern classes are two projects that cannot fully materialize. The first is 
constrained by the private powers and mechanisms o f resistance of civil society; the 
second is limited by the predatory reach and coercive force of the state”.
The Forum of Philippine Alternatives views civil society and state as entirely distinct 
entities. It describes the relations between civil society and state based on the definition 
of Gershman and Bello93: ’’Civil society is an arena of social and political life
92 Fatton, R. Africa in the Age of Democratization: The Civic Limitations 
of Civil Society. African Studies Review 38(2). 1992, pp. 67-100.
93 Gershman and Bello. In Biggs and Neame: Negotiating Room for 
Manoeuvere: Reflection Concerning NGOs Autonomy and Accountability within
the New Policy Agenda. In Michael Edwards and David Hulme (ed.): Non-Governmental Organizations: 
Performance and Accountability. London: Earthscan 1996: 35.
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autonomous from state domination where progressive values and political practices can 
be articulated, counter-hegemonic institutions can be created, which can nurture and 
nourish the creation of autonomous political actors who are able to articulate and defend 
their interests, propose alternative projects for structuring the state and society, and 
transform the relations of state and society”.
Some NGOs and donors view Southern governments as passive actors and set up NGOs 
as the victims of capitalist conspiracy. However, as noted by M. Edwards and D. Hulme94 
that: “ ...there are sound reasons for NGOs to enter into a positive and creative 
relationship with the institutions of both state and government. Governments remain 
largely responsible for providing the health, education, agricultural and other services on 
which people rely, although this is changing under the impact of the ‘new conditionality’ 
and its attempts to expand the role of the private sector at governments’ expense”. Many 
of the new developments came from highly trained professional staff in government 
research institutions, universities as well as from field practitioners with few or no NGO 
affiliations.
Our views on this conflicting analysis originate from the local institutional development 
strategy that successful developments occur as a result of combined efforts between 
complementary social forces including government, civil society, private sectors, 
beneficiaries and donor agencies. Biggs and Neame95 suggest that: “NGOs need to move 
away from rhetoric which suggests that their staffs are more committed to reducing 
poverty than those in the public sector, to an understanding that some public sector staffs 
are as committed and effective in poverty-alleviation as any self-proclaimed activists. If 
NGOs become more reflective they will see in their own behavior some of the actions of
94 Edwards M and Hulme D. Making a Difference: Scaling-up the Developmental Impact og NGOs -  
Concepts and Experiences. In: M. Edwards & A. Fowler ed. NGO Management. London: Earthscan. 2002, 
p.56
95 Biggs, S., and Neame, A.. Negotiating Room for Manoeuvre: Reflections 
Concerning NGO Autonomy and Accountability Within the New Policy Agenda, 
in: Edwards, M. & Hulme, D., ed. Non-Governmental Organizations:
Performance and Accountability, Beyond the Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan,
1996, pp.31-40.
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those in governments and the private sector that they often condemn (self-promotion, a 
failure to learn, etc)”. There is no recipe or set of instructions about a better way forward. 
However there are some sign-posts that might be useful to those wanting to improve and 
further develop the state-CSOs relations.
Most of the governments in developing countries, however facing growing fiscal crisis 
that should encourage public sector to look toward local institutions to help with resource 
mobilization in favor of productive investments. It is true that in most of developing 
countries governments establish local organizations or work through the existing ones for 
different reasons. The successful activities of some such organizations may reflect the 
fact that voluntary and collective nature of rural life is primarily for the well-being of the 
rural people and political commitment is hardly considered as strong motivation to 
improve their way of life. This may confirm some aspect of the structural reformist 
approach but does not rule out that local organizations are not sufficient to produce rural 
development, in the absence of other channels of local institutional development and of 
sound economic policies, infra structural investments, appropriate technology and 
adequate public services. Johanna Kalb96 argues that: “For NGOs to succeed, they must 
exist in an economy with a functional state and private sector. Attempts to use NGOs as 
substitutes for private and public sectors not only weaken NGOs but actually impede the 
development o f these other sectors and perpetuate institutional failures”.
One of the elements in the relationship between state and society and which can be a 
potential crisis within liberal democracies is the sign of inaccessibility. Some Pluralists 
blame declining policy effectiveness and weakened consensus on 'too much' democracy 
while other radical pluralists blame too little democracy.
96Kalb, J., The Institutional Ecology of NGOs: Applying Hansmann to 
International Development.Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 41. 2006, p. 297. 
Available at: httm://papers.ssrn.com. Accessed 22 July 2008.
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E.D. Garilado97 points out some differences between government and NGO sector which 
may lead to tensions: differences in values and ideology; differences in development 
priorities; and differences in development approaches. He identifies three areas of 
concern for the NGO in managing its relationship with government. First, the NGO must 
show that what it does is o f use to the poor population. It is at this stage that the NGO 
develops an expertise and offers a service or a range of services relevant to the 
community. It is also able to do this within the context of the local power structure. 
Second, once the NGO has proven that it can deliver effective services at lower costs, 
there is the opportunity to transfer this technology and approach to the other user 
institutions, i.e., government, with greater impact potential. Third, having established 
credibility in its organization and in its programs, the NGO can move into policy 
advocacy. It is in fact able to do this since it has the experience, expertise base and a 
constituency.
The mistrust between governments and civil society organizations including NGOs 
derived from the latter’s emancipatory view of the socio-economic changes which 
sometime frustrate and even counter product the government view. Irrespective of 
political stance, governments are most comfortable with activities including provision 
and improvement of social services that substitute their own. The creation of a 
countervailing power to governments threatens their legitimacy. Theoretically, the state 
must shoulder three major responsibilities: provision of a form of political process that is 
acceptable by people; insurance of realistic material needs of its population; and 
maintenance of justice. In defining the acceptable form of a democratic political process
QO
two conditions are to be fulfilled according to Fowler : “first, that there is public 
accountability of those in power, and second, that the political process, through openness 
and free discussion, should integrate and resolve individual and collective interests for
97Garilado, E. Indigenous NGOs as strategic Institutions: Managing with 
Government and Relationship Resource Agencies’, World Development, Vol. 15,
Supplement. 1987,pp. 113-120.
98Fowler, A. The Role o f NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations:
Perspectives from Eastern and Southern Africa, in: The Development Policy 
Review, vol.9, N o.l. 1991. p .l3
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the common good. The prevailing view is that most African states have failed in both 
respects”.
In another context the understanding of the role of the market economy, its system and 
political dimension, and its relationship with civil society is necessarily touched upon. 
Gordon W hite" describes the political nature of markets in terms of four separate 
categories: “the politics of state involvement; the politics of market organization; the 
politics of market structure; and the politics of social embeddedness”. Apart of its 
mechanism as inefficient allocator of resources and unfair distribution of wealth, market 
economy sheds light on power struggle between competing forces. Geof W ood100 
describes the political process: “alongside this career [the career of the NGO 
phenomenon] has been the use of conditionality to break state monopolies in both service 
and goods delivery and to remove regulations and licensing to allow the market to 
breathe. But since the market cannot breathe normally, as demanded by theory, then 
NGOs in all their shapes and forms have been available to fill the institutional space 
arising from the critiques”. Very little research has been done on the impact of global 
political and social changes on the allocation of resources between north and south and 
within countries, on efficiency and growth of inequalities and unemployment. The 
following section addresses how these changes affect NGOs in the Middle East.
1.6 NGOs in the Arabic and Islamic World
The Summary of UNDP’s Human Development Report101 described the decline of aid as 
follows: 'Aid has fallen rapidly in both absolute and relative terms over the past decade. 
For developing countries as a group aid to agriculture has fallen in real terms from $4.9
99 White, G. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 24, No.3, 1995, p.4.
100 Wood, G. States without Citizens: The Problem of Franchise State, in: D.
Hulme and M. Edwards, 1997: NGOs States and Donors: Too close for comfort?
London: Macmillian Press. 1997, p.86
101 UNDP. Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 2006, p. 28
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billion a year to 3.2 billion or from 12% to 3.5% of total aid since the early 1990s. All 
regions have been affected. Aid to agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa is now just under $1 
billion, less than half the leveling 1990".
Middle East is a good example of the consistent relation of growth of poverty and 
inequalities. A.S. Bhalla and Albert Berry wrote that:
“Poverty often responds faster to growth where inequality is lower: intuitively, if 
many people are bunched closer to the poverty line, growth tends to pull them 
more quickly out of poverty than it does in societies where income distribution is 
polarized and many of the poor are a long way from the poverty line. Bringing 
such people closer to (but still not above) the poverty line may be as useful as 
raising others above it, but their being very poor in the first place often signals a 
lack of immediate economic potential and a lack of political voice, which together 
may imply that they will not systematically share the fruits of overall growth” 102.
According to the United Nation Development Program about 20 per cent of the 
population in developing Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa were 
without access to safe water between 1990 and 1996, and close to 37 per cent were 
without access to sanitation during the same period.
All these rapid social and political conditions challenge civil society and NGOs in Arab 
and Islamic world to develop coping survival mechanisms that are less focused on quality 
of their work, transparency and accountability and more concerned with resources, 
particularly funding for development assistance and long-term intervention.
102 Bhallla A.S., ed. Globalization, Growth and Marginalization. New
York, London, Ottawa: ST.Martin’s Press, INC., Macmillan Press Ltd London, 
IDRC.1998, P. 179
103 UNDP, www.undp.org 1998.Accessible 3 March 2001.
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In his comments on recent Arab economic, social and political change Galal Amin104 
finds that recent experience differs from the colonial experiences in that: (1) its extent is 
now much greater and accelerating; (2) trade and capital inflows are more diversified; (3) 
a much greater share of the population is directly involved; and (4) there is a much 
greater involvement by multinational corporations and agencies.
According to El-Sheikh (ibid, 2006), Amin examined five channels through which 
globalization impacts human development: (1) international trade; (2) labour migration; 
(3) capital movements; (4) movements of technology, information and ideas; and (5) the 
changing role of the state. Amin observed the varied impact of the political and cultural 
development change in four Arab countries: Kuwait, Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt.
As one of the oil rich countries, Kuwait has a remarkable economic performance in terms 
of per capita income, mortality and morbidity, health and education services. On the other 
hand, despite its globalized economy, Kuwait suffers severe dependency on imported 
food and politically dependent on the United States. Amin summarized the far-reaching 
effects of the rapid political changes both globally an internally on Egypt. The rise in 
income disparities, for example was clearly reflected in the pattern of consumption even 
in such basic goods and services as foods, health, and education. Such differences divide 
the community into two nations. Amin goes on to elaborate and reflect on the substantial 
changes in the character of society: “What is peculiar about social mobility in Egypt that 
has caused it to produce effects and manifestation so opposite to the experience of 
developed countries? Well! besides being too fast and accelerating, the process belongs 
to a particular periphery with its historical; institutions and system of exploitation, and 
that, because of her geopolitical, historical, and cultural importance, Egypt’s arduous 
attempts to escape dependency on western centres were repeatedly defeated.”105
104 El-Sheikh, S. Book Reviews. In: Canadian Journal o f Development 
Studies. Ottawa : University o f Ottawa, XX VI1, NO. 4. 2006
105 Ibid, 17
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The analysis of Amin with respect to Egypt’s social, political, economic and cultural 
dynamics and progress raised many questions and concerns: to what extent that 
globalization can be a force for national and international good, the role of democratic 
institutions, who lead the process; the power of the market in the absence of the 
humanistic mandate. What has been striking is the missing role of civil society in the 
analysis, particularly in Egypt where the civil society has strong presence and influence. 
One would add to these questions whether or not a democratic development state is able 
to survive a globalized blueprint world.
The mainstream of political Islam has also great influences in the political, economic, 
social and cultural life in Middle East. In other words, the monopoly of religion in the 
interest of political group provides the rights of religion empowerment so the group is the 
greatest and superior106. If we take Egypt as an example, we find that the political Islam 
consists of Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic charity voluntary organizations and Islamic 
private business companies. The open-door policy of Sadat in 1970s had both the 
economic and the political impact on growth and empowerment of the Islamic 
movement. He released Muslim brothers from prisons and agreed with them to defend his 
regime. The Muslim brothers took advantage of the agreement with the regime and 
slowly and steadily managed to infiltrate the public institutions. The striking performance 
of political Islam was reflected recently in the growing numbers of seats captured by 
Muslim brothers in the People’s Assembly, trade unions and professional associations 
and student movement. Saad Eddin Ibrahim described the dynamics of Muslim brothers 
and their level of engagement in the Egyptian life: “In times of crisis, such as the 
Egyptian earthquake of October 1992, IPVOs and the MB-controlled professional
106
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syndicates outperform not only their secular counterparts but the state itself, At least, that
1
is how it appeared to the public at large and to the foreign media”.
Ibrahim continued to search and analyze the root causes of the swift rise and spread of 
political Islam in Egypt. He looked at the internal, regional and international factors 
contributed to the progress of the political Islam. He pointed that: “the political crisis 
flows from the slow and sluggish process of democratization and government’s failure to 
make the transition from the highly mobilized society of the 1950s and 1960s to a 
genuinely participatory polity in the 1980s and 1990s”. 108
John L. Esposito contributed to this debate on Egypt by writing: “Islamic activism in 
Egypt has not receded; rather it has rooted itself more deeply and pervasively in Egyptian 
society. The reality of Egyptian society today contributes to a climate in which the 
influence of Islam and activist organizations on sociopolitical development will increase 
rather than diminish” 109. Eight years since the publication of the article of John L. 
Esposito “The Islamic Factor” to which we refer, the Muslim Brothers managed to obtain 
the second representation in Egypt’s parliament in December 2005 (88 seats out of 455), 
compared to 38 seats in 1987 and 12 seats in 1984110 .
Being the strongest opposition to the ruling party, the Muslim Brothers are able to 
criticize the failings of the government, from poverty reduction, housing and employment 
to corruption, poor services and mal-distribution of wealth. They repeatedly play this 
critical role, without offering their own alternative solutions to seemingly complicated 
problems. John L. Esposito concluded that: “As a result, the Islamic factor is regarded as 
both an effective change agent and challenge or threat. While many Muslims find 
meaning, direction, assistance, and a sense of empowerment, others, in particular the 
government and many elites, see Islamic movements as an indirect critique of the
107Marr, P. ed. Egypt at Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role.
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. 1999, p.33
108 Ibid, 41
109 Ibid, 47
110 www.wikipedia.org. Accessible 5 November 2005
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government’s failures, a challenge to its legitimacy , and a direct threat to the stability of 
the Egyptian government and society”111.
The other controversial development issue which attracts many scholars, UN and NGOs, 
in stance, is policy on population in Islamic and Arab world. It is difficult to find 
evidence in Islam to support a ban for family planning. Many predominately Muslim 
countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Morocco, and Tunisia have a definite government 
policy on population, while others encourage NGOs to distribute contraceptives and 
disseminate family planning knowledge: for example, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, and Syria. In 
Iran, radical changes, in favor of family planning, have occurred to make a dramatic 
result. The minimum age for marriage was increased, and every Iranian couple must 
attend mandatory classes on birth control before even applying for a marriage license. All 
forms of contraceptives are free. The UN awarded Iran the Population Award in 1999. 
Women, however, in other predominately Muslim countries, continue to have very high 
fertility rates. For instance, the rate in Yemen in 1997 was 6.4, while in the Western Bank 
and Gaza it was 6.0. USAID112 highlights Yemen overview that: “Persistent poverty has 
contributed to its fertility rate of 6.4 children per mother, one among the highest in the 
world”.
The hard reality is that most the Arab and Islamic counties suffer lack of democracy, 
good governance and transparency. The absence of democratic values, free expression, 
and rule of law hinders development initiatives and people’s participation in matters 
affected their life. Primary among these are institutional mechanisms that will allow for 
community input and participation in the process so that the hard choices necessary for 
equitable allocative efficiency are made by everyone concerned.
111 Esposito, J. L.. The Islamic Factor. In: Phebe Marr, ed. Egypt at the 
Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role. Washington, DC : National 
Defense Press, 1999, pp.47-64.
112 USAID. Yemen Overview. 1999. Available at: www.usaid.gov/pubs. Accessed: 
23 March, 08.
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In response to the question how we measure progress, Fowler responded: “What will 
make a difference to global poverty in the years to come will not be the number of 
villages that are served or children that are sponsored, but how grassroots action is 
connected to markets and politics at multiple levels of the world systems, a collective 
task in which the ability o f NGDOs to work together -  not individual competitiveness -  
will be critical”113.
Consensus among participants of the workshop on the Islamic perspective relating to 
decentralization and community participation, presented by Saeeda Khan of International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) as follows: ‘First, in contrast to the centralized 
decision-making system in many Muslim countries, the input of the community on any 
matter that concerns it, including water management, is mandatory in Islam. Second, 
according to Islam, this consultation is required of all those who are entitled to a voice, 
including women. In addition, because women are mainly responsible for collecting 
water in developing countries and are consistently more concerned about the related 
issues of hygiene and waste management, their input is as important as or more important 
than that of men. Yet women in most developing countries -  regardless of religion or 
culture -  have historically been left out of decision-making. Certainly, in most Muslim 
countries, despite the rights accorded to them by Islam fourteen hundred years ago, and 
the Prophet’s consultation with his wives and other women, decision-makers, who are 
almost all men, often do not follow the example set by him. Third, both true community 
participation and Islam require communities and individuals to be proactive. Fourth, 
because equitable water management ultimately depends upon a concern for fairness at 
the individual level, this change necessarily has to happen at the grassroots level”114. 
Political Islamic movements, however, such as in Sudan, have also used women to 
imagining their political communities. By establishing law institutions to restrict their
113Fowler, A. Beyond Aid: NGDO Values and the Fourth Position. In Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler, 
ed. The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. UK and USA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002, p.8
114 Faruqui, N. I., eds. Water Management in Islam: Overview and Principles.Tokyo, New York, Paris: 
United Nations University Press. 2001, pp. 19-20
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appearance and mobility outside the households115 and “by tying their visions of the ideal 
political community to women’s dress or comportment, they have limited the possibilities 
of women’s equal citizenship”116.
On the other hand, the Egyptian NGO Forum for Women in Development, for example, 
improved the institutional capacity of organizations through networking, training, and 
awareness raising in gender equality, women’s equal participation and full human rights. 
The project enabled representatives of Egyptian women to participate as decision-makers 
in issues related to development and human rights117. Another inspiring example is from 
L’Espace Associatif (LEA) in Morocco. The partnership with L’Espace Associatif (LEA) 
was initiated in 1995 through more than a year of discussions that resulted in the formal 
registration at the end of 1996. Since 1997 through to the present, LEA has carried 
operations based on project funding that it receives from a variety of international 
sources. Partnership with LEA is an excellent example of its model of program delivery 
in action. LEA’s organizational goal is to build and strengthen civil society in Morocco 
by supporting and assisting in the development of civil society and by promoting and 
implementing the “mouvement associatif’. The latter is defined as a “social movement 
involving a large variety of grass root organizations that are committed to working with, 
and responding to, issues and needs related to social and humanitarian issues, youth and
115
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children, economic and developmental needs, the environment, human rights, gender, 
poverty, anti-corruption etc”118.
The growth of such social movements and the increasing role of civil society in 
developing countries is described by Marc Nerfin119:“this phenomenon reflects the power 
that people have as citizens, autonomous from governments and markets, to operate as a 
Third System”. He describes the Third System as “functioning benignly, helping the 
people to assert their own power and making efforts to listen to those who are never or 
rarely heard, rather than seeking governmental or economic power”.
In a perverse way, lack of democracy in Arabic and Islamic countries has created more 
scope for closer co-operation, networking and dialogue among civil society 
organizations. The awakening of civil society serves, on the one hand, to provide 
information and knowledge of human rights and democratization processes and to make 
development policies more community and nation-oriented.
1.7 Methodology
Research Problem:
The key problem which has been addressed by this research is non-governmental 
organizations and development, their relations with the state and their capacity building. 
The research examines the growth and development of the traditional local structures and 
voluntary work in Sudan. The research illustrates the early types and forms of Sudanese 
local initiatives such as communal labour, immigrant associations, saving systems, and 
cooperative groups. The role of the spontaneous or traditional organizations has often 
raised a number of questions and recent reviews of NGO performance suggests that 
successful interventions are strongly dependent on the extent of community participation,
118 Ibid, 2005.
119 Nerfin, M. In: Hollands Glenn and Ansell Gwen (eds). Winds of
Small Change: Civil Society Interaction with the African State. Proceedings of  
multilateral workshops on good governance, sustainable development and 
democracy. Graz, Austria 1995 -  Kampala.Afesis-Corplan. 1998, p. 70
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including the mobilization and management of available resources and encouraging and 
supporting capacities for problem-solving and self-management. The good understanding 
and respect of local capacity, practice and knowledge is a strength contributing to the 
development of partnership between NGOs, CSOs, private sector and government. The 
thesis presents the new forms of NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs), for 
instance the professional associations and political parties. All these forms and their 
dynamics in local context constitute a social capital which challenges all sorts of 
repression, social exclusion and injustice and which meets the people’s needs, especially 
the marginalized communities.
The research assesses the NGOs capacities and reviews the NGOs local institutional 
development strategies from a variety of variables. Six main capacity variables are 
chosen to assess the internal capacity of the participating NGOs: internal governance, 
strategic planning, human resources and management, service delivery, financial 
management and external relations. These variables has been selected on the basis of the 
needs of organizations which could include: participatory program development, 
organizational and financial management, gender sensitization, strategic planning, 
results-based management, rights-based approach and other innovative program 
approaches such gender equality and human rights, child rights and environmental rights. 
The research examines as well the ability of the organizations to effectively engage with 
other actors including government.
Research Approach:
Participatory and collaborative approach is followed to select the project and to 
contribute to the overall design of the research agenda120. This approach proved to be of 
direct relevance to the activities of participating agencies as well as generating 
comparative insights for the research process. The following key features of participatory 
research have been considered while planning and conducting the research: (1) People 
who have been researched are in general the beneficiaries of NGOs capacity building 
process; (2) The knowledge generated is of genuine value for practical purposes because
120 See Appendix A.
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it has been collected through vivid discussions which often succeed to capture the 
perceptions of the participating NGOs; (3) NGOs see a direct benefit for the 
organizations’ development, from the information collected and analyzed. Moreover, the 
knowledge generated is used to promote actions for change or to improve existing local
191actions. The attitude and behaviour is a fundamental pre-requisite of participatory 
research. Gyanmudra believes that: “No personal biases of the researcher must influence 
the process. The attitude must be enabling and with the intention to learn and share 
information rather than dominate and extract information”122
The research activities require the collection of qualitative data, and documenting the 
unique experiences of the organizations and the networks. Research tools will be used to 
compile and analyze existing information and to corroborate data through interview and 
focus groups. Interviews and focus groups are a very useful tool for gathering 
information. They allow for the opportunity to clarify any questions that participants may 
have difficulties in understanding. Another benefit is that they allow the interviewer a 
unique chance to probe the participant for a more complete answer or clarification and to 
build on each answer with additional questions and clarifications.
To sum up the research involves input from people with direct experience in capacity 
building and others involved in participatory ways of working. The research therefore 
drew on the knowledge and experience of many different individuals and organizations. 
In other words Sohng, Sil Lee123 noted that “Research is not done just to generate facts, 
but to develop understanding of oneself and one’s context. It is about understanding how
121 Tilakaratna, S. A Short Note on Participatory Research. 1990, p.2. Available at: 
http://www.caledonia.org.uk/reserach.htm. Accessed 11 Feb. 2008.
122 Aid et Action. Participatory Research and Development. Proceedings of 
EduAction Thematic Workshop on Education and Livelihoods, 2nd to 10th 
December 2006, NISIET, Hyderabad. Available at: www.aea-india.org. Accessed 
11 Feb.2008.
123 Sohng, S. L. Participatory Research Approaches: Some Key Concepts. 1995, p.l 
Available at: http://www.irdc.ca/en/ev Accessed 19 Feb. 2008.
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to learn, which allows people to become self-sufficient learners and evaluate knowledge 
that others generate”.
Selection of Participating NGOs/Networks:
The research looks at the capacity building needs within the following four selected 
Sudanese organizations/networks: i) Friends of Child Society (AMAL); ii) Human Rights 
Legal Aid Network (HRLAN); iii) Sudanese Environment Conservation Society (SECS); 
and iv) Sudanese Civil Society Network for Alleviation of Poverty (SCSNAP). The case 
studies presented here two organizations (AMAL and SECS) that are clearly membership 
organizations with their origins going back certainly many generations, and two networks 
(HRLAN and SCSNAP) that are quite contemporary in their modes of operation. The 
four participating NGOs/networks represent a cross-section of national NGOs currently 
operating in Sudan with particular interest in institutional development, advocacy and 
networking issues. Case studies are selected in order to highlight a broad range of 
capacity development strategies, including relation with the state. The research aims to 
balance an assessment of capacity development with a situational analysis of broader 
social and political factors affecting the relations between NGOs and the state. Case 
studies are all exemplary of collaboration between state and NGOs. They differ, however, 
in the type of the constituencies they represent which vary from member organizations, 
individual members to branches.
Outline:
Chapter One: Literature Review:
This chapter gives information and brief statement on background of the debate and 
introduction to literature review. The chapter briefly touches on issues related to the 
understanding of the local context and its impact on dynamics of local structures and 
NGOs. It focuses on the relevant literature on the organizations of local institutions, 
definitions of concepts and roles of various types of organizations including NGOs and 
civil society organizations. It also provides a few notes on the state-civil society/NGOs 
interactions. The chapter provides a few cautionary remarks about the methodology,
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including research problem, research participatory approach, the selection of the 
participating organizations/networks and finally the research outline.
Chapter Two: Traditional Social Structures and Local Organizations in Sudan:
This chapter begins with the growth and development of local structures, CBOs and 
NGOs features and attributes, their contribution to social development. The analysis 
covers three distinct periods: pre-independence; post independence period 1956-1989 and 
the Islamic period post 1989. The chapter discusses the social capital in Sudan and 
mechanisms for cooperation and solidarity. The chapter describes the voluntary sector 
and its diverse forms and types such as communal labor, migrant associations, saving 
systems and professional groups. The chapter ends with some of NGO vulnerabilities and 
problems
Chapter Three: Civil Society: Totalitarianism, Pluralism and Challenges for the Future: 
This chapter begins with the rise of Islamic movement and its two distinct periods: Post 
independence and the current post 1989. The analysis includes the state central authority 
and ends with the question: Whether what has occurred was a failure of the project or the 
regime? The second section described the NIF -  NGOs/CSOs relations and the impact of 
the breakthrough event, the peace in the Sudan. The third section contains the positions 
and the role of the political parties and civil society, the debate on the impact of colonial 
state and impact of democracy. It concludes with describing the key features of the main 
political parties. The chapter suggests a way out in the last section and addresses issues 
related to the impact of rural culture on Sudanese life, the role of NGOs and CSOs during 
the transformation period.
Chapters Four, Five and Six represent the heart of the thesis with three case studies: 
Organisational Cultures of Sudanese NGOs, NGOs Relation with Governments and 
NGOs Laws, a Comparative study between Laws in Sudan and Egypt.
The first case study (Chapter Four) focuses on the NGOs capacity as dynamic, 
participatory, ongoing processes, and as a process connected with the achievement of the
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organization mission and vision. The chapter is divided into four sections; each section is 
on one of the four participating NGOs/networks. The organizations/networks are Friends 
o f the Child Society (AMAL), Human Rights and Legal Aid Network (HRLAN), 
Sudanese Environment Conservation Society (SECS), and Sudanese Civil Society 
Network for Alleviation of Poverty (SCSNAP). Each part includes an introduction of the 
NGO/network and the description of the status of the six variables: internal governance, 
strategic planning, human resources and management, service delivery, financial 
management and external relations.
The second case study (Chapter Five) examines the relations of the four participating 
organizations/networks with the government. The chapter discusses the government’s 
strategy towards NGOs and discrepancies between what, for example in the constitution 
with respect to voluntary work and the actual practices and behavior characterized by 
lack of recognition and trust. NGOs are developing their own strategy towards 
government in two directions: responding to formal requirements of registration, re­
registration and reporting and working effectively with governmental technical 
departments. The chapter illustrates some of these examples of relations and gives an idea 
of some of government institutions and NGOs and CSOs.
The third case study (Chapter Six) provides a comparative study between NGOs laws in 
Sudan and Egypt. The chapter provides important contextual information for the analysis 
of Sudanese NGOs and the political environment in which they operate. The provisions 
of the laws in Sudan and Egypt are similar in areas such as registration procedures, 
rejection of registration, and dissolution of organizations. The Sudanese law is more 
restrictive in areas of internal and external funding.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion:
This chapter summarizes the research findings with respect of NGOs' relations with state 
and NGOs' capacity enhancement. The chapter presents the crucial contribution to 
knowledge the research made in areas of the impact of democracy and to what extent the 
Sudanese NGOs and CSOs work under authoritarian regimes and succeed in achieving
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tangible results in development issues related to environment and rights. This is contrary 
to the Western notion notes that only a democratic state can create a democratic civil 
society. On the same line the Sudanese NGOs, despite obstacles and challenges, manage 
to establish a good working relation with government's technical departments in areas 
affecting the local communities such as street children, joint juvenile courts and national 
planning for environmental work in Sudan. The research discusses briefly the role of 
popular Islam vs. the political Islam in Sudan and makes a few cautionary remarks that 
NIF has to recognize that the virtual realities which are repeatedly being imposed by 
them cannot succeed in a country that popular Islam is deeply rooted.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter reviews cautionary remarks on lack of literature of local institutions and 
voluntary sector. The neglect of role of community-based organizations and people’s 
social capital hinders capacity building. On the other hand, the overemphasis of western 
literature on international organizations misses the opportunity for understanding and 
learning the local knowledge, values and multiple accountability.
The location of NGOs as one of the social forces between other actors in society or 
within the local institutional framework, agrees with the perspectives which concentrate 
on the institutional organizational results and contribute to social and economic reforms. 
It is interesting to observe the NGOs expectations and how they behaved towards each of 
other actors.
In terms of state -  civil relations, the noble theoretical and romantic expectations that the 
state role is to establish a system and political process, and provide material needs is no 
longer realistic or acceptable by individuals and collective interests who set their 
priorities of equality, justice and rights and claim that the state has to be accountable to 
them.
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Overall the chapter illustrates the complex and multi-faceted dimensions of 
organizations, social change, definitions and roles. It is clear a more textured and 
dynamic framework of analysis of civil society/NGOs and their capacity development is 
long overdue and need to be expanded. Substantial conceptual and analytical tunnel 
vision is compounded by limited and simplistic understandings of more fundamental 
inter-related concepts, such as social capital and state-civil society relations within the 
specific political and social context of political Islam in Sudan. The following chapters 
will discuss in depth some features of the social capital in Sudan represented in the 
traditional structures and local organizations.
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CHAPTER TWO
TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE SUDAN
2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on important aspects of the voluntary sector in the Sudan. It 
describes informal traditional practices and indigenous associations, like communal 
labor, rotating savings and credit associations, and migrant associations. Although these 
social forms have been given some attention in the third world studies literature, the 
subject has never been dealt with systematically in the field of Sudanese studies. It is a 
discredit that no serious writings in Sudan, consider the importance of local organizations 
and community-based organizations as genuine grassroots players at local level that 
invariably committed to developing their communities. It is hoped, therefore, to present 
empirical descriptions of some modes of formal and informal voluntary organization to 
provide information that is relevant to wider studies of Sudanese politics and society.
This chapter is divided into two main sections: The first section describes the growth and 
development of local structures during the colonial period and post independence period. 
The second section presents the social capital in Sudan, including the forms of voluntary 
and NGO sector.
The chapter represents a contribution to, and it comments on, one of the most important 
efforts in Sudan during the last two decades the increasing participation of Sudanese 
communities in larger local institutional structures.
In spite of many prophecies about the expected erosion and decline of voluntary 
community-based initiatives such as communal labor (Nafir and Faza) and other forms of 
rotating saving system, known as Sandug, they have reacted to this involvement by 
coping with the new circumstances and developing new ways of integration.
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During the 1930s, Sudanese graduates established Graduates' Congress in the main towns 
like Wad Medani, Omdurman and Port Sudan. The key role of those who completed their 
education and worked as civil servants was the struggle for independence. In addition to 
their political activities they made a significant contribution to the provision of services 
and social infrastructure in the communities in which they lived or from which they 
originated. Most primary and secondary schools and dispensaries in both urban and rural 
areas, for instance, were built on self-help basis. These local initiatives have been part of 
Sudanese tradition in the 1930s and 1940s and indigenous culture concerned with 
communal labour, saving associations and migrant institutions.124
According to the Sudanese literature on formal co-operation, the origin of the co­
operative movement dates back to the traditional informal practices in Sudanese societies 
during the 1920s and 1930s. The Law of the Co-operative Associations of 1948 was 
based on these traditional structures of social informal co-operation. The Cooperative Act 
125 explains that “the organizational set-up of the co-operative societies consists of 
primary societies with individual physical persons as members at the level of village, or 
area or locality”.
These traditional practices are known in English and Arabic by a number of terms, for 
instance, communal labor \Nafir and Faza\, exchange labour, co-operative labor, and 
Aiad AI Hasad (Harvest) and wedding or funeral days (festive labor). Other terms are 
rotating savings and credit associations, or Sandug, literally meaning 'box'. It involves a 
regular contribution in cash by members of a savings group where the sum is distributed 
to a single member of the group every particular period. Migrant associations are based
124
El Nagar, S.h., algamiat alahlia wa al islam alsiasi fi el sudan, madbuli press, Cairo, Egypt, 2006,p.49.
12S Co-operative Societies Act 2003. Available at: www.unsudanig.org
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on rural-urban linkages which support members in their transition to urban life and 
support their rural communities by raising funds and mobilizing resources and channel 
them to implement certain activities such as building for schools, purchase of school bus 
for girls, maintenance of primary health units.
Communal labor is common in rural communities in where productive tasks are mostly 
similar in structure and in type of work. In such societies there will be a need for 
temporary labor to complete a task initiated by individual unit. Such collective efforts can 
be found in the field of agriculture, house construction, community buildings, and well- 
digging.
The traditional saving system known as Sandug was found in both rural and urban 
Sudanese societies. It began during the Second World War among women in order to
1 Oficope with economic difficulties resulted from the war. I was fascinated by Sandug 
when I read the Journal of Sot A l M am  [Women’s Voice] of the Sudanese Women Union 
when I was in primary School in early 1960. Al Nagar127 writes that Sot A l Mara was 
established in 1955 to express the visions of Women Union. The Journal was distributed 
in primary schools at that time. The membership of Sandug groups is largely composed 
of members of extended families, neighbors, friends and work colleagues, i.e. people 
bound by distinct personal ties.
The nature of relationships between members of these informal associations and practices 
will vary between societies and vary according to social and economic practices as well.
126 Sot Al Mara Magazine [Women’s Voice] o f the Sudanese Women Union, 1965, Central Documentation 
Unit, Khartoum, Sudan.
127
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El Nagar, S.h., algamiat alahlia wa al islam alsiasi fi el sudan, madbuli press, Cairo, Egypt, 2006,p.l30.
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Employment-based groups, for example, recruit members from outside the family group. 
The key principle in the formation of these associations is kinship in the form of direct 
family relationships or some other form of direct personal ties. Close personal ties are a 
determinant factor in mobilizing people in order to make informal co-operation possible.
As mentioned earlier, these different forms of social capital have rather specific tasks to 
fulfill, but their practices as well as their basis for membership lead us into broader issues 
of understanding social organizations and the local economy.
This chapter is an attempt to describe these traditional informal modes of Sudanese co­
operation, including capital, types, functions, memberships, structures and systems. It 
includes discussion on the growth and development of local initiatives, including CBOs 
and NGOs, and their contributions to social development.
2.2 Growth and Development of Local Initiatives
2.2.1 Diverse Structures
Despite the differences of the ethnic composition and social structure of Sudanese people, 
there is still a certain degree of similarity in social habits such food making, dresses, 
wedding and funeral events. The studies of Sudanese groups, for example, in the northern 
and central areas along the Nile indicate a high degree of cultural similarity in customs, 
dress, religious practices and social and political institutions. Sayyid H. Hurreiz128 states: 
“Whether we are discussing Nafir, facial marks, divine kingship or certain kinds of 
Sudanese food, we can point out continuity and similarity that runs across time from the 
Meroitic period up to the present era, and that runs across space from Sennar to Shilluk- 
land and Dinka-land”. Hurreiz129 concludes that “No imposed Islamization, Arabization 
or Africanization was deliberately carried out through the long genesis of the Sudan”.
128 Hurreiz, S. H., & Abdel Salam, E.A.. Ethnicity, Conflict and National 
Integration In The Sudan. Khartoum: University o f Khartoum Printing Press. 1989, p.67
129 Ibid, 67
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However, the current military regime, which came to power in June 1989, imposed its 
political religious mandate and determined to pursue violations of human rights and
1 30contributed to increasing civil strife in the country. El-Affendi emphasizes that “What 
is important is that there is a will to co-exist” and this is particularly necessary in a 
multicultural context like Sudan. The common thread is intolerance toward other various 
cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Ethnic violence as a political problem originates with 
the beginning of nation-state building which created tensions between those in power and 
opposition groups.
The Mahdist revolution began in 1881 after a long period of Turk-Egyptian rule 
supported by British intervention. Despite the religious roots of this reformatic movement 
Mandour El Mahdi noted that ‘political supporters found the time opportune to show 
their hatred and resentment and to join the Mahdi in order to throw off a regime they 
detested.’ The desire to return to true Islam and increasing political resistance against 
foreign intervention succeeded in maintaining solidarity and forming the new state. After 
the death of Mahdi, six months after the fall o f Khartoum in 26 January 1885 the Khalifa, 
the M ahdi’s successor faced difficult situation in maintaining the unity of the Sudanese 
people. He established however strong central administration system by introducing a 
constitution and restructuring the central government including Bayt al Mai al-Amm [the 
general treasury] which became the centre of administration. The decline of Khalifa’s 
government was caused by a mix of problems such as tribal conflicts, growing number of 
followers and inappropriate policies.
2.2.2 Colonial Experiences
Colonial policies take a variety of forms and intend at the end to achieve their goal, both
i^i
economically and politically. According to Tim Niblock : “The Condominium’s
130 El-Affendi, A. For a State o f Peace: Conflict and the Future of  
Democracy in Sudan. Centre for the Study o f Democracy. Amsterdam:
Reproduced by courtesy o f The Pepin Press. 2002,p.39
131 Niblock, T. Class and Power in Sudan: The dynamics o f Sudanese Politics,
1898-1985, (s.l): (s.n.).1987,p.l43
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development efforts were concentrated on the valley of the Nile to the north of 
Khartoum, the Blue and White Nile areas immediately south of Khartoum, central 
Kordofan and the southern part of Kassala province. These areas contained the major 
agricultural schemes [private and public] and benefited most from the spread of education 
and health services. With the exception of Port Sudan, they were the only parts of the 
country where significant urban development occurred”.
A major contribution to rational development process in Sudan was initiated by few civil 
servants and educated persons who established an anti-colonial movement known as the 
Graduates’ Congress in big towns like Omdurman and Wad Medani after the First World 
War in 1918. The political concern of this movement expanded in the 1930s to include 
efforts to construct primary schools and health units all over Sudan by raising funds 
locally and by mobilizing local resources through communal work. These development 
initiatives followed by the elders’ informal committees in urban and rural areas together 
with Sudanese businessmen have built most of the schools and primary health clinics on 
self-help basis.
Sudanese traditional structures shouldered the basic responsibility for leading the 
development process. One of the indicators of the success of such development efforts 
was the creation of a social and political climate in which development would take place. 
This is clearly demonstrated in the initiatives of the political movements in Sudan when 
the liberation struggle evolved in several directions including the social development 
aspect such as establishment and improvement of the basic services; education and 
health. As mentioned earlier these different social forms have rather specific tasks to 
fulfill, but their practices as well as their basis for membership lead us into broader issues 
in understanding social organization, local economy and integrity.
In asking why self-help and community-based initiative and development have succeeded 
in providing strategies for future, an argument is presented that goes something like this. 
To promote sustainable development, the role of the state and political elite is crucial
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during this period, to survive the transition to independence. Mohamed Hashim A wad 
argues that: “But it is significant that the end of colonization which has kindled the 
strongest of pan-Africanist sentiments has failed to alert the Sudanese peoples to their 
common heritage, let alone raise any sense of nationalism among them”. Linked to this, 
are certain other proposals which see the traditional political elites and “the bureaucrats 
that never entertained any idea of structural transformation or radical change in Sudanese 
society”. 133 This explanation agrees with El-Affendi134 who describes the efforts of
MC i -jz
modem elite after independence was frustrated. Both El-Affendi and Ali refer the 
failure of elite to the political environment dominating by the traditional political parties 
based on sectarian, ethnic and regional loyalties. As a major consequence of this 
explanation that the country was beginning to develop an economic and social elite 
whose prime concern was benefit for their sects and not the needs of the majority for 
better living standards.
2.2.3 Post Independence Period: 1956-1989
After independence in 1956 a number of factors in Sudan contributed to the internal 
conflicts and instability and led to a questionable legitimacy and uncertain authority of 
the state such as the complexity of Sudanese society resulting from the presence of 
different nationalities, languages, religions and identities.
132 Awad, M. H. The Bilad Al Sudan: The Common Heritage as a Basis for 
Regional Co-operation. In: Y. F. Hassan and P. Doombos, The Central Bilad Al 
Sudan Tradition and Adaptation, Sudanese Library Series N o.(l 1), El Tamddon 
Press. 1977, p.312
133 Ali, T. M., and Matthews, R.O., (ed). Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and 
Resolution. Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press. 1999, p.202
134 EL-Affendi A. For a State o f Peace: Conflict and the Future o f  
Democracy in Sudan. Centre for the Study o f  Democracy. Amsterdam: 
Reproduced by courtesy o f The Pepin Press. 2002, p. 8
135 Ibidi or
Ali, T. M., and Matthews, R.O., (ed). Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and 
Resolution. Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press. 1999
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During Nimeiri period (1968-1985) the system of native administration was replaced 
with villages’ development committees, and elected councils. The role of sheikhs and 
tribal chiefs was abolished and a civil service system supervised by a single party was 
introduced. The regime advocated a strong governmental commitment to social welfare 
through community development.
During the drought misery of the 1970's the crop of most Sudanese failed to an extent 
that they did not produce enough even for their own subsistence and had to supplement 
their nourishment by collecting the seeds of wild growing grass and grinding them to 
flour. Many animals died and many Arabic gum trees died as well leaving many 
households without their important source of cash income. For those who lost their 
livestock their labor became an important source of cash income. There is significant 
income and wealth inequality. The latest data137 indicates that the poorest 90% of the 
households receive only 8% of national income while the wealthiest 10% receive 70%. 
According to Belal the poor people pay 25 times of what the wealthiest pay for drinking 
water. The disparities are also reflected in the ownership of land and the power structure. 
Widespread poverty prevails; more than 70% of the rural people are in absolute poverty.
In addition to the drought, civil wars, inappropriate policies, combined with difficult 
economic circumstances made it impossible for economic growth and social 
development. According to IDRC (1992) some 85 percent of the population in Sudan is 
said to live at the level of absolute poverty. In the case of Sudan, United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) described the situation that the whole generation of children
137
Sjc. jta t jbJjuiil ^  y^jXaii j  «Uc.Lal^ .VI ULUaill .2005
Belal Abdelrahim Ahmed. Algadia al egtimayia wa al mugtama al medani fi al sudan, 
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has now bypassed the educational system, providing a further impediment to future 
economic growth. Malnutrition has been endemic and widespread for years.
In the 1980s the country experienced a dramatic relief and emergency situation resulting 
from natural disaster such as drought and famine and civil strife coupled with political 
instability. Alex de Waal138 describes the drought and famine in Darfur: “In the far north 
there stand huge forests of dead trees, many uprooted by the wind, with sand drifts 
forming in their lee. One elderly man in Dar Zagahawa explained that this drought was to 
be found described in the Koran, and was a sign of the end of the world. Charles 
Gurdon139 describes the power struggle in Khartoum: “On the political front this has 
meant an increasing concentration of power in the hands of President Nimeiri. He has 
become more autocratic and this has led to the arbitrary arrest of political opponents and 
sudden changes in policy which have had dire effects on the country”. Beyond the natural 
disasters, the famine, drought and civil war in the south are the consequence of the 
policies and practices of the ruling elite. According to this explanation, the deteriorating 
economic crisis and political instability emerge from the bad governance and 
governments’ mismanagement of resources, inequality and regional development 
disparities. Weak government institutions and the emergency conditions encouraged the 
international community including NGOs to intervene with relief assistance. The 
assistance received within the emergency program in Sudan falls into two broad 
categories: relief such as food, logistics, shelter, and non-food items and rehabilitation 
and reinforcement such as reconstructing of schools, health units, and provision of 
services such as education, health, and agriculture. Most striking and missing during the 
relief and emergency operations, is the building of local capacity for humanitarian action. 
The relief projects, therefore, could not be integrated with broader reconstruction 
strategies and could not translate into development assets.
138 De Waal, A., Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan 1984-1985. UK: Oxford Clarendon Press.1989, p.79
139Gurdon, C., Sudan at The Crossroads. Whitestable, Kent England: Menas Press. 1984, p.56
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Inappropriate development policies and absence of long-term strategies characterize post­
independence period and continue to abound, in part because of serious lack of cultural 
and political consciousness. As described by Mohamed Omer Beshir140 “The Sudan, as a 
whole, is still ruled through a temporary constitution and colonial laws by a centralized 
administration. Its educational system inherited from the colonial administration has 
changed little. The economic and political problems of the North and the South are 
complex and fast”. According to Tim Niblock141 that: “The regional imbalance in 
development created conditions and attitudes among the population in the less developed 
areas which were to be of political significance. Niblock continues142 : “Too much of the 
population in the less developed fringe of Sudan, then, the Sudanese state as it emerged at 
independence seemed a distant and alien entity, just as it did in the colonial era”. The 
absence of political will of the state and Sudanese political parties has encouraged the 
intervention of external and international actors in the Sudanese political life. The 
solution to this problem lies in the building of the political will and the participation of 
people in all stages of sustainable development.
Compared to India, for example, the political will of a leader like Mahatma Gandhi in 
1920s and 1930s inspired and motivated many young Indian men and women to 
participate in rural development among the rural poor and scheduled castes. These efforts 
emphasized constructive collective action. Another example is Zimbabwe and Tanzania, 
since independence, where domestic political stability under civilian rule and good 
governance distinguishes them from many other countries.
According to Ministry of Social Welfare the number of international NGOs was about 96 
and the Sudanese more than 100 organizations in early 1988. No serious researches 
studied this period to assess the impact of both the dramatic relief circumstances,
140 Beshir, M. O.The Southern Sudan Background to Conflict. Khartoum:
Khartoum University Press. 1968,p.l01
141 Niblock, T. Class and Power in Sudan: The dynamics o f Sudanese Politics,
1898-1985, (s.l): (s.n.).1987,p.l44
142 Ib id , p. 146
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including the response of the government, the psychological and social consequences of 
emergency assistance on one hand, and the intervention of external support, including the 
behavior and practices of donor agencies and NGOs. The official literature ignores this 
period. A good example is that the National Comprehensive Strategy only mentioned in 
few lines the role of NGOs. The neglect of the local organizations inhibits the 
development learning process and widens the gap between the state and the civil society 
institutions.
Another development, during this period, was the role of the Muslim Brotherhood which 
was officially disbanded in 1977 and Turabi became Attorney-General in the 
government. According to Charles Gurdon143 “This was exacerbated when Turabi chaired 
the Law Revision Committee, whose principal job was to ensure that Sudanese laws 
conformed to Islamic principles”. This period witnesses the growth of Islamic banking, 
which plays an increasing role in the country’s economic and financial systems.
The Sudanese traditional values and self-help initiatives, which sustain social integrity, 
have been eroded by the emergence of new values related to the political ideology of the 
state and the erosion of such values threatens the political stability. A good example is 
Darfur conflict which started in 2003. The root causes of the conflict were the 
government policies of neglect and exclusion. This is in addition to the limited natural 
resources available for nomadic and sedentary groups144. Due to government political 
intervention and its weak capacity, national efforts to resolve the conflict has fallen and 
the government’s authority and effectiveness has been impaired. This is also 
demonstrated by acknowledged policy failures in alleviation of poverty and in
143 Gurdon, C., Sudan at The Crossroads. Whitestable, Kent England: Menas Press. 1984, p. 68
144
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Mohamed, Suliman Mohamed. Darfur, The War o f Identity and Resources, Cambridge Press. 2004
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implementation of CPA. As stated by Dunleavy, P. and O'Leary, B.145: “When states 
have to rely on multiple groups for successful policy implementation, then government 
ceases to be the authoritative allocator of values for society, and becomes merely one 
participant, though a powerful one, in a complex process of bargaining". Historically, the 
self-help efforts, including conflict resolution approaches initiated by local communities 
in conflict zone-areas contribute to the wealth of Sudanese culture and successfully 
resolved many internal issues without the intervention of the central authority.
2.2.4 The Islamist Period: Post 1989
The third democratic experience ended with a coup of June 1989. The national Islamic 
Front (NIF) dissolved by the decision of the Islamic movement. This defines the new 
military nature of the movement. In 1991 the movement re-emerged as the National 
Congress. Turabi described it not as a political party but a national structure. On the other 
hand Turabi’s understanding of Islamic revolution, compared to Iran’s total revolution, 
has been rather different. At the time of Al-Bashir’s coup, Turabi was placed in detention 
for six months, and then under house arrest. The Islamic movement only pledged its 
support for Al-Bashir later, largely because of the latter’s commitment to implement 
Sharia. It was clear that Al-Bashir was always a member of the Islamic movement and 
had been acting on Turabi’s instructions all along, and that Turabi’s detention had been a 
play to disguise the Islamic nature of Al-Bashir’s takeover. The National Congress was 
envisaged in 1991 as the country’s only legal political organization, and it was to provide 
both a forum for political action and produce the government.
The most devastating was the ideological brain washing carried by the regime’s official 
institutions and media that the northern-southern conflict is Islamized as a jihad. Turabi 
stressed that jihad, the holy war, should only be waged in self-defense and not in 
aggression against others. The former First Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha 
said to a brigade of fighters heading for the war front, according to Sudan’s official
145Dunleavy, P. & O’leary, B. Theories o f the state: The politics o f Liberal Democracy. London: 
Macmillian. 1987, p. 67
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SUNA news agency (1995):” The jihad is our way, and we will not abandon it and will 
keep its banner high. We will never sell out our faith and will never betray the oath to our 
martyrs”. Mahmud146 described post-1989 Sudan: “This image has actually led to the 
most tragic cycle of suffering and misery. Jihad whether in its classical or modem form is 
not only a war o f self-defense but can also be an aggression against others for the cause 
of expanding the realm of Islam. In its aggressive form, jihad is a negation of the “other”, 
a negation that can ultimately lead to annihilation, at best subjugation”. Jihad can also 
be defined as military action or any effort in the way o f  God (ft sabil Allah) according to 
Benthall J. and Bellion-Jourdan J147. Hassan Al Turabi responded to economic situation 
at the time o f  famine which threatened Sudan in 1989 by saying that: “We will never 
declare a famine as long as we are an Islamic nation. ...We will never allow international 
aid organizations to do what they want in our country and to oppose the plans o f the 
Islamic Revolution in the South ”148. The priorities o f  NIF reflected in the agenda o f  jihad 
and Islamic revolution were challenged by some internal activists and by international 
community which saw them as a particularly northern Arab and Islamic agenda.
The Sudan, since the military coup of June 1989, is described by its own citizens as a 
failed state with respect to democracy building. The country’s human rights records, 
including torture of political opponents, civil strife, raping of women, exclusion and 
marginalization, are self-evident factors of violence and injustice. According to SOAT149 
that: “In many cases, those arrested by security forces have been taken to unknown 
locations. These detention centres in Greater Khartoum area, where individuals have been 
subject to torture and other methods of physical and mental abuse, are known as Ghost
146 Mahmoud, M. Religion, Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan, A conference 
paper submitted to U.S. Institute o f Peace conference, September 16-17,
1997, p.5. .Available at: httm://www.Usip.org. Accessed 2 August 2006.
147 Benthall J. and Bellion-Jourdan J. The Charitable Crescent, Politics o f 
Aid in the Muslim World. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 2003, p.70
148 Ibid, p. 121
149 SOAT (former SVTG) 1999, 2001, 2004. Reports on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Sudan. March 1998-March 1999. 1999,p.l. Available at: 
www.soatsudan.org/public/ahrr.asp. Accessed on 8/2/2008.
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Houses”. El-Affendi150 criticizes the regime “It is the attitude that undermined the values 
of trust in people, as well as doing away with respect for the individual’s rights which 
was mainly responsible for many human rights violations and acts of cruelty that 
characterized Ingaz [National Islamic Front] revolution under the leadership of Turabi”. 
The practices of NIF during this period tell how Islamists look from inside the skull. The 
cost of such hostile behavior is horrendously high. Unless genuine reconciliation is to 
take place, the implications of these crimes will continue to profound alienation and self- 
exclusion.
Why this has becomes so intimately intertwined with democracy and nation- building? In 
response to this question, first; the mechanism of free elections, which is seen as a useful 
instrument for resolving deep rooted civil conflict have been disastrous. The second 
reason is the unrivalled legitimacy that democracy today enjoys as a form of governance. 
This is particular important when is related to nation-building.
2.3 Social Capital in the Sudan
Sudanese societies have always had mechanisms for social co-operation and solidarity in 
essential tasks and for mutual support. Some local initiatives have been eroded by 
urbanization, the decline of the subsistence economy, rising food insecurity and conflict, 
and compounded by natural factors. It is a mistake for donor agencies and international 
non-governmental organizations, however, to assume as they often do, that formal group 
formation is the only solution to development problems. Many traditional informal forms 
of co-operation have been marginalized and replaced by new structures, often because 
they are invisible to outsiders. Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development 
(ACORD) is a London-based international organization. Its Small Scale Enterprise 
Project in Kassala town, in Eastern Sudan, created a number of NGOs to provide loan
150 El-Affendi A. Sudan’s Turabi and the Crises in Contemporary 
Islamic Movement, this paper is published in the Arab language Al-Quds al 
Arabi on April 25,2006,p. 4( translated by John A. Akec, May 28, 2006). Available at: 
www.sudantribune.com/article. Accessed 17 June 2006.
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assistance instead of working with established local CBOs151. Another example was the 
experience of SECS (1999) in Karton Kassala, a scatter sub-urban area for internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), when SECS decided to establish a branch while there were 
many local groups to work with.
As Robert Chambers152 (1997) noted, the empowerment can not be achieved in the 
absence of institutions. He pointed out the necessity of the new or transformed 
organizations at the group or community level and that they have been increasingly 
recognized by NGOs and governments and have increasingly become the reality.
The functions of community-level organizations range widely from maintaining 
community solidarity to mobilization and management of resources and power to protect 
their communities from the prevailing and powerful yet disappointing state. Other 
functions include provision and improvement of services, claiming and negotiating with 
governments and outside agencies, savings, and income-generating activities. The 
communities of two villages in Kordofan State in Western Sudan; Al Diwakheil and Bit 
Joda, raised funds from Canada Fund Local Initiative (1997 and 1998) to dig a water 
reservoir in Diwakheil and dig a well in Bit Joda. The two communities mobilized their 
own people and neighborhood to successfully complete their work in the two projects. 
Both projects are still working. However, the project in Bit Joda faced difficulties when 
government decided to take over the water management responsibilities from the 
community.
The NGOs and local structures are more cost-effective, equitable and quality manner in
provision and improvement of services compared to state delivery of services,
1 ^particularly in remote areas. Norman Uphoff argues that:
151 ACORD. Annual report, London. 1998, p.7
152 Chambers, R.. Whose Reality Counts? Putting the first last. London:
Intermediate Technology Publications. 1997.
153 Uphoff. Preface in: Blunt, P., and Warren D. M., Indigenous 
Organizations and Development. London: Intermediate Technology. 1996, p.viii
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"In indigenous organization, as with indigenous knowledge, one confronts the 
reality that practices and beliefs are not things to be decided on independently and 
separately. There is a quality of connectedness and embeddedness which 
distinguishes indigenous things from modem things, the latter in Western 
analytical tradition to be separated from each other and judged independently”.
These small informal and formal groups retain a good reputation as trustworthy 
traditional institutions. They usually are not attractive for politicians and local leaders 
because they enforce their own accountability. The reason for the success of these local 
initiatives is that they identify their own priorities, design their responses to local needs. 
Some International NGOs in Sudan have been strengthened through their close 
relationship with local indigenous structures. Good examples are observed by me for 
ACORD intervention in refugee affected areas in Eastern Sudan, where the local 
community succeeded in managing their agricultural activities including extension and 
tractor services. The other success is from OXFAM (GB) in Darfur, Western Sudan, 
where Oxfam has been providing capacity building support to several pastoral and agro­
pastoral community-based organizations since 1995, all of which have been severely 
affected by the current civil strife154.
The local institutions are able to target poor and vulnerable groups. The leaders of these 
local groups are active community members such as teachers, medical assistant, and 
community Sheikh and are aware of the community needs. They also know how to 
mobilize the local resources. The membership of these organizations within the 
community is open and does not exclude any person. The most important issue is that the 
members of these local structures are the poor. The nature of target group, however, has 
changed clearly during the last two decades to include ‘new comers’ due to economic 
crisis which enforces the poorest to be destitute. This all resulted from the macro­
environment and socio-economic conditions as well the introduction of a new category of
154 OXFAM (GB). Report of a Workshop on Capacity Building for 
Empowerment. Jinja, Uganda, 6-8 March 2005.
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low income groups such as soldiers, teachers, junior staff and young people who have 
been fired from jobs.
These local groups are better able to develop effective community participation in 
problem diagnosis, needs assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation. In River 
Nile province, for instance, the local community managed to control the desertification in 
the area by establishing a forestry belt to protect their villages155. The local group 
mobilized the community who participated in establishing community nurseries and by 
raising the awareness of people to self-manage their resources. Women and school 
children contributed in protecting their villages by working in the nurseries. The 
community was also engaged in observing the illegal cutting of trees. The largest impact 
was in increasing women confidence and women were proud to be contributing to 
fighting against desertification and discovering new capabilities and skills in themselves.
Sudanese social systems are based on a high degree of community participation. All 
members participate voluntarily and they are responsible for the performance of their 
local organizations. A good example for participation is the communal work and 
neighborhood relations.
The local NGOs are able to support and strengthen community-based organizations to 
assure the sustainability of the project activities beyond the termination of external 
funding. Public Work (P.W.) is an organization working closely with local communities 
in Diwakheil and Bit Joda, Umrawaba province, Kordofan State, Western Sudan.156 P.W. 
trained women in water management and grain storage. These initiatives are still working 
years after the end of the financial support from Canada Fund.
155 SOS Sahel (UK). Available at: http://www.sahel.org.uk/proerammes/sudan.htm. 
Accessed 25 February 2008.
156 Canada Fund Local Initiatives.. Field Internal Reports. Khartoum, Sudan. 1997-1998.
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CBOs have a crucial role in setting up new forms of partnerships m collaboration with 
government technical departments and agencies particularly in environment related 
issues, public health and agricultural extension and research.
Intermediary NGOs play a role in decentralized decision-making and in democratization 
by promoting popular participation and empowering marginalized groups. The formation 
of interest groups is considered by the intermediary organizations and the CBOs in the 
area as a potential role for NGOs to challenge the weak performance of the state.
NGOs have an influence on reducing the poverty of marginalized areas where no 
government agencies work. These are areas which have poor economic potential and 
where access to social and technical services is very limited. This is true in both urban 
and rural areas in Sudan, where people suffer from severe poverty and lack of resources.
Donor-supported structures and modem organizations more generally tend to require 
literacy and related technical and management skills in order to operate them, thus 
excluding all those whose education has not equipped them for this. In case of Sudan the 
female literacy rate was 49.9% between years 2000 and 2004 compared to 69.2% male 
literacy rate during the same period.157. On the service delivery and supply side, there is 
the small capacity to save, resulting from the low level of real income which is a 
reflection of low productivity which in turn is due largely to lack of capital. This vicious 
circle of poverty is described by Arturo Escobar158 as “A circular relationship exists on 
both sides of the problems of capital formation in the poverty-ridden areas of the world”.
Participation in development is meant to consider what forms of co-operation already 
exist and can be built on. Participation, as empowerment, is also concerned with ways of 
improving the capacity of marginalized population and indigenous groups which are 
potentially capable of strengthening the position within the society of those whose voices
157Britannica, Encyclopedia. Female Literacy Rate in Sudan. 2007. Available at: 
www.encvclopediabritanica.com. Accessed 9 September 2007.
158 Escobar, A. Encountering Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995.p. 76
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are least often heard, not just those with access to the means. Working with women for 
example must take into accounts not only women’s immediate needs but also their roles 
and relationship with the total community.
There are still no satisfying answers to a number of questions such as the impact of 
modem rural development approaches such as food for work programmes on traditional 
forms like communal labor and on local capacity and integrity. Other unresolved issue is 
whether there is a need for new organizational structures. Joachim Ziche and M.A.M. 
Salih159 (1984) raised the following concerns about CBOs in Sudan: 1) Linkage systems 
between formal modem agencies and traditional informal forms; 2) Strategies to 
incorporate local organizations into planned policies; 3) Support of legal and economic 
government to grass-root organizations; and 4) Creation of new social forms instead of 
strengthening the established ones.
These questions are still relevant after more than twenty years of being raised by Ziche 
and Salih in terms o f the role played by the local NGOs and CBOs in development and in 
terms of strengthening the capacity of these local groups to effectively engage in 
development process with other actors.
The diversity of Sudanese community would not be introduced without identifying the 
various types o f local organizations. The typology was also characteristic for example, 
the charitable/service provision versus development/advocacy. The local community, in 
many cases, consciously made efforts to set people’s priorities, design these local 
activities and organizations and to allocate responsibilities and resources in support of 
them. How these different types of the voluntary sector have been classified and managed 
will be mentioned in the next section. The Sudanese voluntary/NGO sector consists of 
different types of work groups, NGOs, and civil society organizations known in different 
Sudanese communities. NGOs including indigenous groups are known to be membership
159 Ziche, J. and M.Salih, M.A.. Traditional Communal Labour and Rural 
Development. Examples from Africa South o f Sahara’. DSRC Seminar No. 49, 
University o f Khartoum. 1984.
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or non-membership organizations which implement activities in their own right, or 
provide support to grassroots organizations such as community-based organizations 
(CBOs) and co-operatives.
2.3.1 Communal Labor Groups
Ziche and Salih160 define communal labor as constituting “ ...people who unite in larger 
groups to solve problems which definitely cannot be solved or at least, not in one time, by 
single persons or very small groups of people”. Another definition from Moore 161that: 
“The joint performance of a task, or a series of sequentially related tasks, by a group of 
persons practicing a minimal division of labor whose relationship to the beneficiaries, of 
their work is other than that of employer to employee”. Ziche, Salih and Moore 
distinguish the communal labour, as informal social structure from local formal 
organizations that they are collective and group solution actions, and they are voluntary. 
On the other hand the deterioration of these work groups in the contemporary context is 
mitigated by the increase in the living cost and therefore by the search for paid work in 
urban centres.
1 f s )Leif O. Manger writes about the significance of two aspects of communal labor in a 
Sudanese context, the ecological context in which communal labor takes place and the 
systems of social organization which define the context within which each groups can be 
mobilized. In terms of ecology, Sudan is a country of great variation, both in 
geographical areas as well as economic factors. The communal labor, such as Nafir, in 
rural agricultural zones is different from the forms of cooperation and support practiced 
in urban communities. In the rural areas the whole community is organized into various 
functional groups such as women group, water committee, village club committee, health 
committee etc. As a matter of fact these functional community structures ensure popular 
participation and establish a close relation between the village and the local
160 Ibid, 1984, p.7
161 Ibid, p.8
162 Manger, L. ed. Communal Labour in the Sudan. Department o f Social 
Anthropology, University o f Bergen. 1987
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administration. Despite of diverse social habits, for example between Eastern Sudan and 
Southern or Western Sudan, the principles of sharing and cooperation are visible. An 
example from Western Sudan could easily demonstrate the environment differences. In 
the North of Western Sudan there is a sand belt and the South is made up of areas of clay 
plains. The rainfall pattern varies from North to South from 100mm to 800mm.
Communal labor is used in all agricultural activities but the most important one is 
weeding due to its short period and to the labor bottleneck where physical efforts are 
made to prepare and clean the land before the heavy rains. In regard to social 
organization the Northern part of Western Sudan where the populations are of Arab 
stock, the mobilization for Nafir is undertaken within a context of patrilineal relatives and 
village neighbors. A great variation in social organization forms is clear in Western 
Sudan where the societies vary from being patrilineal, in the North to being matrilineal in 
the South and duo-lineal in some other places. Despite the different gender role between 
the North and South, the Sudanese women are contributing greatly both in rural 
agricultural areas and in urban settings. Other groups are based on age-system 
membership, where specific age groups are responsible to accomplish specific tasks. If 
successful they will be promoted to higher grade. Recruitment principle is changing from 
being based on kinship and neighborhood to be based on religious identity. The change in 
recruitment pattern has become evident due to several factors: First, the demographic 
changes in rural areas were due to the expansion of mechanized farming and arrival of 
new technology and new comers. Second, the escalation of civil war forced many people 
to leave their areas of origin to safer locations. Third, the imposing of Sharia law in 1983 
by Nimeiri regime changed the social habits, particularly those related to communal labor 
such as drinking of alcohol. The culture and tradition of ceremony accompanied the work 
group has changed from ordinary beer-drinking to Islamic prayers.
Communal labor groups in Sudan are diverse and fall into ten main categories as follows:
1. Reciprocal work (or labor exchange) groups: households work in rotation on each 
other’s fields. Membership is clearly defined and each group is bounded with exclusive
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membership. The members each receive as much labor from the others as he or she gives 
to them. The group has a formal leadership for direction and problem-solving.
2. Festive labor such as Aiad Alar as and Al Bulug: A host is preparing food and drinks 
and inviting people to work. It is not a strict group and no permanent organization. 
Organizational skills are required on the part of the host in order to obtain the labor 
needed.
3. Age Specific Labor Group: The criterion for the membership of age group is constant. 
The work groups undertake work which has to do with the role of the age-set group in 
society. An example of work labor for this group is construction and maintenance of 
community buildings, cultivation, etc. Francis Mading Deng163 (1974: 184) describes the 
age-set systems: “Initiation into age-set subjects young men to severe physical pain, 
which tests their valor and warrior spirit. To endure the pain of the operation involved 
means maturity and ability to face responsibilities of a warrior. But more physical pain 
follows initiation, in the form of institutionalized fights with age-sets immediately senior 
to the newly initiated age-sets”.
4. Custodial labor: It is a type of a forced labor where participation is based on power 
relations like work group undertaken by prisoners for the senior officers or the public. 
People here have to work for stronger traditional and political leadership and authority.
5. Nafir and Faza: These are the terms used for work group in Sudan. They are common 
forms of inter-household co-operation organized on the basis of lineage, gender or, more 
frequently, representing an all-inclusive community group. In Northern Sudan, for 
example, people call Nafir or Faza meaning emergency call to mobilize community to 
contract flood defenses. The work in communal labor is divided based on gender, and 
age. For example women in Northern Sudan contribute in construction work by preparing
163 Deng, F. Mading, Dinka Folktales African Stories from the Sudan, New York: Africana Publishing 
Company. 1974, p. 184
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food for the participants, while women in Western Sudan are sharing by building and 
they are also active in agricultural activities such as weeding and harvesting.
6. Hierarchically organized groups: According to Ziche and Salih164 (1984) this type is 
disappearing because the traditional leaders who used to mobilize these groups have been 
replaced by modem leaders and other non-traditional elements, which do not have the 
basis on which to organize such labour.
7. Bride-service group: It is a type of work group when young man is in bride-service. It 
is a reciprocal work between age mates [12-20 years]. 4-8 men work in agricultural 
activities, house building and fencing of garden or houses. It has two forms- the bride 
service and age-mates. The practices of sharing in the preparation of wedding, for 
example, are well known in most areas of Sudan amongst the young people both male 
and female. This social value of sharing and supporting each other continues beyond the 
age zone as a habit encouraged by the community.
8. Hakuma [literally meaning government], according to Magner165 is a labor institution 
known in South of Nuba Mountain, organizing cleaning of peanuts, participation in 
weeding and in house building. Members of Hakuma are around 30 holding different 
ranks and grades in organization. They also collect money in a collection box. The money 
is collected from members as membership fees and fines paid by those who are not 
following rules and regulations. This money may later be distributed among the members 
or used for collective goals. Women can be organized in their own Hakumas which are 
smaller and informal. They work in each other’s field or pay money instead. Women are 
also members of men’s Hakumas.
164 Ziche, J. and M.Salih, M.A.. Traditional Communal Labour and Rural 
Development. Examples from Africa South o f Sahara’. DSRC Seminar No. 49, 
University o f Khartoum. 1984.
165 Manger, L. ed. Communal Labour in the Sudan. Department o f Social 
Anthropology, University o f Bergen. 1987, p. 82
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9. The other institution for mobilizing labor in the Nuba Mountains is called ‘Maliki,166 
from ‘malik or king’ [maliki also meaning civilian]. It differs from Hakuma in that grades 
system is not applied. Members are not more than 20. Maliki members are not fined for 
bad conduct. Membership can overlap and one member can be a member of more than 
one labor institution.
10 iBaramka’> institution is another type of group efforts initiated by Bagara Arabs, a 
pastoralists group in Western Sudan, as a ceremony for tea drinking. According to Arber 
cited in Manger :”for instance there were strict rules as to how a member should hold 
his tea-glass, using only two fingers at the top of the glass. The glass should further-more 
not be emptied, but some tea should always be left. The glasses would be put on a tray for 
a judge to decide whether someone had done it wrong, and the wrong-doers would be 
fined”. The Baramka used money boxes for savings which they then contributed to the 
community co-operative mill. Baramka is another example in Sudan of hierarchically 
based communal labor. According to Ziche and Salih168 that Baramka labor was assigned 
to working the fields of the leaders or to repair community owned wells or village 
connection roads. Arber relates the origin of Nuba Mountain work groups to Baramka 
institutions.
In Southern Sudan other forms of social co-operation have been introduced by Pari 
society in East Equatorial province. The two principles of their social organizations are 
the age set and the lineage systems. The Pari are the youngest branch of the Nilotic group 
including the Acholi, Anuak, and Shulluk Membership is based on friendship, respect and 
loyalty. Companies are other advanced form institution where members are accountable 
to a local law called the Book Law. They are the most important work group among the
166 Ibid, p.82
167 Ibid, p.97
168 Ziche, J. and M. Salih, M.A.. Traditional Communal Labour and Rural 
Development. Examples from Africa South of Sahara’. DSRC Seminar No. 49, 
University o f Khartoum. 1984.
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Acholi. Membership in these groups is exclusive and it is a right. The ‘Book of law’ 
consists of rules and laws accepted by each member. The use of work groups is not 
evaluated in economic terms. The social aspect is more decisive. Members are fined in 
two cases when shrinking work and when a member wants to have his/her name 
withdrawn from the book of law. They are very strict that everyone should offer the same 
amount of labor and be paid the same amount of beer. The fines are kept by a cashier and 
this money can be spent later on a feast. Women also forming own companies and have a 
book of law. Women usually are more involved in weeding and harvesting compared to 
men.
2.3.2 Migrant Associations in Urban Centers:
Migrant associations are known in Sudan as Rabitat Abna [the tie that binds the sons]. 
They are established by migrants settled in the main towns like Khartoum, Wad Medani, 
Port Sudan etc., in order to serve the interest of their members and their communities.
Migrant associations are regional and tribal initiatives. They represent their villages and 
follow up matters concerning their communities with the central authorities. They are 
particularly active in disaster and emergency time. They play crucial facilitating and fund 
raising role.169
Historically, migration in Sudan has been largely the movement of men. In most 
agricultural schemes in Sudan, there are small scatter villages around the scheme. Men 
come first to work and then families follow them. Most rural-urban migration may be 
characterized as labor migration. The mass movement of men from their rural areas has
169
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important inputs both in the rural economy and on the rural social organization. To 
complete our overview of migration in Sudan we have to look at what we might call the 
rural-urban interaction including the new emerging social organizations like migrant 
association, their role and identity.
Of critical importance is the immigration pattern and changes associated with the motive, 
which is not always political. Francis Deng170, for instance describes the current realities 
of Dinka social change and migration to northern towns: ’’Migration first began with 
young men who saw in the modem market an opportunity for independent wealth. Within 
the tribe, there is no paid labor. But more important, because of the Dinka’s intense pride, 
paid labor is seen as servility and is regarded as inappropriate for a gentleman. Therefore, 
it must be carried out far away from the Dinka girls and in a country where it will no 
matter”.
On the other hand Harir171 describes the impact of the ideology and the policies of 
marginalization and neglect as follows: “Regional clubs started to sprout in the capital. 
Although some of these regional clubs were older than from that date, the majority came 
to existence after October 1964. Thus regionalism, which was strongly abhorred before 
1964, people having in mind the regional civil war which was going on in the Southern 
Sudan, now began to gain respectability”. The same root causes of social injustice and 
exclusion are the main motive behind the current civil war in Darfur region and they 
could be the reasons for potential civil war in other areas of the country.172
The role of migrant associations could be defined as how the new arrived migrants 
responded to urban conditions, and also highlighted by Parkin cited in
170 Deng, F. Mading, Dinka Folktales African Stories from the Sudan, New York: Africana Publishing 
Company. 1974, p. 194
Harir, S. Old-Timers and New-Comers, Politics and Ethnicity in a 
Community Bergen Occasional Papers in Social 
Anthropology No. 29. 1983, p. 102
172 Hamid El-Bashir, 2008. Wars of Periphery; Darfur then Kordufan. Available at: www.sudanile.com
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1 73Pratten :’...migrants from egalitarian tribes adapt to the urban class system by using 
traditional social units and arranging them in some hierarchy by formalizing certain of 
their activities through associations’.
These ethnic associations represent their communities and are accountable to the broader 
community. They are elected members performing their duties in irregular way but they 
are always available in emergency and during crisis. Women are not normally 
represented in these male dominated institutions. In the recent years migrant students, 
both male and female, are increasingly forming their own associations focusing primarily 
on solving problems facing migrant students. This is mainly due to the increasing number 
of students accepted in urban settings. They are also active during school holidays 
arranging health, cultural and educational campaigns in their villages.174 Ethnic political 
associations were banned in Sudan in 1969. There is however a number of urban 
community-based associations representing minority ethnic groups like the Nuba 
Mountain, Shulluk, Mahas and Beja groups. The major role of these groups is the 
preservation of indigenous and cultural identity. Some of them play a rather political role 
as pressure groups and as symbols of ethnic unity. Most of these ethnic migrant 
associations are organized based on their areas of origin such as Shuluk of Gogrial, Dinka 
of Aweel, and Dinka of Bour.
The migrant associations are considered as both a form of community-based 
organization, and as intermediaries between government and donor agencies and their 
communities in the provision and improvement of services and social infrastructure in the
173 Pratten, D. and Ali Baldo, S. Return to the Roots: Processes of  
Legitimacy in Sudanese Migrant Associations in: M. Edwards and D, Hulme 
(eds.) NGO Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic Bullet, London:
Earthscan, 1996, p. 13.
174
El Nagar, S.h., algamiat alahlia wa al islam alsiasi fi el sudan, madbuli press, Cairo, Egypt, 2006,pp.71- 
72.
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fields of education, health, water supply and agriculture. They are key participants in the 
mobilizing, facilitating and channeling of resources. An example of the response of 
migrant association to rural emergency during the flood of 1988 is illustrated by A1
17SBatahani : “In August 1988 El Siyasa newspaper reported that, ‘During the rains and 
flood disasters of 1988, the state apparatus stood like a mud-house in the middle of a sea 
of water and inertia”. A1 Batahani continues:
“Meanwhile, in the former Northern Region, migrant associations lobbied 
government miniseries for supplies, rented trucks or planes, and transported 
medical personnel, drugs, food and shelter to their rural communities where 
committees were established to target and monitor distribution. Some of the worst 
affected villages in 1988 were in Rural Karima Council, and on the basis of early 
warnings for the floods of 1994, associations made announcements on national 
television and on Omdurman Radio, calling upon all ’sons’ of the area to return 
home and help build flood defenses. Indeed, it is significant that, unlike 1988, 
associations from the Rural Karima Council, co-coordinated their actions and 
formed a joint committee to collect damage and needs’ assessment reports which 
were presented to relevant ministries.”
Another example of projects sponsored by or through migrant associations are in the 
education sector, mainly the construction and maintenance of primary schools in El 
Hagiz village in Western Sudan, and in the provision of drinking water in El Diwakhil in 
Western Sudan, Dalawat and Tibabe in central Sudan, Arab Haj, El Gurier and Ibadab in 
Northern Sudan, in the delivery of health facilities in El Sireha, Wad el Bur villages in 
central Sudan. These are projects supported by Canada Fund for Local Initiative (1999) in 
Sudan during the period between 1995 and 2000.
175 Pratten, D. and Ali Baldo, S. Return to the Roots: Processes of 
Legitimacy in Sudanese Migrant Associations in: M. Edwards and D, Hulme 
(eds.) NGO Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic Bullet, London: 
Earthscan, 1996, p. 43
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Women are rarely encouraged to participate in migrant associations. Their exclusion from 
urban voluntary work was seen in many cases due to their increasing family role as 
household heads. The period of the 1980s and 1990s experienced the mass influx of male 
immigrants outside the Sudan due to civil strife and economic crisis. A few associations 
supported women in traditional handcraft production, income generating activities, 
training in small scale enterprises like dress-making, embroidery. However, a major 
contribution has been made by migrant women during the floods of 1988 by donating 
gold and money to emergency fund-raising campaign for their villages. Ideally, migrant 
women themselves should have a much greater role in defining their needs and acting 
upon them and their community ones.
The role of migrant associations in the management and support of these local efforts is 
very essential as a social force within local institutional development framework. The 
migrant associations are no substitute for government. They cooperate with the local 
authorities, donor agencies, non-governmental organizations and community-based 
institutions, to strengthen jointly development efforts.
2.3.3 Cooperative Groups:
For a long period in 1960s and 1970s development planners in Sudan considered 
cooperatives to be the only genuine form of organized self-help. Externally, Sudan was 
an active member of Non-allied States’ Movement in 1950s and 1960s and had been
17 f iinspired by the notion of national liberation and socialism . The origin of co-operative 
movement also has been related to the traditional informal practices in Sudanese societies 
during the years of 1920s and 1930s. The law of the co-operative associations of 1948 
was based on these traditional structures of social informal co-operation. They are formal 
registered groups, composed of males, females or both. They work on a shares’ basis in 
goods, mainly for consumption, and in productive businesses. They have bad reputation 
in Sudan because of weak management and operational problems. The rules and
176 Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, 1974. Democracy on Trial: Reflections on Arab and African Affairs. 
London: Andre Deutsche.
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regulations of co-operatives are official, made by the government and therefore do not 
protect the members’ interest. The field of the work of the co-operatives associations is 
attractive for government officials who are familiar with the market and commodities.
177Nidhi Srinivas shares experience from India and agrees that: “As the co-operative 
becomes viable it can attract the unwelcome attention of government bureaucrats and 
local politicians intent on controlling it for their own purpose”. This explanation agrees 
with the remarks of Hans Hedlund178 that: “ ... experience has shown that state-controlled 
cooperatives that are used as transmission belts for implementing the government’s 
policy do not mobilize people’s resources for development”. This also explains why 
people decided to engage in community-based initiatives rather than participating in 
associations that have degenerated into state-controlled development tools.
In addition to the social forms of cooperation, community-based and self-help 
organizations, a number of professional associations have been created. Most of these 
organizations are formed by elites and educated people, some of them were dismissed by 
the present regime in early 1990s. The following section describes some of their 
objectives and main activities which vary from human rights, child protection, gender 
equality and legal aid to broader community development.
2.3.4 Professional Groups:
The common feature of the professional associations is that some of them are registered 
as profit-making companies with Ministry of Justice. Therefore they fulfill their 
responsibility like other private sector business and pay their taxes. Some of them believe 
that by registering with the Ministry of Justice that distant them from the direct control
177 Srinivas, N., Taking count o f the depth of the ditches: Understanding local 
organization forms, their problems, and strategic responses, In: Blunt P., and 
Warren D. Michael. Indigenous Organizations and Development, London:
Intermediate Technology, 1996 p. 150
178Hedlund, H.,ed. Cooperatives Revisited: Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Ghana. Seminars Proceedings No.21, Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian
Institute o f African Studies. 1988, pp.7-15. Available at: http://books.google.ca. Accessed 22
July 2008.
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and observation of Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and its meticulous registration 
process. They get their financial support from donor agencies, locally or externally, 
consultancy, research and training. Most importantly, they are driven by voluntary values 
and humanitarian cause. They work as implementing and intermediary organizations. 
Most of their beneficiaries are IDPs, women, street children, victims of torture and rural 
and urban poor. They provide training, research and technical assistance to grass-roots 
organizations, NGOs, civil society organizations, private sector and government. They 
work, like NGOs, in similar activities such as human rights, peace building, and conflict 
resolution. They are also active in advocacy, influence of policies, and local, regional and 
international networking. In brief they represent a point of convergence for the interests 
of diverse groups, and at the same time, a space for consultation, dialogue and actions. 
Other professional associations, defined as modem forces, focus on occupational matters 
and union activities such as medical doctors, women, lawyers, agriculturalists etc.
On the other hand, the professional associations are different from NGOs in many ways. 
They are not registered by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). The disadvantage 
of this is that they are not exempted from taxes. They can not be member of networks 
which are registered by HAC. The latter requires that an NGO to be registered first at 
HAC then to be member of a network. Professional associations also differ from NGOs 
in that they don’t have general assembly. They do have however a trustee board or 
executive committee. Most of the professional associations are owned by not less than 
two persons according to the law. The limitation of this is that they are not accountable to 
constituencies. Few of them have structured institutions. Under the current regime NGOs 
and professional organizations are both at risk and they can easily be closed or suspended 
by security authority.
From the above background and discussion, it is evident that the history of NGOs in 
Sudan has followed a circuitous route. Beginning with what could be properly called self- 
help and local initiatives to the current situation where independent civic and professional 
organizations are more issue and advocacy oriented. This development itself is an 
indication of the different social forces at play at different periods in the rapidly evolving 
process of social change. The following are examples of these professional organizations:
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Gender Centre for Research & Training (GCRT)
GCRT was established by women activists in 1997 in Khartoum. Its main general 
objectives are: a) Training targeted groups in the field of gender and development, b) 
Study and analyze the social, economic and legal policies and their implications on 
gender issues, c) create and develop women skills, particularly the poorest women, 
through small development projects.179.
GCRT focuses its activities on the following: training to raise awareness on gender 
discrimination; conduct studies and researches for better understanding of the concept of 
gender, causes and analysis of inequality; create network between those of common 
interest to increase solidarity and building capacity in gender and development. GCRT 
also undertakes studies and training in the following areas: women in development, 
women and democracy, women and structural adjustment, women and employment and 
women and poverty. Its membership is accessible to all women. Recent publications 
include: (1) Peace Program and Gender Issues: Women within Machacos Agreement, 
Bridging Gender Gaps. Khartoum: 2005. (2) Engendering the Peace Process in Sudan: 
Conceptual and Contextual Framework. Khartoum: 2005. In 2004 GCRT wins the Betty 
Plewes award which is created by the Canadian Council for International Cooperation to 
honour its former President-CEO, and is granted to an African non-governmental 
organization engaged in research and policy development on issues of priority to 
women.180 (Inter Pares, 2004).
Main achievements: awareness raising of gender issues, rights and democratization 
among civil society organizations, incorporation of gender into development activities,
179 GCRT. Annual Report. (Unpublished report). 2003, p.6
180 Inter Pares. Inter Pares Publications Bulletin, September 2004. Available 
at: http://www.interpares.ca. Accessed on 10 February 2008.
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advocacy for women rights, participation in and establishment of networks and alliances 
with other NGOs and CSOs181.
Babiker Badri Scientific Association for Women Studies (BBSAWS)
BBSAWS was established in 1979 in Omdurman. Its membership was open to all 
women. Its main objectives are to: eradicate malpractices, female circumcision in 
particular; establish training centers for rural women; work to support democratization; 
advocate women’s political rights; develop social and economic women skills. BBSAWS 
produced recently a package of six studies in various regions in Sudan addressing conflict 
resolution and peace building issues. The studies reflected the peace local knowledge and 
lessons from Sudanese communities in armed conflict areas of Darfur region, Southern 
Sudan, Kordofan, and Blue Nile region. The study was supported by NOVIB (OXFAM 
Netherlands). Main achievements: awareness raising of and fighting all types of mal­
practices, particularly fight against female circumcision, emphasis on the necessity and 
importance of rural development and involvement of young generation in rural 
development efforts, research and studies, publication and dissemination of information 
and knowledge of gender, peace building, education issues182.
Main challenges facing Sudanese women since 1989 according to BBSAWS:
Public Order Law which restricts women freedom; Dress type imposed on women 
working in the public sector and university students; Decisions and regulations affected 
women freedom, for example the Khartoum State governor’s decision not allowing 
women to work in public cafeterias, hotels and petrol stations and all other jobs requiring 
women to work in night shifts; Problems related to women employment promotion. 
Women are not occupying senior positions in the government institutions; Sudanese 
government did not sign CEDAW, the international agreement against gender 
discrimination. Problems related to Personal Status Law; Low representation of women
181 GCRT. Annual Report. (Unpublished report). 2003, p.2
182 BBSAWS. 2008. Available at: www.ahfad.org. Accessed 12 Feb. 2008.
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in the political and decision-making positions; Dismissal of women working in the 
government, 54, 8% of women lost their jobs since the NIF coup in 1989.
Khartoum Centre for Human Rights and Development of Environment
It was established in May 2001 in Khartoum.
Main objectives: 1) Introduction of human rights and human rights education and 
strengthening principles of human rights in the international agreements, particularly 
those ratified by the Sudanese government; 2) Declaration of rule of law principles and 
independence of jurisdiction; 3) Women participation in development; 4) Raising 
awareness of child rights and engagement of children in development; 5) Contribution in 
awareness rising on conservation of environment; and 6) Attention to assist IDPs affected 
by war and desertification.
Main area of activities: awareness raising and education on human rights and provision of 
legal aid to victims of human rights violations. Relation with government: The centre is 
registered as a voluntary organization with Humanitarian Aid Commission. The centre 
participates in workshops and seminars on human rights organized by Ministry of Justice 
in collaboration with UNDP. Suspicion and accusation from the government toward the 
centre and staff centre are questioned by security office.
Mutawinat Group
It was established in 1990 as a company registered at Ministry of Justice. Main 
objectives: working for rights o f vulnerable women and children in Sudan; provision of 
human rights education; legal services and advocacy. Main components: Mutawinat 
(2000) consists of three offices: 1) The legal office responsible for the direct legal aid 
program; 2) The development office focuses on strategic planning and fund raising; and 
3) the research, documentation and training office for effort in social scientific research 
and public education.
Main achievements:
183 A1 Kharasani, B. GCRT workshop on structural adjustment policies. 2001. Khartoum.
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Establishment of AFAG (Horizon) organizations in 1998, under the umbrella of 
Mutawinat, to focus on juvenile justice; direct legal aid; for example legal aid for 
imprisoned women; Legal literacy programs; Training in human rights; Para legal 
training; Publication/library; Studies and researches, example is the review of all 
legislation discriminating against women; Human rights education and national 
legislation; and combating harmful traditional practices.
Relation with others: Donors and external partners: African Women Alliance; Caritas 
(USA); Christian Aid; Fredrich Ebert Foundation (Germany); National Endowment for 
Democracy (USA); OXFAM Australia; NOVIB; SC Sweden; SC UK; Urgent Action 
Fund (USA).
Relation with government: Mutawinat is registered as a company with Ministry of 
Justice. Registration as a company was considered by Mutawinat during group strategic 
planning sessions in 2004. The group strategic report, however did not elaborate further 
on the weaknesses and strengths of being registered as a company.
Sudanese Women’s Empowerment for Peace (SuWEP)
SuWEP is a network consisting from following organizations from both Northern and 
Southern Sudan: Civil Society Network for Peace; National Democratic Alliance Group 
for Peace; National Working Committee for Peace; Non-Partisan Group Southern Sector; 
Nuba Women Group for Peace and Development; SPDF Women Group; SPLM - United 
Women Group; SPLM/A Women Group; and The Southern Women Group for Peace. 
SuWEP was a unique women group which contributed significantly to the peace 
processes and laid strong foundation for dialogue, good understanding, respect and joint 
efforts. Sudanese women for the first time found the opportunity to engage effectively in 
the negotiation and discussions on issues such identity, rights and social justice.
2.4 Challenges Encountering Traditional Structures. CBOs and NGOs
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The wider contexts of Sudanese voluntary sectors’ and NGOs’ approaches to 
development and change were discussed in the previous section depending on when they 
took place. The internal mandate of these local dynamics to provide services or even 
enjoy community was evolved with the experience, and with the change in the political, 
economic and social context.
Overall, the initiation and the processes of Sudanese local voluntary sector require 
allocation of resources, time and effort. While informal structures have the attraction of 
flexibility and interaction, it was clear that reliance on ad hoc allocations in the Sudanese 
context has limited the productivity of certain efforts.
Lack o f understanding of development concept is one of the main problems facing CBOs 
and traditional social structures. The absence of joint and common understanding of the 
principles and values of development lead to scatter efforts of social forces, lack of 
coordination, competition and unnecessary tension amongst NGOs, and CBOs and 
between them and the government.
The different social forces that are supposed to work together to promote local 
institutional development are operating without coordination and co-operation. This is 
particularly true with government agencies at central and local level, private sector and 
voluntary groups.
Resistance is a problem encountering most of independent NGOs and CBOs who are not 
serving the interest of the government and local elites. The reasons for the opposition 
could be political, social or economic. Under the present macro environment the 
government establishes its own bodies known as Popular Committees [PCs] in each 
residential area. The purpose of these structures is for control and security. The members 
of the PCs are either selected or appointed on political basis. The PCs are accountable to 
the political system and they are not representing their communities by any means. Their 
activities focus on political mobilization and advocacy for government policies. PCs do 
not allow NGOs both International and local to work without permission. They create
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barriers to prevent them linking directly with community-based organizations and 
indigenous groups. According to Human Rights Watch184: "A neighborhood network of 
popular committees, created by the current government, provides a means to control 
residential areas where demonstrations also played a political role in topping past 
governments. These committees, too, cannot go beyond the ’red line' to defend the 
interests of residents against the government- such as opposing government demolitions 
of its members' homes".
Lack of democracy within NGOs and CBOs is an area of concern for local initiatives. 
Decision-making is top-down and they lack group consultation. These difficulties face 
organizations with unaccountable leadership and as well encounter communities that are 
not prepared to assume their role as partners in decision-making and in management.
1 SSCarel Drijver differentiates between the social reach of participation and the functional 
reach. He defines the depth of the social reach as “the extent to which the specific target 
groups of the project participate, without intermediaries”. The functional reach 
dimension, according to Drijver, focuses on the content of participation.
NGOs that formed and supported by governments are manipulated to serve the interest of 
the regimes, mainly in areas of security and control. Other similar groups are involved in 
profit-making and business. A number o f such organizations benefit from tax exemption 
facilities and import items for business purpose. The result of these practices is creation 
of business minded groups and individuals within these organizations. The investments 
include profit-making companies, transportation and donations from financial institutions 
such as banks, public and private companies186.
184 Human Rights Watch. Behind The Red Line, Political Repression in Sudan. New 
York: Human Rights Watch/Africa. 1996, p. 8
185 Drijver, C. People’s Participation in Environmental projects in 
Developing Countries. Issues Paper No. 17 March 1990. International Institute for 
Environment and Development. 1990, pp. 3-4
186
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To grasp the contemporary Sudanese NGOs; their identity, autonomy and direction, it is 
important to recognize how they have been initiated and what motivated them? Our 
interest here includes as well the present new forms of consultancy groups which 
registered as companies and are involved in development activities. The influence and 
encouragement of international organizations and donor agencies in the formation and 
initiation of these groups can not be ignored. This is particularly true when there is an 
urgent need for independent organizations. Other factor contributed to the creation of 
these organizations is the inappropriate government policies such as dismissal of staff. In 
reality the activities of these professional groups are similar to NGOs. We are unaware, 
however, about their accountability, decision-making process and their unclear role of 
being registered as companies and their performance as NGOs.
Among the many difficulties Sudanese NGOs and CBOs encounter, several are problems 
of organizational and institutional capacity building which can be summarized in the 
following areas:
- Internal governance including democratic practices, rotation of leadership, 
representation of board members, executive committee and staff members;
- Negotiation with intermediary NGOs, government departments, banks, private sector 
and donor agencies.
- Mobilization and management of local and external resources.
- Management and development skills in needs assessment, problem diagnosis, planning, 
finance and budgeting, monitoring and evaluation.
- Conflict resolution skills, listening, learning, understanding and addressing the needs of 
different interest groups within the community.
- Initiation and collaboration with other communities to learn from each other and to 
share and solve common problems.
El Nagar, S.h., algamiat alahlia wa al islam alsiasi fi el sudan, madbuli press, Cairo, Egypt, 2006,p.l41.
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2.5 Copclusion
There is a strong argument in the last two decades that some of the traditional informal 
practices we have traced, beginning with Nafirs, Nadi al Kherigin (Graduates' Club), 
Sandugs, migrant initiatives, have nearly spent themselves. This evidence has been 
backed by the government neglect, marginalization and lack of interest in supporting 
local efforts. NGOs and CSOs represent one source of social capital for poor and 
marginalized people. The neglect of voluntary sector by the governments and the 
ineffectiveness and inappropriateness of development policies impede the capacity of 
voluntary sector and therefore the forms of local initiatives such as self-help and self- 
reliant efforts will also be affected. The political climate surrounding civil society rights 
is characterized by a religious fundamentalism in the country on the one hand and free 
market and cultural globalization on the other, which has exacerbated preexisting 
political and social divisions.
On the other hand there are still social forces and community based organizations which 
have asserted themselves, notably the silent and peaceful revolt of Sudanese societies 
against official apparatus of injustice and instability. It is evident that communities, 
which were historically poor by measuring of income and economic capital, revealed 
strong resources of social capital in the planning and visioning process. It is also true that 
groups that have strong social network and trust will do better at working together in the 
future. However, it has been more difficult to accomplish participation in conflict or 
vertical communities. Few people have the opportunity to engage actively in the 
economic and political lives of their communities. The dangerous potential for human 
strife that often emerges from the irresistible urge for people’s participation clashing with 
the inflexible systems must be recognized.
Mutual co-operation in the Sudanese history takes the form of a continuing struggle over 
the distribution of incomes and access to benefits and services, in which solidarity gives 
strength to those who have neither income nor assets.
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The increasing attention of the potential of local initiative conies as a result of the forced 
abandonment of the state responsibilities for social services and subsidies. This tendency 
in the absence of public sector and with some support from the non-governmental 
organizations becomes rather a substitute but not a solution to the problems encountering 
local institutional development. As Alan Fowler187 describes it: “Reform will require the 
creation of new political institutions that recognize and incorporate traditional social 
structures rather than oppressing them. In other words a political reordering that is better 
informed by indigenous values and is able -  through inclusive coalitions -  to 
democratically reconcile divergent demands resulting from ethnic diversity, class 
differentiation and modernization from a peripheral position within the global economy”. 
It can be imagined that both social forces, private and public sectors are being involved in 
the creation of alternative developmental strategies in which development projects are 
seen as policy experiment and subject to constant change.
These informal institutions have difficulties handling management and leadership and the 
power that comes with it, like any other local groups. This, however, should not detract 
from the many positive features of social cohesion, solidarity and local integrity. The 
factors which make these local initiatives more successful and sustainable lie in their 
emphasis on addressing community needs and on the process and outcome.
This chapter is about traditional structures and NGOs in the Sudan. It provides 
information on their growth and development, their features and their contribution to 
social development and discusses some of their problems. This background is necessary 
for understanding the social and political contexts of the contemporary Sudan which 
affect the dynamics and functioning of CSOs. The rise of Islamic movement and the 
position of CSOs and NGOs will be discussed in the following chapter.
187 Fowler, A. Non-Governmental Organizations as Agents o f Democratization: An African Perspective, 
International Development Journal, Vol. 5, No.3. 1993, pp. 325-339.
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CHAPTER THREE
CIVIL SOCIETY: TOTALITARIANISM. PLURALISM AND CHALLENGES
FOR THE FUTURE
3.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the present political situation including the regime’s institutions 
and its social organizations on the one hand and the position of social and political 
oppositions on the other. The chapter shows how the Islamic movement uses religion and 
power to sustain and protect a system which has lost its credibility and legitimacy among 
many Sudanese citizens.
The Sudanese political parties and voluntary organizations were the core groups of civil 
society that contributed to the independence and to the democratization processes in the 
country. The Sudanese civil society organizations achieved remarkable results reflected 
in their coping mechanisms with the current totalitarian regime. Without these social 
forces, the plural political systems are always at risk. The emergence and triumph of the 
civil society between 1955 and 1969 were influenced by the spirit of the struggle for 
independence and by the fight for democracy and social justice. The period between 1970 
and 1989 showed both the crises of the military dictatorship and the one party system and 
the sluggish democratic regime which failed to meet the upfront challenges for the social 
and political changes. The people of the Sudan succeeded between 1955 and 1989 to 
achieve independence (1956) and overthrow two military regimes in 1964 and 1985. 
These radical political changes in 1964 and 1985 were initiated, designed, mobilized and 
managed by historical political parties and the civil society forces. The description of 
main political parties, their initiation and main objectives will provide background 
information of these parties and will show some of the dynamics between them and the 
prevailing democratic processes.
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This chapter will focus on the use of Islam by the state in the Sudan. The authoritarian 
incumbents have clung on to power since June 1989 and mobilized the state resources 
and its institutions to serve political Islam interest. The multicultural and multiethnic 
Sudanese context has yet to confront the legacy of its current situation, an outcome of the 
dominance of NIF over all other regions. However, this accusation is not directed to the 
NIF alone. Historically, other regimes in the Sudan had been criticized for the abuse of 
power. It is also known that the political leaders often call Islam into play during crises. 
The good example was the declaration of Sharia laws by Nimeiri in 1983. The other 
example of abuse of Islam and power was when an alliance of Islamists from the Umma 
Party, National Unionist Party and Muslim Brothers led to the dissolution of the 
Sudanese Communist Party in 1965 and the expulsion of its democratically ellected 
members from the constituent assembly. This trend was intensified after the coup of 
1989. The Islamic movements used the institutions of the state to structure and legitimate 
its hegemony. The state apparatus propagates the ruling party’s policies, strategies and 
ideology and provides it with the means for exercise of coercion, and gives it the material 
resources to divide the society.
This approach contributes to other studies of Sudanese politics by highlighting, in 
historical context, that the rise of Islamic movement can be viewed as part of the decline 
of local community as the center of social capital. Clearly, the Islamic movement has not 
brought into being the future envisioned by Sudanese. Moreover, in Sudan as elsewhere, 
once Islamic regime discourse is appropriated as the language of an authoritarian regime, 
its ability to serve as an agent for social change is surely compromised.
This chapter consists of five main sections. The first section focuses on the rise of the 
National Islamic Front (NIF), its growth and development from a small political party to 
the third political power, based on the election of 1985/1986 and to a party of full ruling 
power as a result of the NIF military coup of 1989. It also discusses and analyzes the 
nature of the government organizations and the causes leading to the failure of the 
Islamic project in the country. The second part discusses the NIF - NGOs/CSOs relations. 
It discusses the impact of the peace process and the signing of the CPA in January 2005
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and to what extent the peace agreement affects the work of the civil society. The third 
section presents the positions and the role of the main political parties and civil society, 
the impact of the colonial period and the impact of the democratization processes. The 
forth section is an attempt to raise issues of concern and to discuss the way out as an 
alternative approach contributing to the improvement of the present situation. The last 
section summarizes the main issues of the chapter and offers an overall assessment of 
these issues.
3.2 The Rise of Islamic Movement
3.2.1 Islamic Movement Post Independence
The Sudanese Islamic movement historically started as an offshoot of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood movement in mid-1940s. The Unified Sudanese Muslim 
Brotherhood Organization was established in 1954. Ten years later, in 1964, the 
movement established a political organization called the Islamic Charter Front. It was 
originally shaped by its student origins and came to be seen as an urban-centered modem 
movement, compared to the tradition-bound Sufi orders (Khatmiyyah) and the Umma 
Party (Ansar). It was Hassan Al-Turabi, their thinker, who changed the movement’s 
nature and course of action. In the period between 1964 and 1969, the Islamic movement 
grew like a pressure group, advocating for an Islamic constitution, a project that was 
supported by both the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah sects. This and other reasons lead to 
Nimeiri’s coup of May 1969. A major contributing factor in the dissolution of the 
Sudanese Communist Party in 1965 was the aggressive drive of the Islamists, together 
with the Umma Party and the National Unionist Party188.
Turabi took a pragmatic approach towards the Nimeiri regime (1969-1985) and became 
after 1971 the only politically active party. Turabi was appointed to the post of the
188 Mahmoud, M. Islam and Islamization in Sudan: The Islamic National Front. Conference paper; Religion, 
Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan, U.S. Institute o f Peace Conference September 16-17, 1997. Available at: 
C:/Documents and Settings/admin/my documents/Sudan/Islam and Islamization in Sudan by Mohamed 
Mahmoud.htm
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Attorney General in 1979 and the Muslim Brothers were found to have become members 
in the cabinet and in other important positions in key government institutions. This 
reflects the anti-democratic nature of the Islamic movement and its opportunistic 
approach by aligning itself with Nimeiri’s regime and its institutions in the late 1970s. 
The most important factor, however, was to infiltrate the regime’s organizations and 
create official venues for campaigning for Islamization. The other crucial factor was to 
gain grounds for the movement’s economic foundation, based on the formula of Islamic 
banking and investment. This period witnessed an increase in the number of branches 
opened by the Faisal Islamic Bank and an increase in the Islamic women dress. The 
climax of the movement’s infiltration and empowerment strategies reached in 1983 when 
Nimeiri declared the September Sharia Laws. Mohamed Mahmoud describes this period 
as: "Public and private spaces were declared be under Divine jurisdiction and the nation 
was whipped into a frenzied state of Sharia hysteria. The only thing is that the whipping 
was not metaphorical in this case but agonizing corpo-real. Scores of urban destitute lost 
their limbs and were reduced to lifelong disability and stigmatization. Hundreds were 
subjected to the cruel humiliation of public flogging. And one citizen, Mahmoud 
Muhammad Taha, was publicly executed, convicted of apostasy” 189. Nimeiri observed 
that the empowerment of Islamic movement and its impact on public life put his regime 
at high risk. Nimeiri’s regime realized that the Sharia Laws didn’t bring stability; on the 
contrary, people were extremely upset about the bad image resulting from the 
implementation of Sharia, its extreme brutality and humiliation. Nimeiri accused the 
Islamic movement for conspiracy to topple his regime. This conflict situation added to 
the escalation of civil war in the south and to the political and economic crises that lead 
to the people’s uprising of April 1985. The trade unions and the opposition political 
parties jointed hand in hand and organized a political strike which weakened the 
government and state institutions. The subsequent democratic context of 1985-1989, 
posed a potentially serious threat to the economic base and imposition of the Sharia 
gained by Islamic movement. A major turning point for the movement came in May 1985 
when the Islamic Charter Front changed its name to the National Islamic Front (NIF). 
According to Turabi, it was a new coalition between the Islamic movement and a number
189 Ibid, 2.
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of tribal and popular figures, which undertook to protect and preserve the achievements 
of the movements against a campaign by secular political parties and power groups to 
eradicate totally the Islamic legacy of the Nimeiri regime.
3.2.2 Islamic Movement in Power: Period Post 1989
The military coup of the Islamic National Front (NIF) of 1989 took a very hostile and 
aggressive attitude towards all civil institutions such as trade unions, women groups, 
students, political parties and civil society organizations. All democratic practices 
including free expression, meetings and organizations were banned. Instead the NIF 
established hundreds of organizations which have been offered tax and custom 
exemptions and became shareholders of privatized public bodies. It was thus not 
surprising that the ex-minister of Finance: Abdelwahab Osman critically condemned this 
corruption in his budget speech as one of the factors leading to the weakness of revenues 
the government should have collected to strengthen the budget.190
Given this challenging political environment, there are several issues to consider. First is 
the general space, which allowed civil society to intervene and to present their opinions, 
their refusal, acceptance and choices. The second element is the cultural, educational and 
media institutions that perform beyond their mandates and policies due to the solid 
grounds they stand on, norms and organizations. Third is the political dominance of the 
organization [Altanzeem], and this uses power as a self-serving tool for the sole interest 
of the ruling junta or group. These three elements are the determining factors that affect 
the position of civil society. Some members of civil society forces see the regime as 
criminal (SVTG, 2000 -  2001) and immoral and others take compromising stances by
190
AujJa. ,jjbjjjJI ^ I Jjmll AjUSM '1 .2006 Aa«Lui (jiill
- El Nagar, S. E., 2006 National Associations and Political Islam in Sudan. Madbouli press, Cairo, Egypt, 
2006: 79.
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rationalizing the irrational. El Nagar (2006: 79) explains that funds for Islamic 
organizations in Sudan are from Zakat191 and charity donations which are not accountable 
for. Some of those in charge of the organizations are wealthy and they manage those 
organizations for self-interest or for political gain.
The direct question is if civil society is restricted by the cultural, educational, information 
and security associations which allow for the voices to be heard or hinder them 
simultaneously, what is the space left for the civil society? In other words, if the general 
space is a precondition for the function of civil society, what is civil society’ limitation in 
the case this space is hindered to develop or its establishment has been cancelled? Would 
civil society play a role in the absence of the constitutional, academic and cultural 
institutions which are the determining factor to realize its role? Regardless to who will 
respond to these questions, it is clear that civil society have to encounter the conditions 
which restrict its presence and civil society is expected to look at its role in the building 
of the space and institutions and in the search of the state of law.
What will we suggest to guide the civil society in the right direction? What are the 
necessary measures for the civil society to rely on? First is the identification of the 
features of the present phase. It has been a long process of injustice, neglect, violence, 
torture and violations of all types of human rights. Civil war, displacement, economic 
crises, unemployment and racial discrimination were the obvious results of inappropriate 
policies of education, agriculture, economics and service delivery. Tayeb Zein El-Abdin 
summarizes the Economist Intelligence Unit Report on Sudan which includes information 
on deteriorating situations in Darfur and Abyie, the intention of the government to apply
the tax reforms recommended by MIF and the stories of corruption, particularly of the
10')ruling party which pays financial illegal incentives for political interest. The 
legitimate question is the one which begins with why and not how. The features of the 
present situation have continued for the last two decades. If civil society is happy with
191 Zakat is the third o f the Five Pillars o f the Religion which are known by all branches of Sunni Islam and 
it is a financial commitment to give up a fixed proportion o f one’s wealth for specified good reasons.
192 Zein Al-Abdin, A., 2007. Summary of the Economist Intelligence Unit Report on Sudan. Available at: 
www.sudanile.com
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this present phase, it means that civil society is worthy of exploitation, damage and 
exclusion. If civil society is not happy with all these conditions, it means that it is weak 
and helpless to the extent that other forces determine its direction and fate.
This unpleasant phase of identification of features lead to the question of redefinition of 
big issues with respect to identity, exclusion and marginalization, human rights, culture, 
state, religion and self-determination and other minorities issues. The Sudanese civil 
society baffled by the appeal of the present political regime, notes that its achievements 
were truly remarkable. It revealed that it was possible at times to do the truly unthinkable. 
It taught us that: The violation of human rights and social injustice raised to levels 
previously thought politically unattainable. The un-political public bodies were 
politicized, militarized and forced the holy principles of the market into areas of society 
of integrity. The regime sharply demolished union power and increased security power. It 
made the rich richer and the poor poorer. It did all this and in the process traumatized the 
opposition. This has meant the dominance of Islamist ideology, the belief that a 
community comprises merely a sum of self-interest individuals. Indeed the word public 
itself is to be dismissed, cast off into the shelves of history. What we are instead to 
celebrate is a community of vulnerable consumers and self-interest protected individuals.
An individualist reading is therefore only partially true and entirely misleading; it offers a 
partial description and no explanation. In other words, the mortality rate, for example, in 
a population is not merely natural, but reflects the social, economic and political 
arrangements of society, prior factors affecting the health of the population.
1 •Jok Madut writes: “The rise of militant and political Islam in Sudan dates back to 
1965, but has increased dramatically since the National Islamic Front’s (NIF) ascent to 
power in June 1989”. Jok correctly referred here to the alliance of the traditional sectarian 
parties and Muslim Brothers after October revolution in 1964 and their violence to 
banning o f the Sudanese Communist Party and the application of Islamic Law. We may
193 Jok, Madut. Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence. Oxford: Oneworld. 2007, p. 13
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also refer to the failure of the Khartoum Round Table Conference of 1965 which was 
organized by the Unions and Professional Front (UPF) government to resolve the conflict 
in the south. Lack of confidence between the south and the north and the absence of 
political will and coherent leadership within the political elite on both sides, north and 
south, were the main reasons for the failure194. On the other hand, Jok195 in his analysis 
of condemnation of the Arab-Muslim of the north, writes that “ ... as more and more non- 
Arab and non-Muslims who feel excluded from the centers of power move further away 
from Sudanese citizenship and instead offer loyalty to racial, regional or ethic 
citizenship”. The emphasis on race and religion undermine the genuine root causes of 
the civil strife in the country which being more about cultural, political, economic and 
social exclusion and marginalization. What have been achieved after the CPA in 
Naivasha in January 2005 are the efforts of both military struggle, mainly led by 
SPLM/SPLA and social and political efforts of many Sudanese, regardless of their race 
and religion, for social justice, equality and democracy.
The search for the society cultural dimensions in Sudan reflects the willingness to look 
for solutions to tackle difficult social problems. It would also mean a rational search for 
the effectiveness of alternative development policies and strategies. The local indigenous 
culture has been neglected and eroded due to the fast rhythm of the western culture which 
invades all walks of life through the satellite, movies, videos and internet. The local 
culture encountered serious developmental difficulties due to the impact of the external 
media and to a lack of interest and the limited resources allocated for the development of 
the traditional culture.
3.2.3 Development Stages & Central Authorities of NIF
Since National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power in 1989, Sudanese society has gone 
through a process of radical reforms on the basis o f the ideology of NIF. Sudan has 
passed the following stages: 1. Centralization of power in the hands of one party; 2.
194 Ali, T. M., and Matthews, R.O., (ed). 1999. Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution. Montreal & 
Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, p.206.
195 Jok, Madut. Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence. Oxford: Oneworld. 2007, p.12
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Domination of the ideology of NIF; 3. Militarization of the Sudanese society; 4. 
Advocacy of culture of violence and war; and 5. Political and social exclusion for other 
political parties and civil society organizations.
The state, for better or worse, has become the constant and formidable presence even the 
most remote villages. It attempts to reshape the Sudanese society by promoting some 
groups and classes while repressing others and simultaneously maintaining autonomy 
from any single group or class. The state as described by James M. Malloy, “ ...is 
characterized by strong and relatively autonomous governmental structures that seek to 
impose on the society a system of interest representation based on enforced limited 
pluralism.”196 In other words state social control involves the power of the state to 
penetrate and centrally co-ordinate the activities of civil society through its own 
infrastructure.
Another perspective, which might not be in contrast with the strong controlling role of 
the state in Sudan, and a typical characteristic of a single-party and dictatorial system, is 
that despite the regime’s attempts of imposing policies and strategies, the state failed to 
damage the social fabric of the Sudanese society. Indeed, the NIF strategy of torture, 
terror and exclusion have reduced the power of the civil society and curtailed its 
autonomy.
The regime promised to break the monopoly of power by the coalition of traditional, 
sectarian and secular forces and hand power back to the people, with the intention of 
leading a process of regeneration and renewal of Sudanese society. In reality, however, 
the outcome is far from what the political leadership had intended. Political and economic 
crisis continued unabated, civil war extended and internal strife is widespread, and 
recently the ruling NIF forces seem to have run into intra-factional conflicts over power 
that has weakened their political and ideological resolve. Feeling the pressure of internal
196 Quoted in Migdal, S, 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society relations 
and State Capabilities in The Third World. Princeton: Princeton University press, p.6.
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opposition and faced with mounting challenges from external opposition and 
international community, the regime seems to have consented to regime-led opening up 
and reform.
It is worth taking a few moments here to see the stages in government treatment of civil 
society in Sudan. The table below, particularly the first three stages has shown the 
government attitudes towards civil society and signs of hospitality, at the beginning, to 
signs of acceptance and tolerance, a gradual attitude best reflected by the table. Such 
variations are important to show the power structure between the state and civil society 
and the characteristics such as civil society capacity building processes.
Table (1): Stages in State treatment of civil society
Stage 1: The state does not tolerate independent civil society. Hostile state.
Stage 2: The state accepts autonomous organization, but does not provide space for it. 
Stage 3: A space for independent activity exists, but the practice of governance does not 
promote autonomous organization.
Stage 4: The state provides favorable structures but no active support.
Stage 5: The state actively promotes autonomous organization. Benevolent State.
*    i nm 1 1 *
Source: Alex Hadenius and Fredric Uggla
In 1991, Sudan adopted a new federal structure of government. According to the Federal 
Government Bureau (1995 and 1997) that the country was divided into 26 states, 114 
provinces and about 621 councils. The following federation system was introduced in 
1992. 198
The wilaya (state) is the main power base at the sub-national level. Each state has its own 
governor, legislature and executive administration. It is governed by a wali, (Governor) 
who is elected by the wilayat (states) legislative council from a list of four nominees
197 Hadenius, A., and Uggla, F. Making Civil Society Work, promoting democratic development. What can 
state and donors do? World Development, Vol. 24, No. 10. 1996, p. 1629.
198 Sarrouh, E. Decentralized Governance for Development in the Arab States. Local Governance forum, 
Sana’a, Yemen, December 6-9, 2003, pp. 38-41.
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proposed by the president of the republic in consultation with elites and community 
leaders in the wilaya. The wali appoints a cabinet typically composed of five ministers 
for finance, public works and engineering affairs, social and cultural affairs, education 
and health. Each wilaya also has an elected legislative assembly, which approves its 
legislations and budgets and oversees the performance of the various ministries and 
departments. Ten of these states are in the South. State governors and legislators in the 
South, before the peace agreement, were appointed by the central government and could 
be removed at its discretion.
The muhafaza (province), which is an intermediate level headed by a muhafiz, who, 
unlike the leaders at the other levels, is appointed directly by the president, but reports to 
the wali. The functions of the muhafiz are limited to political, supervisory, coordinating 
and security-oriented roles. He/she has no executive or legislative functions or intrinsic 
powers other that coordination between localities or those delegated from the wali. The 
muhafiz plays a significant role in the Sudanese federal system. This may be attributed to 
two factors: (a) The muhafiz has been the primary local administrator throughout the 
previous decentralization schemes adopted in Sudan during most of the 20th century, 
except for the current system where the muhafiz has been stripped off most of his/her 
powers, (b) A muhafiz is usually selected based on his/her strong allegiance to the regime 
regardless of any prior experience in local administration.
The mahaliya (locality) is the other side of the coin to the wilaya and the other pillars of 
the adopted federal system. Each wilaya is composed of a number of urban and rural 
localities. Each locality has an elected deliberative and legislative council, which elects 
an executive body. This council is assisted by technocrats and civil servants who may not 
necessarily be residents of the locality, but are seconded from their agencies at the wilaya 
or the national level to the locality in order to oversee the local health, education, or 
public works systems.
The lajna al-shabiya (popular committee) is an elected body of volunteers who 
administer the affairs of a neighbourhood or village. At this nuclear unit, or lowest level
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of the administrative-political structure, each geographical unit forms a base conference 
(motamar ghaidi), as a public forum. Thus all neighbourhood residents could participate 
in deciding on the neighbourhood’s affairs, in electing a popular committee composed of 
20-30 members for a two-year term; and in approving its programs and achievements. 
The conference has two regular meetings per annum. However, in special cases the 
neighbourhood may call for a special meeting to address an emergency or to vote for 
changing an ineffective popular committee.
The influence o f the Islamic movement in Sudan expanded to contain all walks of social 
life. The local federal system and its organizations initiated and supported by the Islamic 
regime were most effective instruments and tools served to protect the political system 
and to recruit and mobilize human resources for security and control. The regime started 
with a social mapping covering all ages, gender and locations in both rural and urban 
areas. The leaders of the federal system at all levels were NIF members. Other 
community members were totally excluded from the federal processes. Women 
representation was poor. The traditional leaders, originally known as a base for local 
administration were neglected or recruited to defend the regime. The local federal system 
hindered the local development and the integrity of the local community was at risk.
3.2.4 NIF Failure: Is it a Failure of the Project or the Regime?
3.2.4.1 Islamic Civil Society Movement
Some Islamic reformists were critically reviewing the status of the Islamic movement and 
suggesting an Islamist alternative. Abdelwahab El-Affendi one of the former members of 
the National Islamic Front, described the ambivalence in the organization’s set up: “On 
the one hand, Turabi had an inner circle of followers whom he addressed with complete 
frankness. And on the other hand, Turabi had a different message for the general public. 
That led to mixed results. First, it led to the emergence o f a clique within his inner circle 
that claims to have better understanding for the Islamic doctrine than their peers have. 
Second, Turabi’s inner circle began to develop and display low opinion about the rest of 
Muslims, as well as undermining the understanding of the religion and religious
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teachings” 199. This argument gives rise to some questions related to personal ambition of 
political leaders and to what extent this leadership style influences Islamic movement and 
how does this relate to people’s needs and to their survival circumstances?
El-Affendi, who was defending the Islamic regime as an active INF member and as Press 
Attache at the Sudanese Embassy in London, responded on human rights violations in 
Islam: “A more controversial issue here is the role of states that are asked to back the 
action against thinkers and artists. There is a question about the legitimacy of these 
largely undemocratic states, which have no religious or popular legitimacy and no 
inclination to promote freedom of Islamic values”200. Ironically, the Sudan, the country 
that experienced the most blood-shed in the recent history under the NIF regime, didn’t 
appeal to be a case of criticism and learned lessons for those members of NIF who still 
believe in Islamic solution. El-Affendi noticed the discrepancy between words and deeds; 
between the tongue and the hands caught up with the NIF. The deep crack in the ethics 
and moral structure of NIF in Sudan is hard to be fixed by the same hands. Without self- 
criticism and recognition of the extent of the damage created in the social, cultural, 
political and religious structures of Sudanese society, no credibility whatsoever will be in 
favour of Islamic solution. El-Affendi continued to argue that the most recent views 
expressed by Turabi that women have equal rights to men, had the right to marry a 
Christian or a Jew and could even lead prayers “should be seen as a predicament of a 
nation handicapped by religious inheritance that offers no tools or means for 
modernization”201. However, this analysis indicates a mismatch between the outcomes of 
NIF involvement and its justifications for ruling the country for the last two decades.
199 El-Affendi, A., 2006. Sudan’s Turabi and the Crises in Contemporary Islamic Movement, this paper is 
published in the Arab language Al-Quds al-Arabi on April 25, 2006, p.3, translated by John A. Akec, May 
28,2006, available at: www.sudantribune.com/article
200 El-Affendi, A., 1999. Using Islam to undermine democracy: A dangerous endeavour, a paper submitted 
to Islam 21 Seminar on Freedom o f Expression, Human Rights, October 1999. Available at: 
www.islam2 1 net/pages/key issues.
201 See footnote 9, 2006:4.
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Hassan Makki, the historian of the Islamic movement, gives the following list of 
organizations that are financed by the Arab Gulf countries after reconciliation with 
Nimeiri 202:
• Raidat al Nahda [female organization] formed in 1979. In 1983 it had 7 branches, 
grew to 27 in 1984, and then to 67, including those in South, in 1994.
• Shabab A l Binaa [male youth organization] focused on the building of 60 
mosques, donation of blood to the Armed forces and group marriages.
• Al-Islah Wal Musat, a charity helping destitute families.
• Marakeez Al-Nisa Al-Muminant (Centres for Women Believers).
• Munzamat Al-Dawa Al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Mission): By 1992 its activities 
expanded to combine missionary-charitable work with business. The following 
institutions were formed: Institute of Research and Missionary Training, African 
Society for Special Education, African Society for the Welfare of Mothers and 
Children, Dan Fodiu Charitable Corporation for Trade and Enterprise, The 
General Apparatus for Investment, the International Corporation for Media 
Production and Development, African Islamic Center changed to the African 
Islamic University, the African Islamic Relief Agency, and the Islamic Medical 
Association. Investment in charitable organizations was one means towards 
establishment of political trust aims at grasping external financial resources and 
creating a public relation network for public audience and donors. On the other 
hand, the regional and international nature of the activities of these organizations 
shows that Islamist movements continue in multi-farious ways to challenge not 
only the domestic status quo but the international status quo as well.
The list of Mekki, however didn’t include the position of these local groups under the 
regime, what support they provided to the regime and what assistance they were offered, 
particularly by the Islamic banking systems and government institutions, what facilities 
they received as non-governmental organizations from Tax and Custom departments?
202 Hassan Mekki. Interview by Al Ingaz Al Watani daily newspaper, Khartoum, Sudan. 1992.
203 Mohamed, A. Political Islam: Image and Reality. 2004. Available at: 
www.worldpolicy.org. Accessed 20 Feb. 2008.
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Alex de Waal described the Islamic movement’s organizations: “they can act as trading 
companies, may assist in training and feeding the soldiers, and are active in 
proselytization. Peace Camps run by Islamic agencies are integral part of the 
government’s counter-insurgency strategy. In some of the war zones, Islamic agencies 
have become virtually indistinguishable from the government”204. Such underlying and 
implicit assumptions concerning the role of Islamic organizations working in war zone 
areas, for instance, prelude further inquiry into quality of their services, which benefits 
and at what expenses.
Tayeb Zein Al-Abdin, a Sudanese Islamist scholar divided the Islamic groups to two 
categories: voluntary agencies and national sects and government institutions205. The 
former consisted of Ansar sect, Khatmiyyah sect, the modem Islamic movement known 
as National Islamic Front, Muslim Brothers, Ansar Al Suna Al-Mahamedyyah, other Sufi 
groups, and sub-organizations and associations under the structures of the main groups. 
The government Islamic institutions are under the Ministry of Guidance, Al-Zakat 
Chamber, higher education institutions such as Omdurman Islamic University, Al Koran 
Al-Kareem University, International African University, the Islamic studies sections in 
these universities, Islamic Education Department at the National Curriculum Center in 
Bakht el-Rida, and the Religious Program sections at Televisions and Broadcast. In 
Sudan there are 30 universities for a population of 38 million. Many of these new 
universities would not pass the accepted international standard that qualifies academic 
institutions for the status of university. The Sudan Islamic regime has its own copycat 
Cultural Revolution with similar devastating effects on the education system, and has led
204 De Waal Alex. Famine Crimes. Oxford-Bloomington and Indianapolis: African 
Rights/International African Institute. 1997, p. 98
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Zein Al-Abdin El tayeb, 2003.The Role o f Islamic Religious Groups in Support to Peace”, presented to 
workshop on The Challenges of Peace in Sudan, organized by National Civic Forum, Khartoum, 22- 
23/12/2003).
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to almost an entire generation of inadequately educated individuals. Mohamed Saeed Al- 
Gadal206 observes that: “Khartoum University has become the possession of a political 
party, because appointments and promotions occur according to the political loyalty”.
The accumulations of wealth started in 1971 when NIF allied with the Nimeiri military 
regime. NIF was illegal body but managed to work at that time. The intervention of NIF 
extended to the business sector and benefited from the financial institutions such as Faisal 
Bank and other Gulf countries. According to Alex de Waal207, the June 30, 1989 coup 
“was the culmination of ten years of NIF financial dominance in Sudan and in 
government. The NIF was able to take that process to its logical conclusion”. Of 
particular importance have been the types of social movements and organizations that 
established before the coup of 1989, and new ones created to serve the regime after 
1989208.
206 Al-Gadal, M. S. Interview with Al Sahafa newspaper, issue number 3927, 5 May 2004.
207 De Waal, A.. Famine Crimes. Oxford-Bloomington and Indianapolis:
African Rights/International African Institute. 1997, P.98
208 1. Relief and Islamic Mission (Dawa) Organizations: the Islamic movement established a number o f  
relief and advocacy organizations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The most known ones are Islamic 
Mission (Dawa Islamiyyah) organization and the Islamic relief Agency. One purpose o f these 
establishments was to attract funding from Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries. These and other relief, 
voluntary and Dawa organizations are under the management o f the NIF. The other clear reason for the 
existence o f these organizations was to have several fronts for Islamic advocacy and social activities not 
necessarily defined as NIF organizations. The first chairperson for the Trustee Council for Dawa
Islamiyyah organization was a military person who worked for a long time in Saudi Arabia. This
appointment assisted to have strong support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Emirates. Ten o f the 
members o f the Trustee Council were known Islamists and members o f the NIF. Other three members were 
not NIF members; one was previous vice chancellor o f University o f Khartoum, the other two were from 
Muslim Brothers party and Ansar Al Suna Al Mahamediyyah.
The Dawa Islamiyyah organization provided services for internally displaced persons and in other areas. 
The provision o f service delivery includes health, education and relief activities such as food items, cloths 
and medical supplies in all over Sudan during natural disasters or man-made crises. All o f these have to be 
done in the name o f the National Islamic Front.
2. Islamic Student and Youth Movement: The student movement represents the biggest social force
belonging to NIF. These are students o f higher education institutions, colleges and secondary education. 
They are the most dynamic group for NIF’s social, cultural, political and religious activities. As mentioned 
earlier the origin o f the Islamic movement was the students. The Student Unions were controlled only by 
the NIF in all the universities between the period 1974 and 1990. The NIF succeeded in finding ways to 
involve this largest social group, after graduation from colleges and higher education, by employing them 
in NIF’s economic and financial institutions, voluntary charities and in political and security system.
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3. Islamic Women and Youth Movement: National Women Front, Nahda Pioneers Association [for 
females], Youth Building Organization [for males], represented the women front o f NIF amongst women, 
and female and male youth. National Women Front was very active in 1986 during the election campaign 
for NIF. It organized political rallies, workshops and individual contacts in residential areas and 
employment locations. Two female MPs represented NIF in the Parliament. Women of National Women 
Front participated actively in all political campaigns during the third democracy between 1985 and 1989. In 
the social front, Islamic women organizations prepared and implemented projects and activities for 
families, widows, orphans, destitute female headed households, productive families, female prisoners, 
displaced and street children, female sellers, consumers. This big effort was closely coordinated with and 
supported by other Islamic organizations such as Islamic Relief Agency and Dawa Islamiyyah 
Organization. One of the largest schemes is group marriages called Al-Zahra Marriage, aims at creating 
social units o f NIF in all regions o f Sudan. The other well known project was Guntar Dahab, gold collected 
from well off Sudanese women inside and abroad, allocated to support the Sudanese Military Forces in the 
civil war against the South. The Sudanese Television was campaigning for this project as well. The same 
period witnesses the Islamic women dress for the NIF’s perspective.
4. Islamic Trade and Professional Unions and Modem Forces: The laborers’ front was considered as a 
weakest area o f NIF, compared to the Communist party’s successes. The laborers were not well 
representative in the NIF (Woodward, 1990: 210 and 300). The weakness of NIF infiltration in trade and 
professional unions continued up to 1989 (El Nagar, 2006: 59). The NIF coup of June 1989 had radically 
changed the whole democratic set up and replaced it by oppressive authoritarian regime which banned all 
unions and democratic institutions. Appointed Islamic cadres replaced the elected members and the 
mandate o f the unions was directed to advocate for the political regime, its policies and for its own security 
and interests. Most o f the labor leaders o f other political parties were either dismissed or in prisons. New  
labor law was introduced to serve the single political party system and the labor organizations were 
restructured to serve regime’s self-interest.
5. Modem Forces: This group represents medical doctors, engineers, agriculturalists, pharmacists, 
accountants, financial controllers and auditors, bankers, administrators, clerks and secretaries, teachers, 
entrepreneurs, retired, job seekers graduated from colleges, universities and secondary schools. Within their 
own unions and associations they have been known as the modem forces. This group was influential in the 
Sudanese political processes particularly in the October revolution o f 1964 and during the popular uprising 
of April 1985 and up to 1989. After the military coup o f 1989, the modem forces’ unions and associations 
were banned, and the leaders were sent to jail or dismissed. New organizations were formed for modem 
forces with the Islamic labels.
6. NIF’s Community-based Organizations: The NIF’s organizations and approaches didn’t encounter 
challenges at grass roots and community levels. Rural people are instinctively Muslims and were lacking 
organizations and some directions. The non-Muslim population in the displaced camps and in the South 
were poor and desperate for educational and health services, food and relief aid. The political and social 
NIF’s network contains all aspects o f life in rural and semi-urban areas. The coup o f 1989 imposed new 
political structures throughout Sudan. The Popular Committees mandate covers the control, security, 
economic life, physical movement in displaced camps, elections, trade permissions, all type o f licenses and 
funeral permits. The NIF’s program for Comprehensive Daawa was a well known all over the country. It 
has cultural, social, religious components. The latter, for example, contains Al Koran Al Kareem sessions 
for children at kindergarten levels and for female households. These activities are undertaken in mosques 
and schools. It is implemented by Al Koran Al Kareem Organizations in almost every village. Other social 
activities for example focused on sport particularly soccer, the most favorite male sport in Sudan. Sport 
teams were initiated and supported by the Islamic organizations. Attention was also given to the mosques 
and their important role in Islamic advocacy for children, women and non-Muslims. Training o f Sheikhs in 
advocacy and speeches was provided to prepare them to defend the political, social and economic program 
of NIF. Building mosque in every ministry and government institution was the main priority for NIF’s 
members. NIF advised its members to visit mosques and to pray regularly. Attendance to pray in the 
mosque was considered by some government institutions as a main criterion for staff and employees’ 
promotion.
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The most controversial terminology introduced by Turabi was the word Al Tcrwali which 
means political succession. The Arabic version Al Tawali is the striking one. It was first 
mentioned vaguely in Article number 3/26 in the 1998 Constitution that the citizens have 
the rights to organize in political associations. The only conditions were participation and 
democracy at the leadership level and to advocate peacefully in competition and 
commitment of the constitution. The Political Associations’ law was promulgated in 
1999. Forty one political organizations, mainly parties, applied for registration. All of 
these political parties were small marginal groups and had no public support. The known 
traditional parties, those represented in the democratic Parliament between 1986 and 
1989, boycotted the registration which could give legitimacy to military regime. The split 
of the government party to National Congress Party, under the leadership of President Al- 
Bashir, the Peoples Congress of Al-Turabi, accelerated the announcement of new 
political parties’ law. In 2001 the law was changed to recognize the legitimacy of the 
traditional political parties and their rights for political activities.
All this suggests that the NIF prepared for a long term political, social, religious, cultural 
strategies to be implemented and imposed on the whole local structure including children, 
women, youth, religious leaders, students, employees and organizations. Under the brutal 
suppression by NIF for the last two decades, the NIF tried to infiltrate into the Sudanese 
society and to mainstream its political agenda. On the other hand the Islamic movement 
tried to cope with modernity by developing approaches and following processes similar 
to secular system but in an Islamic way, e.g. Islamic schools, Islamic insurance, Islamic 
sports. The exclusion of other political components led by NIF produced an immature 
Islamic experiment. The disbelief in democracy by NIF enhanced the brutal oppression. It 
is believed, by many progressive forces, that the tolerance of Sudanese Islam as a religion
7. Publication and Media: In the area of publications, the NIF established a number of publication 
companies, centers and bookshops in Khartoum State. The purpose o f these institutions was to effectively 
produce, publish and disseminate Islamic literature and books written by Islamic writers. On the media, the 
NIF allocated both human and financial resources to train and equip Islamic institutions with well qualified 
Islamic staff and high tech equipment, tools and technologies.
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and pluralistic democracy can effectively counter political Islam that is referred to 
political objectives (Sondra Hale209 and Hayder Ibrahim Ali210). According to Ahmed 
Alzobier211 that: “Abdelsalam Al Mahaboub, one of the leading Islamist in Sudan, 
confessed ...that the Islamic movement had created a conflict due to its isolationism and 
alienation from the Sudanese society and the dilemma o f viewing the whole society as the 
other or the enemy”. In this context El-Affendi suggested a new Islamic movement; its 
main concept is self-criticism, listening to and communicating with others. The effects of 
social changes, the spread of education and secularization and globalization are likely to 
contribute to the shrink of the Islamist space. This certainly leads to the various stages 
and variations the state in the Sudan has gone through. The Islamic state, in the beginning 
was hostile and aggressive, imposing its ideology by power of military and security.
While building its Islamic apparatus, it involved Islamist movements initiated by the state 
and supported to defend it. The state, as a result of its own internal conflict and due to 
civil strife in the south, west and east and due to international pressure, seems to be 
opening up and trying to ally with other parties to sustain the power and authority. The 
current Islamic regime in Sudan is far shallower and more easily undermined. This 
conclusion might agree with Sondra Hale who wrote that: “In Sudan Islamization was a 
movement from above, not an autonomous movement; it was a method of consolidating 
state control by exerting cultural (religious) hegemony. Most of the lower to middle class 
women I interviewed, for example, claimed to be religious, but distanced themselves 
from what they viewed as fanatic Islam. Muslim southerners too exhibited religious 
sentiment but resented state control over religion. Through the years, I have known 
Sudanese, both northern and southern, to view religion as a private matter” . The
209 Hale, S. Gender Politics and Islamization in Sudan: Women Living 
Under Muslim laws (WLUML), Dossier 18, October 1997, p.p. 11-12, London:
Macmillian Press. 1997.
210 Ali, H. I. Civil Society and Democratic Change in Sudan. Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Press. 1996,pp.310-312
211 Alzobier, A. The Intellectual Degeneration in Sudan. 2007. Available at: 
www.sudanforum.net. Accessed 18 Feb. 2008.
212 Hale, S. Gender Politics and Islamization in Sudan: Women Living 
Under Muslim laws (WLUML), Dossier 18, October 1997, p.p. 11-12, London:
Macmillian Press. 1997, p. 11-12
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Sudanese view of Islam aimed at reconciling all views and ensured that all views are 
actually included in the deliberation process, thus realizing a substantial representation of 
citizens, power sharing and equal wealth distribution, matters of fundamental human 
rights. However, in the absence of organized social movements, Sudanese tend to be 
unable to express the demands of the large masses of people.
The experience of the Islamic regime and the NIF project is a complete failure. It is an 
absolute authoritarian regime, no rule of law and its authority is illegal, and without the 
recognition and acceptance of the Sudanese people. The authority is bom accidentally 
either by the power of security and military or a mixture of ideology and military. Based 
on this the regime has no legitimacy. Since 1989, the Islamic movement’s main concern 
is to control the political life in the country and to allocate all efforts and resources to 
maintain power. The state simply has been unable to achieve what it has promised to 
achieve and has been so widely assumed inevitable. These promises have been replaced 
by discouraging performance and priorities213. The state's policy performance can be 
characterized overall as a failure to pursue the regime's own declared goals. Despite all 
resources and assets, the Sudanese state failed to concentrate the social control it sought. 
It failed to achieve predominance be eliminating other social forces applying conflicting 
rules of the game. The state has built huge armies, security and police forces214. However, 
it has been so ineffective in accomplishing what the society has so eagerly expected. The 
regime promoted a culture of violence and religious delusions, extended for instance to 
the educational systems of all levels and even to songs for children in the primary 
schools. The regime’s handling of the post war and the CPA processes cast serious 
doubts on its overall willingness and commitment to democratic transformation and to 
sustainable peace.
213 Speech o f Minister o f Finance on the regime’s priorities. Al-Ingaz Al-watani newspaper, 27 May 1991.
2H Kabaj, M. I. 2006. Al-Sudan: Igtisad Al-Ingaz wa Al-Ifgar Al-Shamil (Sudan: Salvation’s Economics 
and Absolute Poverty). Khartoum: Azza Publication, p 48.
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Hayder Ibrahim A li215 supported the notion of the regime’s failure by adding the 
following reasons: 1. The nature of the regime in Sudan, since the military coup of June 
1989, has neither a constitutional ground nor ethical, philosophical, logical rationale. 2. 
The Islamic movement, historically known as the body responsible for the introduction 
[presentation] of the Shari law as part of its political mandate, was no longer considering 
the Islamic law the core issue. 3. The Islamic state declared the war in the South as a 
religious war in order to mobilize all resources and to involve young Northerners, for the 
first time, in the longest civil war. This resulted in the escalation of the war and the 
increase of poverty. 4. The Islamic movement considered Al Ansar, the Umma party 
members, its natural allies and the Al Khatmiyyah, the potential partners, since both sects 
advocated for the Islamic system. Despite this potential network of allies, the Islamic 
movement failed to attract them to establish an Islamic front ensuring the northern 
cultural and religious dominance.
Another factor contributing to the crisis is the level of competency of the bureaucracy and 
the quality of public service delivery in the country. Some of the factors that can account 
for this poor competency are the image and attitude of the government towards other 
social actors, including NGOs, CSOs and CBOs. In other words how the government 
views its own social capital represented in humanitarian voluntary work. Sudan is a huge 
country (million square miles) divided into 26 states, which is then divided into 
administrative districts. The limited autonomy of local government in fiscal and non­
fiscal matters, and the absence of capital at the local level undermine the ability of these 
governments to initiate development projects.
The Sudan also lags behind in its accomplishments in scientific and technical education. 
The majority of high school students prefer to go for general education rather than 
technical education. Ironically, the government favors to support higher education and 
overlooks basic education. In other words, it supports rich and undermines poor. The 
state must set the right development priorities. Military and security expenditures are
215 Ali, H. I. Civil Society and Democratic Change in Sudan. Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Press. 1996, p. 312
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often among the highest. The World Bank reports that: “By 2000, defense and security 
expenditure was estimated to account for about 3 percent of GDP, while development
expenditures stood at about 1.5 percent of GDP (and were biased toward capital-intensive
01 (\investments in energy and subsidies for large-scale irrigation) . The state must also 
create a balance between territorial national security and human security. The Sudan has 
taken remarkable strides in domestic production of weapons for the purpose of internal 
control. This impressive array o f armaments and sophisticated war technologies can’t be 
set at the expenses of education, agriculture and health. Without training and scientific 
education, those systems often become irrelevant and useless.
3.2.4.2 Regime’s Violations and Corruption
The Islamic regime’s severe violation of human rights was reported from the onset. It 
restricted and banned the work of the civil society organizations, such as trade unions, 
opposition political parties, student unions and women groups (SVTG Report, 2001), and 
(Human Rights Watch, 1996) and (Amnesty International, 2007)217. It succeeded in 
damaging the capability of the society to express itself through its organizations and 
unions. All elections have been falsified. Both The military nature of the regime and the 
authoritarian and religious ideology introduced the most hostile and aggressive political 
regime since the independence of 1956. It is a unique authority compared to others, 
allows some relative relief at the upper level. This reflects the silence of grass roots and 
rural poor.
The transformation to a new political system created a class of capitalists who benefit 
from the inappropriate economic policies such as privatization of successful public 
institutions as well as from wide spread corruption, and mismanagement. Corrupt
216 The World Bank. Report No. 24620 -  SU, Sudan Stabilization and Reconstruction, Country Economic 
Memorandum, V ol.l, June 30, 2003. Available at: www-wds.worldbank.org.
217 Amnesty International Report. Described rapes o f women in Darfur by Janjawid, a government 
supported militias, violence against demonstrators, journalists were frequently arrested and newspapers 
censored and seized, detentions o f people without charge or trial, cruel inhuman or degrading punishments 
and torture and forced displacement in many areas including Darfur and Meroe dam. 2007. Available 
at:www.amnesty.org
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privatization robs the government treasury of needed funds . Lack of independence of 
the legislature and the judiciary undermines the goals of democratic choices and impartial 
legal decision making. On the other hand the security nature of the regime established a 
wide range of young opportunists in the free market and in the civil society to illegally 
benefit from tax and custom exemptions utilizing their security and political positions in 
the regime.
Corruption is a symptom of bad governance and undermines any serious progress of state 
building. At the present time, following the CPA, the National Congress represents the 
Islamic movement in the National Unity government with the other partner the Sudanese 
People liberation Movement (SPLM). Al Watan newspaper (2006)219 reported that the 
representatives of SPLM left a meeting of the National Council in Southern Darfur, 
discussing financial allocation of 518 million Sudanese Dinars to institutions and 
organizations belonging to the National Congress Party. The State government of 
Southern Darfur decided to donate 50 million Dinars for People’s Defense, 150 million to 
the Women Union, 50 million to the Youth Union, 100 million to the Security 
Department and hundreds of millions were donated to other Islamic organizations. The 
representative of SPLM announced that all these organizations are defined as National 
Congress’s organizations and not independent bodies. SPLM decided to raise the conflict 
to the Constitutional Court to resolve the issue.
Sudan scored 2.2 out of 10 according to Transparency International (2004 and 2005) and 
Sudan ranks number 122 out of countries highly corrupt220. Corruption Perceptions Index 
of 2005 ranks Sudan as number 144 out of 158 countries and scored 2.1. The report 
indicates that: “Of those, 70 countries scored less than three, indicating rampant 
corruption that poses a grave threat to institutions as well as to social and political
218 Suliman Osman. Current Privatization Policy in Sudan. Policy Brief #52. The William Davidson 
Institute at the University o f Michigan. 2007, p. 3.
219 Report on National Council of Southern Darfur. March 27, 2006.
220 Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index. 2004, pp. 8-9 
Available at: w w w .Transparency.org. Accessed 7 Dec. 2005 and 30 July 2006.
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stability” 221. To sum up Sudan for the last three years of 2003, 2004 and 2005 scored 2.3,
2.2 and 2.1. This shows how progressively, under the Islamic regime, the country was 
leading to be on the top of highly corrupt countries.
The criticism of Islamist use of and control over humanitarian aid was voiced by 
international organizations, Christian Sudanese organizations and other Sudanese
999independent groups . It is evident that the Islamic government showed preference not to 
local organizations, as Ghazi Salah Eddine Atabani, an influential NIF official defending 
the government policy, but preference was to Islamic organizations such as Daawa 
Islamiyyah and Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), Committee for International 
Charity, Muwaffaq Al-Kheiriya and others. This was the intention of the Islamic 
government throughout its ruling. The Islamic organizations were the only ones allowed 
to work for IDPs and refugees. Institutions like churches, NGOs and unions, have been 
identified as sites of opposition to the Islamic authoritarian regime. During disaster and 
civil war amongst the Northern organizations, the religious organizations only had access 
to affected areas and to international resources. This happened to the extent that some 
Islamic organizations treated the international organizations as resource providers for a 
twin-ship in order to get resources and implement projects.
In an interview with the Secretary General of Sudan Council of Churches in Khartoum in 
May 1996, Jerome Bellion-Jourdan wrote that: “According to Rev. Enoch Tombe, the 
NGOs were in the service of the NIF which sought to prolong the war in order to be able 
to Islamize the South. Christian communities are bound to lose members in the Islamic 
hands which are protected by the govemmenf,223. According to Rev. Tombe: ”The policy 
was part of a broader aim, the Islamization of Africa, deriving from a duty to fill the
221 Ibid, 2005, pp.16-17
222 Benthall J. and Bellion-Jourdan J. The Charitable Crescent, Politics o f  
Aid in the Muslim World. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 2003, p. 123
223 Bellion-Jourdan, J. Western Versus Islamic Aid? International Muslim 
charities and humanitarian aid in Sudan, in: Benthall Jonathan and Bellion
Jourdan Jerome, The Charitable Crescent, Politics o f Aid in the Muslim World. 
London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 2003.
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vacuum motivated by the strong assumption that Africans have no religion and are 
pagans” 224.
Sudanese of different cultures, religions and regions are constantly willing through their 
various social organizations, popular movements, membership and community based 
organizations, trade unions, farmers, women, youth and professional associations to hold 
dialogues on the present and future direction. The present political imperatives dictate not 
only new forms of dialogue but also a reconceptualisation of the analytical framework 
that has dominated our understanding of state-civil society relations.
3.3 NIF -  Civil Societv/NGOs Relations
The role of Sudanese civil society organizations under different regimes is controversial. 
The legitimate question is whether they imply “a strong sentiment of anti-statism? and 
whether their role has been shaped by socio-political conditions? Under the early single­
party and dictator systems (1958-1964 and 1969-1985) civil society, namely trade unions, 
was a politically loaded concept that referred to the opposition political parties. This begs 
the questions, how this has been changed under the current authoritarian regime and to 
what extent this affects their dynamics and functions? Most importantly, on the other 
hand, is also how civil society organizations develop the capacity to learn?
A lot of progress has been made in recent years in strengthening the role of civil society 
organizations in the Sudan. The challenges however facing them have also grown over 
the past years. It is an uncertain time for those who champion their rights, legitimacy and 
recognition. Some voices are heard suggesting that after the terrible attacks in the United 
States on 11 September 2001, the roles of civil society are less important, that global
225 Steyler, N. State -  Civil Society Relations in South Africa: Towards a 
model o f good governance, in: Hollands, G. and Ansell, G. eds., 1998. Winds of 
Small Change: Civil Societylnteraction with the African State. Proceedings of 
multilateral workshops on good governance, sustainable development and 
democracy. Graz, Austria-Kampala.Afesis-Corplan. 1995,p. 101
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dynamics and internal security have other considerations. Omar G. Encamacion226, for 
instance, notes that: “Having reached unprecedented popularity, the concept o f civil 
society currently finds itself the object of considerable cynicism and disdain, if not a full- 
fledged backlash. Attacking civil society has become a sport among scholars and political 
commentators, as evident in the many articles, conferences, and books devoted both to 
deriding both the term and its proponents”. The tension created as a result of 11 
September shouldered mounting responsibilities on civil society organizations worldwide 
and therefore their roles, in combating fundamentalism, enormously increase.
What was perhaps equally important was the linkage between the fundamental systems 
and an increase of poverty and flourishing of corruption227. The increased social 
differences were related to absence of freedom. It was also important to differentiate 
between the bonding social capital and bridging capital. The latter was reflected in close 
emotional relationship between friends and families who were relied on to achieve basic 
living standard in time of crises. The former was known as the dynamic power needed for 
relationship. This was what inspired Edward Said 228 , the Palestinian thinker to 
differentiate in his analysis of culture and identity between filiation and affiliation. The 
former was a compulsory relationship between the individual and his/her family or
226 Encamacion, O. G. Beyond Civil Society: Promoting Democracy after 
September 11. The article is reprinted from the Fall 2003, issue o f Orbis, FPRI’s 
quarterly journal o f world affairs. 2003. Available at: www.fpri.org/orbis. Accessed 14 
July 2008.
227 Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, March 18, 2005. Joint 
Assessment Mission (JAM Sudan), was carried out by the World Bank and the United Nations, with the 
full endorsement o f GOS and SPLM, VOL. 1, Synthesis: “There is no single reliable estimate o f poverty in 
Sudan, but there is consensus among Sudanese analysts that poverty exceeds 50 percent -  for the North, see 
for example “Sudan Country Economic Memorandum”, World Bank, 2003. For the South, see “Towards a 
Basline...” New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation, April 2004, page 18. Available at:
www.unsudanig.org
228
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Saeed, Edward. The Intellectual and the Authority, Translated by Mohamed Anani, Ro’ya Press. 2006
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his/her tribe, while affiliation is a free type of relationship based on creativity, and deep 
human desire to help and serve a problem without prejudice or prior opinions.
Does social and cultural consciousness in communities deeply rooted in tradition, 
obedience, centralism and anti-civil rights accept human rights as a culture and allow 
their integration in our life? The state in the Sudan does not respect human rights, it is 
neither a state of institutions nor a state caring about diversity, acceptance of others, 
advocating for reconciliation. Edward Said, for instance explains the way he understands 
reconciliation: “I sincerely believe in reconciliation between peoples and cultures in 
collision, and have made it my life’s work to try to further that end. But true 
reconciliation cannot be imposed neither can it occur between cultures and societies that 
are enormously uneven in power. The kind of reconciliation that can bring real peace can 
only occur between equals, between partners whose independence, strength of purpose, 
and inner cohesion allows them fully to understand and share with each other” 229. In 
other words and in the contemporary context of Sudan that the peace building and 
reconciliation efforts are challenged by the lack of political will and the absence of 
democratic reforms.
Does this paradox permit new culture of respect of others, democracy and pluralism in 
communities of culture of discrimination, authoritarian and security forces? Some people 
might argue that whether or not this situation of splitting between traditionally isolated 
systems and new imported modem structures and concepts maintain? Could we create 
new national agenda which is inspired by modem institutional development and related, 
at the same time, to reinvented tradition and integrity of communities? Could we 
establish this foundation without excluding others? All these social, political and cultural
229
.j.ViH .ijA lill ^ U c .  ^ .(2005)
Saeed, Edward, Islam Translated by Mohamed anani -  Ro’yaa for puplication and distribution -  Cairo -
Egypt. 2005, pp.58-59
131
crises gained momentum in the last two decades that brought to the fore a completely 
different, and alarming, understanding of these issues. This analysis however does mean 
to colour the picture to be more cloudy and complicated. It is an attempt to understand 
the civil society context in Sudan, not to exaggerate its strengths and capabilities.
According to Ali Taisier M. and Matthews R.230 that: “Imbued with the attitudes and 
dictates of the colonial regime but not its reasoning or mode of thought, the pretty 
bureaucrats-cum-national leaders were not up to the challenges of building a democratic 
and just society”. This meant that independence did not come as a result of liberation 
struggle but as a result of diplomatic negotiation and agreement between the colonial 
powers and the main largest religious sects in the country. The new leaders did not call 
for social change and simply the colonial policies and practices continued.
Abdella Ali Ibrahim231 analyzed the relationship between national movement, its cultural 
dimensions and the present Islamic movement: “The Islamic movement inherited all this 
and still defended its so called constants that can’t be compromised which are the same 
basics of national movement: Arabization and Islam and their expansion at the level of 
state apparatus and nation”. Belal responded to this by writing: “The inheritance o f the 
colonial development approach by the Islamic movement was more dangerous and sinful 
due to the complete exclusion of rural development and small farmers and due to the 
advantages and unlimited support to investors”232.
230 Ali, T. M., and Matthews, R.O., (ed). Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and 
Resolution. Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press. 1999, p.202
231 Ibrahim, A. A.. Discussion with Abdella Ali Ibrahim: National Movement 
and present Islamic Movement. Al Sahafa newspaper, 5 July 2003.
232
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Belal Abdelrahim Ahmed,. Algadia al egtimayia wa al mugtama al medani fi al sudan, dar azza, 
Khartoum. 2005
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While Sondra Hale was preparing her research questions on issues related to gender 
politics and Islamization in Sudan, was she aware of how this is connected with the world 
capitalist system? She realized the connection after she changed the questions to ask: 
“What elements we see in most religions-at least the Judaic-Christian-Islamic tradition- 
which make them useful as political strategies during socio-economic, therefore, political 
crises. Are there social processes which religions reinforce or reassert which allow a 
society to realign it after social or economic upheavals? I asked if Islam, in particular, 
lends itself more easily than other religions to a realignment strategy. What, in particular, 
lends itself more easily than other religions to a realignment strategy? What, in particular, 
was happening in Sudan during the post-colonial era? These questions cannot be 
answered satisfactorily in a brief paper, as they are too integrally connected to the world 
capitalist system”233. This is exactly what makes the Sudanese bourgeoisie completely 
tied with semi-sectarian divisions and dependent on foreign investment and that the 
Sudanese capitalism cannot express itself independently unless through allying with the 
sectarian forces. This suggests that weaknesses of the Sudanese national capitalism 
inhibit the emergence of a progressive nationalist fraction of the forces as a potential ally 
in the struggle for democracy.
It is clear that the international isolation and poor socio-political and economic conditions 
are making Sudan vulnerable to globalization and structure adjustment policies. 
Governments are highly dependent on external financial resources and cannot afford to 
disagree too vocally with international institutions and donors’ policy prescriptions234. 
During the seventies and eighties, the resistance to U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank policies 
by the Sudanese civil society, namely trade unions and political parties, has been a
233 Hale, S. Gender Politics and Islamization in Sudan: Women Living 
Under Muslim laws (WLUML), Dossier 18, October 1997, p.p. 11-12, London: 
Macmillian Press.
234Gyimah-Boadi (eds). Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of 
Progress. London: Rienner. 2004, p.49
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widespread and consistent feature of the Sudanese political terrain. The mass based 
nature of Sudanese civil society organizations in the civic field was a fundamental 
component involved in political decision-making. These examples of civil society 
struggle highlight the importance of recognizing that civil society includes a diverse 
range of organizations seeking to relate to the state in different ways.
In the Sudan, despite the political instability, economic crisis and civil war, the people 
only hope for peace, justice and human rights lies with the civil society movement235. 
They look at them as their last hope. It is evident that the Sudanese civil society is now 
firmly on the agenda o f both the government and international community, particularly in 
their roles in maintaining sustainable peace. The government has at least acknowledged 
that civil society organizations have a role to play. Unfortunately this does not necessarily 
mean that it will accept this role. The government often argues that the civil society 
organizations are the front of the opposition. The difference is that those sorts of claims 
go against the tide of opinion. There is much greater recognition now of the centrality of 
civil society movement and its immense benefits in the field of conflict prevention, peace 
building, gender equality, human rights and environment. Another advance is the 
consolidation of networking efforts in the area of peace, human rights, and poverty 
alleviation. The momentum in these key areas was clearly shown at the Seminar of Peace 
Initiatives in Khartoum, the Roundtable on Poverty and Sudan National Women 
Convention in Kampala in 2002236. The striking contributions were also made by 
Sudanese women groups through Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace 
(SuWEP)237. It is worth recalling how difficult the process was in each of these cases. 
Successes however have been achieved in the forms of common understanding of 
challenges facing CSOs and also in the mechanisms of cooperation, and dialogue created 
among CSOs. This is further proof that determination and perseverance of civil society 
organizations can achieve results, which make enduring impact. The attempts to hinder
235 Interview notes with the representatives ofNGO case studies.
236 National Women Convention supported by CIDA, NOVIB and Alternatives and other donors and 
facilitated by Justice Africa and Sudanese women groups inside Sudan and Abroad, March 11-15, 2002, 
Kampala, Uganda.
237 SuWEP was established in 1997 with the support of the Netherlands government and is composed o f 62 
NGOs/CBOs and consultant members.
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the process of engagement of civil society in decision-making are short term and civil 
society will prove it worth many times over.
In contemporary Sudan and under the current political environment of civil strife, 
economic crisis and violations of human rights, civil society attracts independent 
community organizations which are at the forefront of the struggle for peace, justice and 
respect for human rights. The organizations of civil society have increasingly become 
distinguishable from the state. It is understandable that, subsequent to the military coup 
of 1989, local activists and trade unionists were dismissed from the government and 
being active in civil society, leaving behind a vacuum in government. The culture of 
resistance and confrontation of civil society has been always dominating the relations 
with the state, due to lack of recognition, lack of trust and hostile attitudes by the state.
It is obvious that the state is no longer the sole legitimate agent for development decision­
making and the management of development resources. It is widely accepted that civil 
society has essential role in both. An impressive list of those important advances 
includes:
- New awareness of the importance of the informal sector in providing livelihood 
opportunities for the disadvantaged. Stimulated in by the success of the Small Scale 
Enterprise program in Eastern Sudan, initiated by Agency for Cooperation and Research 
in Development (ACORD), where thousands of the urban poor have supported to 
establish their own employment and their financial constraints to self-help and self­
management are removed. Women in particular, have shown that they are excellent credit 
risks 238.
- Access to rural credit by small farmers and producers eliminates barriers that prevent 
poor rural men and women from gaining access to resources. A good example is the 
experience of Sudanese Development Association (SDA) in River Nile State and in 
Khartoum State by offering legal protection to the women in the informal sector and 
recognition by the state.
238Hall, E. The Port Sudan Small Scale Enterprise Program. Seeds No. 11. 1988
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Such commitment by civil society organizations to strengthen their capacities to provide 
leadership on important policy issues will lead to new development dynamics in which 
people will self-manage and control their own resources and possibly lead towards 
breaking the government monopoly.
The rapid changing situation in the Sudan since 1989 is gathering by new momentum 
with the government policies of control and restriction, on the one hand, and with the 
increasing numbers of civil society organizations seeking to legitimize their identity and 
recognition, on the other hand. The dialogue among Sudanese NGOs and civil society 
organizations continues in national and local forums, continuously deepening 
understanding in poverty, human rights, gender equality, peace, and environment issues 
and expanding the consensus on necessary action. More and more civil society 
organizations are taking on leadership roles in studying and taking positions on 
significant development policy issues, setting new directions for their own organizations, 
and joining in the formation of networks and forums in support of joint action, advocacy 
and educational strategies on critical local and national issues.
A number of considerations and risks need to be taken into account when determining the 
participation of various social forces in the development process. For example: (i) 
government will only pay lip service to their peace and human rights; (ii) commitments 
will not live up to them; and (iii) civil society and international organizations may start 
loosing strength in their mainstreaming of human rights and gender.
Al-Midan239, the electronic newspaper of the Sudanese Communist Party argued that the 
new forms of non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations which 
increased during the 1990s as an expansion to their partners and centers in developed 
countries were still new and initiated by elites. It is expected to be close to the poor 
people whom they originally established for to reduce their sufferings. These 
organizations are neither a substitute nor equal to the popular committees initiated by the
2003 j i jU j 186 tlujliVI wifr tA 1~~|' 'I CjI vW) Cil«liuj  < i c . A->]l .
(Non-profit organizations, civil society organizations and challenges o f community services), Issue No. 186 
October, 2003.
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poor in villages and residential areas to solve their problems as a result of government’s 
lack of service responsibilities.
As Atta Al-Batahani observed, “Compounding the problems was burgeoning militant 
resistance and seemingly chronic political and social instability. An exit from this crisis 
had to be found. It does seem that to overcome these barriers, business, both domestic 
and foreign, need a government that seems to express the aspirations of the majority, but 
only in the limited and modified form without giving rise to socially radical CSOs and 
radical political movements as in the 1950 and 1960s”240. This of course begs the 
question as to what is the majority and under what circumstances this majority will come 
and who will represent and how will be representative. Indeed it might perhaps not be 
exaggeration to state that more resources have been spent on creating this majority over 
more than fifty years than any other such idea in the world. Al-Batahani continued to talk 
about the tasks and challenges of CSOs and its roles in unity and reconciliation: “CSOs 
should adopt a hard line on leveling of grounds and a fair system of dispensations for all 
Sudanese. In certain cases affirmative action may seem necessary not only in state 
institutions but also in private workplace i.e. civil service and business leaders must take 
concrete steps in this regard241. Al- Batahani concluded that in order for the CSOs to play 
a role in peace, unity and reconciliation, they have to build both financial and institutional 
capacity. He noted two major constraints facing CSOs: “The increasing dependence on 
foreign aid and the political leadership has not yet made its mind to endorse a genuine 
constitutional reform of the authoritarian regime”242. Al-Batahani however didn’t tell us 
the way out from the financial dependence syndrome. He talked more about the impact of 
foreign donors shift large portions of their funding from civil society organizations to the 
new government and how that resulted in discontinuity of many organizations and in staff 
turnovers and restructuring exercises. Institutional capacity is in fact a major challenge 
encountering CSOs. But again Al-Batahani mentioned the external factors leading to 
inefficiency of CSOs and didn’t address the internal constraints, such as governance,
240 Al-Batahani, A. The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Reconciliation, Social Development and 
National Integration in Post-Conflict Sudan. A paper presented to workshop on the Challenges o f Peace in 
Sudan, organized by National Civic Forum, Sharqa Hall, Khartoum, 22-23 December, 2003.
241 Ibid, 2003.
242 Ibid , 2 0 0 3
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transparency, strategic planning, human resources; service delivery problems inhibit the 
development of CSOs in Sudan. The latter package of constraints can be managed locally 
using CSOs’ own resources and increase the financial independence of CSOs by 
mobilizing and managing own resources and hence creating financial sustainability 
strategy.
Development programs designed to strengthen civil society contain inherent risks 
associated with perceived changes to power relationships. In the Sudanese context, where 
the environment is fragile, managing the programs will require constant awareness of 
sensitivities. On the other hand, the increasing number of NGOs requires a critical self- 
assessment in regard to the definition and re-examination of their development roles and 
strategies. The following major risks have already been identified by NGOs based on 
their experiences in the country243:
1. Inadequate and insufficient space for civil society organizations to function effectively;
2. Restrictive legislation governing NGOs;
3. Weak NGOs’ capacities, including issues of leadership, gender equality, participation, 
accountability, transparency and sustainability. El Nagar244 adds specific challenges 
encountering women’s NGOs: “absence of policies that aim at empowering women and 
addressing gender issues; weaknesses of official mechanisms to support women and 
voluntary work; and the government’s trend to establish legal institutions to restrict 
women’s appearance and mobility”.
What is also extremely curious and indeed frightening is the negative image created by 
the regime and its wider institutions on the role and functions of independent CSOs.
243 Summary o f interview notes from the representatives o f NGOs participating in the case studies.
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Current distrust of the state unfortunately feed its poison into this. Can we consider this 
as a Sudanese case? Experiences from many developing countries show that distrust 
situation might not fundamentally change with CSOs. Surprisingly, Migdal245 argues that: 
“A central argument I elaborate in this book is that the capacity of states (or incapacity, 
as the case may be), especially the ability to implement social policies and to mobilize the 
public, relates to the structure of society”. While Migdal sees the failure of the state as a 
result o f the resistance of social organizations, we relate, however, the ineffectiveness of 
the state to bad governance, weak public institutions and inadequate policies and 
approaches, including violations of human rights, injustice and gender inequality.
3.3.1 Sudanese Women and the State
Sudanese women have won significant gains since independence in 1956. They won the 
right to vote, they hold prominent political positions and they are members of the 
Parliament. The constitution of 1964 states that “All persons in the Sudan are free and 
equal before the law...No disability shall be attached to any Sudanese by reason of birth, 
religion, race, or sex” (Ministry o f Justice, 1964). The constitution of 1973 states that: 
“The Sudanese have equal rights and duties irrespective of origin, race locality, sex, 
language, or religion” (Ministry of Justice, 1973). The constitution of 1998 states that: 
“All people are equal before the courts of law. Sudanese are equal in rights and duties 
with regards to functions of public life; and there shall be no discrimination only by 
reason of race, sex or religious creed. They are equal in eligibility for public posts and 
offices not being discriminated on the basis of wealth” (Ministry of Justice, 1998).
Moreover during the period between 1965 and 1989 a number of specific acts were issued 
in favor of women’s equal rights. They include:
Article 16, Part 6 equality in Civil Service, Civil Service Act, 1973.
Article 9, Equal Pay for Equal Work, Public Service Act, 1973.
Article 80, Equal Pension and Gratuities, Social Insurance Act, 1974.
245 Migdal, J. S., Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society relations
and State Capabilities in The Third World. Princeton: Princeton University press. 1988, p.33
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Article 6, National Training Act, 1976.
Maternity leave and other leaves.
The experience, however, suggests that simply mandating or legislating civil rights and 
democratization from the top is not enough to sustain those processes. After the June 
coup of 1989, the above acts in support of women’s rights were reversed. The 
government is running the state according to the Emergency Law. According to Kamal 
Al-Jizouli246 that: “the Public Order Law of 1996 is imposed by the Islamic regime on the 
majority as an external power to control the life of the people and to reshape their 
behaviors. Al Jizouli responds on the speech of the Police Director on the law who says 
that those who don’t want to be ruled by the Public Order Law must not come to 
Khartoum State. The population of Greater Khartoum, however are more than five
947million persons including two million IDPs representing about 600 tribes and ethnic 
groups of Sudan.
The state represents the setting within which the other institutions operate. The 
government of Sudan often plays pro-active roles in reinforcing gender inequalities 
through different policies and legislation, by combining secular and customary or 
religious laws. The status of women is poor. In indicators such as maternal mortality, 
literacy and primary enrolment, women in Sudan are far behind their counterparts in the 
rest of the developing countries.
Under the current paradigm of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) gender inequalities 
are perpetuated. For instance in the states whose role towards citizens, is to meet 
homogeneous demands, it is easier to deal with the household as a unit through which 
demands can be met. Thus any changes in this structure of the state’s delivery will be 
resisted by the state for reasons of cost effectiveness and economic growth.
246 Al Jizouli, K., Women Initiatives Group report on the Public Order Law o f 1996.2000, pp. 25-26 
Khartoum.
247Population Distribution by States in Sudan 2002-2003, Available at www.mfa.gov.sd tO jj
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The state has an interest in perpetuating the dominant gender ideology so as to fulfill its 
role as facilitator for the market to work effectively. In other words the unpaid labor 
undertaken by women within the household elevates the living standard of the working 
class above that granted by wage alone, and provides the services of care and 
socialization o f children, who are the future labor force. These are services, which can 
only otherwise be delivered, less proficiently and less cost effectively to capital, by the 
state.
The state is interested in the domestication and re-domestication of women. This interest 
can be summarized in the following two points:
a) Maintaining family integration secures the supply of manpower for production,
b) Women bearing the responsibility of domestic work and reproductive activities beyond 
their biological reproductive role, has created an opportunity for the state to rely on them 
to shoulder extra activities which used to be the state’s responsibility, but were 
terminated as a result of implementing the SAPs in most Third World countries, i.e. 
social services such as health care for the elderly and the sick.
State is not only male biased for the sake of patriarchy aiming at controlling women’s 
sexuality, but also among other reasons to control women’s freedom through the 
management of property. The state adopts oppressive measures against women to keep 
them domesticated or to re-domesticate those in public life. It is not only the religious 
minded who have such fear of women’s non-domestication but also most of the educated 
middle classes, who may be living a western lifestyle, often hold ideas that encourage 
control over women’s freedom and their sexuality and match such control with social 
morality and affinity.
Most of the practice of the state in Sudan, placed man at the center of the political life, 
and considered women as economic, political and social dependents. In recent years some 
changes of attitude have occurred, as a result of the increasing role played by women at 
different levels, that women’s opinions are being valued but as a separate identity distinct 
from the civil society. The exclusion of women from development processes, including
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peace negotiations, conflict prevention and basic services policies also raised the question 
of overall legitimacy248. In South Africa, for instance, the multi-racial National Coalition 
of Women mobilized women throughout the country to state and defend their own 
interests, their immediate infrastructure needs as much as their views on geo-politics, 
with the chiefs and community leaders. Large numbers of women later stood as 
candidates for the new federal and state parliaments, and large numbers were successful, 
making the proportion of women in state and federal parliaments the highest in the 
continent. The outcome has been a constitution that declares South Africa to be a non­
racist and non-sexist state, and institutionalized mechanisms to protect the gains made. 
Statistics show that women in South Africa are making their way to politics. This is 
confirmed by the increase of women in Cabinet for 2004 general election. Women stand 
at 42% in the Cabinet.249
3.3.2 Restrictions of Voluntary Work
The Emergency Law has been in effect continuously since the coup of 1989. The Law 
gives the government sweeping authority and control over societal activities, restrictions 
on free expression, on meetings and gatherings, censorship of printed materials, and 
arrest on the basis of suspicion. Due to rapid political changes in the country, the NGO 
legislation requires regular reform and it will be necessary for the NGOs to develop 
effective relationships with their own government.
In the Sudan the question of how to regulate the growth of the non-state-sector has 
already become virulent. The concern with internal security has already led to NGO 
legislation providing the government with better instruments for vetting and controlling 
the NGO community. Experience to date suggests that the state does not consult the NGO 
community while preparing the legislation. The permission for work and NGOs
248 Sudan Gender Profile, 2004. Women’s representation at parliament stands at 10%
in northern states, 15% in southern states (1999), women in government at ministerial level 
stands only at 5%., compiled by Wafaa Elfadil, WFP April 2004. Available at: www.unsudanig.org
249 South Africa Review o f 50/50 Campaign. 2006. Available at: www.wedo.org.
Accessed 13 July 2008.
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registration are determined by political considerations rather than by any calculation of 
the contribution of NGOs to social and economic development efforts. The freedom of 
associations and organization, however, has clearly spelt out in state’s latest
250constitution , which states: “Citizens shall have the right o f association and organization 
for cultural, social, economic; professional or trade union purposes without restriction 
save in accordance with the law”.
The state accommodates conflicting views on the role of civil society organizations and 
their relations to it via a two-faced system, which maintains the status quo in repressive 
or negligent public policies and behaviors while expanding support for NGOs and CSOs 
affiliated to the government behind the scenes. Specific examples of how independent 
groups suffer to get registered as non-profit organizations by government authority and 
the financial and logistical support provided by the same authority to pro-governmental 
organizations highlight how public policies operate in practice, and whom they harm. In 
many cases, disadvantaged groups have suffered disproportionately from the current 
policies, and individuals and organizations advocating for social and political reforms 
have encountered multiple roadblocks.
The present mechanism for registration appears more restrictive than favorable for 
NGOs. The tensions between the state and NGOs are likely to emerge if the legal 
environment is not created for NGOs. Government laws and structures are often rigid, 
hierarchical and autocratic. Questions of NGOs legitimacy, recognition and acceptance 
are essential for their accountability and performance. As described by Michael Edwards 
and Alan Fowler251 that: “First, when the decision is taken to work within government, 
the constraints and difficulties of the government system have to be accepted as a starting 
point. Second, personalities and relationships between individuals are a vital element in 
successful government -  NGO partnerships”. On the other hand and since 1989 the 
government has maintained a great degree of control over the secular independent 
voluntary sector, even as increasing number of NGOs, academics, development
250 The Interim National Consitution of the Republic o f the Sudan, 2005.
251 Edwards, M. and Fowler A. NGO Management. London: Earthscan.. 2002. p.57
143
specialists, political and human rights activists have sought a reform of laws of non-profit 
organizations. The government does not appear to be moving towards any type of 
accommodation with those groups, and, indeed, it may not have to. Hundreds of 
suspected governments' opponents had been arrested throughout the country and detained 
without charge or trial. Most detainees were members of political parties or civil society 
organizations, including human rights activists. There had been many cases of prisoners 
being detained without charge or trial for lengthy periods that appear to have been 
prisoners of conscience that is prisoners detained or imprisoned on the basis of their 
beliefs, color, ethnic origin, language or religion that have not used or advocated 
violence. Human Rights organizations have documented hundreds of cases of torture by 
government security officers. It is evident that the security forces systematically practice 
torture. There are many reports of severe beatings and of cruel and inhumane form of 
tying prisoners, which has on occasion led to death252. Officers of the Interior Ministry’s 
Internal and External State Security Directorate perpetrate most torture. The international 
community was more direct in noting that widespread human rights violations continued 
throughout 1990s.The government were relentless in pursuing and eliminating any 
challengers. The human rights abuses included confiscation of equipment and materials, 
closure of offices of NGOs, cultural centers and training and research institutions. 
Sudanese and international human rights reports document not only the violation of 
human rights but also the failure o f the government to admit its responsibility and put to 
trial those responsible for torture and abuse.
3.3.3 The Impact of Peace
Africa’s longest civil war between the north and south of Sudan had started in 1955 and 
persisted through democratic and military regimes. The Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 
had stopped the fighting but failed to bring peace. The first serious discussions between 
the two warring parties; the government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s
252 Prosecuting A Murderous Regime. The Sudanese Human Rights Quarterly, No. 15, June 2003 and 
Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan. Jemera Rone, HRW, 1996, quotes: “Dr. Ali Fadl 
arrested on March 13, 1990, he was severely tortured in a ghost house and he died o f internal 
hemorrhaging...”
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Liberation Movement (SPLM) reflected in Machakos in Kenya, in July 20, 2003, where a 
partial agreement on issues of self-determination of the South, had been reached by GOS 
and SPLM. The Naivasha Peace agreement signed between GOS and SPLM in January 
2005 in Kenya was the major turning point and breakthrough of democracy. The nature 
of the state as stated in the 1998 Constitution: Article 1, Machakos Protocol: 1.1 and 
Preamble is that: ’’The Republic of the Sudan is a sovereign, democratic, decentralized, 
multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual State; 
committed to the respect and promotion of human dignity and founded on justice, 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. It is an all embracing 
homeland wherein races and cultures coalesce and religions co-exist in harmony”. All 
these values of diversity, justice and social inclusion can be translated into strategies 
which can be seen within the development perspective as institution-building efforts 
aimed at reducing uncertainty associated with the implementation of the CPA.
The potential partnership between SPLM and National Congress Party from the one hand 
and between the state and the civil society from the other hand is thus to clarify the legal 
framework of the activities of NGOs which will be changed by constitution and each 
state may have its own law to govern the NGOs work. Sarnia El Nagar254 raises several 
questions: Will the state continue discriminating organizations, under the present 
partnership, in the coming period? Will the SPLM establish and identify its own 
organizations? What will be the positions of civil society organizations? Will they be 
divided with the possible political parties’ system? Will this division weaken the civil 
society or will the efforts of building democracy support them and eliminate the split?
253The Interim National Consitution of the Republic o f the Sudan, 2005, p.3.
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3.4 The Positions of Political Parties. Civil Society Organizations and NGOs
This section addresses the situation of the main political parties, their brief history, goals, 
strategies and efforts in the Sudanese life. It focuses on the impact of social exclusion and 
democracy on the development and progress of these social actors.
3.4.1 The Impact of the Colonial State
The impact of the colonial state in Sudan was significant in forming the economic, social 
and political foundation for the country. This all occurred for its self-interest. The 
colonial state encouraged and supported the traditional religious and ethnic identity 
which became deeply rooted in the Sudanese society. On the other hand, the colonial 
state contributed to the social changes in the country by providing modem education and 
creating new social forces in the economic, agricultural and transportation fields. 
Although the colonial authority had institutionalized the local agents, this was a strategy 
to seek support from traditional leaders and their communities by giving them limited 
rights to practice their traditions, religion and culture, while at the same time introducing 
market economy. Despite its limitation, the education initiated by the colonial state had 
its effects on the graduates who organized themselves in dynamic organizations and 
political parties. These dynamics assisted in mobilizing the Sudanese people to form their 
social organizations. The labour movements, graduate clubs, labour clubs, women and 
professional groups, farmers and student unions were the very first signs of the birth of 
civil society independent from the traditional religious and ethnic parties. Belal
255
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suggested that the principal features of the economic and social development during the 
colonial time is in fact the elements of Sudanese civil society development, started with 
students’ movement in i903 in Gordon College and ended with the University of 
Khartoum in 1956. He listed the political events of these movements such as the first 
strike in Gordon College in 1937, the establishment of the Culture and Reform Society in 
high secondary schools in 1938 and the students’ union in 1941 and the regional student 
unions in 1952. He considered women’s education as effective steps towards the 
development of civil society in 1907 at Khartoum Primary School and developed by local 
initiatives to expand to Rufaa Girls School in 1911, then the Female Teachers College in 
1921 and the formation of the Women Union in 1952. Belal documented the beginning of 
the labour movement which started in 1899 as a result of the completion of the railway 
between Wadi Haifa and Khartoum North. This particular event was a striking starting 
point for organized labour movement, shifting from its tribal agenda to wider economic 
purpose. The first labour club was established in 1934 in Khartoum and the labour law 
was announced in 1948. In 1949 five unions were registered and the number rose to 86 in 
1951 and to 123 in 1954 with 87,355 members.
It was surprising that these unions and organizations confronted the new national state 
which inherited the colonial rule. The distrust expanded from the colonial state to 
independence state. On the other hand, the new independence state distrusted the new 
social forces which threatened its position and interests. The lack of trust between the 
state and civil society organizations led to accusations and conflict. The sate accused the 
civil society of being politically committed and non-loyal to unions. The CSOs refused 
the division between their unions’ activities and the national political agenda. The 
confrontation and tension repeatedly continued between the state and CSOs on issues 
related to union laws, demands for improving living standards, labour conditions and 
other major national issues, over the period after the independence and all the way 
throughout the successive governments, both democratic and dictatorships. M. O.
Belal, Abdelrahim. Civil Society in Sudan. Articles number two in Alsahafa newspaper issue No. 4653
[online]. 2006. Available at: http://www.alsahafa.info/news/index. Accessed 22 May 2006.[translated by
Bashir Abdelgayoum].
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Beshir refers to the North and South problem: “Since national divisions between 
different communities in certain countries have not prevented them from co-operating 
together in forming one state, and since man-made differences can be counteracted by 
man-made devices to bring together different communities, the case for separation is 
neither convincing nor in the interests of either region”. Beshir shows the importance of 
people working together in contributing to nation-building and conflict resolution. 
Unfortunately, the consequent governments had not encouraged these local initiatives and 
instead policies of economic, cultural and social isolation dominated the political climate 
in the country.
3.4.2 The Impact of Social Exclusion
Due to social injustice, inequality and political exclusion, Sudan saw the emergence of 
the strongest regionalist movements in post-independence Sudan257. Such movements 
developed in both Southern and Northern Sudan. Examples were the Southern of the 
South, the Fur of Darfur, the Nuba of Southern Kordofan, and the Beja of Eastern Sudan. 
According to Niblock258 that: “Even though the social and economic basis for all of these 
movements was laid down under Condominium rule, however, it was only among the 
Beja that a concerted movement emerged prior to independence. Regionalist movements 
among the Fur and Nuba came into existence after 1964”. In Western Sudan, Darfur 
Development Front and the Union of the People of Nuba Mountains, as described by 
Harir 259: “led by well qualified and nationally respectable categories. Moreover, most of 
the leaders were university graduates, who held top positions in the bureaucracy and, 
above all, good leading positions in the then functioning multi-party political system”.
256 Beshir, M. O. The Southern Sudan Background to Conflict. Khartoum:
Khartoum University Press. 1968, p. 101
257 Sudan: A Study o f the Evolution and Prospects o f its Contemporary Politics. Abdel Salam Sidahmed 
and Alsir Sidahmed, 2005, Routledge, p. 143.
258 Niblock, T., Class and Power in Sudan: The dynamics o f Sudanese Politics,
1898-1985, (s.l): (s.n.). 1987, p. 147
Harir, S. Old-Timers and New-Comers, Politics and 
Ethnicity in a Community Bergen Occasional Papers in 
Social Anthropology No. 29. 1983, p. 101
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One area of interest is the debate on social exclusion and how it relates to poverty and 
poverty alleviation. Others lay greater emphasis on multiple deprivations as a defining 
feature of social exclusion: low income, an insecure job, poor housing, family stress, and 
social and political alienation. Poverty can be spatially and socially disaggregated. Many 
authentic researches revealed that over 80% of the Sudanese society has been trapped in 
absolute poverty260. Ninety percent of the absolutely poor are in rural areas. By absolute 
poverty, according to researchers, is meant the situation in which a person lacks basic 
human needs (food, shelter, and clothing) that help to sustain human life. This 
explanation is in line of the description of Arjan de Haan who defines social exclusion 
as "the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from 
full participation in the society within which they live. The concept refers to exclusion 
(deprivation) in the economic, social and political sphere. It implies a focus on the 
relations and processes that cause deprivation".
The other aspect, does the debate and new thinking on social exclusion in the north offer 
opportunities for dialogue and lessons? What are the insights from the south that will 
enrich the debate in the north and between the north and the south? The added-value of 
the engagement of international organizations is the ongoing struggle against the 
international injustice and the re-discovery of poverty in the north opens new 
opportunities for dialogue about the analysis and impact of international political, 
economic and social agenda and for international solidarity as well.
260
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261 De Haan, A.. Social Exclusion: Towards a Holistic Understanding of  
Deprivation. Paper presented at Vila Borsig Workshop. 1999, p. 8
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The search for identity and justice in the time of civil wars (1955-1972, 1983-2005 in 
Southern Sudan and 2003-2008 in Darfur), militarization and insecurity has encouraged 
the growth of ethnic fundamentalism and social and human rights movements, with their 
related sense of self-righteousness and intolerance of social and political exclusion. There 
has been tendency to view the political and economic crises of 1990s as somehow 
unrelated. The patterns of growth between those who have and who have not accentuated 
injustice and undermined the legitimacy of the social institutions that have supported that 
injustice. The resulting sense of exclusion and loss of hope fuels the problems of 
violence. Only by acknowledging the failures and the interlinked nature of their root 
causes can we hope to deal with them. The Political Declaration of the Sudan Liberation 
Movement and Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/SLA), for instance accuses the government 
of economic and social exclusion, systematic marginalization and racial 
discrimination . Related to this, is Harir’s valid analysis when he described the crisis in 
Darfur as an “erupting volcano” and that the resource -driven conflict of 1987 and 1989 
developed into “regional ethnic war” of international nature263. It is worth saying that the 
contemporary socio-political and cultural contexts of Darfur conflict are diverse and 
region specific. As concluded by Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala that the 
dimension of “the polarization of Sudanic communities-inextricably linked through ties 
of history, kinship, and culture” can’t be overlooked and is overlapping with other 
dimensions such as scare resources and demands for social inclusion and economic 
integration of marginalized regions.264
National debates have to be encouraged to address issues of injustice and unfair 
distribution of wealth. This should evolve to reflect local realities and that the main 
dimensions of social exclusion would be different in each society. The other added-value 
and a challenge at the same time is how the Sudanese civil society organizations will 
prioritize sustainable development strategies to enable them contribute to strengthening 
social inclusion, rights and balanced regional development. In this respect the Sudanese
262 The Political Declaration of SLM/SLA, March 14, 2003. Available at:www.sudan.net
263 Sharif Harir, 1994. The ‘Arab Belt’ and the ‘African Belt’. In: Sharif Harir and Terje Tvet (eds.) 
Shortcut to Decay: The Case o f the Sudan. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute o f African Studies, p.145.
264 Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace. 2006. Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publications, p. 160.
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civil society organizations realize that one’s own potential is achieved only through 
effective collaboration with others. This has been demonstrated in the establishment of 
networking efforts in peace, human rights and poverty alleviation. The Poverty Forum 
describes, for instance the role of civil society in the following:
1. Strengthen peace and human rights initiatives to have close links with grass root 
organizations and engage with both rural and urban communities.
2. Assist the network efforts to operate as umbrella group of committed organizations and 
to be more responsive and accountable to grassroots initiatives.
3. Strengthen the interaction of the networks and grass-roots organizations and part of 
this process must entail either articulating interests on behalf of grass-roots groups or, 
more appropriately, empowering them to articulate their own interests. Capacity building 
could facilitate networks’ diversification of their funding base by providing training in 
fundraising and public relations. Staff exchanges between international organizations and 
the Sudanese civil society organizations may prove especially beneficial in this area, 
since they could learn technical and media skills, while international organizations could 
learn from them about development issues, and thus present them more accurately to 
donor agencies.
4. Build and strengthen networks of NGOs to empower civil society and develop 
capacities for stronger advocacy and participation.
The major emphasis for civil society in contemporary Sudan should be increased 
education and training to maximize their human resource and knowledge potential and to 
promote for democratization processes, including values and practices, amongst their 
constituencies and stakeholders.
3.4.3 The Impact of Democracy
265 Poverty Forum. Proceedings of workshop on poverty alleviation.
Facilitated by Alternatives and SECS and supported by NOVIB, Khartoum, 11-12 
November 2001.
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Within the Sudanese social, economic and political context there is a debate and 
questioning whether the civil society organizations are the appropriate tools for the 
delivery of democracy. Are democracy and civil society processes that continually evolve 
or goals to be achieved? Adlan El Hardallu266 noted that experiences confirmed that 
pluralism and election were not sufficient to guarantee democracy and he emphasized 
that democracy required additional efforts aiming at strengthening and developing CSOs
967to effectively contribute to social and economic changes. El Hardallu summarized five 
main problems facing the CSOs, in Sudan. Firstly, due to historical weakness of 
community development, Sudan failed to form an economic system that produced 
professional group’s independence from the state. The Sudanese middle class consists of 
bureaucrats, military officers, and educated journalists and professionals and some 
private sector persons both commercial and agricultural. There were no stable 
organizations that united these groups apart from being equally suffering from economic 
crises. The experiences of October revolution in 1964 and the popular uprising in April 
1985 showed how these groups represented in their unions and associations split to pieces 
after the successes in defeating two military dictatorships. The reason was that most of 
these groups were dependent on the state as the primary employer and not relying on the 
private sector. In other words, the narrow financial interests of the middle class and its 
relationship with the state divided between their concepts of supporting political 
pluralism and democracy and their capabilities of leading a movement to take over and 
maintain power and therefore securing its material interests under the new situations. El- 
Hardallu’s analyses run a corollary risk of being ‘too theoretical’. These sorts of 
challenge necessarily require us to analyze trade unions in the context of their inter­
relationships with influential political parties and intra-relationships among themselves. 
The analysis should discuss other overlapping factors such as the distribution of power 
and resources in societies. The alliance of trade unions to political parties challenged their 
identity and autonomy on the one hand, and the violence created by the traditional 
political parties during the three democratic periods, on the other hand, are strong causes
266 El-Hardallu, A., Poverty and sound Governance: The Role Of the Public 
and Private Sectors and Civil Society. Occasional Paper. Khartoum: Khartoum 
University. 1998.
267 Ibid, 1998
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for the failure of democracy in the Sudan. Secondly, the historical background of the civil 
society and the state didn’t develop during the peaceful transformation of power from the 
colonial state to independent state. Contrary to relationship between the state and civil 
society in Western Europe which Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist, described as a 
balanced opposition, the state under the colonial period was imposed to confront the 
society. The concerns of national unity after independence forced the new state to form 
and control the civil society by imposing the ideology of national unity which used to 
rationalize this control. Thirdly, the civil society often failed to identify the right goals 
and objectives which can be achieved due to lack of vision and resources. El Hardallu 
alluded in his analysis to the influence of the Sudanese Communist Party and its 
intervention in the work of trade unions but almost in passing. This led to confusion 
between trade unions’ purpose and the political agenda and to what extent they can 
advance their political influence while protecting their autonomy. Other political parties, 
including Umma, Democratic Unionist, Muslim Brothers and National Islamic Front, 
also participated in influencing the civil society. Fourthly, the civil society lagged the 
internal organizational systems such as transparency, democracy and accountability. This 
explained the resistance of unions’ and organizations’ members due to lack of 
participation in decision making processes. Fifthly, the diversity of Sudanese society and 
its traditional and rural background contributed to their ties to traditions and to political 
and religious affiliations and therefore these organizations couldn’t fit in the modem 
forces represented in CSOs268. Contrary to this analysis of modernity, the civil society 
has to be more than elite affair and therefore it has to be rooted in the traditional society 
and in the culture of people.
Despite what is so frequently asserted as self-evident, common sense, and therefore 
somehow true, there is no clearly understood link between democracy and civil society’s
Ofx Qdevelopment. Mohamed Abu Algasim Hag Hamad responded to the question what is 
the secret behind the deep frustration by saying that Sudan has never been ruled since 
independence and up to now by democratic systems. This is in spite of opportunities
268 Ibid, 1998
269 Hag Hamad, M. A. Article in Al Sahafa newspaper, 5 May 2003.
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made available to both dictatorships and parliamentary regimes to take over power. 
Sudan has not been governed by elites who could have established a state of institutions 
that lead to national unity, development and modernization. The military and ethnic 
oriented authorities dominated the state and the society.
Prior to the Peace agreement in Naivasha in January 2005, Sudanese, both northerners 
and southerners, and the international community, believed that peace was the missing 
conceivable point of national consensus270 . Because the people are desperate to end the 
forty year war, the two warring parties didn’t insist on how this peace will be achieved 
and of course nobody dared to ask whether peace can be reached within an undemocratic 
authoritarian regime. The vast majority o f Sudanese are confident that the solution lies in 
democracy.271
According to Elie Kedourie272 that democracy is quite new to Islam. She argued that 
democracy had failed in the Middle East and unlikely to succeed in the near future 
because of the culture of Muslim communities that have been accustomed to centralism, 
obedience and authoritarianism. In response to the question is there any conflict between 
Islam and democracy in the Sudanese context, Gabriel Warburg raises two questions: 
’’...first, if a majority imposes its religious convictions, whatever they may be, on a 
minority by force of numbers, can it be defined as democratic? Secondly, is the status of 
ahl al-dhimma [ahl al-thimma] offered to non-Muslims in an Islamic state by Islamists a 
democratically acceptable one? Finally, can ethnic nationalism based on Islamic-Arabic 
ideal, which has been dominant in Sudan’s political life since independence, lead to 
coexistence within democratic institutions?273 Some leftists accused Islamic and Arabic
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environment of ethnic discrimination and violations of human rights274. It is not the 
Islam, however that hinders the process of democratization, but the Islamist ideology and 
the authoritarian regime that create an environment which is not conducive to social 
inclusion, unity, reconciliation and nation-building.
It is also noted the critical linkage between democracy and social movements and their 
efforts in nation-building processes. As democratic organizations, social movements 
usually develop during democracy and relapse when a comprehensive dictatorial system 
is imposed on them. In Sudan social movements, including national and regional ethno­
cultural groups suffer under both dictatorial and democratic regimes275. Some Sudanese 
politicians accused them of being separatist representing external forces and they 
detracted from national unity276. The complicated question was to what extent the social 
movements related to democracy and if anyone of them rely completely on the other? 
Charles Tilly277 presented three questions related to continuous or temporary linkage 
between social movements and democracy:
What causes the broad and incomplete harmony between social movements and 
democratic practices?
To what extent and how democratization caused the establishment and flourishing of 
social movements?
Under what circumstances the social movements being actually advanced as a result of 
democracy?
274 Abdella A. Ibrahim, Two Strikes in the town o f Atbara. 2008. Available at: www.sudanile.com
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Tilly continued to say: “The third issue enforced us to think about the unavoidable 
question: “Under what situation and how damaging are social movements to 
democracy?”278. In response to this question, social movements in Sudan, including 
regional and national organizations take the lead in shaping and reshaping the political 
and social context. Their role is also in initiating the discussion around the conditions 
required for the accomplishment of democracy and democratization279.
The period between 1985 and 1989, under a democratic state, witnessed endless debate 
and division over the penal expression of hudud of the Sharia law, whether it should be 
continued or cancelled. Hudud is a word in Islamic law that applies to punishments 
inflicted upon committers of some of the most serious offences. The traditional 
punishment for heresy or apostasy in Sharia law is the death penalty. Islamic movements 
defended the law as an irreversible gain. Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the prime minister at that time, 
had the chance to repeal the law but he decided not to do so. Umma party raised the 
slogan:” Sudan is our country and Islam is our religion” since its establishment in the 
1940s. Islamic element is incorporated into Sudanese life, even if there is no Islamic 
movement. Sadiq-Al Mahdi, in his election campaign, promised his electorate to 
implement alternative Islamic laws.
The collapse of democratic governments three times in Sudan does not imply a necessary 
failure of democratization as a process, its concept or distinctive values. The experience 
of democracy indicates that it creates uncertainties partially because of weak democratic 
institutions and insufficient practices by both the government and the opposition. Other 
factors contributed to the defeat of democracy are mismanagement, governmental 
inefficiency and political uncertainty. The role of Sudanese political parties in the social, 
economic and political life was controversial. In the following section some of their 
features and contributions were presented and discussed.
3.4.4 The Main Political Parties
278 Ibid, 2005, pp.246-247
279 Mamdani’s discussion with Samir Amin . Discourse on Democracy in Africa.. 1994.. Available at: 
http://dissertations.ub.rug.nl See 26. 1994, p. 170
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This section provides a quick glimpse of the main political parties in Sudan. It reviews 
their position towards the application of Sharia Law and their contribution to peace 
processes. The common challenges are their internal governance; lack of rotation of 
leadership and weak democratic practices.
3.4.4.1 The Umma Party
It was created in 1945 during the growth and the dynamics of Graduates Congress, trade 
and farmers’ unions. It was organized by Abdel Rahaman Al Mahdi and was supported 
by the Ansar, the Mahdi’s followers. It was an Islamic party by orientation and roots. In 
its campaign for independence, Umma party was raising the slogan of Sudan for 
Sudanese. It was a religious sect which was developed latter by Al Sadiq Al Mahdi, the 
great-grandson of Mohammed Ahmed al Mahdi. The latter led the revolution which 
ended the Egyptian administration in Sudan in 1885. Its supporters followed the strict 
teachings of the Mahdi, who ruled Sudan in the 1880s. Although the Ansar were found 
throughout Sudan, most lived in rural areas of western Darfur and Kurdufan. It was 
supported by the Baqqara, the nomad cattle herders and the sedentary tribes on the White 
Nile. Al Sadiq Al Mahdi succeeded to develop the party to be of a national character. The 
party’s 1986 general elections’ program was called Nahj al-Sahwa, the party’s manifesto 
of Islamic reawakening: “Beside the inalterable and binding texts of the Koran and 
Sunna, new rules and principles must be adopted through enlightened and qualified 
Ijtihad” 280 During the last period of parliamentary democracy, the Umma Party was the 
largest in the country, and its leader, Al Sadiq al Mahdi served as prime minister in all 
coalition governments between 1986 and 1989. Al Sadiq al-Mahdi missed the golden 
opportunity during this period to replace the 1983 Sharia laws, known as Nimeiri’s 
September laws. In his first address to parliament, he declared that his government would 
abolish the September laws and replace them with true Islam. By the time Sadiq al Mahdi
280 Abdelmoulah, A. An Ideology o f Domination and the Domination o f an Ideology, Islamism, Politics, 
and the Constitution in the Sudan. Conference Paper: Religion, Nationalism, and Peace in Sudan. U.S. 
Institute o f Peace Conference, September 16-17, 1997. Available at: www.usip.org
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realized that ending the civil war and retaining the Sharia were incompatible political 
goals, public confidence in his government had dissipated, setting the stage for military 
coup. According to Abdella Gasm Al Seed that there were strong political and social 
circumstances contributed to the failure of the third democracy [1986-1989]; such as the 
isolation of the government, the increasing opposition of the political parties and trade 
unions and the rejection of the NIF and DUP to Kokadam Declaration of 1986. The latter 
agreement was described by Ali Taisier M. and Mathews R. that: “The Kokadam 
document was a political landmark in the country’s modem history. It proved that there is 
a national potential and a force for peace in the Sudan. For the first time in the history of 
the civil war, popular organizations in the north established direct links with the southern 
armed movement and agreed on a joint peace program”. Following the June 1989 coup, 
Sadiq al Mahdi was arrested and kept in solitary confinement for several months. He was 
not released from prison until early 1991. Sadiq al Mahdi indicated approval of political 
positions adopted by the Umma Party during his detention, including joining with the 
SPLM and northern political parties in the National Democratic Alliance opposition 
grouping.
The main weakness of the Umma party is thus the slowness of decision making in 
essential national issues such as Islamic laws and peace processes. Other critique made 
by the party’s opponents is the absence of internal democracy, despite the fact that the 
party insists that democracy is a vital element for successful political practices.
3.4.4.2 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
281
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It was similarly based on a religious order, the Khatmiyyah sect. Ever since the 
Khatmiyyah opposed the Mahdist movement in the 1880s, it has been a rival of the 
Ansar. It had its centre in the southern part of Eastern Sudan and in portions of the 
riverine areas and middle class in these areas and in the middle of Sudan. The Mirghani 
family was able to turn the Khatmiyyah sect into a political power base. Moreover, gifts 
from followers over the years have given the family the wealth to organize politically. In 
1952 several groups allied to form the National Unionist Party which supported union 
with Egypt. The party was committed to Islamic constitution and Sharia laws must 
remain the basic source of law, while customs and principles not contradicting Sharia 
may also be consulted. Khatmiyyah have had sizeable followings and its leader has 
traditionally constituted the bearer of religious authority in Sudan. Although the 
Khatmiyyah was more broadly based than the Ansar, it was generally less effective 
politically. Historically, the DUP and its predecessors were plagued by factionalism, 
stemming largely from the differing perspectives of secular-minded professionals in the 
party and the more traditional religious values of their Khatmiyyah supporters. Ismail Al- 
Azhari was elected to be the president of National Unionist Party in December 1953. He 
was the first prime minister for national government in January 1954283. The DUP leader 
and hereditary Khatmiyyah spiritual guide since 1968, Muhammad Uthman al Mirghani, 
tried to keep these tensions in check by avoiding firm stances on controversial political 
issues. In particular, he refrained from public criticism of Numeiri's September Laws so 
as not to alienate Khatmiyyah followers who approved implementing the sharia. In the
' J QA
1986 parliamentary elections, the DUP won the second largest number of seats and 
agreed to participate in Sadiq al Mahdi's coalition government. Like Sadiq al Mahdi285, 
Mirghani felt uneasy about abrogating the sharia, as demanded by the SPLM, and 
supported the idea that the September Laws could be revised to expunge the "un- 
Islamic" content added by Numeiri.
283 Sidahmed, Abdel Salam and Sidahmed Alsir. Sudan: A Study o f the Evolution and Prospects o f its 
Contemporary Politics., Routledge. 2005, p. xv.
284 Transitional Military Council: Results of 1986 election: Umma Party won 99 seats; the DUP obtained 64 
seats and NIF 51 seats. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org
285 Ali, T. M., and Matthews, R.O., (ed).. Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution. Montreal & Kingston, 
London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 1999, p. 212
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By late 1988, however, other DUP leaders had persuaded Mirghani that the Islamic law 
issue was the main obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the civil war. Mirghani himself 
became convinced that the war posed a more serious danger to Sudan than did any 
compromise over the Sharia. It was this attitude that prompted him to meet with Garang 
in Ethiopia where he negotiated a cease-fire agreement based on a commitment to 
suspend the September Laws286. During the next six months leading up to the June 1989 
coup, Mirghani worked to build support for the agreement, and in the process emerged as 
the most important Muslim religious figure to advocate concessions on the 
implementation of the Sharia287. Following the coup, Mirghani went into exile and 
remained in Egypt. Since 1989, the NIF has attempted to exploit DUP fractionalism by 
co-opting party officials who contested Al-Mirghani's leadership, and these efforts 
weakened the DUP to great extent, particularly that Al-Mirghani is in exile for almost 
two decades.
DUP is accused of being undemocratic and non-transparent with respect to issues related 
to decision making, leadership and management. DUP was an active member of 
Democratic Alliance, a group of the opposition abroad (NDA, 1992).
3.4.4.3 Sudanese Communist Party (SCP)
The Sudanese Movement for National Liberation was established in 1946 as the first 
communist group initiated by intellectuals, students and labourers. It called for the 
struggle against colonialism and for self-determination. In 1953 an anti-imperialist front 
was created by the communists and attracted many people. The communist party 
dominated farmers’ and trade unions and was active in the students’ movement and 
influenced significantly the growth and dynamics of Sudanese civil society. Although 
relatively small, the SCP had become one of the country's best organized political parties 
by 1956 when Sudan obtained its independence. The SCP also was one of the few
286 Ibid, 212
287 Ibid, 213.
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northern-based parties that recruited members in the South 288 . The remarkable 
achievements of the growing and fruitful alliances, between the communist party and 
other democratic forces in civil society were demonstrated before and during the October 
revolution in 1964289. The various religiously affiliated parties opposed the SCP, and, 
consequently, the progression of civilian and military governments alternately banned 
and courted the party until 1971, when Nimeiri accused the SCP of complicity in an 
abortive military coup. Nimeiri ordered the arrest of hundreds of SCP members, and 
several leaders, including the secretary general, were convicted of treason in hastily 
arranged trials and summarily executed290. These harsh measures effectively crippled the 
SCP for many years. Atta Al-Batahani described the post-1964 period: “In a way, the 
post-1964 progress, made by what seemed to be a baffling alliance of CSOs and radical 
left, was short lived. Sensing the potential threat posed by this radicalism of civil 
society/social movement, the predominantly Northern hegemonic groups turned against 
the Communist Party and civil society organizations (press, judiciary, trade unionism) in 
a bid to put an end to social radicalism in Sudanese politics. Counter social movements 
(sectarianism, Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic regionalism) in the North and armed 
rebellion in the South moved to fill in the vacuum”291.
Following Nimeiri's overthrow, the SCP began reorganizing, and it won three seats in the 
1986 parliamentary elections. Since the June 1989 coup, the SCP has emerged as one of 
the Al-Bashir government's most effective internal opponents, largely through fairly 
regular publication and circulation of its underground newspaper, Al Midan.
The SCP had been criticized by traditional and ideological opponents that the party’s 
acceptance to democracy is not genuine and is only for tactical reasons. Kamal El-
288 Joseph Garang was a southern Sudanese communist leader killed by Nimeiri regime on July 28, 1971 as 
a result of the failure of military coup o f July 19, 1971.
289 Woodward, P., Sudan: 1898-1989 The Unstable State. Khartoum: Mohamed Omer Beshir Centre for 
Sudanese Studies Publication. 2002, p. 122.
290 Gadaia Sudaniya (Sudanese Issues), 2000. Evaluation o f 19 July 19971. Sudanese Communist Party. 
Irregular Periodical, No. 24, October 2000, pp.24-36.
291 The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Reconciliation, Social Development and National Integration 
in Post-Conflict Sudan. A paper presented to workshop on the Challenges o f Peace in Sudan, organized by 
National Civic Forum, Sharqa Hall, Khartoum, 22-23 December, 2003, p.2.
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Jizouli, a communist lawyer, wrote a book about the Sudanese communists and 
democracy and stated that the acceptance of the party to work based on the general 
principles of liberal democracy, which means to respect pluralism as part of democratic 
movement in the country and to use democratic tools to participate in the peaceful 
political processes and to refer to democratic mechanisms for mobilization, strike, 
peaceful demonstrations and election. This statement was politically correct according to
909Al-Jizouli and it was clearly described in the party’s constitution and literature.
The wide range of features of Sudanese political parties’ work should not be taken to 
imply that they are about to have a major impact on the livelihood of Sudanese society -  
their efforts remain too small, fragmented, and poorly coordinated. Perhaps the most 
significant implications of their experiences lie in the early discussions on issues related 
to rights and justice. Hassan A1 Tahir Zaroug of the SCP, for example, in the fifty second 
session of the Sudanese Parliament on December 31, 1955 discussed the proposed 
temporary Sudan constitution and criticized that the salaries of workers in South Sudan 
were less than the workers in Northern Sudan performing the same work. He also noted 
that the female teachers got less wages and poor employment terms compared to male 
teachers doing the same job. According to Abdella Ali Ibrahim293 that was just the early
292
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political emptiness of Sudanese national graduate pioneers when the chairman of the 
Parliament Babiker Awadalla refused these basic citizenship rights and considered them 
as irrelevant. Unfortunately these were initial human rights violations in Sudan which 
continued to lay shadow and upset the process of the state even prior to independence.
The democratic regimes led by sectarian political parties attempt to limit democratization 
to political system, such as election, free expression, free organizations etc, leaving the 
social questions, social inclusion, social justice and equality untouched. The role of 
political parties in Sudanese life has been always complemented by the status and 
dynamics of Sudanese civil society organizations. The overthrow of two military 
dictatorships in 1964 and 1985 was extraordinary and unique joint efforts between the 
political parties and civil society organizations. The following section describes some 
features of the future direction, based on the understanding that civil society and other 
social actors committed to sustainable development, must find out ways to appreciate the 
social and political processes involved through democratic environment and sound 
institutions.
3.5 The Wav Out
The dynamics of social movements are based on the social and cultural dimensions rather 
than the socio-economic factors and that emphasis is on the role of middle class and 
technocrats and on the collective identity.
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Belal294 noted that the expansion of voluntary work concept increased the role of 
voluntary organizations in all aspects of the social change; economic, political, social and 
cultural. It was clear for the NGOs that service delivery activities for specific target 
groups, in specific sector or region was insufficient. It was necessary to change the total 
framework of communities. This included the work of influence on strategies and 
development policies. It was, therefore, important to influence the total framework to 
effectively change the small pieces. He listed the methods of civil society organizations 
in the following:
• Provision of services of charity form, at the beginning;
• Provision and ownership of resources and capital to integrate the target groups
into the economic cycle;
• Organizational and institutional building and networking to empower 
organizations. This makes the state suspicious about their civil society intention;
• Scientific research is needed to serve the interest o f target groups;
• Lobby with these target groups and debate on good governance, justice, equality,
credibility, and transparency, is necessary.
Belal valued the role of trade, labour and professional unions in the social changes in the 
following points: a) Role of unions in the change from traditional system to modem 
structures. This involved changing the characteristics of traditional society based on clear 
vision and strategy; b) Role of unions in achieving sustainable development.
Based on the contribution of Belal 295 on the social changes, we can add other 
characteristics describing both the traditional society and the expected social results in the 
following table (2):
Table (2): Sudanese Societies: Between Tradition and Modernity
Traditional Society Modem Society
Filiation relationship: compulsory to 
immediate family, friends and tribe
Affiliation relationship: free, creative to 
wider community members, exchange with
294
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other organizations
Bridging social Capital for the benefits of 
family and tribe
Bonding capital for broader human 
purpose, including production relations
Objective is to meet basic needs Objective is to meet both basic and 
strategic needs for private sector
Use of traditional technology with low 
production
Use of modem technology with high 
production
Collective ownership for natural resources 
Dependency on limited resources 
Authoritarian non-participatory
Individual ownership 
Independence
Democratic participatory approach
The Sudanese traditional society gained ground from its tribal institutions and extended 
families. The member of this society has no choice but to commit her/his self to the 
family and tribe values and principles. This restricts the freedom of the member 
particularly in marriage and ownership of assets (land etc). The tribal institutions inhibit 
freedom, justice and human rights, particularly when dealing with others. The 
transformation from tribal relationship to other institutional relationships imposes new 
production and exchange ties by the free market which lead to new linkages with trade 
unions and other forms of civil society organizations. Civil society organizations are 
democratic institutions, whose membership is voluntary, regardless of race, religion, 
culture or gender. The values of peace, transparency, accountability, justice, equality, 
democracy, freedom and volunteerism are the principles governing the work of civil 
society organizations and reflect the extent of commitment of membership. One 
important value which characterizes the work of civil society is its independence. The 
independence of Sudanese NGOs/CSOs however has been controversial. Some of them 
were independent from any government influence. The question was to what extent they 
were influenced by political parties or even by donor agencies. The latter has strong 
influence and most of civil society organizations were without identity or clear vision. It 
was noted that the influence of the political parties was less compared to the influence of 
donors.
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The objective of production in communities of subsistence economy is to meet the basic 
needs, according to Belal while the objective in free market is to achieve profit for the 
private economic companies . The role of civil society during this transformation is to 
advocate and maintain labor rights including improvement of income, living standard, 
and social and medical insurance coverage. The appropriate modem technology used in 
modem sector will increase the productivity which is one of main social changes. The 
role of unions, both occupational and professional is to encourage the use of modem 
appropriate technology for the benefits of both the economic institution and the laborer. 
This trend is also related to the consequence of the technological intervention and the 
problems resulted from this change. The role of unions is also concerned with the 
assessment of training needs of employees, technical assistance and analysis of direction 
of technical development. This latter requires close cooperation with scientific and 
research institutions and with other civil society organizations for networking, exchange 
of information and knowledge. With regard to ownership of natural resources, the social 
shift includes the change from collective to individual. Civil society organizations are 
aware of the implications of this new form of ownership and should adopt the principles 
of collective responsibility and create the mechanism for monitoring, accountability and 
transparency for private companies involved in investments and economic, social, and 
environmental activities.
Nevertheless, the political challenges in Sudan since June 1989 resembled many of the 
other recent post-conflict building efforts297.
296 Ibid, p.200
297 The following features characterize the present situation o f a country which has not yet learned the 
lessons: 1. The state as an institution has to be restructured and revived. The single party political system 
which dominates the politics o f Sudan for the last two decades has to accept and respect other political 
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prevented and pre-empted; 3. The political culture o f torture, fear, distrust, brutal dominance has to be 
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A plan needs to be developed to produce a broadly representative and legitimate conference to amend the
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Conceptually, it is helpful to break down the transformation into three broad categories: 
an administrative revolution, a process of social and economic convergence, and a shift in
90Sthe substance and processes of democratic governance .
The British politician, Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in 2002 launched a highly publicized program to improve the Bosnian 
business environment: “the Bulldozer Committee, as it was proudly named, distributed a 
one page form that citizens, companies, NGOs and even government institutions could 
use to identify unnecessary laws or bureaucratic red tape that needed to be eliminated. It 
instructed them to indicate the precise law or regulation that needs to be amended as well 
as the article number. Insert on a separate page the original text as well as your suggested
constitution, set priorities and prepare for democratic elections. What is needed is to reach a tipping point at 
which practically the entire political actors become focused on the common vision o f a better country.
298 Three broad categories: a. The administrative revolution involves reassessment o f the role of 
government, review o f civil services, its power, efficiency and effectiveness, reforming old policies and 
extending the state into new field o f activities. It entails reviewing the functions o f government institutions, 
rationalizing existing structures, re-profiling and creating new ones. It involves drafting o f new legislation. 
There should be a rigorous semi-annual and annual review and monitoring and support mechanism as well.
b. The economic and social convergence: One o f the core values o f wealth sharing of national economy in 
the 1998 Constitution: Article 8. says: “The State shall develop and manage the national economy in order 
to promote prosperity, create an efficient and self-reliant economy; it shall also enhance regional economic 
integration. The overarching aim in economic development shall be the eradication o f poverty within the 
Millennium Development Goal, the minimization o f inequalities o f income, and promotion of a decent 
quality o f all life for all citizens”. Each region is required to assess thoroughly its level o f competitiveness 
in agriculture and industry and to analyze the constraints that it faces in these and other priority sectors. It is 
necessary to describe in detail the programs and instruments needed to achieve that goal. This requires the 
regions to prepare multiyear strategies in a whole range o f areas-agriculture, rural development, education, 
transportation, and environment, and the like-and compile these into a national development plan.
c. The third element o f this model is a change in the nature o f the political processes including decision 
making, inclusion o f other social partners and creation of a mechanism for dialogue between the state and 
civil society, including private sector, unions and others. The inclusion o f different social actors requires 
links both vertical and horizontal in the government reinvented structures and a more coherent and 
comprehensive administration.
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replacement text”299. Can we replicate the experience and the success story of Bosnia 
which had gone through serious civil war, in a country like Sudan that had experienced 
the longest civil strife and has not yet learned from the lessons? Jok Madut explains that: 
“The wider the gap between the remote regions [the South, the Nubian north, the 
northeast, the southern Blue Nile and the Nuba mountains] and the state apparatus, the 
less loyalty the peripheral regions give to the state: citizens of the peripheries become 
more committed to ethnic or regional citizenship than to pride in the nation”.300
According to Zein Al-Abdin, the high risks that threaten the national unity in the country 
have political nature o f the government and SPLM and others political forces. The 
Islamic voluntary organizations are politically committed working for their political 
parties’ interest. He emphasizes the role of small religious organizations, which are not 
politicized. He suggested that the Islamic groups can be effective at grass root level for 
Muslims and non-Muslims. He overlooked the religious nature of the war which the 
Islamic movement was campaigning for and the emphasis of Jihad in the wholly war. 
Zein Al-Abdin didn’t differentiate between the Islamic voluntary organizations and the
301government institutions
299Knaus, G. and Cox, M. Building Democracy after Conflict, The Helsinki Moment in South-eastern 
Europe. Journal o f Democracy, January 2005, volume 16, number 1, pp. 47, USA: The Johns Hopkins 
University press. 2005,p.47
300 Jok Madut Jok, 2007. Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence. Oxford: Oneworld, pp.l 13-114.
301 Zein Al-Abdin, A., 2003 summarizes the role of Islamic organizations:
1. Cultural awareness: Emphasis on noble values o f Islam such as recognition and respect o f other 
religions, culture o f peace, transformation from image o f war and jihad to peace and love based on justice, 
freedom and rule o f law, anti-discrimination and anti-racism and advocacy for cooperation and inter­
marriage. 2. Social aspect: The Islamic groups can work individually or collectively to address issues of 
poverty, displacement, employment and educations. Names o f organizations such as Dawa Islamiyyah, 
Relief Islamic Agency and International Corporation for South Sahara Development were mentioned as 
examples. Zakat Chamber can play a role among internally displaced persons particularly the non-Muslims; 
3. Education Reform aspect: The Islamic groups can contribute resolving conflicts in tribal-zone areas in 
Darfur, Southern Kurdufan and Blue Nile. The Muslims and Christian religious leaders can replace the 
language of hatred, separation by language o f peace and unity; 4. Political Education aspect: The risks of 
national unity resulted from the weaknesses o f good governance, transparency, justice, human rights, 
cooperation in nation-building. Islam consists o f all these values but religious leaders didn’t give them
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With respect to the relation between state and religion, as one of the potential 
endangering issue in the Sudanese political, social and cultural life, it is the high time for 
the Islamists to recognize that the virtual realities which repeatedly being imposed by 
them can not succeed in a country that popular Islam is deeply rooted.
| Zein Al-Abdin presented the case of the Sudanese Religious Reconciliation Council,
| which was established in December 2002 as a voluntary apolitical organization,
[
consisting of Muslims and Christians. It aims at building the values of cooperation and 
reconciliation among the sects, protecting freedom of religions, resolving conflicts and 
recommending policies and legislations to protect rights of religious groups and 
information and education policies that reflect religious and cultural diversity. The 
council advocates the compensation to Catholic Church for the Catholic Club confiscated 
by the government. The Council recommended allocating time in the broadcasting and 
TV programs for the Christians. A committee for protection of religious freedom was 
formed to review and study any complaints. This effort involves the national and 
international organizations302.
attention and no one makes politicians accountable for these values; 5. Joint Cooperation Model: The 
Islamic groups can give a good example for cooperation with other non-Muslim groups in all these aspects 
and in repatriation o f displaced persons and refugees and in service delivery and provision of assistance to 
widows, orphans and homeless persons.
302
Khalil, Azaa [2006] : The Social Movements in the Arabs World : Case Study on the Social Movements in Egypt, Sudan. Algeria, Tunis, Syria, Lebanon and
Jordan -  published by Afro-Arab Research Centre, Cairo
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organized by National Civic Foram, Khartoum, 22-23/12/2003). Translated by Bashir Abdelgayoum
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On the other hand A1 Bandar 303 highlighted the threat of the post conflict period with the 
increasing empowerment of the military establishment and whether or not the state 
survives the military intervention. He believed that the peace agreement will bring with it 
an alternative concept of national security, a review of military doctrine and a new 
foreign policy.
The civil society organizations managed to overcome the most critical time, and 
succeeded to lay out the survival strategy in order to explore different coping 
mechanisms with the rapid changing political situations. While this set up is in place, the 
confrontation of the state by civil society is in the form of declaration of facts using rights 
based approach and in encountering the professional technocrats and intellectuals who 
manipulate for their own interest and benefits. The following are the main challenges 
encountering civil society organizations:
1. Issuance of democratic laws governing the work of civil society organizations and the 
work of trade unions. Consultative and steering committees representing civil society and 
trade unions should be formed from independent civil society and trade unions to 
participate in all stages of the implementation. The steering committees should review 
old laws based on the rapidly changing political environment.
2. Review of laws governing the work of private and informal sectors and small 
businesses to protect the rights of all parties involved.
3. Compensation and relocation of those dismissed from work by the Islamic regime in 
1989.
4. The responsibilities of rebuilding trade unions and associations rely on the willingness 
of the workers and trade unionists to join their unions and organizations.
What then explains the need for or the belief in social movements? This question, though 
extremely moot, is difficult to answer with any certainty, since it involves feelings, 
opinions and prejudices. The social movement is not a substitute for civil society. There 
are many complex reasons, some interlinked. There is a belief that social changes has
303 A1 Bandar, S. Can Nivasha Peace Deal call off the next coup? A paper 
presented to the Horn o f Africa Conference III: Transforming Horn of Africa: 
Culture of Peace vs. War Culture, 27-29 August 2004, Lund, Sweden.2004
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resulted from huge social paradoxes in the modem society in Sudan. There is an urgent 
necessity for development of collective identity in a country of diversity and 
heterogeneity. There is a strong hope, the same hope expressed in civil society, that the 
middle class exists and has the capacity to contribute to the debate on the collective 
identity. The middle class is represented in all walks of life both in rural and urban areas;
I in agriculture, civil service, military, business, and education. Belal argued that the
|
I middle class was the civil servants who inherited the political and managerial authority
1
from the colonial state after independence. Those representatives of middle class were the 
officers with other allies dominated the public sector and implemented development 
programmes in non-participatory manner. Belal concluded that this middle class was 
almost completely vanished or eroded. There is nevertheless real and deep division with 
respect to the question who is the middle class? Is it the salaried modem forces and the 
officials? Or those who were dismissed from government, retired pre-maturely, or being 
forced to immigrate?304. In response to this question, the middle class consists of all those 
forces, both the paid and unpaid at the urban and rural levels. Most important is that 
CSOs and NGOs represent some of social forces, including those with the voices heard 
and the political standing, on the one hand and silent majority on the other.
3.6 Conclusion
What happened in Sudan was the emergence of a sectarian legacy, on the one hand and 
creation of urban elite, on the other hand. The post-independence era reveals that the 
ruling leaders dishonored the promises to consider a decentralized solution for Sudan 
(Alier: 1990). Therefore, the seeds of economic marginalization and political exclusion 
had been rooted in the political life of the country. The uninterrupted domination of the
| ruling urban elite, comprised of the leadership of the sectarian political parties, the
1
I
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military dictators and the NIF tyranny after independence was responsible for the civil 
wars, social injustice and lack of confidence of marginalized regions.
This chapter contributed to other studies of Sudanese politics by highlighting, in 
historical context, that the rise of Islamic movement can be viewed as part of the decline 
of local community as the center of social capital. Clearly, the Islamic movement has not 
brought into being the future envisioned by Sudanese. Moreover, in Sudan as elsewhere, 
once Islamic regime discourse is appropriated as the language of an authoritarian regime, 
its ability to serve as an agent for social change is surely compromised. With respect to 
the relation between state and religion, as one of the potential endangering issues in the 
Sudanese political, social and cultural life, it is the high time for the Islamists to 
recognize that the virtual realities which repeatedly being imposed by them can not 
succeed in a country that popular Islam is deeply rooted.
It is in this context that the key role of civil society organizations is in the articulation of 
national aspirations for equity, democracy, and lasting peace. The Sudanese civil society 
organizations must be vigilant to identify the priorities and opportunities for contributing 
to strengthening social inclusion, rights and balanced regional development. In this 
respect the Sudanese civil society organizations realize that one’s own potential is 
achieved only through effective collaboration and alliances with other social forces, 
including political parties, private sector and government to institute an equitable 
framework of governance for Sudan’s multiple communities.
This chapter critically engages with authors such as Al-Hardellu in his analysis of 
traditional organizations vs. modem civil society and argues that we are all addicted to 
the ‘modernity fetish’, even when it weakens the Sudanese social capital. What has been 
neglected is the process by which traditional initiatives have contributed to the making of 
peace and development. The chapter argues also with Jok Madut in his generalization and 
emphasis on race and religion as root causes of the conflict in Sudan. The binary 
perspective of North against South, Christians against Muslims and Africans against 
Arabs prevents the analysis of social, economic and political exclusion of marginalized
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communities by the ruling hegemonic elite. This also undermines the role of social 
customs and traditions, which have led to local peace agreements in conflict tribal zone 
areas.
Such limitations of the role of Sudanese communities and lack of recognition of the 
contribution and joint efforts of Sudanese civil society in the past and the present 
constrain their potential strengths and successes in achieving rights, democracy and a 
lasting peace. Democracy and peace will continue to be elusive if  the historical, cultural 
and social ties, coalitions and alliances of the Sudanese communities have been ignored. 
But reaching such a strategic goal depends on the strengthening of local initiatives and 
social capital, and the establishment of democratic institutions. The coming chapters will 
discuss the capacity strengthening of some of these actors and the engagement of NGOs 
in more coordinated relationships with public sector.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURES OF SUDANESE NGOs
4.1 Introduction
The Sudan has been caught in the dilemmas of simultaneous economic, social and 
political transformations. Rethinking the interrelations between state, private sector and 
civil society has been rare. Solutions have rather been sought in peace agreements such as 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)305 , signed between the government of 
Sudan and the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) in January 9, 2005. Many 
NGOs thought that the little margin of openness following the CPA would provide at 
least the minimum environment conducive to civil society activity. There was still some 
harassment, bureaucratic complications and obstacles, as well as the controversial new 
act regulating humanitarian and civil society organizations. However, all this was simply 
incomparable to the situation during the 1990s.
Good governance is a key value incorporated in the CPA and as a cross cutting in every 
single aspect of the agreement. From the government perspective, good governance 
denotes a regime characterized by rule of law, efficient and effective public sector 
management, accountability of public office, decentralization, public availability of 
information, and transparency. The World Bank, for example, and some donor agencies 
expect better service delivery, poverty reduction and prevention of corruption as 
outcomes. Some international agencies apply more direct political and rights-based 
approaches and embark on measures to increase democratic participation. On the other 
hand, participation of Sudanese civil society in national decision-making process, e.g. on 
peace process or development policy, has never been fully representative. The state 
building has been biased towards the interests of military dictator regimes, urban 
Northern elite and Islamists who took over the colonial institutions but neither adapted
305 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army. 2005. Available at:www.ummis.org/English/document/cpa-en.pdf
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them to the interests of the majority nor appreciated the existing diverse cultural 
identities. As a consequence, civil society organizations, e.g. NGOs and trade unions, 
political parties, women groups, student and professional movements for non-violent 
nature and peaceful transformation approaches of multiple social groups have been 
initiated in a way that would give them the chance to work properly.
| This research intends to look into the organisational cultures of Sudanese NGOs, their
democratic practices and their internal systems of the participating NGOs. This includes
; the roles and responsibilities of the organizations’ various levels, selection of new
I
leaders, general assembly meetings, and rotation of leadership, representation issues, 
accountability, financial management, networking and relation with the various levels of 
government.
At this point the internal dynamics and development processes within these local groups 
contributed to the democratization process and to the complex political and social 
problems encountering the post-conflict societies. The organizational cultures case study 
focused on the main areas of the organization’s and network’s concerns, including 
internal governance, strategic planning, human resources and management, 
implementation and service delivery, financial management and external relations.
In other words the capacity building framework will help the organization, as Fowler 
describes it: “ ... to identify correctly what combination of system, structure, style or 
environmental factor is limiting performance, and to select the right mix of tools, 
methods and strategies to bring about the required changes” .The first section of this 
chapter shows a table which illustrates the criteria for assessing the efficacy of Sudanese 
NGOs and the priorities for capacity building initiatives.
|
[
The internal governance addressed the roles and responsibilities of executive 
board/committee, the staff members and the volunteers; the rotation and diversity of the
306 Fowler, A., Campbell, P. & Pratt, B. 1992. Institutional Development & NGOs in Africa. Oxford: Intrac 
&Novib. 1992, p. 19
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members in the executive committee; the general assembly meetings; the gender balance 
in the organization’s structure, representation of youth; the transparency and 
accountability.
The strategic planning section covered areas such the organization’s vision and mission; 
the key principles and values; the short-term and long term plans; the priority areas, the 
review of these plans; and lessons learned.
The human resources and management discussed the mobilization and management of 
human resources in the organization; the job descriptions, terms and responsibilities of 
the staff members and volunteers; administrative procedures and policies; the personnel 
system; the annual work plan; staff development; the support to voluntary work and 
satisfaction of volunteers; the participation of the staff members in the decision- making 
processes; and the management of the information system.
The implementation and service delivery part showed the identification of the 
organization’s needs; projects’ design; the technical assistance; the situation analysis and 
assessment; the implementation of activities; evaluation of projects; and the sustainability 
strategy.
The financial resources section interested in the budgeting and financial resources 
planning; financial management, skills and provision of financial reports; financial 
systems; financial sustainability; and management of organization’s assets.
The last section focused on the external relations, including the relation with 
stakeholders; relation with other NGOs and civil society organizations; relation with the 
government and donors.
4.2 Criteria for Assessing the Efficacy of Sudanese NGOs and the Priorities for
Capacity-building Initiatives
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This section contains the organization standard with all systems, policies and procedures 
in place. The vision is well articulated and the goal is clear. Confidence is built up and 
there is a sense of ownership. The engagement of all stakeholders at all level of the 
organizational development processes. The organization is capable of mobilizing and 
managing resources effectively.
I
i
Table (3) shows the variables and the expected capacity standard:
Table (3): Capacity Building Variables and Expected Results
Variable Expected Results
Internal Governance Structure and trusting relationship among 
all involved, willing to change, democratic 
practices and good leadership style, clear 
roles, inclusiveness, diversity, and 
accountability.
Strategic Planning Values and vision are agreed upon and 
integrated in all aspect, periodical review 
of performance and strategy, the plans are 
working documents with flexibility.
Human Resource & Management Systems and policies are in line with vision 
and values, roles of all are clear, 
transparency, and honesty are every day 
values, all concerned are part of decision 
making, staff board, volunteers’ 
development, and sound gender balance.
Implementation and Service Delivery Services within a strategy to meet people 
needs based on competence and resources, 
rights and results based approach, 
consultation and assessment by 
beneficiaries on services, learning by 
doing.
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Financial Management Clear plans, policies and procedures, 
strategy for financial autonomy, 
consultation with all members, financial 
transparency and audit, effective use of 
resources.
External Relations Effective networks and networking to 
facilitate change, inclusiveness with 
partners, effective policy influence, and 
cooperation on shared values and common 
goals.
4.3 Friends of Children Society (AMAL)
4.3.1 Introduction
Friends of Children Society (AMAL), is a Sudanese non-profit NGO founded on 
February 22, 1984 and registered on March 21, 1984. Its membership is opened to all 
Sudanese of 18 years of age and over irrespective of sex, religion or ethnic origin. 
AMAL has been able to establish linkages and membership in a number of organisations 
including Arab Non-governmental Organisation Network for development (Beirut, 
Lebanon), African Human Rights Network (Gambia), Sudanese ASIDS National 
Networking and other member association and groups working with children. Over the 
last 22 years, AMAL has worked on the social front working in areas related to human 
rights, child welfare, health, education, etc. Its projects and activities are aimed at 
promoting child welfare, disseminating and implementing the Child Rights Act, 
providing capacity building to organisations working with women and children,
I empowering communities working with minority and disadvantaged as well as applying
i
I preventive measures through the establishment of community and poor families support.
4.3.2 Internal Governance
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AMAL was an NGO that experienced great internal challenges from its own members. 
The general assembly meetings were described as venues for membership conflict. An 
interviewee believed that what was happening in the organization was similar of what 
was going on in Sudan.307 Some people interviewed noted that the organization had a 
constitution, rules and systems.308 The problem, according to them, was the application 
and the daily practices of these rules and regulations. The intervention of the executive 
committee in the day to day work created unpleasant working environment. The 
organizational structure consisted of trustee board, executive committee and staff 
members. The executive committee was elected every two years by the general assembly. 
A decision was taken that the executive committee members were not permitted to be 
staff members.
One of the interviewees identified 5 types of organization: 1) Grass-root and community 
based; 2) Traditional (charity, unions and linkages); 3) Intermediary; 4) Membership 
organizations such as disabled groups; and 5) Government.309 He classified AMAL as 
intermediary organization. He added that 95% of the organizations’ resources were 
external. The dictatorial regimes in Sudan created unhealthy and non-transparent 
environment affected the work of NGOs. The NGOs were not keen to be transparent with 
the authority because they feared the risk of control or even confiscation of resources. 
There was no progress and genuine development of NGOs. Researches were absent and 
there was no single NGO supporting research activities. The networking was external and 
NGOs had not learnt from linkages and networking with others. Very little was known 
about development policies and NGOs focused on implementation of activities.
I 307 Idris A1 Nayel, Member, 6/4/2007, SCSNAP office.
[ 308
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309 Hassan Abdel Ati, Member, 26/4/2007, Edge Consultancy office.
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| According to the same sources the rise of ethnic movements excluded the concept of 
networking. The voluntary work had been shifted to profitable business. The internal
i
I conflicts in organizations created self-interest and personal groups. Other factors
contributing to the weakness of NGOs were that 90% of organizations were registered in
I Khartoum and there was no communication with the rural areas. Rural communities were
|
excluded from any consultation or decision making processes on issues affected them 
directly. This raised the whole issue of participation and transparency which were key 
I conditions for good governance. He added other reasons contributed to the weakness of
voluntary sector:
Political exploitation: Both government and political parties were establishing 
NGOs. The reason for this engagement was that funds will be channelled through NGOs;
Competition over resources: International NGOs are competing with national 
NGOs over the financial resources. International agencies such as European Union (EU), 
UN and the World Bank are forming their own networks. 310
An activist with AMAL up to 1998 described the work at AMAL as a rehearsal for 
democratic reform and social change in the country.311 It was a confrontation between 
the leftists and right-wing groups, including government forces. He believed that the 
representation of the local communities in the organization’s executive committee 
assisted AMAL in the establishment of the democratic practices and that, for example, 
the agenda for poverty reduction included in the organization’s strategy and program. 
This was due to the fact AMAL was working with the poorest of the poor and 
marginalized communities. The good example, described by the interviewee, was the 
| Social Development Center in Umbada, which was one of the organization’s activities
| that contributed to the awareness raising of the local community in the area of health and
education. According to him the Center benefited the marginalized groups and trained 
I young girls and boys in the field of music, secretariat, to gain skills. Some of these young 
girls were sex workers who had been trained in hair dressing and other related areas and 
obtained jobs. Some of the young males were trained in Youth Center to work as
310 Hassan Abdel Ati, Member, 26/4/2007, Consultancy office.
311 Idris A1 Nayel, Member, 6/4/2007, SCSNAP office.
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musicians with the local groups.312 The Social Development Centre was considered as a 
pro-poor intervention. AMAL established itself in the same locality in which it works. 
This identification with and grounding in the community is often a critical attribute for 
effective community social development activities and a great strength of AMAL.
A focus group discussion of four persons was arranged to give the opportunity for some 
members who felt neglected and alienated.313 They consider themselves as founders 
who contributed to the initial establishment of the organization. AMAL, historically was 
known as an organization that always had two levels of membership; those who were 
elected as executive members and others as opposition. It was interesting to find out all 
these two groups were defined and labelled as leftists. The focus group discussed the 
problems facing the organization and the solutions. The key point of concern, expressed 
by the group was the absence of membership in the planning, implementation and 
management of the organization. According to the group, a few members who have no 
legitimacy were now dominating and controlling the organization and its resources. The 
general assembly that elected the present executive committee was illegal because 
members were not invited for it. The meeting was supported by the government, although 
it was not legitimate. According to them the organization was completely isolated from 
members and community. They suggested the following way out:
General Assembly meeting to discuss the core issues. All members should be 
invited. The meeting must have clear agenda, including assessment of the present crisis 
and solution measures;
The establishment of board of trustees: The board of trustees was not functional 
and therefore one of the main management tools was absent;
312
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313 Iman A1 Hedai, Azhari A, Najal H. and Faiza B., Members, 16/4/2007, SCSNAP office.
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Review of the strategy and preparation of annual work plan: AMAL had no 
strategic plan or at least not operational;
Building up of confidence and trust o f old members: AMAL was a dynamic 
organization with many volunteers and supporters who were neglected and their 
disengagement affected the quality of the services provided by the organization;
Learning from other experiences and sharing with other NGOs: AMAL was one 
of the leading organizations within the Sudanese civil society movement and contributed 
significantly to realization of child rights in the country. This leading role in advocacy 
and policy influence was ineffective and inefficient.
The above discussions highlight a number of tensions that face AMAL as a membership 
organization within a social and political context. These tensions, although not unique to 
Sudanese NGOs, are particularly relevant for those organizations, given the initiations 
and motivations of many of the membership organizations.
The Deputy of Secretary General referred to the constitution of 1997 and noted that there 
was clear division between the staff members, the executive committee and the 
members/volunteers. 314 During the executive committee of 2006-2007, attention was 
given to the branches to expand and increase their membership. The organization had 
branches in Nyala (Western region) Gedaref (Eastern region) and there were preliminary 
committees in Sennar (Blue Nile) and Kosti (White Nile). There were committees in 
residential areas at Khartoum level focussing on challenges in urban communities. The 
organization was building capacity of the committees in the areas of social mobilization, 
communication and community development. He added that the selection of new leaders 
was a democratic process. Members had the rights for nomination and vote. Each
[ 314
!
Ij £>UalU 4<huil . 2 0 0 3 frl 4.1ml 4 «■»•>
1
Friends o f Children Society. Proposal on Voluntary and Administrative Regulating Rules o f Amal 
Organization. Khartoum: Unpublished Report.2003.
182
nominating person has to address the General Assembly to present him/her-self and what 
was expected from him/her. These were no selection criteria. However, there was a 
general understanding that the members of the executive committee must be qualified to 
deal with others, inspiring and capable to mobilize communities. The number of the 
executive committee members was nine and there was 30% women representatives in the 
executive committee.
The roles and responsibilities of the executive body and voluntary committees were clear 
and there was no overlapping that caused constraints according to the Coordinator for
l
1 1 c
i  Social Center. The structure of the organization consisted of executive manager,
!
accountant, coordinators for alternative families, youth & social center, social workers 
and teachers, co-operators, messenger and guard. The original structure of AMAL, 
compared to the current one, composed of other sections such as executive secretariat, 
child rights unit, research unit, library coordinator, information coordinator and financial 
manager.
There were administrative procedures for recruitment and announcement for new jobs. 
The executive committee was elected every two years by the General Assembly. The 
interviewee suggested that the members of executive committee must be committed and 
believed in the aim of the organization, they must have no criminal record and they must 
be fluent in languages (Arabic and English) and considered these as criteria for selection 
of executive committee.
The Coordinator for Psychological Support noted the absence of the executive committee 
for the last four years and the responsibilities were not defined and the staff members 
were doing the work o f the executive committee.316
I
I
He added that the new leaders were selected by the General Assembly. The General
i
i  Assembly always witnesses severe conflict. Some members of the executive committee
315 Nefisa Sulieman, Coordinator for Social Centre, 7/4/2007, AMAL office.
316 Ibrahim A. Rahim, Psychologist, 6/4/2007, AMAL office.
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constrained the work. The interviewee emphasized the challenging role of the executive 
committee as a linkage between the organization, the society and the government. Based 
on this role he suggested that the members of the executive committee should be well 
respected in the civil society and with long experience in voluntary work.
According to one of the social workers, that she and other colleagues were lobbying, 
during the election time, to make the executive committee continue to avoid penetration 
of new comers and volunteers. 317There was intervention by the executive committee in 
the work of staff. Most of the time the executive committee members were absent and 
their number was less than ten. It was a necessity to have administrative and financial 
systems, terms for work and best utilization of the financial resources. The same 
interviewee added that the new leaders were selected by the General Assembly every two 
years. Their contribution was low and did not attend regularly. The working environment 
was not encouraging. There were no toilet facilities in the office. According to the 
interviewee that working conditions has to be improved and the executive committee has 
to be more efficient. She added that the organization must identify members for the 
executive committee with good reputation, honest and committed to work. She suggested 
at least 50% representation of women in the organization and staff members must be also 
members of the organization.
According to the one of the branches’ representatives, that through the support and 
monitoring of the Secretary General there were committees working closely with the staff
0 1  Q
members and there was a harmony between the different bodies. When she was in the 
executive committee, she intervened whenever necessary. She noticed that the work was 
stable and the organization did not encounter crises that can stop the work. She also 
believed that the organization could not satisfy everyone and the phenomena of the 
gossip is everywhere and she believed that gossip was healthy and it showed the level ofi
I democracy in the organization.
317 Sahar Abu Shok, Psychologist, 6/4/2007, AMAL office.
318 Asma Abu Naib, Nyla Branch Coordinator, 7/4/2007, AMAL office.
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According to the interviewee the branch, where she was working, was independent in 
terms of proposal writing and the funding was central through the main office in 
Khartoum. She commented on the representation of women in the executive committee 
by saying that the election of the executive committee was free and democratic and it was 
possible to have an executive committee without women. She believed that the main 
determinant factors in the selection of the members of the executive committee were 
commitment to and interest in humanitarian work.
Another staff member interviewed was working for 6 years for AMAL (2 years as a 
volunteer and 4 years as a full time staff member) defined the key capacity required was 
the funding resources. He preferred the self-sustainable finance. He suggested the return 
of old specialised offices and committees. According to him, AMAL had the human 
resources; the question was how to utilize them.
An activist and member of AMAL of Nyala Branch summarized the required capacities 
as follows:
Presentation skills: The presentation of the organization, its program and its 
activities was poor. Members and staff had no experiences to address meetings, 
workshops and external events. Poor materials were disseminated to community and 
donor agencies;
Communication: There was no communication strategy or plan and there was no 
proper documentation. This was clearly reflected in the organization’s annual reports and 
other promotional materials. The organization was mainly working with children but 
unfortunately the materials produced were not addressing the children issues in 
innovative ways;
I - Proposal writing: This was considered as a chronic problem facing the
i
| organization despite the long working experience and linkage with donor agencies.
I
Proposal writing was considered as ongoing required type of training and on job service 
technical assistance. There was a need of people acquainted to the donor’s proposal 
writing requirements;
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Research: This was considered as the weakest area in the organization. There 
were many gaps in the skills and knowledge. Some of these gaps were initiated by our 
partners and organization’s stakeholders and others by the organization. There were 
insufficient resources for research both human and financial. Research was not 
considered by the organization as one of the priorities. Most of donors were not interested 
in research.
Networking with other NGOs and working relations with GOS: The concept of 
coordination and collaboration was weak amongst Sudanese NGOs and civil society 
organizations. The relation with the government was tense and characterized by lack of 
trust;
Media: Media was far reaching objective. The necessity for the media for the 
organization was increasing due to lack of child right education and violation of human 
rights in general. The government owned and controlled the media. Therefore the media 
was supervised and guided by the government interest. Some of independent newspapers 
gave limited space for NGOs to present their views and activities.
Overall internal governance represents the heart of the organization. As we can see from 
the discussions and interviews that AMAL is still confused about its identity. As Michael 
Edwards correctly describes the effect of the internal pressures on the organizational 
development process: “they have passed through a phase of fresh-faced youth (small, 
dynamic, and open to change and challenge) and have entered a period of mid-life crisis
O I Qwhen anxiety about future is commonplace and bureaucratization sets in”
4.3.3 Strategic Planning
i
Other challenges encountered during this establishment period were the strengthening of 
the organization to become people’s movement and to attract more members. The 
| question was whether the organization will be financially self-sustained and to what
j extent the organization will manage to address the huge problem of the marginalized
children. It was clear the organization was lacking a clear strategy and the work of the
319 Edwards, M. and Fowler A. NGO Management. London: Earthscan.. 2002. p.29
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organization of relief nature responded to the actual day to day needs. This did not 
exclude that some creative initiatives were implemented and succeeded. The drought, 
desertification and the civil war in the South, for instance created a momentum for 
voluntary spirit among organization’s students, academics and activists who decided to 
participate in humanitarian aid activities and development programs.
i
A female staff member listed the following priority areas necessary for the organization’s
; direction: 1) the importance of clear strategic planning to work scientifically; 2)
[
availability of funds; 3) competent human resources; 4) monitoring; 5) training in 
management and finance; 6) networking with other organizations and 7) cooperation with 
the government for registration and permission to conduct activities.320
As we can easily trace the priority areas, according to some people interviewed, advocacy 
is not considered as one of the main focused activities. Edwards Michael suggests that: 
“This is not helped by the tendency in some NGOs to separate advocacy from programme 
management and develop semi-independent advocacy units. Rather than seeing advocacy 
as an integral part of everyone’s job at all levels, advocacy can become divorced from the 
concerns and priorities of people directly involved in development or relief work” (2002: 
91).
4.3.4 Human Resources and Management
A senior staff member interviewed, participated in internal capacity building committee 
and presented a paper on the role o f membership. He classified the participation and 
membership activities into three periods:321
First period (1983-1987): Establishment and joint work with Public Committee for 
Relief.
320 Nefisa Sulieman, Coordinator for Social Centre, 6/4/2007, AMAL office.
321 Abdelazim M. Ahmed, Deputy Secretary General, 7/4/2007, SECS office.
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The role of members and volunteers during the period 1983-1987 was defined by A. 
Anderson, an expert on management funded by SCF/Sweden to conduct an evaluation of 
the organization’s performance. He described the members and volunteers as people who 
have lost their sense of commitment, initiatives and rights. Those members who 
contributed to the most activities o f the organization were replaced by small group of 
executive committee members and staff.
j
One important observation was the experiences brought by members and volunteers to 
the organization from their diverse political, civil services and trade union background. 
This was clearly shown during the preparation for the election of the executive committee 
as one of the conflict areas around the competing leaders and which group will win the 
election.
The position of the organization’s member who was also a staff member didn’t create any 
contradiction for him/her as a volunteer who sometime paid from his/her own pocket to 
run the work. However, the discrimination between the staff members and other members 
started to increase and the tension as well.
A number of issues had been raised during this period in respect to the participation of 
members:
- Role of participants;
- Differentiation o f the various stages of the project cycle;
- The participation of the members in the projects’ activities;
Second period (1988-1997): Work based on basic system before the structural and
|
I constitutional modifications.
!
|
Many members had been employed and training programs assisted upgrading skills of 
staff, NGOs and government employees. The members participated in projects’ activities, 
training and workshops internally and externally. A resource development unit was 
established.
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Despite the expansion of the activities during this second phase, the question of the 
relationship between the staff members and the volunteers (the organization’s members) 
had not been resolved. A proposal was presented by the staff members who were 
members of the organization as well to completely divide the responsibilities of the staff 
members and the volunteers and change the constitution to exclude the staff members 
from being organization’s members. A new executive committee, representing these 
views, were elected in 1997.
I
I Professional successes had been achieved as a result of the various linkages with donor
i
agencies and the outside world. The setback was the absence of plans to engage the 
membership or to attract new ones. The organization succeeded during the period to 
establish an office. However, the increasing interest of the students in the organization 
revealed new behaviour resulting in the election dominated by the students. Most of the 
students were ex-government employees, dismissed by the government and active in non­
profit local NGOs.
Third period (1998-2002): Work based on constitution and present system.
The staff members who used to be members (volunteers) found a new situation where 
their membership will be at risk if the constitution was modified to stop the membership 
of the staff members. According to the discussions and debate among the members the 
proposal of the division between the voluntary and staff work came as result of threats 
that the staff members become a pressure group influencing the executive committee. 
Some voices from the members were against the idea of freezing the membership of 
those who were staff members. On the contrary they commented that being a 
member/volunteer was an asset and staff members should be encouraged to be members. 
Other opponents disagreed with this view and they believed that the person can not be an
I employee and employer at the same time.
|
j The modified constitution stated clearly under article 6.5.1 that the “membership will be 
frozen for any member who is appointed by the organization in a fixed-term paid
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position” (Constitution and Strategy: 6). The current constitution created voluntary 
offices to absorb the membership activities. The question raised was to what extent the 
voluntary offices added to the experience of the organization work and to what extent the 
participation of the members was effective and in accordance to the strategy and aim of 
the organization.
To sum up, human resources management is always linked to NGO work and human 
resource needs are defined in terms of the skills, knowledge, and values. As Fowler
i
| correctly put it: “It is the gap between what is available and what is required”. AMAL 
has to link its human resource management to needs, performance and potential of its 
members, staff and volunteers.
4.3.5 Implementation and Service Delivery
AMAL has well established programs which deliver services to remote poor 
communities. These activities range from social centres and youth program, education 
project for children, vocational training for youth, psychological rehabilitation project for 
children, cultural activities such as drama, music and drawings, alternative families for 
street children, child rights including juvenile, and child abuses. These are traditional 
activities initiated by AMAL and their continuation relies mainly on the donor agencies. 
The design of these projects was based on the needs required by children. The donor 
agencies play a role in identifying the community needs. AMAL has well experienced 
qualified technical staff. The organization depends on the knowledge of the board 
members and employees. The projects, however, start without pre-assessment or baseline 
data. In some cases donor agencies usually are not interested in surveys or pre-assessment 
information. These situations led to a gap in information on how was the situation of the 
community before the intervention and made the measurement of the progress intangible.
322 Fowler, A. Human Resource Mangement In: Michael 
Edwards & Alan Fowler ed. The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. UK and USA: Earthscan 
Publications Ltd, 2002, p.441
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A central feature of successful service delivery of AMAL is compatibility with the 
existing community system and also AMAL’s responsiveness to the community needs. 
The quality of the projects supported by AMAL over the past three decades reminded us 
of what Lehmann wrote about the experience of popular education in Chile: ’’Such 
activities open up space in which individuals can become persons, in which a climate of 
affect and respect reigns, in which participants acquire a vocabulary of competent and 
skilled social interaction enabling them to regard themselves and each other as citizens, 
as equals, rather than, by implication, as dependent and interstitial operators”.
The following tasks had been achieved during this third period:
1. The first phase of AMAL building has been completed and four shops were rented 
out, effective as from 1/9/2000. The revenue was used in constructing Phase Two of the 
building (first floor) to accommodate offices.
2. The Resource Development unit in Omdurman has been rented out and the revenue 
generated is allocated to meet the costs of the ongoing education program in Um Badda 
Social centre.
3. Utilizing the Solar Unit provided by the UNDP Urban Poor Program, a video club 
was started in Um Badda Social centre and the revenue is shared by AMAL and the 
Social Centre administration and used for maintenance, improvement of the local 
environment and the topping of salaries of the staff of the centre.
4. An agreement has been reached with the Urban Poor Programme to provide to Brick 
Making Machines and train builders (from Haj Yousif and Dar El Salam) on construction 
of low cost housing. The group trained will start by building AMAL Youth Programme 
Premises in Dar El Salam on the piece of land allotted to AMAL for the new Youth 
programme. The group will later, in partnership with AMAL, develop into a business 
group and an income generation programme for AMAL.
[
The interviewee added that the concept and management of voluntary sector remained a 
j  priority training area and preparation and training methods should be changed to meet the
i
! ---------------------------------------
i  323 Carrol, T. F., 1992. Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link in the Grassroots Development. USA:
! Kumarian Press, p.60.
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needs of trainees and the cultural and social context. 324 AMAL had strong human 
resources that require administrative systems. Networking with other organizations and 
civil society is valuable and necessary for the influence of policies.
In response to the question to what extent was the effectiveness of training, she 
responded that there was no other alternative. She admitted that training didn’t produce 
effective results. She pointed that in most cases the training performance relied on how 
well the training institution or individual was capable of providing training, preparation 
o f training materials, training tools, concept and curriculum and training evaluation by 
I trainees. Unfortunately, the personal social network was a determinant factor in selection 
o f training providers.
It was clear the training was an area of concern for people interviewed. A staff member 
noted the importance of people selected for training. To institutionalise the training she 
suggested meticulous selection of trainees and strict follow up for the purpose of the 
result of the training. She was trained at Asian Studies Institute in Cairo in capacity 
building and she learnt that training was useful to select the right person for the right 
place. She also discussed the seasonality of training and its implication was that people, 
for example trained in advocacy and lobbying, left the organization. She asked for more 
advocacy training.
A social worker interviewed referred to the training and capacity building concept 
initiated by War Child organization.325 This innovative model of training was using 
drama, music, and sport, and relied on available local resources attractive for children. 
She admitted that she didn’t apply what she learned for no good reason. She didn’t 
believe that all problems were related to funds. In response to the question what 
institutional capacities required to influence policies, she responded by saying she didn’t
j
| understand the institutional building but the organization had the human resources and 
the experiences and staff participated now by attending activities when invited.
I
\ ----------------------------------------
324 Nefisa Sulieman, Coordinator for Social Centre Unit, 6/4/2007, AMAL office.
325 Sahar Abu Shok, Psychologist, 6/4/2007, AMAL office.
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What has been unique in the grass-roots work of AMAL is that the organization turned 
into activist and advocacy and as potential agent for rights and child protection.
4.3.6 Financial Management
Most people interviewed from the staff and the executive committee agreed that the 
organization had a financial record, annually audited and financial information was 
available to members during the general assembly meetings. It was noted by senior staff 
| members that there were financial procedures and funds released by authorized persons 
upon the approval of the organization’s executive manager based on the budgets 
approval. There was a financial secretary.326
The opposition focus group interviewed expressed different views. 327 Some of the 
participants were concerned about the corruption and the danger of losing the basic assets 
of the organization. Their worries were that the organization was not accountable to 
anybody. The decisions were taken by a few people in the executive committee without 
consulting other members. The organization’s financial and administrative systems were 
suspended.
According to resource people interviewed the organization encountered major 
management problems reflected also in the financial management. The parallel bodies i.e. 
the executive committee and staff members was the key constraint and the intervention of 
the executive committee in the day to day work created tension and conflict. At present 
the conflict was between the executive committee and the members who felt neglected.
Social and financial audits fulfil a similar purpose in the social domain. Major findings 
| and root causes of discomfort and dispute among members of AMAL is the lack of 
communication, particularly in financial matters. As Zadek and Raynard writes:” The
326 Mohamed Jadalla, Chairman, and Abdel Khaliq A1 Nuari, Secretary General, 17/4/2007, AMAL office.
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revelation, for example, that a company has not traded according to its declared ethical 
principles or has acted against the values and interests of other stakeholders offers the 
opportunity for stakeholders to bring pressure on the organization to change its practices, 
or at least to amend its declared principles in line with its practice.”
4.3.7 External Relations
The period between 1988 and 1997 witnessed important development in the history of the 
organization. Many projects were funded by donor agencies such as World Food 
I Programme (WFP), Band Aid, Norwegian Save the Children Fund (SCF), SCF/ Sweden 
and Fredrick Ebert. According to some interviewees, the organization was facing major 
I issues with its funding agencies due to lack of financial reports and transparency. It was 
clear that the organization’s communication activities and report writing were poor. The 
internal dispute within the organization, lack of strategy and accountability problem 
affected also the organization’s external relation. AMAL was known as an active member 
in networks and had a good reputation in participating in regional and international 
events. The recent organization’s reports showed low profile at the external relation level.
AMAL and HRLAN
AMAL was one of the founders of the Human Rights and Legal Aid Network (HRLAN). 
It contributed to HRLAN establishment and the first years of HRLAN progress. AMAL 
was funded by HRLAN to implement some activities related to its human rights 
component. According to HRLAN, AMAL didn’t use the funds as agreed. HRLAN 
refused to fund the second proposal submitted by AMAL. Since then, AMAL suspended 
its activities in the HRLAN network.
A meeting was arranged between AMAL and HRLAN to discuss the causes led to the 
i suspension of AMAL membership in HRLAN. The participants pointed that the
I
misunderstanding between AMAL and the network was a result of bad communication.
i
1 328i Zadek, S., and Raynard, P., 2002. Accounting for Change: The Practice o f Social Auditing, in: 
Edwards, M. and Fowler A. 2002. NGO Management. London: Earthscan.
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329 The participants agreed that AMAL will review the suspension decision taken by the 
AMAL’s executive committee and will communicate with the network to activate its 
membership. All participants agreed on the importance of the networking and the 
necessity of the presence of strong promising organizations as members of the network.
AMAL was going through most critical time in terms of its relation with membership,
| donor agencies and with other national and international NGOs. It was not expected,
under these circumstances, that AMAL will review soon its membership with HRLAN.
I
[
4.4 Human Rights and Legal Aid Network (HRLAN)
4.4.1 Introduction
Human Rights and Legal Aid Network (HRLAN) established in April 2002 by Sudanese 
civil society organizations with the purpose on increasing the efficiency of human rights 
organizations in Sudan. A survey on the profile of human rights in Northern Sudan was 
conducted by Alternatives, a Canadian NGO in late 2001. As a result of the survey, six 
human rights organizations (Friends of Children Society (AMAL), A1 Manar, Mutawinat, 
SUDO, PLACE, Gender Centre for Research and Training and Sudanese Victims Torture 
Group (SVTG) decided to initiate a network for information and knowledge sharing and 
for joint advocacy actions. More specifically, the network advocated the protection and 
promotion of civil human rights for groups and individuals in the Sudan. HRLAN was 
successful in establishing itself in terms of working space (equipment, furniture, and 
required staff). It was registered with HAC. Today, HRLAN regrouped more than 60 
organizations from different parts of the country. It had created relations with other 
national and international NGOs, and UN organizations. A first strategic plan was
| developed with the participation of 28 organizations. At that time the number of member
|
| organizations was 32. HRLAN had also been successful with the media (articles,
| interviews, etc).
I
329 From AMAL attended: Abdel Khaliq A1 Nwari, Secretary General, Abdelazim M.A., Deputy Secretary 
General, Asma AlNiab, Coordinator for Nyala Branch. From HRLAN attended: Yasir Salim, Chairman, 
Mutasim A1 Amir, Coordinator and Asia A1 Amas, Member, 29/4/2007, HRLAN office.
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In terms of challenges, the organizational capacities of the network had improved 
significantly but there were some areas needing to be strengthened such as record 
keeping, reporting, monitoring, and financial systems. The relation with member 
organizations and their participation in decision making processes were still weak. 
Fulfilling assignments and meeting deadlines were below average in certain cases. The 
j  network had built confidence amongst international organizations, UN bodies and donor 
agencies. The funding situation was far better compared to three years ago when HRLAN 
; relied on only one donor.330 The network strategy had to be reviewed annually to 
prioritize activities and to link plans directly to expected results to facilitate monitoring of 
activities. The roles and responsibilities of coordinators, and committee members needed 
to be well defined. As a result of national and regional meetings on networking, the 
understanding of the networking concept was improved amongst the network member 
organizations. Finally, the network continued to encounter difficulties with HAC because 
of sensitivity surrounding the issue o f human rights.
4.4.2 Internal Governance
A steering committee was established in 2002 from two persons; a secretary general, a 
coordinator, representing two NGOs: AMAL and Mutawinat. Other member 
organizations such as Gender Centre and Khartoum Centre for Human Rights and 
Development played a key role in the preparation and writing up of the network 
constitution and regulations.331 The meetings of the network took place on rotation bases 
in the premises of the members. The team work of all member organizations was the 
inspiring factor for the network initiation.
i
| The first executive committee was elected on January 2003 by the general assembly.i
j Seven members were selected representing their organizations. The roles and 
responsibilities of the network expanded to consist of a chairman, deputy, secretary
; 330 HRLAN Progress Report, 2002: 3, Khartoum, Sudan.
331 Ibid, 2002: 4
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general, financial officer, two training coordinators and a legal aid coordinator. The roles 
of the executive committee were specified in the implementation of the general assembly 
resolutions and recommendation, execution of the activities to achieve the objectives of 
the network; preparation of action plan, recruitment of executive manager; coordination 
for the general assembly meetings and preparation for the final annual report. In terms of 
the network membership, three ideas presented and discussed in the executive committee 
meetings: 1) Network members to be selected from NGOs and voluntary centres; 2) 
Members to be from NGOs, voluntary centres and individuals active in human rights 
area; 3) Members from NGOs, centres and individuals with the condition that individuals
i
t
had no right for vote. The lengthy discussions and meetings in the executive committee 
agreed with the second proposal that members to be identified from NGOs, centres and 
individuals. The reason for selecting this proposal was that the organizations/founders felt 
the necessity to broaden the participation and offer the opportunity to human rights 
activists to effectively engage in human rights areas.
The second phase of the network establishment was when HRLAN registered in April 
2004 with Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). A new executive committee was 
elected by the general assembly. One of the first decisions taken by the new executive 
committee was to have a three year strategic plan.
According to members of the executive committee interviewed that 97 member 
organizations were registered in the network. 46 organizations had registration 
certificates with HAC and 32 did not submit their certificates. 332 HAC introduced an 
article in the Networking Act that only those organizations registered in HAC were 
permitted to be members in a network.333 This definition excluded most known and active
I members of the network. Many of the other members were weak, unknown, and without
i
| address. The attendance of member organizations in the general assembly meetings was
332 Husam Mohamed Osma, Member, 10/4 and Mohamed A1 hassan Abdelatif, Training Coordinator, 
11/4/2007, HRLAN office.
333 The Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (organization) Act, 2006: 8. Chapter III: Organizations 
Branches and Networks. Available at: www.hacsudan.com. Accessed December 28, 2008.
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always a challenging issue facing the network. The first two meetings of the general 
assembly were usually cancelled due to lack of the quorum, i.e. two third of the members.
In the network strategic plan sessions conducted in April 2004, an internal assessment 
group identified the main internal weaknesses: lack of commitment; weak reporting 
system; poor communication between the network and members; weak attendance in 
network meetings; funding through intermediary body; lack of understanding of 
networking and civil society concepts; weak institutional management; weak training 
opportunities; lack of spacious premise; weak mentoring and evaluation; weak
j
| documentation and lack of information system; most of network members had short 
experience in network activities.
Since the establishment of the network in 2002, regular general assembly meetings took 
place and new executive committees were elected. Some members were replaced by new 
members and there were some limited changes at the chairman position level. The 
chairman was replaced once since 2002 and no rotation made in this position since 2004. 
The reason given for electing the same person was that the network was going through a 
major transitional period and the chairman had the sufficient experience, knowledge and 
skills to efficiently lead the network to the new phase. Some people interviewed 
suggested agreed limited period for some senior positions such the chairman and 
president to avoid domination of certain persons and to learn the lessons of the previous 
chairman of SC SNAP, who wanted to shift the network to a corporate company.334
According to members interviewed that the network extended its activities to various 
regions in Sudan and created focal points in some main locations. The network, however,
I
[ did not succeed in attracting members of these locations and regions to effectively engage
i
i  in its work. There was weak representation of organizations from Southern, Eastern,
[
Western and Blue Nile areas in the executive committee and in the staff member 
| structure.
334 H usam  M oh a m ed  O sm an , M em ber, 1 0 /4 /2 0 0 7  and M utasim  A1 A m ir, C oordinator, 1 0 /4 /2 0 0 7 , H R L A N
o ffice .
The network had the plans to improve the leadership skills and to maintain at the same 
time the spirit of the team work. The executive committee members played a crucial role 
in the effectiveness and efficiency of the network work and they developed democratic 
practices, values and principles that created a strong foundation for the network and for 
future direction.
The network, according to members interviewed offered opportunities for the women
c
I within the network structure and its different committees. The network appointed 
recently a female coordinator to be responsible for one of the main projects. However, 
more women needed to be represented in the executive committee and in the senior 
management positions such as the chairman and the president. Gender equality was a 
necessity not only for staffing and representation but also for the incorporation of gender 
equality into the policies, strategies, procedures and systems of the network.
In addition to the existing network structure, HRLAN had to improve the member 
organizations’ participation in decision making process by creating better mechanisms to 
reach the members and engage them in the different committees and consult them 
regularly to get feedback on issues related to their satisfaction about the network 
activities and how they could be improved, particularly in the areas of internal 
governance and financial management, priorities and network direction.
In connection to board and member organizations linkage, Rajesh Tandon offers some 
forms of governances such as family boards, invisible boards, staff boards and 
professional boards. HRLAN governance structure lies between the staff board and 
professional board. From this perspective, HRLAN is more accountable to its staff and 
board compared to its constituency, the member organizations. However, the
iit
i  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
335 Asia A1 Amas, Member, 12/4/2007 and Yasir Salim, Chairman, 12/4/2007, HRLAN office.
| 336 Tandon, Rajesh. 1995b. Board Games: Governance and Accountability in NGOs, in: Edwards, M. &
Hulme, D. (ed.) 1996. Non-Governmental Organizations: Performance and Accountability, Beyond the 
Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan, p, 41.
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performance of the network, in terms of governance is satisfactory but it can be enhanced 
by further consultation and dialogue with the members.
4.4.3 Strategic Planning
The strategic plan of HRLAN conducted on April 2004 and the plan covers the period 
; between 2004 and 2007. The plan, which was facilitated by a local consultant, discussed 
the following areas: 1) internal assessment; 2) external environment; 3) market 
assessment; 4) developing mission statement; 5) developing vision statement; 6) strategic 
I objectives; and 7) steps to achieve objectives.337
During a focus group meeting with four young male and female representatives of 
member organizations and in response to the questions what were their expectations 
when they joined the network, their replies were varied as follows: 1) funding, 
information and training; 2) new experiences, and knowledge sharing; 3) training of 
trainers in human rights; and 4) joint work with other NGOs for social changes.338
The strategic direction sessions identified the following areas for the network: 1) legal 
aid; 2) advocacy and pressure; 3) monitoring; and 4) raising awareness.
Based on the sessions and the general set up of the strategic plan, the planning was 
designed to achieve objectives rather than results. The plan actually re-presented the early 
four strategic objectives of the network when was initiated, as informal group, in 2001. 
They could be summarized as follows: 1) disseminate human rights culture within the
337
iI
| f j f i a jaJl (2007-2004) j i -y i  .2004 j  jjLuiiyi jjia .
I
j
j
j  . 2004. Stratdgique Plan 2004-2007. Khartoum: HRLAN Publication.
i
i
; 338 Anwar Bashir, Member from Child Rights Institute, Abdelalla Hamid, Member from Cultural Action
Centre, Muwaia Hassan, Member from Nubian Heritage, and Aisha Rufai, Member from Peace Bridge 
organization, 20/4/2007, HRLAN office.
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different societies in Sudan, and enhance the role of the community in maintaining these 
rights; 2) advocate the target groups and pressurize the government to activate, sign and 
ratify international conventions; 3) provide legal aid and legal counselling to target 
groups and sectors; and 4) monitor violations of human rights and evaluate 
implementation of conventions that are signed by the government.
i
The participants’ future expectations were not based on what had been achieved and how 
had been achieved. For example, the fours areas identified as strategic directions were far 
j  from been realistic and objective. The good example that after three years of the strategic
plan sessions, only one of the four areas had been considered as the core network activity. 
The key focus of the network since its establishment was the awareness raising and 
human rights education activities amongst the network member organizations and for the 
general public. In the area of advocacy and policy influence, very little had been 
achieved. In terms of monitoring and watching of human rights violations, the network 
gained poor results and the establishment of the vocal points, as one of the tools of 
monitoring, had not been effective so far.
According to the table of the strategic objectives 2, 3, and 4, very few had been achieved 
in the last three years.339 The plan also did not mention how the network will measure the 
progress towards achieving these objectives and whether or not objectives’ indicators 
were identified.
The intention of this criticism was not to undermine the efforts made by the consultant 
and the participants during the three days of strategic plan session on April 2004. On the 
contrary, it was to remind members of the network to review the three year strategic
| planning and assess what had been achieved, and what went wrong in order to set
i
[ priorities and action plan.
I
4.4.4 Human Resources and Management
339 Ibid , 2 0 0 4 .
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During the interview of a senior staff member, it was noted that the job descriptions 
needed to be reviewed particularly that the network management structure was changed 
dramatically as a result o f new interventions. Therefore new staff members, possibly with 
the same title but without reviewing the previous ones, were recruited.340 There were two 
coordinators. They differentiated between them by attaching them to the donor agency 
funded the project. The network had not utilized from the young males and females who 
used to come asking for voluntary work. The network did not develop a policy towards 
volunteers. The network had administrative and financial policies and procedures. These 
needed to be known by members and needed to be reviewed based on the observations 
and consultations with members. The network policies and procedures should reflect the 
values and principles adopted by the network. Most of people interviewed reported that 
the recruitment policy was unclear. The policy of salary scale and salary increase was 
also unknown. All people interviewed agreed that the network had no plan for staff 
development. It was unclear how people were selected for staff training opportunities, 
whether there were any criteria for selection and to what extent new knowledge and skills 
utilized from training. It was suggested by some young members interviewed that staff 
training and personnel development were part of the strategic planning and the network 
annual plan based on the staff performance and assessment. Resources had to be allocated 
for these purposes.
The other missing component, according to some executive members that the information 
system and documentation were weaknesses that the network was aware of and tried to 
establish management information system (MIS) and resource centre.341 The information 
on the projects and on the network in general were collected on ad hoc efforts and based 
on the personal files and interest. An effective MIS would be used for planning, 
measurement of progress, reporting and for decision making purposes.
4.4.5 Implementation and Service Delivery
| 340 Mutasim A1 Amir, Coordinator, 10/4, 2007, HRLAN office.
! 341 Yasir Salim, Chairman, 12/4 and Mutasim A1 Amir, Coordinator, 10/4, HRLAN office.
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The network identified the needs of both member organizations and marginalized 
communities based on limited consultation with member organizations and with some 
donor agencies. The network, according to people interviewed, had not developed 
concept and methodology that will assist to identify the needs of marginalized groups 
based on their own assessment. In most of the cases the projects were designed by the 
network and the network took the leading role in planning and implementation. The 
network offered the opportunity for other member organizations to implement some 
activities such as human rights awareness project or legal education on child rights for 
staff members, member organizations and community based organizations. Most of the 
people interviewed critically noted the lack of transparency with regard to the criteria for 
selection o f implementing member organizations. The majority of the human rights 
awareness, and human rights education and capacity building trainings benefited the staff 
and member organizations.
Recently the network got a two year fund from European Union to establish a media 
centre for human rights. The network had completed three projects supported by 
Alternatives and NOVIB. The last phase of the project focused on capacity building to 
improve the internal systems, including internal governance, strategic planning, financial 
management, service delivery, management and human resources and external relations.
The network conducted several training activities such as conflict resolution, gender and 
human rights, monitoring and evaluation, report writing, networking, and peace culture. 
The network succeeded also in the following areas: establishment (office, equipment, 
furniture and staff); legal status and registration with HAC; reasonable number of active 
membership; first strategic planning; success with media; good partnership with Christian 
Aid and with the High Office of Human Rights; good contacts with international and 
national NGOs; and good linkages with government. Between March 2004 and March
| 2007 the network organized 35 training sessions, workshops, seminars and
i
conferences.342 Only four of these training and awareness events took place outside
i
342 HRLAN Annual Report, 2007:7, Khartoum, Sudan.
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Khartoum in Port-Sudan (Eastern Sudan), A1 Fashir (Western Sudan) and Sennar (Central 
Sudan). The network contracted local consultants for the training sessions.
The network was part of Darfur Assessment Mission (DAM), a special consortium of 
Sudanese NGOs such as SECS, SCSNAP, A1 Massar, ACORD and Kabkabia 
Development and Reconstruction Society. 343 In June 2004 the mission assessed thef
status of the population in two provinces (Kutum and Kabkabia) affected by internal 
conflict. The group assessed the human rights aspect of the conflict. DAM was 
considered the first effort initiated by Sudanese NGOs in Darfur. The initiative was 
! supported by NOVIB to assess the situation and to understand the root causes of the
problem in the two provinces. The assessment mission proposed a number of projects in 
the areas affected by the conflict.
Most of the people interviewed criticised the urban based activities organized by the 
Network.344 They reported that many human rights violations were taking place outside 
Khartoum. They suggested that the network had to expand activities to other states in 
Sudan.
The ambiguity over the selection of training centres and consultancy groups which 
conducted training for the network created unease and discomfort amongst member 
organizations and staff members. It was suggested and agreed by most of people 
interviewed that the network had to develop policies and procedures with regard to 
selection of consultants, consultancy companies and also member organizations. The 
procedures and policies had to be written and known by all members for transparency 
purpose. The procedures and policies should include the methods used to advertise for 
| training and consultancy contracts, the period for contract, terms of reference, payment,
| and written agreement. The latter should clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of
| each party and precautious measures to be taken in case of delay in submitting the
requirements for training or consultancy.
343 Update o f Darfur Situation. Available at: www.novib.nl. Accessed November 24, 2008.
344 Yasir Salim, Chairman, 12/4, Husam M. Osman, Member, 10/4, Asia Amas, Member, 12/4, HRLAN 
office.
The network participated in a workshop on networking and networks’ Act in Sudan. The 
workshop was conducted in cooperation with the Gender Centre for Research and 
Training and supported by DED. Four papers presented as follows: challenges facing 
networks in Sudan; networking and networks; the Network Act; and experiences of 
Sudanese networks. The workshop recommended formation of a committee to study the 
networks’ Act; coordination of the efforts of all related bodies to jointly advocate for 
networks work free of any restrictions and for opened networks’ membership without 
exclusion. The committee responsible for the Act review was chaired by HRLAN. The 
committee was asked to review the Act and make the necessary changes and 
modifications in order to exclude the restrictions that do not allow NGOs to participate in 
the network.
The network organized two workshops in Khartoum on networking and networks’ 
experiences in Sudan and on networking and social movements. The first workshop on 
networking and networks’ experiences was organized between 19 and 20 November, 
2005. The key papers presented were: the networking and networks in Egypt; the role of 
NGOs in the peace process; the basic principles of gender equality; and documentation 
and information. The workshop was attended by 60 persons from the public arena 
(activists, academics, NGOs, researchers). Three case studies were presented by 
Sudanese networks (HRLAN, SCSNAP and Women Network on Peace and 
Development). The workshop was facilitated by HRLAN, SCSNAP, and Alternatives 
and supported by NOVIB. Human rights activists from Egypt participated in the 
workshop.
|
The other workshop organized by HRLAN was a workshop on networking and social 
movements, on April 11 and 12, 2006. It was also facilitated by Alternatives in 
[ collaboration with HRLAN and supported by NOVIB. The first day discussed three
| contributions: the importance and advantages of networking and networks; social
j  movements; and the networking and social movements from Egyptian perspective. The
second day two papers were presented: the strategic role of civil society in networking;
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and the networking as a strategy for civil society organizations. An activist from Egypt 
participated in the workshop.
One of the long term challenging issues which faced by many networks and NGOs was to 
what extent the member organizations and staff benefited from the training sessions. 
Some people interviewed agreed that the measure of progress or impact of activities, both 
training and services, was a crucial and important aspect. 345 Some interviewees 
suggested that to assess progress, it was necessary to create a data base system prior to 
any intervention. It was also advisable to conduct self-assessment for training and 
situation analysis for service delivery intervention. The other important area was the 
identification of the progress and result indicators, how they were been selected and who 
was involved in these processes? Most of training workshops were provided by 
individual consultants or consultancy groups without monitoring the quality of their 
services. One measure which could be taken, according to some interviewees that the 
necessity of the training checklist (training plan, training materials, training tools, and 
evaluation) to be presented by trainers and to be accessible to and known by trainees. The 
evaluation and meetings with the trainees were one of the best feedback and response on 
the quality of training and services provided by consultants.
I attended many discussions with HRLAN over the last two years with regard to whether 
or not the network consider providing legal aid to members and individuals in need. 
HRLAN believes that this is an urgent need in a country violates systematically the rights 
of its citizens. It has been agreed that the services of legal aid can be understood and 
properly evaluated only in the context of the particular development strategy, including 
availability of resources, both human and financial.
4.4.6 Financial Management
345 Y asir  S a lim , C hairm an, 12 /4 , M u tasim  A1 A m ir , C oordinator, 10 /4 , M oh am ed  A . A b d ela tif , T rain ing
C oordinator, 11 /4 , H R L A N  o ffic e .
Most of the financial resources of the network were originally decided by the projects 
funded by donor agencies. The planning for budgeting was minimal after the allocation of 
funds and after signing projects’ agreement. The network usually had a budget margin of 
10-15% for some modifications and changes. The preparation for projects’ budgets 
involved only very senior experienced staff and executive committee members.
i
! In terms of financial management, the network had a full time accountant. According to|
j people interviewed that the network had a financial system and there was financial policy 
and procedures.346 The budget, before presented to the general assembly, was audited by 
external audit. A financial report was prepared and presented to the general assembly. It 
was a routine exercise happening annually without hassles according to people 
interviewed. However, some members interviewed criticized lack of financial 
transparency and the financial ambiguity over the network budget, the salary scale, the 
training costs and the consultants’ expenses. In the absence of involvement of member 
organizations in planning and budgeting, such critical remarks on the financial 
management were expected. The network, according to some people interviewed, had to 
announce its financial policies and procedures for member organizations. A written 
internal financial guide would be a valuable and useful document. The network had to 
review these policies and procedures regularly to accommodate the comments and 
observations from the different stakeholders (members, donors, and government) and 
financial experts and auditors.
The network had the opportunity to diversify its financial resources. Its good reputation 
could easily attract other donors. The network should plan ahead a long term sustainable
| financial strategy. The available resources both human and financial, if utilized 
effectively and efficiently, could generate potential financial options. This included 
marketing of human resources of the network member organizations. Other important
ii
aspect which had not been fully engaged was the Sudanese private sector. By consulting
346 L ubna K h aw aja , F in an cia l O fficer , 4 /4 /2 0 0 7 , H R L A N  o ff ic e , L aila  M . S a lih , M em ber, 4 /4 /2 0 0 7 ,
H R L A N  o ffic e .
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and involving the private sector in development interventions, some of its financial 
resources could be allocated to benefit those in needs.
4.4.7 External Relations
The network increased its visibility among various stakeholders (government, national 
and international NGOs, donor agencies, UN bodies, and direct and indirect 
beneficiaries). These stakeholders, however, were not aware of the network’s activities 
| and the network documentation, communication and publication were not sufficient and
| not accessible to them. The network channels of communication through publication,
! newsletter, website, needed to be strengthened and diversified.
The network participated in other NGOs’ and networks’ events, whenever invited. In 
some cases the network took initiatives to coordinate efforts or lead to achieve some 
benefits. Good examples were the role of the network in the review of networks’ act, and 
the leading role played by the network in the campaign against the NGOs law regulating 
the voluntary work presented by the government.347 The other efforts made by the 
network were coordinating the consultations and meetings with other NGOs and civil 
society organizations on the Human Rights Commission Law. More than 31 
organizations discussed and prepared a draft law and consulted with the UN mission in 
Khartoum and with the Consultative Council of Human rights.
4.5 Sudanese Environment Conservation Society (SECS)
4.5.1 Introduction
The Sudanese Environment Conservation Society (SECS) is a local, voluntary 
| independent, non-profit organization, established in September 1975 in Arkweet
Conference. SECS was initiated as an extension for Natural History Society, established
i
347 HRLAN Annual Report 2005, p.5
348 HRLAN Progress Report covering the period between January and March 2006.
in 1966 and the Sudanese Nature Conservation Society established in 1970. SECS aimed 
to raise environmental awareness among the community. It has more than 8000 Sudanese 
members from different background (academic, students, activists, women, public 
figures).349 It works through a network of 113 branches/sites in all states of Sudan. The 
executive committee was running its work voluntarily and the volunteers were 
conducting the activities on minimal allowances.350 There were more than 20 projects
i
implemented by the organization.
4.5.2 Internal Governance
Some interviewees described the relation between the executive committee and staff as
I O Mbeing vague and confusing. Three of SECS old members agreed that the organization 
has an institutional framework but on paper and not effective. 353 Only few members 
were getting assignments and opportunity of travel outside the country.354 There was no 
regular meetings and therefore no feedback. Some founders interviewed believed the gap 
and lack of communication, between the executive committee and the staff team resulted 
from the decision that the executive committee members were not allowed to hold 
administrative positions within the organization. Some of both young and old generation 
critically noted the continuation of the founders in the executive committee. They all 
believed it was the high time for young generation to take over management 
responsibilities. It was suggested by them that several mechanisms can be found to 
maintain the relationship between the generations and to ensure the contribution of 
founders.
I
i
I ---------------------------------------
| 349 SECS Annual Report 2006: 4
350 Ibid, 2006: 5
351 Ibid: 2006: 2
352 Asim Maghrabi, Member, 13/4, Consultancy office. Sadiq Kara, Coordinator for Advocacy and 
Lobbying, 14/4, SECS office.
- 353 Ali Khalifa, Coordinator for Environmental Rehabilitation, 14/4, Muasim Nimer, Member, 15/4, and
Adil M. Ali, Member, 13/4, SECS office, 
i 354 Asim Maghrabi, Member, 13/4, Consultancy office.
355 Asim Maghrabi, Member, 13/4, Consultancy office, Amal Abdelfadil, Member, 18/4, University of 
Khartoum.
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The weaknesses of the specialized committees were known as a disappointing factor for 
the management and for the committees’ members. The idea behind the formation of 
these committees was to widen the space of members’ participation in the organization’s 
activities. The committees work was usually initiated by the committees’ coordinators. 
The committees had no allocated funds. The members of these committees were 
young volunteers, who were asked to prepare plans. The members, however, found out 
there were no resources for these plans.
The number of the organization’s branches increased from three in Shendi, A1 Suki and 
Medani to become 113 branches scattered all over the country.357 Most of the branches 
were initiated by the communities and supported by SECS main office in Khartoum. The 
relationship between the center and the branches is considered as one major obstacle 
encountering the progress of the organization and limiting the opportunity of the 
branches’ representation in the organization’s decision making processes. The branches 
conferences were held on regular basis. A new constitution was recommended by the 
branches conference. The high financial cost of the branches’ conference inhibits its 
continuation. According to some interviewees, the branches conference, as a consultation 
exercise, was no longer functional. 358 They commented that the organization is going 
through a process of constitutional reforms which will define the relationship between the 
center and the branches and will specify roles and responsibilities and will address the 
issue of representation. Others responded that the absence of branches conferences was a 
deliberate policy to stop the critical views being expressed by some branches’ members 
about the performance of the center. Despite all these views, the branches conference is 
considered by all as a democratic practice necessary for good governance and for the 
organization’s internal dynamics.
356 Sumaiya A1 Sayed, Secretary General, 17/4, SECS office.
! 357 SECS Annual Report 2006: 5-6
358 Ali Khalifa, Coordinator for Environmental Rehabilitation, 14/4, SECS office and Adil M.Ali, Member, 
13/4, SECS office, Tariq Haroun, Member from Rahad Branch, 21/4, SECS office.
210
-JC Q
Some of the people interviewed criticised the preparation for the general assembly. 
The general assembly was known as one of the important democratic mechanism for 
participation, transparency and accountability. It was a venue and opportunity, for 
example, for branches representatives whose voices were usually not heard, within the 
organization’s structure, to speak out their views. The preparation, as viewed by 
interviewees, was weak and poor. The focus of the general assembly meeting was to 
j agree on the annual report and the selection of the new executive committee. These 
meetings were accompanied by tensions over the question of who will take over. The 
| groupings of members over the elected list and the risk of invasion of new members 
| created unhealthy atmosphere. The whole idea behind the general assembly meeting asi
democratic venue was dismissed due to mobilization for election of new executive 
committee and the behaviour and attitudes attached to this exercise.
Based on these views, particularly, on branches, it was clear that the organization had no 
capacity to relate to them. Communication with and support to these branches was poor. 
However, these branches were community based and therefore self-sustained. 
Historically, branches have emerged within specific historical, social, and cultural 
contexts. The outcomes of their activities, as advocacy groups, are distinct and unique. 
With the rise of a new discourse of the state in Sudan, branches began to initiate projects 
and strengthen SECS, on the one hand and local civil society movement, on the other. 
With support of German Development Service (known as DED) a component 
strengthening the capacities of the branches was established. Unfortunately the support 
was stopped by the end of the project. This raised the ongoing discussion on the 
organization’s strategic thinking and whether or not SECS is still a project oriented 
organization and a donor driven initiative.
Focus Group Meeting
iI|
A focus group meeting attended by several SECS members representing young 
generation and founders, volunteers, technical committees, board members, executive
359 M utasim  N im er , M em ber, 15 /4 , S E C S o ffice , Sad iq  K ara, C oord inator for A d v o c a c y , 14 /4 , SE C S  o ffic e .
committee members, discussed the present challenges and future direction. The following
360areas of capacity building needs were reported as priorities by the participants:
1. Strategic Planning: review of the strategic planning as a result of the changing 
political environment of the country’s peace processes in general, and those variables of 
SECS in particular;
2. Administrative Structure: recruitment of executive manager; establishment of 
fund-raising unit and a part-time officer for proposal writing; definition of roles and 
responsibilities of executive office and executive committee; formation of a coordinating
i
committee; expansion of the structure to contain an advocacy and lobbying project;
i
recruitment of a media coordinator; establishment of monitoring and evaluation office; 
general meeting on quarter basis; emphasis on external evaluation; personnel rules and 
regulations; accountability for all; capacity building; networking and the effective role of 
SECS in the networks; emphasis on long-term funding commitment to ensure quality of 
activities and donors’ credibility.
3. Branches: new structure for the branches section at the main office and
recruitment of qualified staff; information system and communication with the branches; 
support to branches program; capacity building; branches conference; and establishment 
of fund mechanism for branches.
4. Members and volunteers: support the voluntary spirit; establishment of office for 
members and volunteers; generation dialogue; training programs; data-base for members 
and skills.
5. Documentation and information system: data-base and information system;
website.
6. Committees: roles of committees; capacity building; workshops and newsletter
for the committees’ work.
7. Priority areas: peace; human rights; oil industry and mining; land conflict; poverty
i  reduction; environment local and international.
I
!
tt
360 See Appendix (C)
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8. Work methods: lobbying; mass media; coordination, coalition and collaboration 
with private sector, government and political parties; environmental awareness raising for 
legal, legislature and executive members.
The organization’s way out proposal was realistic and can be achieved under certain 
requirements. First, the organization should create result indicators to assess the progress 
| of what has been discussed and agreed upon. Second, SECS needs to establish a
monitoring unit mainly to measure the achievements and to shed light on the constraints 
encountering the progress. Third, the monitoring unit should develop a warning system 
I that concentrates on the risks and the strategy to mitigate them. The participants
i
I suggested a regular three month focus group meeting to be held to engage the
administration and other members in the process, including representatives of the 
branches. The same regular meetings will review the organization’s strategy and 
highlight the priority areas of intervention. It was also agreed and strongly recommended 
by the participants the necessity for documentation system and unit to ensure the flow of 
information to all those involved and to use them for the strategy, research, monitoring 
and reporting.
4.5.3 Strategic Planning
SECS Strategic Plan (2004-2013) was drafted towards the end of 2003. In mid 2004 
important political development took place in Sudan. Sudan Government and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 9 January, 2005 in Naivasha, Kenya, ending the longest civil war in Africa. 
This posed a new challenge to SECS among other civil society organizations.361 Special 
focus was on environmental rehabilitation and sustainable development in the past 
conflict period particularly in conflict affected areas, including contribution to building 
| and maintaining peace. Emphasis was on lobby and advocacy as well as awareness rising.
I The peace component in Lobbying and Advocacy Project (LAP III), one of the
i organization’s projects succeeded in sending six campaigns to Southern Sudan (Juba,t
! 361 Adil M. Ali, Member, 13/4, SECS office.
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Wau and Malakal) and Darfur, Damazine, Kosti, addressing issues of peace building, 
culture of peace, dissemination and awareness on CPA protocols especially power 
sharing and wealth sharing protocol. Different approaches and techniques were adopted 
to get the message across to people concerned in these areas through lectures, drama, 
children programmes and discussions groups. SECS and other NGOs need to be 
recognized and facilitated if peace-building efforts are to be successful. Effective and 
sustainable peace building require joint efforts, and partnerships between state and civil 
society organizations. Pamela Mbabazi and Timothy M. Shaw describe what happened 
in Uganda in 1990s: “ ...constitute something of a model in terms of constructive 
| postconflict division of labor among state, companies, and NGOs, encouraged by the 
Musevni regime’s realism following the traumas of the Amin and Obote II years. That is, 
peace-building governance has advanced human security, which makes human 
development a possibility once again”. 362
In 2007, the third year of the strategic plan, weaknesses were revealed by the 
organization, particularly as a result of the rapid changing in the political environment 
after the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The organization suffered 
from lack of focus and its work scattered on different fronts whenever the need arises to 
highlight environmental issue. According to some interviewees SECS has to restructure 
and re-profile to cope with the new challenges resulted of the CPA. New intervention 
areas such as peace, human rights and conflict prevention should be priorities. Al- 
Batahani asks: “Who else other than CSOs to offer and project an inclusive ethos across 
society to form a mantle of reconciliation, consensus-making and nation-building?”. 
SECS should explore new innovative ways of implementation, selection of projects, and 
relation with stakeholders, including donors, government and private sector. Future 
planning should take in consideration improvements in the relation of members and
I 362 NGOs and Peace Building in the Great Lakes Region o f Africa: States, Civil Societies, and Companies 
in the New Millennium. In: David Lewis and Tina Wallace, eds. 2000. New Roles and Relevance. United 
| States of America: Kumarian Press, p. 188.
363 The Role o f Civil Society Organizations in reconciliation, social development and nation integration in 
j Post-Conflict Sudan. Workshop on the challenges of peace in Sudan, organized by National Civic Forum. 
Sharqa Hall 22-23 December 2003, p.8
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branches to be further engaged in decision making processes particularly in areas that 
matter them.
An assessment was made by SECS committees regarding the way out for the 
organization. The committees outlined the following opportunities for SECS. First, the 
interest and willingness of young males and females to work as volunteers in the NGOs 
sector remarkably increased. Second, the margin of freedom was expanded in a country 
which was still ruled by military regime. Third, the new constitution and the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) opened space for participation and engagement 
of civil society organizations. Fourth, the international attention and interest in 
environmental issues increased. On the other hand, there were a number of threats facing 
the NGOs sector which can be summarized as follows: 1) the crisis of governance and the 
vicious circle of democracy and dictatorship; 2) the economic pressures, inflation and 
devaluation of local currency; 3) the NGOs new law and the implications on the 
registration, re-registration and performance of NGOs; and 4) the attitude of the 
government towards independent NGOs and lack of recognition and support to civil 
society movement (SECS, 2007).
There were ideas highlighted by most of interviewees. Most of the interviewees, for 
example, agreed that the key weakness of SECS was that, despite that the organization’s 
vision and mission were clear; the organization was a resource provider and not long­
term process oriented. 364 This was clearly demonstrated in the mobilization and 
management of human resources, particularly, in an organization that attracted many 
volunteers and members of diverse background.
The most striking in terms of SECS long-term strategy is the absence of financial 
autonomy and sustainability, as one of the urgent capacity areas of the organization. This 
is a growing worry which has been reflected in the recommendations made by the
364 M utasim  N im er , M em ber, 15 /4 , S E C S  o ff ic e , A s im  M aghrab i, M em ber, 1 3 /4 , C on su ltan cy  o ffic e .
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organization in its financial reports. These reports suggest more involvement in 
income-generating activities as well as investment in consultancy and local funding.
4.5.4 Human Resources and Management
The organization was managed with the support of part-time staff. The organization, 
however and at some stage had a full time executive manager who contributed positively 
to manage day-to day work. The organization had limited capacity to manage and
| mobilize financial and human resources. A full time training coordinator was employed
i
to meet some of the training requirements of staff members and branches. The position of 
the training coordinator was terminated at the end of funded project.
At the organizational level, it was pointed by some people interviewed that there is an
urgent need for financial rules and regulations and an administrative system.366
SECS recognized the necessity and significance of capacity development as a result of
the organization’s increasing scale of activities and increasing number of stakeholders.
The organization made remarkable efforts to meet the high expectations of members,
branches, civil society organizations and government bodies. The interviewees noted that
the present institutional structure was inefficient to be responsive to the increasing
advocacy work as a result of the invasion of market, external investment and government
business interest. The organization was initiated by elites in mid 1970s. The diverse
types of activities attract many other politicians, civil society activists and civil servants.
Most of these practitioners and young graduates work as volunteers. The organization,
however, lack the clear strategy to utilize from these human resources. The absence of
human resources direction and the lack of human resources data hinder the organization’s
| development.367
|
!
i  SECS could benefit from the large number of volunteers in the implementation of the 
I project activities. Volunteers were trained as coordinators and vocal points for technical
365 SECS Financial Reports o f 2002 and 2005.
366 Adil M. Ali, Member, 13/4, SECS office.
367 Mutasim Nimer, Member, 15/4, SECS office.
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committees that set-up by SECS. Training, under specific program, was designed to 
address issues such as peace culture and environmental conservation. For example 53 
fresh graduate volunteers were involved in LAP III implementation (11 components 
coordinators, 10 advocacy trainers, and 16 activity coordinators).368
; As a result, SECS executive members decided to set out a clear advance volunteers’
I policy. The draft document was produced and submitted for discussion by volunteers in 
their technical committees. Finally all the comments and points of views were further 
j discussed in a one-day workshop attended by some of executive committee members and 
volunteers. The document, titled SECS Volunteer Policy, contains: SECS volunteers 
number, stages and types; volunteerism definition; aim of the volunteer policy; SECS 
volunteer-types; volunteers registration; volunteers duties and rights; code of conduct and 
work, transparency and incentives.
The organization’s human resources and management systems were questioned by 
interviewees. The dissatisfaction covered volunteers and some founders interviewed as 
well. 369 There were some arguments over the financial management aspect. Some 
interviewed were pleased with the financial system. Others believed that the system was 
bureaucratic, complicated and unknown by most members.
4.5.5 Implementation and Service Delivery
The organization was playing a key role in advocacy and lobbying to prevent the 
implementation of inappropriate policies and the invasion of private sector in 
development activities. The impact of oil companies, cement factories, and high tension 
electricity lines are examples of areas where the organization created environmental 
awareness raising campaigns through the media, workshops and in the National 
Assembly.
j
| 368 SECS Progress Report, 2003: 3
369 Mutasim Nimer, Member, 15/4, SECS office.
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Lost Court Case and Lessons Learned:
The review of the current environmental related policies for the above issues started by 
the electromagnetic pollution, specifically the high-tension electricity lines (HTEls). The 
urgency of this matter was a result o f the ongoing process of erecting an HTEL inside the 
residential areas of the city of Khartoum.
The Lobby and Advocacy project, one of the organization’s initiatives, had opened a fact 
finding file (FFF) to assess the effects of HTELs. The first step in this regard was the 
formation of an experts committee that held five meetings to review the available 
scientific data regarding this issue. The experts committee produced a scientific report 
that emphasized the potential hazards connected to the HTELs citing examples from 
other countries and international standards.370
Following this, three forums were carried out to facilitate dialogue between different 
stakeholders, including the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources, the 
Ministry of Electricity and the National Electricity Corporation, the Ministry of Health, 
Occupation Health Administration, the media, medical experts, electricity experts from 
national universities and representatives of the affected communities from the residential 
areas through which the HTELs run.
The most important point concluded from those forums was that there isn’t an updated 
environmental assessment for this project which is an obligation under the Environmental 
Protection Act of 2000. The outcome of these forums and the concurrent media campaign, 
led the Minister of Environment and Physical Planning (E & PP) to stop the ongoing 
work in the HTEL and to form a technical committee to investigate this issue. The 
j Society was represented in this committee. The report produced by the technical 
committee confirmed that the HTEL in question does not adhere to the international 
| standards. The Minister of Environment & PP submitted this report to the Council of 
I Ministers (CM). However, the CM established another technical committee headed this 
I time by the Minister of Irrigation which gave the National Electricity Corporation the 
| green light to proceeds in its work and complete the erection of the HTEL.
370 SECS Annual Report 2004: 7
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The court case of the High Tension Power Lines presented by the organization was lost 
due to intervention of high political authority. The power administration however 
incorporated environmental standards in the new projects. Recent policy influence joint 
efforts were directed towards the change of the new NGOs law and the new proposed 
tourist project in Sunut Forestry, an environmental protected area in Khartoum. Another 
successful advocacy work led by SECS was the case of the use of the pesticide (timek).I
Some interviewees reported that SECS is scattered and not focusing on main
i
j  environmental issues such the sewage system, Nile water pollution and trees coverage in 
Khartoum state, as examples.
One of the challenges faced by SECS as agreed by some people interviewed was the
7^1weak documentation and media. What has been done and achieved was not well 
presented. The work of Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) in Darfur, for instance, where 
SECS was a member of a coalition was not shown by the media. The public hearing was 
considered by some interviewed as a strong and influential advocacy and policy influence 
mechanism. The case o f Buri Power Station and the film produced by the organization 
showing the oil pollution in the Blue Nile river created by the Station, succeeded to 
convince the Minister of Energy to intervene and stop the leak o f the oil.
The organization had significant record in advocacy, lobbying and environmental 
education. The organization succeeded through the media, particularly, newspapers and 
radio, to present as a strong advocate for environmental rights. The organization, 
however, had poor follow up mechanisms and the increasing number of volunteers, both 
I newly graduated and well experienced activists, was not effectively and efficiently 
utilized in the organization set-up. These shortcomings were also reflected in the 
organization’s external relation with other NGOs, networks, private sector, donors and 
government.
371 Muawia Shaddad, Chairman, 21/4, SECS office. Muasim Nimer, Member, 15/4, SECS office.
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The organization’s training component consisted of three main training courses designed 
to equip the members with training skills, peace and development concepts and advocacy 
training. The purpose of this component was to perform efficiently their duties at the 
community’s level. Moreover, the training component was expanded to provide training 
to different branches.
: 4.5.6 Financial Management
379; Many interviewees noted that the organization has a financial system. According to 
the rules and regulations members have the right to ask about financial matters. 
Members get financial information on request and/or at general assembly meetings. Both 
donor agencies and HAC were satisfied with the financial reports of SECS. A founder 
suggested a website newsletter, including the organization’s financial status. Others 
commented that there was a need for clear financial rules and regulations. It was 
observed that there is a financial system known only by the organization’s financial 
manager and there was no delegation of authority in case of his sudden sickness or 
absence. The organization had an accountant but had no power in decision making. The 
financial resources were well utilized and financial transparency was in place within the 
organization border. There was an annual financial report and the organization’s budget 
was audited externally. Some donor agencies allocated funds within their projects’ budget 
for external auditing.
SECS provided financial reports of 1995-1997, 2000-2002, 2002- 2004 and 2004-2005, 
for this research. The reports are summarized in the following table:
| Table (4): Summary of SECS Financial Statements (1995-2005)
1995-1997 2000-2002 2002-2004 2004-2005
i  372 Mohamed A1 Fahal, Finance and Administrative Manager, 14/4, Abdel Rahim Belal, Member, 22/4, 
Consultancy office, Asim Maghrabi, Member, 13/4, Consultancy office, Magda Hassan, Coordinator for 
Service Delivery, 22/4, SECS office, and Ali Khalifa, Coordinator for Environmental Rehabilitation, 14/4, 
SECS office.
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iResources:
Internal
external
Total
845,157
67,896,349
68,741,507
14.000.000
125.000.000
139.000.000
17,102,510
100,874,273
117,886,783
11,595,580
57,038,698
68,634,278
Expenditure:
Salaries 5,580,038 12,000,000 16,025,998 7,956,262
Others 4,723,952 171,000,000 119,140,130 68,944,530
Total 10,303,990 183,000,000 135,166,128 76,900,792
Recommendations More Income More income Increase Members fees
generation generation members fees Restructuring
Members fees Members fees Government Income
More external More external funds generation
funds funds Internal funds Fund raising
Restructure
income
generation
campaigns 
Identify other 
investments 
External funds
Funds are in Sudanese Dinar (1USD = 200 Dinar)
Internal resources are membership fees, donations and activities’ income. External 
resources are funds from international organizations. The table shows the organization 
financial pattern both income and expenditure. From these figures and recommendations 
the trend is towards control of expenditure mainly recruitment of staff and other over 
head expenses and increase of internal resources including locally fund raising, 
membership fees and other banking, and income generation investments. The striking 
observation is the decline of external funds between 2000 and 2005 by almost 68%.
The following table shows SECS expenditure on capacity building between 1996 and 
2005 as follows:
Table (5): Summary of SECS Expenditure on Capacity Building (1996-2005)
1996 1997 2002-2002 2002-2004 2004-2005
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I
!
Capacity
building 3,600,000 3,600,000 14,000,000 42,000,000 24,000,000
expenses
Amounts are in Sudanese Dinar (1USD = 200 Dinar)
The allocation of funds for capacity building shows the increasing awareness of this 
component and its significance in the development of the organization. The capacity 
building activities are integrated in each project funded by donor agencies. The challenge 
as expressed by the organization is how to make these activities sustainable since they 
rely on external funding. The other concern is that there is no staff member selected for 
capacity building. This is mainly due to that the funds allocated were insufficient.
4.5.7 External Relations
The organization developed a good working relationship with some private sector, such 
as Hagar Tobacco and Kenana Sugar companies. Both contributed to organization’s 
participation in various environmental conferences and initiatives. It had not been 
reported that the organization challenged the Tobacco industry and its health hazard 
impact.
The organization admitted that the effectiveness of the advocacy work rely mainly on 
joint work and networking with other NGOs, networks, political parties, trade unions and 
private sector.
The organization was a member and/or a founder of various networks and coalitions. 
The organization supported the establishment of many networks and hosted some of 
them. The important aspect of SECS external relations was its cooperation and 
collaboration with government, particularly with technical departments and ministries 
such as Ministry of Environment. The organization, however, had no clear strategy with 
regard to networking efforts. Despite its increasing advocacy and lobbying activities, 
SECS was not fully incorporating the concept of networking in the day to day advocacy
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work. SECS was anticipated, by other civil society organizations, to be the leading 
organization in advocacy and policy influence. Given the advocacy experiences, the 
human resources and the good reputation amongst donors, private sector and government, 
the organization’s achievements in coalitions, networking and collaboration were not 
satisfactory.
One of the organization’s strengths was the ongoing discussions on how things can be 
improved, given the available human and financial resources. The open door meetings 
and dialogue created a healthy environment that encouraged the administration to prepare 
for a way out session. The idea was to invite diverse members to attend a one day 
meeting to highlight on the challenges, the risks and solutions.
The organization’s alliances and networks and its image as a major actor in civil society 
movement leads to legitimate concern, which is to what extent the organization is capable 
of managing effectively these multiple relationships. A similar caution is expressed by 
Lisa Jordan and Peter Van Tuiji, who argue that: "Even at the basic level of information 
exchange, the maintenance of every relationship requires resources”.373
SECS and SCSNAP
SECS was one of the founders of SCSNAP. Most of the early meetings and discussions 
about the initiation of the network took place at SECS. SECS senior staff and 
management contributed in planning, action plan and budgeting of the network. SECS 
hosted the network in the first year. An agreement was signed by SECS and SCSNAP to 
offer an office for SCSNAP and also to channel the transfer of funds through SECS bank 
account and partially to manage the flow of the funds to SCSNAP under certain 
conditions. These arrangements continued until the registration of SCSNAP, upon which 
SCSNAP opened a bank account. SCSNAP moved to its own office. The relationship 
between SECS and SCSNAP shifted from an institutional one to a personal. The
373 Jordan, L. and P. van Tuijl, 2002. Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy, in: Edwards,
M. and Fowler A., 2002. NGO Management. London: Earthscan, p.l 17.
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chairman of SECS allied with the chairman of SCSNAP to compose a team running the 
network more than four years. Both insisted to continue as elected members for the 
executive committee o f SCSNAP. The committee period was only two years according 
to the constitution of the network and the resolution of the network general assembly 
meeting. According to people interviewed from SECS that there was no feedback about 
SCSNAP to SECS executive committee. The leadership style of SCSNAP caused severe 
damage in the network performance resulted in tension and bad understanding with 
member organizations and donor agencies. The result was that the fund was suspended by 
the donor agency. SECS chairman was still a member of the network executive 
committee but his presence and contribution in the development of the network was 
minimal after the disengagement of the donor agency.
4.6 Sudanese Civil Society Network for Alleviation of Poverty (SCSNAP)
I
4.6.1 Introduction
t
I SCSNAP was established in July 2002 as a result of a two day Roundtable Discussion on
|
| Poverty organized in Khartoum in February 2002 by Sudanese organizations and
| Alternatives, a Canadian international development organization based in Montreal. The
Roundatable was supported by NOVIB. The activities of SCSNAP were innovative in 
dealing with poverty, were guided by the UN Millennium goals, and were related to the 
objectives of poverty alleviation, reduction and eradication. Today, SCSNAP had 58 
member-organizations comprising strong local NGOs and CBOs.374 It had established 
good contacts with other national and international NGOs working on the issues of 
poverty and exclusion. SCSNAP organized and established a strategic plan. It had also 
established a legal status and registered with HAC. It had become known with local 
media as a source of expertise and information about the problem of poverty, affecting 
the fast majority of the Sudanese population. Nevertheless, the challenges faced by the 
SCSNAP were still huge. The organizational capacity of the network was still weak.
!
Administrative processes like record keeping, reporting, monitoring, and financial
374 SCSNAP Progress Report, 2003:2
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systems were not well developed. Working plans were not linked directly to goals, and 
objectives of the network. There was a need to define more clearly the roles and 
responsibilities of member-organizations, and to identify relations, roles, and 
responsibilities of coordinators, committee members, and secretaries, particularly in the 
fields of finance, training, and public relations. Another necessity was to strengthen the 
capacity to plan according to schedules, deadlines, reporting-dates, and to organize 
internal processes so as to deal adequately with assignments, tasks and constraints. All in 
all, member-organizations needed to apprehend more fully the concept of the network 
(coordination, funding, capacity building, etc).
4.6.2 Internal Governance
Most of the people interviewed were members of the network. The following assessment 
made by the interviewees focused on the network period between 2002 and 2006. Some 
of them agreed that the democratic practices and decision making processes were 
inappropriate.375 The leadership style was inefficient and the management was a top- 
down approach. The network became a corporate organization under the full hegemony 
of the network chairman who behaved like an executive corporate director with absolute 
power and full control. The general assembly convened only once during the first four 
years. It was due once every two years. The rationale behind the delay of the general 
assembly meeting made by some people interviewed that the network senior management
' i n f .
was worried that the network will be taken over by the government organizations. A 
second reason given by the chairman that the network should wait until the situation was 
clear about the new act regulating NGOs work. Some of the members of the executive 
committee found these reasons inadequate to freeze the general assembly and therefore 
hinder the whole democratic practices and rights o f the organizations’ members. The 
second influential person in the network was the chairman o f the Sudanese Environment 
Conservation Society (SECS), who supported the idea o f the delay of the general
375 A1 Nagiya A1 Wasila, Member, 17/4, SCSNAP office. Zeinab Baderldin, Member, 17/4, office.
376 Khalid Idris, Member and chairman between 2002-2006, 2/4, office. Muawia Shaddad, Member of 
Board, 26/4, SCSNAP office.
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assembly meeting. SECS had been hosting SCSNAP since its establishment and up to the 
network registration.
The members of the executive committee were very experienced and qualified activists 
and well known persons in the civil society community. The network executive 
committee, however, was ineffective and overpowered by the chairman. The committee 
members were either very busy, frustrated or they were simply neglected and pushed 
aside by the chairman who was in charge of whole operation. The opinion of some 
members interviewed was that the network was not a success at a ll.377 The simple reason 
was that the network leadership had reduced the network aim from an advocacy and 
policy influence to easy exercise of awareness raising and some knowledge generation 
through workshops while neglecting the internal democratic practices, transparency and 
accountability goal.
The chairman’s intention and dream was to see the network evolving from membership 
organizations’ initiative into a corporate body with an executive director. This chairman 
lost the election in the last general assembly meeting and a new leadership took over the 
management responsibilities. Some of the new leaders were also interviewed but their 
time in the network was insufficient to assess the situation.
The network consisted of 58 member organizations with variation in their vision, 
mandate, strategies and direction. They were all working on poverty related issues such 
education, health, environment, gender equality, community development, and human 
rights. The majority of the member organizations were only nominally members of the 
network and they had limited contribution in the absence of the executive committee 
meetings, and the general assembly. SECS had a powerful and dominating position in the 
network and it was patronizing it. The alliance between the chairman of the network and 
SECS director on the one hand and the rest of the members on the other hand explained 
the tension and frustration and distrust expressed by members interviewed.
377 Tahra Hamad, Ex-Secretary, 23/4, Gender Centre for Research and Training (GCRT), Nemat Kuko, 
Member, 2/4, GCRT office, Awadia A1 Hag, Member, 3/4/2007, Taiba office,
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4.6.3 Strategic Planning
The network had a strategic plan which had not been utilized to achieve the expected 
results. Member organizations agreed on principles and values at the early stage of the 
network establishment. The plan was not reviewed and the network management used to 
work on day to day basis. The leadership style developed by the chairman imposed 
different sets of principles characterized by lack of democracy and absence of members’ 
participation in the decision making processes. The key element was what had been 
achieved as result o f the network strategic thinking and planning. In response on when 
last time they reviewed their strategic plan, the reply concerned of having a new one 
rather than going through the old ones. The strategic planning document is rather a 
decorative or forgotten report and not been treated as a working reference. In some cases 
the organizations are attracted by new fashion in development and instead of stick to their 
identity, and vision, they find themselves trapped by what they have been offered by 
donor agencies.
This will lead us to how we organized strategic planning exercises and who attended 
them. Michael Edwards noted: "Strategic planning is commonly assumed to be a linear 
process which starts at the apex of the organization and then moves logically out to the 
periphery. This is not the case. Why? Because the nature of sustainable development 
processes means that they cannot impose and have to be negotiated. So, for NGDOs any 
plan has to be arrived at through a process of consultation. If done properly, strategic 
planning is down-up-down-up, inside-outside-inside process between the organization 
and its key stakeholders".378
4.6.4 Human Resources and Management
378 Edwards. M., 2002. International Development NGOs: Agents o f Foreign Aid or Vehicles for 
International Cooperation. In: Michael Edwards & Alan Fowler, ed.: NGO Management. London, 
Sterling,VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002, pp.27-37.
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The roles and responsibilities of staff members were unclear. The original structure of the 
network composed of the network coordinator and office secretary. The network created 
profile and roles for the coordinator to coordinate the efforts of the members and to 
assure the implementation of the agreed upon action plan outlined by the members. The 
chairman was not anticipated to shoulder the day to day management tasks. The first 
decisions taken by the chairman was to marginalize the roles of the coordinator and he 
became the person in charge of all tasks. This style of leadership created unease amongst 
members and staff who found themselves excluded and laid off from the network without 
consultation with other executive committee members.
4.6.5 Implementation and Service Delivery
The network executed a few regional workshops and thematic meetings such as human 
security, education and employment policies, sustainable development, conflict over 
resources, poverty root causes in eastern Sudan, advocacy and lobbying, concept of 
exclusion, poverty and marginalization in South Blue Nile State, critical view on local 
development projects, and privatization of Gezira scheme. These seminars and 
workshops were quite useful as suggested by most interviewees. However, they 
comprised only a portion of the approved action plan and they satisfied only a small 
portion of the project objectives. According to members of the executive committee 
interviewed that most of these themes were selected by the chairman and no consultation
370
was made with other members. According to the chairman, who was also interviewed, 
that some workshops took place under difficult political circumstances where the 
government tried to stop them due to that SCSNAP had not been registered. The 
chairman said he managed to overcome the obstacles through his own social and political 
contacts. The quality o f papers, level of participants and discussions in the regional 
workshops and in the thematic discussions were quite satisfactory. They contributed to 
awareness raising and knowledge sharing about poverty reduction, not only to the 
network’s members but also to the Sudanese society in general. The activities increased
379 Nagiya A1 Wasila, Member, 17/4, SCSNAP office, Zeinab Badreldin, Member, 17/4, SCSNAP office.
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the visibility of the network. Based on this reputation, the chairman represented the 
network in various national and international events. However, the results on the ground 
in terms of change o f policies, improvement of conditions and quality of services were 
poor and ineffective. Most of the people interviewed also agreed that these activities were 
of academic nature and lacked focus and priorities.
4.6.6 Financial Management
Most of the people interviewed pointed that the financial situation of the network was 
completely unclear. The host organization, the Sudanese Environment Conservation 
Society (SECS) was responsible for bank account since the network had no bank account 
in the beginning of the establishment. An agreement was signed between the host 
organization and SCSNAP with respect to the financial procedures and the financial 
authority in terms of funds release and signing of financial approval. The main problems 
faced by the network members were that they did have access to financial information 
and records. Because of the absence of reports and lack of transparency it was unclear to 
what extent that the network respected the agreed upon budgets and the level of variation 
from the original budget.
4.6.7 External Relations
The visibility of the network increased as a result of the broad membership and the 
implementation of workshops and seminars in Khartoum and in the regions. The network 
was also known amongst international organizations, UN and donor agencies. The 
chairman who was also a good public relation officer represented the network nationally 
and internationally. According to some members interviewed the network was known by 
outsiders more than by its members. 380 The network influences on policies and public 
opinion was poor. The network focused on conducting of thematic workshops without 
seeing how these events could help achieving its objectives.381 The network succeeded to
380 Muawia Shaddad, Member, 26/4, SCSNAP office
381 Abdeljalil El-Mekki, 2006, Evaluation Report.
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register with HAC and was committed to submit reports and follow the rules and 
regulations imposed by the law.
From the analysis of the organizational cultures of the participating 
organizations/networks, we can make the following overview on the six variables based 
on research data.
Table (6): Sudanese NGOs and Capacity Enhancement: Case-study Overview
Friends of Children 
Society (AMAL)
Human Rights and 
Legal Aid Network 
(HRLAN)
Sudanese Environmental 
Conservation Society 
(SECS)
Sudanese Civil Society 
Network for Alleviation 
of Poverty (SCSNAP)
[ntemal
governance
Top-down approach 
Absence o f rotation 
Lobbying in election
Participatory 
elected board 
weak relation with 
members
Limited participatory 
Elected board with 
lobbying
Weak, no regular 
meeting. No 
consultation with 
members
Strategic
Planning
Not functional Review needed to 
set priorities
Need to be reviewed 
regularly
Not functional
Human
Resource
Management
Lack of utilization of 
members
Inadequate system
Systems available 
Ambiguity over 
consultants 
payment and no 
volunteers policy
Admin. System to be 
updated and known, 
Restructure and re-profile 
of staff
Poor system and lack of 
policy and absence of 
job profile. No use of 
human/member 
resources
Service
[Delivery
Poor Benefit only staff 
and members 
Feedback needed to 
improve training
Lack of follow up 
Better focus on advocacy 
than delivery of service
Training not always 
effective.
Financial
Management
Lack of transparency More transparency Good report but 
bureaucratic system
Unclear. System and 
transparency needed
Networking,
External
Poor almost isolated Focus activity 
rather than scatter
Weak and ad hoc and not 
focused
Poor and ad hoc
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Relations efforts
4.7 Conclusion
The main objective of this chapter was to critically review and analyze some features of 
the organisational cultures of the four participating organizations/networks. The purpose 
was to show their inherent limitations and strengths. The chapter acknowledges the 
necessity of addressing these shortcomings in a way that could help to compare between 
their present capacity situations and the standard that is expected to achieve. It was not 
intended to portray them in any way as the ideal or the only form of an NGO. As we can 
see from the chapter’s findings that the participating NGOs take many different shapes 
and forms depending on their vision, values and direction. It is necessary to understand 
the political environment and context they are working in.
The strengths of some of the four participating organizations/network lie in their 
recognition of the participation of their constituents. The lull engagement of all members 
in all stages will safeguard and guarantee the effectiveness and efficiency of development 
processes. Despite the fact that all four organizations are making efforts to promote 
positive values in society at large, they are weak internally in advancing democratic 
practices and promoting transparency within their structures. This is somewhat 
unpredictable phenomenon, given the political restrictions. It is expected that there will 
be more democratic practices inside the organizations and less promotion of democratic 
values externally.
Overall, the most distinguishable weaknesses within the four participating organizations’ 
structure include strategic planning, thinking and advocacy. The lack of identity, and the 
confused purpose of the organization hinders all others elements of service delivery and 
organizational management and influence both the internal and external dynamics.
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In terms of influencing social policies, the research revealed that the four NGOs did not 
play a strong role in systematic monitoring violations of human rights, child rights and 
environmental rights. The responsive manner, for example, of SECS and HRLAN 
advocacy and policy influence, is based on ad hoc mechanism and advocacy has not been 
part of the job profile of each staff This justified the shortcomings in follow up of many 
advocacy issues raised by these organizations and in seeking to influence public policy at 
a national level. On the other hand, the government never acknowledges that policy 
changes are a response to civil society work.
In terms of networking, particularly cooperation and working with the government, it 
seems that there is plenty of room for expanding and multiplying the channels for 
dialogue between the government technical departments and NGOs which have not been 
fully utilized.
Activities designed to build capacities among organizations and networks can only be 
effective when these partners have strong commitment to the processes. Organizational 
development is a challenging process, as it forces partners to acknowledge and confront 
weaknesses and shortcomings, as well as strengths. The research will address this risk 
through participatory approaches that foster ownership and emphasize shared learning. 
The coming chapter will discuss in details some o f these interactions between the 
organizations and the government, as one of the main partners in the development 
processes.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NGOs RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS
5.1 Introduction
One of the objectives of this research was to study and analyze data and information from 
development practitioners, academics, volunteers working with Sudanese NGOs and 
from the third sector. The intention was that the analysis, findings and different views 
will contribute to developing a better understanding of the evolving relationship between 
governments and the non-profit and voluntary sector in Sudan. The research will 
facilitate the discussion o f ideas across the voluntary sector so as to help create a dialogue 
within the sector and between sectors.
Most of the initiatives are undertaken by the civil society organizations to improve the 
working environment through the various discussions and workshops. Civil society 
organizations are working together to determine how the relationship with other sectors, 
including the government and business sectors, should evolve so that can best serve the 
public interest. It is high time to develop a joint table approach, as a starting point to 
discuss issues of interest and concern with the other sectors and to explore key areas:
(i) improving the relationship between the civil society sector, private sector and 
government;
(ii) enhancing the capacity of the sectors to serve the public; and
(iii) improving the legislative and regulatory environment in which the civil 
society operates.
Historically, in the past and present, the Sudanese have the innate sense of the value of 
the voluntary sector and its contribution to the establishment of most of self-help efforts 
and its importance as a catalyst for what is most important in communities. It is 
something that can no longer be left behind unstudied in the context of what it means for 
public policy and what public policy means for it. If we do not put the same level of 
concern and intellectual capacity behind the issues in this sector as we do behind private
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sector issues and behind public policy questions in the purest sense, we will all, as a 
society, suffer as a result.
There are, however, some really fascinating questions that have to be dealt with in some 
measure:
- Do state institutions embrace in reality and spirit the dynamics of the voluntary
sector?
- If technical departments, ministers, some politicians, the central and provincial 
level, say one thing, but HAC and security offices says another in their 
regulations and attitude, what does that mean?
- Do the elements of Sudanese political culture, both during democratic and 
dictatorial regimes, truly encourage a dynamic and competitive sector or are there 
built into our political culture some normative constraints that say we only want 
the voluntary sector to go so far? We do not want them in some areas, we want 
them in a neat categorized position, and if this is so, why?
- How do we ensure that the voluntary sector with its strengths and weaknesses is 
not asked to take upon itself burdens and responsibilities that are normally the 
discourse of government?
- How do we work with the many federal and provincial policy and regulatory 
anomalies where different messages are sent, again unwittingly by virtue of how 
this country is governed?
5.2 Governments* Strategy towards NGOs
The Constitution, Article 12, sub-article (1) specifies the role of the state in social justice: 
“The State shall develop strategies and policies to ensure social justice among all people 
o f the Sudan, especially through safeguarding means of livelihood and opportunities of 
employment. To that end the State may also encourage mutual assistance, self-help and 
charity” 382
382 The Interim National Constitution o f the Republic o f the Sudan, 2005. Available at: www.sudan- 
embassv.de. Accessed December 29, 2008.
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The government strategy, however, is a complex of various approaches played by 
different government actors at several levels both central and local. Here is a summary of 
government approaches towards NGOs according to the data collected from the 
interviewees:
- Government develops an aggressive policy towards NGOs to restrict their 
activities or activities of some organizations. It tries to control the work of NGOs 
by imposing the NGOs’ law and regulations;
- Government tries to contain some NGOs by providing support, both financial or 
material or self-interest exchange;
- Government uses some political agenda to pretend that there is a cooperation and 
partnership;
- Technical government departments create good working environment and 
partnership with NGOs.
The government has to announce reaffirmation of its commitment to work with the 
voluntary sector as clearly articulated in the constitutions and policies, for the benefits of 
all Sudanese. An initiative has to be taken to meet the following objectives. First, is to 
help the civil society sector increase its capacity to meet the needs of Sudanese society 
and second, is to work with civil society sector to improve the government’s policies, 
programs and services. This objective recognizes the sector’s role in policy influence and 
advice beyond service delivery. It also reflects the voluntary sector’s finely attuned 
understanding of the needs of the people it serves. The second objective is that the 
government has to make a commitment to involving the sector in policy-making to 
ensure more informed policy-making by the government. But involvement in policy 
formulation requires the capacity to participate and a learning culture on both sides. 
Government departments need to incorporate the civil sector more systematically and to a 
greater extent in the development of policy initiatives.
5.3 NGOs Strategies towards Governments
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As Clark wrote about the attitude towards government that NGOs can “oppose the State, 
complement it, or reform it, but they cannot ignore it”383
In Sudan the NGOs rights and benefits are related to their political positions. In most of 
the cases, the Minister is the person to decide or not to give support or assistance to an 
organization. The authority of the Minister, according to NGOs law was unlimited. It 
always depends on how supportive the organization to the government political mandate. 
Therefore most independent organizations are not getting benefits from the government. 
The benefit NGOs wish to get is not to be investigated or interrupted by the security 
authority. As Farrington describes it that: “NGOs may well decide there is little left in 
the state on which they can draw, or which can be improved through the exercise of
384pressure”
The independent civil society and NGOs initiated under difficult political conditions 
develop a culture of mistrust and lack of confidence in working with the state. 
Unfortunately, the Sudanese civil society experiences the political repression under both 
the democratic and dictatorial regimes. Democratic governments are quite likely to 
perceive civil society as a threat. Civil society organizations such as trade unions, 
professional associations, women’s and students’ unions have played an increasing role 
in national politics. As explained by Taisier, M.A. and R. Matthews that: “This 
development, coupled with the rise of the SPLM, has precipitated several realignments 
within political and popular forces, which in turn have gradually transformed national
-IOC
perceptions of the civil war”. Moves to democracy in Sudan during the vicious cycle 
of military and elected government have not been genuine and democratic changes are 
neither straightforward nor automatic. Security authority has never been supportive or in 
favour for the work o f civil society. The government created a suspicious image for those
383 Clark, J., 1991. Democratizing Development: The Role o f Voluntary Organizations. West Hartford:
The Kumarian Press, p.75
384 Farrington, J., ed., 1993. Reluctant Partner? London and New York: Routledge, p.195.
385
Ali, T. M., and Matthews, R.O., (ed) 1999. Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution. Montreal & 
Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, p.216.
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not supporting its political agenda. The bureaucratic complex of the regimes, in addition, 
is a sufficient obstacle for any progress to be achieved.
What are we expecting from a government that favour some Islamist and semi- 
governmental organizations by contracting them to implement programs? This is not to 
say that independent NGOs will accept financial assistance from the government. They 
know that their autonomy will be challenged. For all these reasons, “whether and under 
what circumstances a particular local organization should relate to government or avoid
O O/T
government is a major strategic decision”.
NGOs interviewed are developing different strategies when dealing with the authorities. 
A strategy with HAC when dealing with the formal registration, and re-registration and 
another strategy when working with the government technical departments in projects’ 
related activities. Some of NGOs, for example keep low profile and maintain a distance 
from government bodies. Others are developing contacts with HAC and inviting HAC 
personnel to attend workshops.
Most of people interviewed believed that the role of HAC is to control the work of NGOs 
and to report to the security authorities on the performance of both international and 
national NGOs. This role is on line of the government’s strategy towards the civil society 
in general and NGOs in particular.
It was reported by most of people interviewed, that the relation with the government is 
weak and it was characterized by the following features:
- Lack of recognition of CSOs’ role;
Lack of trust in voluntary sector;
- Accusation of CSOs being partners with donor agencies and international 
organizations;
- Poor communication and absence of any means of dialogue between CSOs and 
government.
386 Esman, M.J. & Uphoff, N.T., 1984. Local Organization: Intermediaries in Rural Development. Cornel: 
Cornel University Press, p.267.
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5.4 The Joint Alternative Strategies
The role of NGOs and other forms of voluntary work is also raised within the context of 
local institutional development framework. In order to produce effective development 
efforts, NGOs need to link with other channels concerned about development process 
within the community. These social forces include public sector at local and central levels 
and private agencies. NGOs find it increasingly difficult to justify to members and donors 
as well their interaction with governments. In the case of Sudan, NGOs acknowledge the 
need to work through government; they are registered with the government and tend to 
work in close collaboration with it. Some people however believed that the involvement 
of voluntary organizations, for example, in public work was in order to survive. Others 
support the co-operation among the different social channels as part of local institutional 
development. The alarming issue emerging here was how to maintain NGOs’ identity and 
integrity in this process of multi-alternative development model. Another point of 
concern was how directly NGOs have to be involved in political activities and to what 
extent they remain attached with or detached from governments. Charlie Pye-Smith and 
Grazia Borrini Feyerabend with R. Sandbrook argue that: “It would be naive to disregard 
the fact that a process by which communities acquire control over local resources, 
organize themselves in management institutions, strengthen their capabilities, enter into a 
variety of partnerships and gain full access to regulated markets, has fundamental 
political implications”. 387
In response to the question of how the governments perceive the operation of NGOs, we 
agree with the analysis of Bratton, M., that “The amount of space allowed to NGOs in 
any given country is determined first and foremost by political consideration, rather than 
by any calculation of the contribution of NGOs to economic and social development”.388
387
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This political view of NGOs applies not only to INGOs but also to independent Sudanese 
NGOs at national level as well as to CBOs at very local level.
A number of Sudanese NGOs were restricted by the governments, both under democratic 
and military regimes, on the ground that they are politically active. This is not necessarily 
to be in conflict zones but in areas affected by political instability. Other similar situation 
where governments regard voluntary sector with suspicion is that after June 1989 the 
government dismissed for political reasons a good number of qualified professional and 
technical officials, who found places in NGOs and private sector. This situation creates 
political tension between voluntary sector which have a relative autonomy, and state 
agencies.
Independent NGOs and CBOs are hardly able to function in the political system which 
dominated by single party or dictatorial regimes. The political role of the intermediary 
NGOs under such conditions is to contribute to the development process by strengthening 
the capacity of grassroots initiatives and linking them into development networks.
The voluntary sector however expands because of the failure of the governments to 
provide basic needs for the people. The growing economic and political decline and lack 
of resources and inaccessibility is undermining the government’s legitimacy and 
authority and adding to the existing discomfort between state and NGOs.
5.5 Examples of Government Institutions
5.5.1 Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC)
The Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (Organization) Act (2006) specifies the role and 
responsibilities of Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC).389 HAC is a specialized unit 
established at Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to be responsible for the following: 1)
389 Chapter IV “The humanitarian aid commission: Establishment o f the commission 2006: 9. Available at: 
www.hacsudan.com. Accessed December 27, 2008.
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awareness raising and establishment of better understanding of humanitarian voluntary 
work in coordination with other bodies; 2) mobilization and development of resources in 
case of emergency and whenever needed; 3) training on disaster management at all levels 
and in coordination with other bodies; 4) initiation of projects and identification of 
humanitarian aid needs; 5) establishment of strategic reserve for emergency to meet 
urgent needs; 6) coordination with external bodies and facilitation of emergency 
assistance; 7) mobilization of internal and external resources in collaboration with 
concerned authorities for rehabilitation of affected areas and for repatriation of IDPs; and 
8) monitoring and evaluation for all humanitarian voluntary work in Sudan.
Most of NGOs are registered with Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the central 
body responsible for the work of international and national NGOs. With the increasing 
difficulties facing organizations to register, some non-profit organizations register in 
other central government bodies such Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Culture and 
Information. Those NGOs working in Khartoum State are registered with Humanitarian 
Aid Department (HAD) in Khartoum.
Hassabu Mohamed Abdurrahman, the commissioner of the Humanitarian Aid 
Commission, reports that the number of national NGOs registered was 2060. 390The 
number o f those legally finalized their position is 1006. The number of foreign NGOs is 
268.The Commission, according to the commissioner, decided to carefully observe the 
work o f NGOs, in collaboration with the States’ commissions. NGOs were instructed to 
submit regular activity reports. Committees will be established for certain roles, in 
addition to higher committee chaired by the commissioner. He added that in 2005, 158 
million dollars were entered the country allocated for NGOs and the commissioner did 
not know for what projects the money used. The commissioner noted that there were 17 
official central bodies concerned about the humanitarian work and the coordination was 
necessary between these bodies.
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The commissioner deliberately gave a bad image about NGOs and he did not explain to 
whom the amount of 158 million dollars was allocated. The government was aware of all 
financial transactions through the embassies and bank facilities. This was a typical 
official statement that created confusion between the work of UN, international 
organizations and national NGOs.
The Secretary General of HAC in Southern Darfur State states that an evaluation report 
produced by HAC on the work of NGOs in IDPs camps in Southern Darfur. The report 
revealed, according to HAC, that some NGOs and studies centers were not operational 
and they were only on papers. HAC recommended the cancellation of 58 organizations 
out of 100. Those organizations have the right to appeal. HAC reported accusations from 
UN Population Council that some NGOs received funds but not implemented the agreed 
activities and other NGOs received donations from UN bodies without notifying HAC. 
HAC introduced some procedures to monitor the NGOs work and these procedures, 
according to HAC, did not intend to underestimate the work of national NGOs. HAC 
reported that 27 international organizations working in Southern Darfur, 13 UN bodies, 5 
international institutions and 5 Islamic and Arabic organizations.
"The Forgotten Activists in Darfur" is a title of report, issued by Correspondents without
'iQ'j
Borders, a French based organization and published in a Sudanese newspaper. The 
report focused on the work of Sudanese civil society organizations active in the region 
since 2003 but their work was unknown compared to international organizations. The 
Secretary of Civil Society Organizations Initiative, Shams El Din Dau El Bait, believed 
that the neglect of NGOs work in the region is an old issue. The reason of the escalation 
of the crises in the region was a result of the control and restriction over the national 
NGOs and the national media work. The national NGOs are working under difficult 
conditions and without support. He gave an example of Call of Darfur initiative which
391 Ibid, 2007.
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had been stopped by the authority that did not allow the organizations involved to meet. 
This government attitude towards national NGOs encouraged the hostile reaction of IDPs 
towards national organizations, and distrust and at the same time increased the 
confidence in the work o f foreign NGOs.393
5.5.2 Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA)
Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA) was established in 1971 as a forum for 
the national NGOs. Its objectives include: “a) to develop voluntary activity in Sudan; b) 
to exchange information between NGOs; c) to build the capacities of NGOs staff by 
training in different fields; d) to link between NGOs and relevant GOS and other regional 
and international entities; and e) to establish a data bank that provides NGOs with the 
necessary information”. 394
According to Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA), a government 
coordinating body, number of NGOs in Sudan is “250 organizations working in 
humanitarian assistance; emergency relief, rehabilitation, education, orphan sponsorship, 
homes for street children, mother and child care, health services, sanitation, environment, 
supply of water and many development activities”. 395 Based on these data, NGOs can be 
classified in the following table:
Table (7): SCOVA Summary of Registered Local NGOs and INGOs
Type of NGOs Number
National NGOs 140
CBOs 30
Networks 08
Foreign NGOs 58
UN Agencies & INGOs 03
393 Ibid, 2007:3
394 SCOVA, 2003. Directory for NGOs working in Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan.
395 Ibid, 2003
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In this Table SCOVA didn’t make any analysis and definition. It was not clear on what 
basis was the classification between national NGOs and CBOs. The number of UN 
agencies and international organizations was far less than the actual number. In Southern 
Darfur there were 37 international organizations and 13 UN agencies according to HAC. 
From the 140 national NGOs surveyed, 138 organizations are Khartoum-based. There is 
no information regarding the registration date of organizations and the registration 
authority. Although the directory of SCOVA is for non-governmental organizations, there 
are some governmental organizations listed. There is one organization located at one of 
the federal ministries. SCOVA didn’t explain how these data collected, its sources or 
methodology of data collection. SCOVA gathered information on NGOs according to 
the type of organizations. For example, national NGOs and foreign organizations were 
described according to the following categories: organization/director; location/address; 
branches; objectives; target; plans; and capacity building.
NGOs Networks were categorized based on: name of network/chairman; 
location/address; major objectives; number of NGOs forming the network; field of 
activities; activities implemented by the network; affiliation/partnership/network outside 
Sudan; future plans; and training needs. The profile of community-based organizations 
(CBOs) includes: organization’s name/director’s name; location/address; major 
objectives; target groups; current activities; affiliation/partnership, network; source of 
funding; future plans; and training needs.
SCOVA did not clarify who did the survey and when. It was also not clear the basis of 
selection of the categories for each group of organizations (national NGOs, CBOs and 
networks). It was unclear what SCOVA meant by capacity building. From the list of the 
areas of capacity building, it was clear that intention was the training needs. It will also 
be interested to find out why SCOVA wanted to know the source of funding for the 
networks and for national NGOs and CBOs.
Summary of capacity building sectors and areas identified by SCOVA for the national 
NGOs:
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- Sectors: informational technology, health, education, relief and rehabilitation, 
disaster preparedness, conflict resolution, peace building, water supply, gender 
equality, child rights, poverty reduction, small industries, voluntary work, 
environment, credit and saving, handicraft, human rights, tourism, languages, rescue 
technology, home economics, media, care of elderly, street children, rehabilitation of 
prisoners, camps services, HIV/AIDS, voluntary work & volunteers, land mine 
services, distance education.
- Areas: advocacy, lobbying, proposal writing, report writing, management, networks 
& networking, fund raising, financial management, data collection & analysis, 
conflict prevention, mediation and negotiation, evaluation, participatory research, 
communication, outside visit & international experience, human rights, strategic 
planning, leadership, self-management, needs assessment & basic-line survey, 
publication & documentation, workshop equipment and tools, trucks and spare parts 
for agricultural production, office equipment.
Objectives of the networks and capacity building areas identified for NGOs networks by 
SCOVA:
Objectives: coordination between NGOs and government and UN organizations, 
participation in development programs, exchange of experiences, capacity building, 
promotion of local capacity in food security, coordination and co-operation between 
members, fund raising, information collection, studies, awareness raising, capacity 
building of members, coordination with regional and international groups.
Areas: management, project proposal writing, data collection, monitoring & evaluation, 
report writing, financial management, networking, gender issues, needs assessment and 
early warning.
It is interesting to find out from the survey conducted by SCOVA with respect to the 
objectives of the networks and activities implemented by the participating networks and 
from the needs of capacity building that no single network identified policy influence, 
advocacy and lobbying as areas of interest, activities or needs. Such type of ambiguity
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with regard to the role of participating networks raised the questions of understanding the 
concept o f networking and to what extent the differences between networks and 
organizations are clear. It is possible that the methodology used to collect data about the 
networks or sources of information are not accurate.
5.6 Case Studies of NGOs Working with Governments
5.6.1 Friends of Children Society (AMAL)
AMAL, according to some people interviewed, was historically accused of being anti- 
government and being politically oriented. The relationship with HAC had never been 
improved. Security authority searched the organization’s office and some members were 
arrested and other members were asked regularly to report the security office.
Registered organizations are taking permission to conduct activities (workshops and 
seminars, survey and research activities) and for documentary films, for example, 
permissions are from security and intelligence offices. Another example was a program 
called “Peace for Darfur” broadcasted by British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) had 
been stopped by the government. The relationship with HAC is only when there is a 
general assembly. The government is keen only on security issues when dealing with 
NGOs. It has been observed by one interviewee that some states managed to create space
0^7for NGO-state interaction. For example, Kassala Sate recognized the role of NGOs to 
the extent that 20% of the state budget for 2007 was allocated to NGOs. The statement 
however did not specify which NGOs benefiting from the government donations. In two 
other states, Western Darfur and Khartoum, only government and semi-government 
organizations received financial assistance from government.
The following are some technical departments and Ministries which AMAL developed 
some working relations with:
396 S. Abu Shok, and A. El-Newari interviewed on April 13, 2007, AMAL Office
397 H. A. Ati, 26/05/2007, Edge Consultancy office.
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The National Council for Child Welfare (NCCW)
NCCW was established in 1991 as government body responsible for monitoring and 
promotion of children’s rights in Sudan. NCCW operates under the Ministry of Social 
Planning and Development. Later on, NCCW was attached to the President’s Advisory 
on Women and Children’s Affairs for one year. Currently, NCCW has rejoined as a 
department under the Ministry as it was before.
AMAL is working with the Council of Motherhood and Childhood Care. AMAL 
participated in the Council’s activities and the Council attended AMAL’s forums and 
workshops. AMAL is hoping of having partnership with the Council. AMAL observed 
that the Council supported financially specific organizations such as Ana A1 Sudan. 
According to AMAL’s staff member interviewed that the relation was more personal and 
political.
In response to what extent an NGO can make the government accountable, AMAL 
partner organizations: Khartoum Centre for Human Rights, The Sudanese Child’s Rights 
Group, Abd A1 Kareem Mirgani Centre, and Sudan Organization for Social Development 
(SUDO), prepared a critical remark and questions for the government in relation to an 
agreement signed by the government with Qatar and United Arab Emirates whereby the 
government and the gulf countries were accused of exploitation of Sudanese children in 
child trafficking and camel racing. The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
during its forty-fifth session “was concerned that there continue to be cases where 
children -  especially children belonging to particular tribes -  are trafficked to the Middle 
East to be used as camel jockeys” (Unedited Version: 8).
In order to realize the altitude of advancement which is accomplished in implementing 
the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children (OPSC), Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography, attached to Child’s Rights Agreement, it just needs a rapid assessment for 
the situation on the ground, that reveals a huge mismatch between ratification of the 
Agreement and actual and legal abiding to it. There are, however, difficulties in
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identifying the achievements and the vacuums as monitoring the implementation of 
Child’s Rights Agreement constitutes a major challenge facing both NGOs and state 
parties (Session 45 of CRC, 2007).
A survey conducted by Friends of Children (AMAL), in collaboration with the Sudanese 
Child Rights Group (SCRG) came to a result that the Government efforts are neither 
consistent nor systematic; hence their effect on children is meager in comparison with the 
range of violations and the opportunities and facilities to combat and eradicate them. The 
main reported shortfalls are that the Protocol is not considered of significance to the 
government. Therefore the government doesn’t incorporate its principles into 
government’s policies and action plans. This explains the absence of the role of 
government institutions in the implementation of the Protocol. The role of the National 
Council of Child Welfare (NCCW), for instance, as the governmental body responsible of 
child rights is nonexistent. NCCW lacks the authority and facilities to protect child’s 
rights and to ensure the implementation of the plans. It was noticed that there are absence 
and lack of coordination within the governmental bodies and a delay in legislative and 
administrative amendments to employ the Agreement. NCCW did not start to emphasize 
on works aiming at applying the Agreement in a holistic manner that requires a high level 
of formal coordination in order to instigate the Agreement through the Government and 
the community.
AMAL Forum raised the following questions in 2006: Is NCCW responsible for Child’s 
Rights including availing authorities and mechanisms for protection? Is there a national 
plan of action? If not, why? Are there available human and material resources from the 
government? What are they? What are the actual governmental efforts in the field? 
The NGOs Forum has observed a strict centralism in planning, implementation and poor 
participation in projects and programs besides lack of coordination between the 
government bodies and the regions. NCCW failed in creating the interaction between the 
concerned institutions in steps of planning, implementation and evaluation of the current 
programs and envisaging the opportunities that can reflect the role of the government to 
identify the factors and hindrances that impinge on compliance to commitments.
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Street Children
The government collects street kids on regular basis and puts them in semi-urban camps 
such as A1 Hegeir and Abu Zeid. Contacts were made by the government with AMAL 
and other specialized organizations to assist in project activities like social and 
psychological rehabilitation, education and family reunification of those children. The 
street children problem has been considered as sensitive by the government. The 
government wants to have a good image on the one hand, and does not like the 
intervention of international organizations in this particular issue. However, the resources 
of the ministry of social affairs, including the human and financial are not sufficient to 
address the issue. On the other hand very few local specialized organizations have the 
expertise and the resources to address this complex problem. The government has been 
accused by some of international NGOs and international media of launching an 
Islamization process including approaches to convert those most non-Muslim children 
through the campaigns and educational system introduced by the government through the 
Islamic organizations in IDPs camps. Sudan Country Report describes the situation as 
follow: “The Government operates camps for vagrant children where they are subject to 
abuse. Police typically send homeless children who have committed crimes to these 
camps, where they detained for indefinite periods. Health care and schooling at ther 
camps are generally poor and basic living conditions are often primitive. All the children 
in the camps, including non-Muslims, must study the Koran and there is pressure on non- 
Muslims to convert to Islam”. AMAL established a project which provided protection 
and education for street children. AMAL identifies families to take care about them, 
while seeking their original families for reunification. For those children who stay longer 
with alternative families, they attend school and vocational training.
Juvenile Court, a Joint Project
Sudanese Organization against Torture (SOAT) published a report on Reformatories in 
Sudan in April 2004. The report includes the following observations made by the UN
398. Country Information and Policy Unit. Immigration and Nationality Directorate. Home Office, United 
Kingdom. October 2007. Available at: www.ecoi.net. Accessed December 27, 2008.
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Committee on the Rights of the Child. Sudan was one of the first countries to ratify the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990:
- The UN committee stated that’ the committee is of the opinion that the system of 
the administration of juvenile justice in Sudan is not fully compatible with articles 
37, 39 and 40 of the convention and other relevant United Nations Standards”399.
- The age of criminal responsibility is too low as a child may be punished by 
detention at the age of seven.400
- Police investigation was done in the same manner as of investigation with adults.
- Investigation was done in total absence of social work.
- Police did not have special places for keeping juveniles while they were under 
policy custody.
In 1999 AMAL with national and international organizations namely, Mutawinat, Sabah, 
Saint Vincet, Save the Children Sweden and UNICEF, entered into an agreement with the 
judiciary in Khartoum North and East Nile Provinces. The agreement aims to set up a 
joint project of juvenile court. SOAT401 reported that this joint project was in fact an 
outcome of joint advocacy efforts of the NGOs and judiciary. The project was supported 
by Save the Children Sweden. The participating mentioned NGOs contributed to the 
technical, logistical and administrative aspects of the juvenile court system. The concerns 
of NGOs were focused on issues related to the low age of criminal responsibility, the lack 
of integration of the system of juvenile justice into legislation and practice provisions of 
CRC, and lack of protection for children under 18 years of age.
399 SOAT (former SVTG). Reports on the Situation o f Human Rights in Sudan. 2004, p.2. Available at: 
www.soatsudan.org/public/ahrr.asp. Accessed on 8/2/2008.
400 Paragraph 69 for Document CRC/C/15/ADD. 190. “ Noting the reference to a juvenile court project in 
the State party’s response to the list o f issues, the Committee is concerned that the holistic approach to 
addressing the problem o f juvenile crime advocated in the Convention, including with respect to prevention, 
procedures and sanctions, has not been sufficiently taken into consideration by the State party. The 
Committee is concerned that the age o f criminal responsibility is too low as a child may be punishable by 
detention in a reformatory from the age o f 7”. Human Rights Index o f United Nations Documents.
Available at: www.universalhumanrightsindex.org. Accessed December 27, 2008.
401
SOAT (former SVTG). Reports on the Situation o f Human Rights in Sudan. 2004, p.2. Available at: 
www.soatsudan.org/public/ahrr.asp. Accessed on 8/2/2008
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Type of delinquency reported by AMAL in its mid year report January -  June 2004 
shown below in Table (8).
Table (8): Type of Delinquency
Type of Delinquent Number of Cases
Theft 69
Murder 51
Injury 39
Other 05
Total 164
Male children between the ages of 14-18 years were kept in a special home (Dar A1 
Fitian) to spend their prison time. The home is under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Interior and managed by staff members who were trained to care about these children and 
guide them for better behaviour. The poor facilities of the home and the potential danger 
of the future of these children attract national NGOs such as AMAL and Sabah to work 
with the Ministry of Interior to implement joint activities including rights awareness 
raising, health and education. The NGOs used an educational entertaining approaches 
advocating for child rights and preparing them for a better future.
5.6.2 Sudanese Civil Society Network for Alleviation of Poverty (SCSNAP)
Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP)
SCSNAP had achieved a structural place in PRSP process and in one of the Joint 
Assessment Mission (JAM) committees. JAM was the mechanism established by the 
UNDP and World Bank to assess the needs for the post-conflict period. The position of 
SCSNAP in the PRSP created an opportunity for the network to play an effective 
lobbying for poverty alleviation and long term poverty reduction strategy. It was strategic 
and crucial to support the process of wealth sharing as a result of oil profits and its impact 
on the PRSP and peace. The network attended regularly the meetings of the Poverty
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Reduction Unit at the Ministry of Finance and National Planning.402 One of the main 
objectives of the unit was to plan a poverty alleviation strategy and prepare with 
Sudanese civil society organizations the PRSP. The network was chosen as a member of 
the economic group in the need assessment committee. The committee presented a report 
relating the economic problem with the poverty in the country. According to SCSNAP, 
the report of the committee was presented to the donors’ conference in Oslo in 2006 and 
adopted by the conference as one of the main reports for development. The network 
participated also in Nairobi meeting between the government and SPLM as a 
representative of civil society prior to peace agreement. The network established good 
working relationship with HAC and the Ministry of International Cooperation.
Nevertheless, the outcome of SCSNAP efforts in reducing poverty and in contributing to 
PRSP was poor compared to what was anticipated from a network that had access to be 
member of Poverty Reduction Unit at the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. The 
weak lobbying in PRSP and the ineffective advocacy of SCSNAP questioned the whole 
position of the SCSNAP. The member organizations were not aware of the participation 
of the network in the PRSP or in peace processes. The chairman was the only 
representative who attended these events, without consultation with other members and 
without feedback.
5.6.3 Sudanese Environment Conservation Society (SECS)
SECS in collaboration with the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources 
(HCENR) and Ministry o f Environment and Tourism produced a strategy called: 
“Towards a National Plan for Environmental Work in Sudan” on November 1996. 403This
402 K. Idris, 27/3/2007, SCSNAP office.
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work was a result of an agreement signed by the government and UNDP in 1991 which 
encouraged the adoption of comprehensive vision and planning of environmental 
conservation and sustainable development. SECS within its strategies to address main 
environmental issues and in collaboration with the HCENR and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
established the environmental forum at the main office of SECS in Khartoum. The forum 
consisted of professionals, members of the National Council (Parliament), executive 
members of the government, scientists, and universities’ academic staff, media and 
culture figures. The forum discussed the environmental problems that facing the country 
and the proposed solutions. The forum recommended that the government should adopt a 
comprehensive national plan for environment in Sudan. The forum asked a number of 
national experts to prepare a document called “Towards a National Plan for 
Environmental Work in Sudan”. The document was first presented to the environmental 
forum on October 16, 1995, during the celebration of the International Environmental 
Day. The forum was addressed by the Minister of Environment and Tourism who 
supported the initiative of SECS and promised that the government will support the 
efforts aim at the preparation of the national plan. The document was mainly addressing 
the government of Sudan as the executive and coordinating body responsible for 
implementation, coordination and monitoring of other government departments and units. 
Among those are the cabinet, the National Council, the HCENR, the Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forest, the Ministry of 
Animal Resources, the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources, the Ministry of 
Energy and Mining, the Ministry of Culture and Information, the Ministry of Education, 
the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Interior, the Federal Charter, and the Ministries and councils of the States. 
Since the introduction of the national environmental plan, SECS succeeded to establish a
Women Initiatives Group. Women in the Law. Workshop in collaboration with
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, A1 Sharga Khartoum 11-18/04/2000
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and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1996. Towards a National Plan for Environmental Work in Sudan.
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working relationship with these government bodies. Some of these technical departments 
and ministries invited SECS to participate in environmental assessments, seminars and 
workshops. SECS aims at incorporating the national environmental plan into the works 
and programs of all government units, departments, ministries, and private and voluntary 
sectors. The 121 page document contained the main following sections: introduction, the 
Sudanese environmental context, the present environmental situation and the national 
environmental plan. The most urgent environmental areas in the document include the 
desertification, civil strife and instability, environmental deterioration, energy crises, 
pollution, poverty, lack of ecological diversity and population problems such as 
displacement. The institutional and legal framework of these urgent issues were 
summarized as follows: the government commitment towards environmental 
conservation and sustainable development, the administrative and organizational 
structure, the potential of application of environmental law, experience, qualification and 
training in the executive system, the community participation and role of women, the 
voluntary sector’s capacities and activities, and the environmental awareness amongst 
private, foreign investors and general public. The document was treated as a government 
environment policy, plan and long term strategy.
5.6.4 Human Rights and Legal Aid Network (HRLAN)
HRLAN continued to have difficulties with the central government because the issue of 
human rights is still sensitive in Sudan. HRLAN developed effective approaches to 
achieve its objectives and targets. The network focused during the first years of its 
establishment on raising the awareness of member organizations on human rights 
education including international human rights conventions and laws. The network also 
succeeded in implementing regular training and technical assistance in human rights 
related issues, particularly those either not fully implemented or have not been ratified, to 
the network staff members, and executive committee members. Within the same 
education campaign, the network organized training sessions and workshops for 
government staff on the basics of human rights, signed treaties, conventions and national 
legislations. This included the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior.
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In terms of advocacy and lobbying, HRLAN continued to coordinate with other NGOs 
and civil society organizations to propose modifications and changes of laws and policies 
or in some cases suggest alternative ones. For example, the government signed the 
Convention against Torture but it has not been ratified. HRLAN would hold lobbying and 
advocacy with other concerned parties so as to influence the decision makers to move 
ahead with the ratification of the convention. HRLAN invited the civil society 
organizations to pressurize the government to amend the new act called “Temporary 
Decree for Regulating Voluntary Humanitarian Work of 2005”. HRLAN was a member 
of the coordinating committee to review the Act regulating the voluntary humanitarian 
work. The network with other NGOs and CSOs addressed their critical views about the 
Act and met government members of Humanitarian Aid Commission, Ministry of Justice, 
the National Assembly, and the Legislative Assembly. The legal complaint made by the 
NGOs coordinating committee was submitted to the Constitutional Court.404
Over the last few years, HRLAN has been campaigning to reform the Networking Act in 
Sudan. This has helped bring together state and non-state actors. A workshop has been 
conducted for HAC to better understanding of the concept of networking. HRALN was 
active in the Legal Reformation Forum. The purpose of this forum was to incorporate the 
international treaties and conventions into the interim constitution of the Republic of 
Sudan of 2005. The forum was held on September 2006 and recommendations were 
submitted to the Council o f Ministries and to the Legislative Assembly. The key issues 
were the law of national security and the law of journalism.
5.7 Conclusion
In the preceding chapters I have sought to show the hostility of both the authoritarian and 
the democratic governments over the years in terms of their image and attitude towards 
CSOs and NGOs in Sudan. There were also many undocumented stories of how NGOs
404 Lawyers and Associate Lawyers. Request for stopping implementation o f Voluntary humanitarian work 
(organizations) Act, by SECS and NGOs against the National Assembly and the Legislative Authority, 
submitted to the Constitutional Court.2006.
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undermine and ignore the governments. The joint alternative model of cooperation or 
even partnership between the governments and CSOs is potential and promising, 
particularly in areas that matter communities and people. The success of some joint 
efforts, for example, the national environmental plan between SECS and National 
Council for Environment and Natural Resources; street children and joint juvenile court 
between AMAL and Higher Council for Child Welfare; human rights education between 
HRLAN and various Ministries; and PRSP between SCSNAP and Ministry of Finance, 
is worth documenting for learning and possible replication.
It is important to understand the system of the most committed opponents of civil society 
rights and roles, the network, media and dialogue are still an effective strategy with 
policymakers who may be more open to rights and roles perspectives. This discussion 
will focus on two less visible audience present in many legislatures and government 
agencies: (1) those, that do not give the issues much attention, and (2) those, that are 
already in favor o f civil society rights but voice these opinions only behind the scenes.
This first audience may not have seriously examined the issues or may have little 
information; being politicians, they have taken the safe road, which is usually to espouse 
the official system. This group may be more open to persuasion by dialogue and 
information on the complementary roles of civil society and the success stories. The 
second audience consists of those legislators and public officials who take rights- 
affirming stances on issues related to civil society rights in silence. There are fierce 
behind-the-scenes disagreements within governmental agencies, political parties, and 
committees, too often resulting in bland and meaningless consensus statements, or simply 
in inaction.
It is clear that various advocacy strategies must focus on issues affecting public life such 
as child rights, health and women’s status, education, employment, basic services such 
water, health services, sanitation and environment.
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One similar strategy could be to present supporting voices in the mass media, bringing 
hitherto private and public opinions into the open. This will legitimize the debate and 
make it publicly. It is important and truly inspiring to find Sudanese NGOs and 
government institutions whose concern is with volunteer-led advocacy and education. It 
is not impossible to engage Sudanese in development issues. There are thousands of 
young people and retired persons who are highly committed to contribute and making a 
difference in Sudan through their educational and lobbying efforts.
On the other hand, the implication of accountability and transparency on the state-CSOs 
relation is also relevant. Neither each side can insist on leadership accountability if they 
are unable to set a good example themselves in this regard. Civil society organizations 
are accountable certainly to their members, to their donors, to public officials, and to their 
employees.
State-CSOs relations must go beyond zero-sum processes where they take the view that 
their benefits or advantages should or must come at someone else’s expense. This 
thinking and practice is a closed system where no gains of value or productivity. With 
negative-sum relations, the system runs down to disorder and dissolution over time 
because more is being extracted from it than is being put in. State-CSOs dynamics should 
promote and support positive-sum system, where relations between individuals, groups, 
organizations, communities, sectors and state, achieve multiple benefits and that there is a 
continuous accretion of value and productivity, making the relation sustainability is 
possible.
State-CSOs relations are to be considered as open systems, not for the sake of analysis, 
and not for the comparison and identification of costs and befit, but rather for the 
production of multiple net benefits broadly dispersed and inclusively adding the most to 
our quality of life. The open system is an adaptive, creative and flexible process where 
our limited resources can best be used to achieve the greatest and most lasting benefits. 
We have to avoid mental barriers set up by bureaucracy which prevent us from looking
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for and at immeasurable but admittedly important consequences, co-generated benefits 
that cannot be readily attributed to any one source.
The degree of space created by a stable and accountable state is thus vital in encouraging 
the strengthening of civil society. This will allow people to mobilize and apply social 
energy to the improvement of their futures. The people, by right and by necessity, must 
be the architects and the dynamics of sustainable development. What happened to 
Sudanese people under both democratic and authoritarian forms is worth documenting, 
particularly under the present regime which has made all efforts to riding people of some 
of their original values.
One must go, however, beyond looks of success to show in the coming chapter the 
frustration of NGOs when they are jointly criticize the new Act Regulating the Voluntary 
Work which they believe will add to further restriction and control of humanitarian 
efforts.
CHAPTER SIX
NGOs LAWS; A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN LAWS IN THE SUDAN
AND EGYPT
6.1 Introduction
The requirements for NGOs registration and the registration process reflect the intentions 
and motives of the state and its relationship with the NGOs, its strategy and attitude 
towards voluntary sector. As noted by Farrington "The justification given by 
governments for their efforts to regulate NGOs fall into broad categories: issues related to 
the need for financial control and the need for co-ordination of development activities".405 
In Sudan, for example, the arbitrary action, arrest and confiscation of NGOs’ equipment 
and materials, by governments, indicated that the political motives and the fear of the 
NGOs’ influence on the societies are the ones underlying governments’ law efforts.
The data on these particular issues, e.g. NGOs law is very important in the wake of the 
workshops, seminars and joint statements initiated by Sudanese civil society 
organizations between 2005 and 2006. This particular part of the research complements 
the work of civil society efforts by offering a space for exchange of experiences and ideas 
independent of the government.
Most of these data has been gathered during my several field visits to the Sudan and 
Egypt. The NGOs laws in the two countries represent major barriers for the development 
of civil society organizations and their role in effective engagement in the social and 
political reform. The selection of Egypt was based on the similarities of the oppressive 
laws governing the work o f voluntary sector and for the struggle by the civil society in 
improving them and creating an enabling working environment for constructive dialogue 
and partnership between civil society and government. Because of the rapid changes in
405 Farrington, J., ed., 1993. Reluctant Partner? London and New York: Routledge, p.51.
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the political environment affecting the relation between the state and civil society 
organizations, some items may be out of date almost as they are written. This case study 
does, however, provide a) a review of the NGOs laws in the two countries; and b) an 
analysis of some main items of the laws and the implications on the NGOs and civil 
society.
Why the role of the government institutions is believed to be particularly important for 
the type of relations between them and NGOs? To answer this question, we begin with 
the description and analysis of most items in the laws that have contributed to the debate 
and tension of civil society organizations. This includes definitions, registration 
requirements and process, donations and funds, secondment of civil servants to NGOs, 
penalties, NGOs rights and benefits, violations and dissolution. This is followed by 
description and the terms of some governments organizations that have direct relations 
with civil society organizations.
6.2 NGO Laws in the Sudan and Egypt
The literature on the characteristics of the Sudanese state and its relation to civil society 
is part of a broader debate and discussion on the role of civil society, its legislative and 
regulatory framework and the political, social, cultural and economic context in Middle 
East. Civil society movement, for example, was one of the groups most manipulated by 
the regimes in Egypt, according to PDP NGO/84 Law Workshop 406 and in the Sudan407
406
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(El-Nagar, 2006) to forge its hegemony. In the last two decades, changes in the regimes’ 
policies towards civil society in the two countries clearly reflected the regimes’ search for 
organizations that protect them and advocate their policies and political agendas. The two 
regimes, since independence, throughout post colonial periods and up to presence, were 
realized that civil society organizations had the potential to attract individuals, groups and 
members that represent the wide range of the societies.
The potential o f the civil society to mobilize masses became clear in the Sudan during the 
October revolution in 1964 and the April uprising in 1985. Two military regimes in 
Sudan were over thrown, as a result of the political engagement of Sudanese civil society. 
The role of civil society organizations, particularly trade unions and professional 
associations played major roles in reshaping political life in the two countries. This 
potential threat of civil society organizations raised the security measures of the regimes 
by strategically establishing mechanism of laws and regulations regulating the voluntary 
work.
In a comparative study between the law governing the work of the civil society 
organizations in Sudan and Egypt, the research highlighted some similarities and 
differences, the position of civil society organizations towards the law and the 
implications of the law on the voluntary work in the two countries. The Sudanese NGOs 
law called the Voluntary Humanitarian Work (Organizations) Act. 408 The Egyptian law 
titled the NGOs and Foundations Law, number 84 of 2002.
6.2.1 Background of NGO Laws in the Sudan
< » .(jtjjjjJI ^ ml unit j  AjIaVI ll .2006 4a«Lui 4 jiill
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408 The Voluntary Humanitarian Work (Organizations) Act, 2006. Available at: www.hacsudan.net. 
Accessed December 28, 2008.
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The law of Companies of 1925 allowed charities and organizations to be registered and to 
be legally recognized. Charities, research centers and organizations registered by this law 
with Ministry of Justice. The purpose of the signed charity could include: 1) provision of 
charitable services to vulnerable groups; 2) linkage between particular group of people 
with others in the region or world wide; 3) provision of legal aid to particular group of 
people; 4) acceptance of donations from all sources to fund the company; 5) 
establishment of charitable funding facilities to care about particular group of people; 6) 
publication and dissemination of studies and books on child and women rights; 7) 
establishment of profit-making activities to enable the charity/company to achieve its 
purpose and goal. The number of founders of the charity was a range between 2 and 50 
people. Many NGOs preferred to register under the company law of 1925 to avoid the 
complicated and lengthy registration procedure of the Humanitarian Aid Commission.
The first legal framework was produced in 1957 in the name of Law Regulating the 
Registration of Associations. Most of the articles in this law described the terms and 
terminology used in the law. Association, for example, was defined as a group of 7 
people or more engaged voluntarily to achieve a goal. The law established rules to ensure 
democratic practices and transparency particularly on funding issues. The law introduced 
a deposit system to recognize the civil society organizations and did not restrict the 
freedom of organizations.
In 1986, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Law were issued to implement and 
monitor the relief assistance for those affected by drought and desertification. The law 
suggested plans and programs to rehabilitate those most vulnerable. The law 
recommended ways and means of how to utilize funds from the external assistance in 
accordance to state policy. The law governed the work of foreign relief agencies, whose 
number increased suddenly as a result of the emergency situation in the mid 1980s.
The Ministry of Social Planning decided to cancel the NGOs Registration Law of 1957, 
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Law of 1986 and the Law Regulating Foreign
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Work of 1988. The Ministry admitted that the law of 1957 did not contain the rapid 
political, social, cultural and economic changes and did not address the development and 
service role of NGOs, their support and funding of activities. The Ministry concluded that 
the law of foreign voluntary work together with the NGOs Registration Law had limited 
vision and purpose. The Ministry decided to establish a new legal administration in 1995, 
named Humanitarian Aid Commission.409 In 1996, a law regulating the activities of 
cultural groups was issued to recognize the work of any group, not less than 25 people 
that aim at implementing creative activities in the field of culture and art, particularly 
cultural carnivals, cultural missions, cultural researches. The law regulated the work of 
foreign cultural communities living in the country. The funds of cultural groups were 
defined as public funds according to the criminal law of 1991.
The Ministry of Social Planning issued in 1999 the Regulations for the Registration of 
Foreign and National Agencies, based on the Law of Humanitarian Aid Commission of 
1995. The regulation contains registration procedures, organization’s basic systems, 
including management of funds, meetings and dissolution. The regulation includes 
annexes identifying guidelines and rules of foreign voluntary work (Ministry of Social 
Planning, 1999).
HAC of Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs prepared recently a new law regulating the 
voluntary humanitarian work for NGOs (both national and foreign NGOs) in Sudan. The 
law was issued as a temporary Presidential decree on August 2005. The law was rejected 
by NGOs. A Coordinating Secretariat of civil society organizations and national NGOs 
was formed in October 2005 to study the government law and to prepare a reply 
representing the NGOs view. SCOVA invited NGOs and around 500 representatives
409
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Humanitarian Aid Commission. Temporary Decree, Humanitarian Aid Commission Law. 1995.
Khartoum: Unpublished report.
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participated in the discussion of the new law. SCOVA, based on this consultation wrote a 
critical memorandum to Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. Ministry of Justice presented a 
proposal of law regulating voluntary work for 2006. The proposal tried to address some 
of the concerns expressed by the civil society organizations. However, there are some 17 
unresolved issues critically noted by 128 national NGOs in a statement presented by the 
Coordinating Secretariat of civil society organizations on February 12, 2006. The law 
was challenged by the National Assembly and a list o f recommendations presented by its 
Humanitarian Affairs Committee. Six national organizations (Sudanese Environment and 
conservation Society, Women Legal Awareness Group, A1 Mubadarat Women 
Organization, Sudan Social Development Organization, Network for Strengthening 
Women Role in Peace and Development, Southern Women Group for Peace) submitted a 
second legal request on May 27, 2006, to the Constitutional Court against the National 
Assembly with respect to constitutional matters related to the government NGOs law.410
The Constitution, Article 40 item (1) with regard to freedom of assembly and association 
clearly states: “The right of peaceful assembly shall be guaranteed; every one shall have 
the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join 
political parties, associations and trade or professional unions for the protection of his/her 
interests”. The Constitution continues in item (2) “the law shall regulate the exercise of 
this right as is necessary in a democratic society” 411
The Constitution in Sudan follows the spirit and values of the International Declaration of 
Human Rights which in Article 20 No. 1 states the right of any person to select the 
organization or peaceful group he/she wants to join. The article No. 23, No.4 also 
confirms that any person has the right to establish or be a member of the union that 
protect him/her.412
410 The Voluntary Humanitarian Work (Organizations) Act, 2006. Available at: www.hacsudan.net. 
Accessed December 28, 2008.
4,1 The Interim National Constitution o f the Republic o f the Sudan. 2005, p. 16. Available at: www.sudan- 
embassv.de. Accessed 10 January 2009.
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6.2.2 Definitions
The definition of civil society organizations is always a necessary and interesting aspect 
which implies to some extent the image and attitude of the government towards CSOs. 
Civil society is a new term and is more political because includes trade unions. The 
Egyptian law differentiates between NGOs and trade unions. The trade unions have their 
own law.
Law in Sudan defined civil society organizations as organizations, associations, unions, 
non-governmental or semi-governmental local organizations established by not less than 
thirty Sudanese citizens, working in the field of non-profit voluntary work and registered 
according to the provisions of this Act and this does not include: a) any company 
registered according to the company act; b) any political party; c) any group working 
towards achieving political aims or objectives; d) any institution or agency registered 
according to the provision of other laws. The law (2006) defined international institution 
as foreign agency, government organization and specialized UN agencies working in 
Sudan.413
According to the law, voluntary sector means any voluntary, charity, humanitarian non­
governmental, non-profit making activity undertaken by any civil society organization, 
charity organization or institution, foreign voluntary donating or implementing 
organization or agency. Provided that this activity is having development objectives, 
cultural objectives, national objectives, services objectives or scientific or research 
objectives414 (2006).
Based on these definitions, the following concerns were raised by representatives of 
Sudanese civil society organizations during their campaigns against the law:
413 The Voluntary Humanitarian Work (Organizations) Act, 2006. Available at: vyww.hacsudan.net.
Accessed December 28, 2008.
414 Ib id , 2 0 0 6
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- The law combines two groups of organizations, the relief NGOs and civil society 
organizations. The latter does not work on relief, for instance the human right 
organizations. In the past each group was governed by its own law.
- The law restricted the field of activities for NGOs by defining voluntary 
humanitarian work as voluntary and humanitarian work aims at providing 
humanitarian, relief, general services or human rights, environment and 
improvement of economic and social services for beneficiaries. Civil society 
organizations responded that setting of the objectives of voluntary work hinders 
their right for free organization and for selection areas of interest. 415
The Egyptian law introduced the association as a group of people, not less than ten, who 
has a continuing organization, for non-profit purpose. The law has two conditions for 
establishment: (I) to have a basic system written and signed by founders and (ii) to have 
an office. Members who have been punished as a result of criminal, dishonesty are not 
allowed to participate in the establishment of an organization. The Egyptian law allows 
foreigners who have permanent or temporary residence to become members of the 
organization.
6.2.3 Registration of NGOs
The registration procedures of NGOs are the most painful part of the process for NGOs. 
This is the time when the authority mobilizes its resources to gather information about the 
people applying to register an NGO. Most of the decision is taken at this stage by the 
security officers and not by the technical Ministry.
(i) Procedures
415
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Article 6 of the law specifies the criteria for registration of civil society organization: “a) 
it should not be less than 30 people; b) it should have basic statute including the names of 
members, their place of residence, organization’s objectives and financial system, areas 
of work and geographical jurisdiction and minutes of meetings; c) the organization 
should have residence; and d) the Minister or General Registrar may accept registration 
o f an organization that having less than 30 members”.
Registration requires: a) submission of application including names and addresses of not 
less than 30 founders; b) organization’s constitution and structure are to be attached to the 
application; c) a letter from the interim manager, or the board of directors/trustees 
requesting establishment o f the organization, is to be attached to the application; d) 
registration fees to be paid.
The new law in Sudan416 instructs applicant organizations to provide names and 
addresses of not less than thirty member founders. The legitimate question raised by 
many new applicant organizations is why the new organization needs thirty persons to be 
founder members? The Interim National Constitution of Republic of the Sudan417 states 
that: “ ...every person shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including 
the right to form or join political parties, associations and trade professional unions for 
the protection of his/her interest”. This explains how the NGOs law (2006) contradicts 
with the Constitution. Article 9 (2), however, from the same law gives the authority to 
the Minister to approve registration for any organization that has less than thirty member 
founders. The right for equality was also hindered by authority given to the Minister to 
accept or reject applications based on the number of founders. Mohamed Agati describes 
the Egypt’s NGO law: “The Egyptian NGO law establishes a system of government 
interference that undermines the freedom of association guaranteed in the Egyptian 
Constitution and in international human rights instruments to which Egypt is a
416 The Voluntary Humanitarian Work (Organizations) Act, 2006. Available at: www.hacsudan.net. 
Accessed December 28, 2008.
4,7 The Interim National Constitution o f the Republic o f the Sudan. 2005, Article 40:1. Available at: 
www.sudan-embassv.de. Accessed 10 January 2009.
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signatory”. 418 The registration fees for newly registered organizations are 100 thousands 
Sudanese pounds (NGOs Registration Regulation, 1999)419 According to Article No. 5 
(1) in the law that: “no voluntary organization is allowed to practise any work or activity 
in its own name if it is not registered according to the provision of this act” (HAC, 1999). 
The law does not recognize those many community-based organizations initiated in 
almost every Sudanese village and contributing significantly to the economic and social 
development of Sudanese communities.
Article 11 in the law stated that the registration is renewed annually according to the 
conditions in the regulations. The registration is valid for one year. The Sudanese civil 
society organizations complain about the short period of the registration validity and 
about the lengthy procedures for renewal. This is unconstitutional restriction because 
again it undermines and challenges the voluntary spirit of Sudanese society. Compared 
to the advantages provided to commercial sector, the voluntary work is neglected and the 
commercial companies, for example, were not asked to renew registration.
The Egyptian law420 asks for the following information to be included in the applicant 
organization’s basic system: 1) name of organization should be derived from its purpose;
2) area and type of activities and its geographical location; 3) address of the office; 4) 
name of each founder member, age, nationality, occupation and residence; 5) 
organization’s resources; 6) organization’s structure and bodies and its responsibilities, 
criteria for selection of its members; 7) membership regulation, criteria, membership
418 Undermining standards o f good governance: Egypt’s NGO Law and its impact on the transparency and 
accountability o f CSOs. The International Journal o f not-for-profit law, Vol. 9, Issue 2, April 2007. 
Available at: www.icnl.org. Accessed December 29, 2008.
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rights and duties, attendance of general assembly, voting in the general assembly; 8) 
financial control system; 9) identification of a representative from the founders during the 
establishment process. The law requires the applicant organization to deposit 100 
Egyptian pounds (less than 20 USD) to the account of organizations and foundations 
donation fund. The concerned administrative body of Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Insurance notifies the date of submission on the organization’s application copy. The 
Ministry should respond to the organization in 60 days. The registration is offered after 
the 60 days, even if  the registration is not completed.
(ii) Rejection o f Registration
A civil society organization in the Sudan may be rejected by the Commissioner in cases 
of: a) the basic statute of the organization is contradicting any of the adopted policies of 
the state in the field of humanitarian work; b) the name of the organization coincides or is 
similar to the name of another registered organization; c) the organization fails to meet 
the registration requirements (completed application, copy of constitution, request for 
establishment, payment of registration fees); d) the authorized official or technical 
authorities or agencies did not accept the registration (1999).
Representatives o f civil society organizations expressed their concern that the law did not 
specify criteria for rejection of registration. The law should prepare regulations for 
rejection and CSOs should be informed about the reasons for rejection.
The application can be rejected in Egypt421 (Al-Jundi, 2005) by the administrative body 
during the 60 days if the organization’s purposes include one of the following activities:
1) establishment of military units or of military nature; 2) threat to national unity, 
violation of general order or call of discrimination between the citizens because of 
religion, gender, color, or language; 3) any political or trade union activities governed by 
political parties and trade unions laws; 4) profit-targeting activities with the exception of 
following commercial rules to gain income contributing to achieve the purpose of the 
organization.
421 Ibid , 2 0 0 5
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The regulations of the Egyptian law (Al-Jundi, 2005) define the political activities which 
are only allowed by the political parties:
- political campaign and promotion of political party’s program;
- support candidate during election campaign;
- spending organization’s money to support activities of a political party or a
candidate;
Submit candidates on behalf of the organization for parliament election.
The regulations of the law name the following activities to be only undertaken by trade 
unions:
- Demand for rights of particular workers or professionals; provision of certificate
or work permission.
(iii) Cancellation of registration
The law in Sudan gives the authority for cancellation of organizations’ work to the 
Registrar if it violates this law, its regulations or any other valid law. The decision of 
cancellation of organization’s work must be made by a court and not by the Registrar. 
This article violates the right for organization in the constitution which contains that 
organization’s members have the right to work, suspend or freeze it without any 
restriction. In case that request of cancellation was made by the organization’s general 
assembly, the funds will be allocated as follows: a) resolve financial commitment; b) 
transfer funds to the existing project or to another organization of similar purpose. If the 
decision of cancellation was made by the registrar or a court, organization’s funds was 
allocated to the existing activities or to any other humanitarian and voluntary work. The 
law, however, did not explain under what circumstances the cancellation is made by the 
registrar or by the court. The cancellation of registration was given to the registrar, 
Commissioner or to the court without defining the violations upon which the decision of 
cancellation was made.
(iv) Constrains facing NGOs in the registration process
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- Long process including information required to complete the application. The 
complicated process for establishment, the restrictions, control and punishment 
inhabit the spirit of voluntary and non-profit work of associations, individuals and 
groups. In both Sudan and Egypt, the final decision over the registration of the 
applicant organization is taken by the security authority. Security intervention in 
registration process is known in Sudan and Egypt. Sometime the application for 
registration is rejected because of some names of the organization’s board 
members. In the two countries sometime the lengthy delay is due to unnecessary 
reservation and objection about some members.
- Restrictions on the field of activities and the intervention of the authority in the 
management and financial affairs of the associations. Field of activities, such as 
human rights and gender are not always encouraged. In Sudan some human rights 
organizations are registered as business companies. Most of human right 
organizations in Egypt are not registered.
The contradiction between the different laws at the central and state or 
provincial level. This is also due to the unlimited authority of some governors and 
security offices. In Sudan there were cases of some organizations that registered as 
companies or as cultural associations. The laws for business organizations and 
cultural centres, however are also governmental laws.
6.2.4 Purposes of Organizations
According to the Sudanese law (2006) the following are the basic principles governing 
the humanitarian work: 1) no religious, ethnic, gender and political discrimination; 2) 
honesty in selecting the most need areas for project activities; 3) accountability to 
stakeholders, including beneficiaries, and donors, bodies related to the services in the 
area; 4) sustainability o f activities to create and enable an environment for the local 
communities to become self-reliant in the longer term; 5) understanding and respect of 
local community’s desires and needs through participatory process at all level and 
throughout the activities; 6) foreign voluntary organizations are not allowed to intervene 
in Sudan’s internal affairs.
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The objectives of the humanitarian assistance and work consist of the following services:
- relief assistance to those most affected by natural and non-natural disasters;
- eliminate, reduce and manage disasters’ risks;
- link relief assistance with repatriation, rehabilitation and development;
- care for IDPs and refugees through planning and implantation of relief and 
rehabilitation activities;
- rehabilitate socio-economic infrastructures affected by war or natural disasters in 
collaboration and coordination with the national organizations established for this 
purpose;
set priorities for repatriation, relief and rehabilitation in consultation with 
beneficiaries and relevant government authority;
- building capacity to empower national NGOs;
- Implement relief projects and humanitarian assistance through non-government 
voluntary, charity and/or civil society organizations whose objectives are in 
harmony with general policies and target group interest.
It is clear that the principles and objectives of the humanitarian assistance are designed 
for international organizations working in relief and humanitarian work. Few national 
NGOs in Sudan are working in emergency and relief. The law governing the voluntary 
work for NGOs does not differentiate between international and national NGOs. This has 
been raised and criticized by Coordination Secretariat of the Civil Society Organizations 
(2006) while discussing the law in 2005 and 2006.
This explanation justifies the absence of the emphasis on voluntary work as one of the 
pillars of Sudanese social capital. The government law, policies and practices with 
respect to independent voluntary work miserable failed to improve non-profit sector, they 
lack any sense of strategy and direction and the government recent NGOs law was deeply 
mistrusted by most of civil society organizations because of lack of consultation and 
recognition of the role of civil society.
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The restriction on the changing o f the objectives is exaggerating the role of the Minister 
in Article 37 in the law that civil society organizations or foreign voluntary organizations 
are not allowed to change their objectives stated at the time of registration or expanding it 
or to merge with other organization before obtaining the approval of the Minister (2006).
With the exception of the four fields of activities (secret organizations, military nature, 
political, threat to national unity, and profit-making activities) prohibited by the Egyptian 
law, an organization with legal personality could perform any activities aim at achieving 
its purpose in community development such as those activities focusing on human 
sustainable development areas of education, health, culture, social, economic and 
environmental services, consumer protection, legal, constitutional and human rights and 
others. Other new areas are also allowed subject to getting approval from the concerned 
social affairs department.
6.2.5 Secondment of Civil Servants to NGOs
Both laws in Sudan (2006) and Egypt (2005) allow secondment of government personnel 
to work in voluntary organizations upon the request of the organization. The Egyptian 
experience on secondment showed some challenges:
- the board of the organization has the absolute freedom to request for secondment;
- to ensure that those seconded aware of the NGOs non-bureaucratic work;
- to renew secondment annually and a maximum period of secondment should be
known to avoid domination over the organization’s work. The incentives for the 
seconded person was be clearly stated in the secondment letter;
- Ministries ensure the capability of seconded staff.
The secondment of government employees to work in NGOs is an Egyptian practice and 
it has not been implemented by the authorities in Sudan. The experience of secondment 
of government officials in the NGO sector in Egypt is not encouraging. The seconded 
person brings bureaucracy and top-down approach to the NGO. The governments in the 
two countries, however, must fulfill their limited but vital tasks of legitimacy and 
legislation of NGOs, recognition for their role and support to their development efforts.
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6.2.6 Conflict Resolution Committees
The Egyptian law is more advanced and democratic in conflict resolution situation. It is 
an important mechanism that has not been learned by the authorities in Sudan.
In case of conflict between the NGO and the administrative body, the Egyptian law 
(2005) established committees, headed by counsellors from the appeal court and two 
representatives, one from the administrative body of Ministry of Social Affairs and other 
from the regional federation nominated by the board council of Associations’ general 
union. In addition to a member representing the organization concerned. There are certain 
procedures for the establishment of these committees arranged by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, Ministry of Justice, the General Union for Associations and Foundations and the 
organization concerned.
6.2.7 Associations/Organizations Rights
Article 36 of the Sudanese law read: “No civil society organization registered according 
to this law is allowed to receive funds or donations from abroad or from a foreign person 
inside the country or any other institution before obtaining the approval of the 
Minister” 422.
By this restriction, the government wants to control and restrict the field of NGOs 
activities and funding processes. According to the constitution item 139 that resources of 
national income include grants and external assistance. The Minister was given a free 
hand, with no questions asked about how he/she reached the decision on approval or 
disapproval of NGOs’ funding. The law again violates the right for free organization, the 
international treaty for civil and political rights, and the decision number 106/57 of the
422 The Voluntary Humanitarian Work (Organizations) Act, 2006, p.l 1. Available at: www.hacsudan.net. 
Accessed December 28, 2008.
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General Assembly of the United Nations of 13/2/2003 which recognize the valuable 
contributions of voluntary work. The government of Sudan was committed to this 
decision, participated in and voted for it.
The law gives the authority to the Minister to offer exemptions from taxes and custom. 
The law however does not specify criteria for those offered exemptions. The law violates 
the right for equality and encourages discrimination between organizations. It is 
anticipated that the authority supports voluntary work by exempting organizations from 
paying registration fees and all other taxes including custom. It is understood to impose 
fees and taxes on commercial sectors. In fact, the facilities received by investment and 
business companies are better than those offered to non-profit organizations.
Compared to the Sudanese NGOs law, the Egyptian NGOs law, particularly the executive 
regulation, Article 56, 57 and 58 specify the rights of NGOs in the following areas, some 
of which are much in favour for voluntary work:
- Right for ownership of assets including buildings assisting in serving the purpose 
of the organizations.
- Right for getting internal donation and funds from Egyptians or foreigners or 
international organizations that work legally in the country on the condition that 
the NGO informs the concerned department about the amount of funds and the 
donor agency. With respect to external funds and donations, permission has to be 
taken from Ministry of Social Affairs. There are certain procedures to follow by 
NGOs to get the external funds, including information about the foreign agency, 
local representatives, if any and country, area of activities of the donor, amount of 
funds. A response has to be made to the NGO’s request in 60 days from the date 
of request submission. In case that the NGO received the funds prior to the 
permission from the Ministry, the money will be kept in special account in an 
official bank. The NGO can request a temporary release o f the funds on the 
condition that the released funds are refunded if the permission is not accepted. It 
was not clear whether the NGO has the right to use the funds after the 60 day 
period of the request submission.
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On the other hand, Article 76 from the Egyptian law (2005) states clearly that if the 
donation is from a donor agency which has a legal identity in the country, the 
organization has to inform the concerned ministry of the funding. It explains that 
receiving donations or funds from inside the country, without the approval of the 
concerned ministry, is considered to be a criminal act which leads to imprisonment and 
payment of fine. The organization usually waits for long time to get the approval of the 
ministry. The confusion is actually created by the ministry which approves the funding 
from a legal donor agency, based in Egypt, instead of responding to the information 
received from the organization about the donation. This unconstitutional restriction 
violates international human rights law and creates barriers between the community 
participation and voluntary and social work. The culture of donation and encouragement 
of volunteerism are hindered by restrictive and undemocratic regulations. The other laws 
such as the penal code are sufficient in punishing those who are accused by court. The 
civil society organizations, particularly organizations working on advocacy and human 
rights issues are accusing the security in intervening in decisions related to donations and 
funds. Human rights organizations are facing difficulties in getting donations internally 
and from abroad. Although the Egyptian law requires information about the inside 
funding, the practice and application of law shows that authority is rather asking for 
permission from the organizations.
6.2.8 Formation of Networks and Regional Federation
The NGOs law in Sudan (2006) offers the formation for networks among CSOs and 
between them and regional or international organizations, to civil society organizations 
that have common purpose and registered according to this law, for the purpose of 
exchange of experience, professional performance development and for mobilization of 
joint efforts. The law restricts the network formation for those registered and have 
common purpose. This excludes those unregistered to network with the registered ones 
and isolates the work of organizations having common concerns but registered under 
different laws.
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The Egyptian law (2005) addresses the formation of regional federations and unions 
which are entities established by organizations and foundations to cooperate between 
themselves and to provide services. Union forms of organizations implement or fund 
joint activities in particular areas of common interest. Examples are unions for gender 
equality, and street children. A union consists of not less than 10 organizations and 
foundations working in the same geographical location.
6.2.9 Violations, Penalties and Dissolution of NGOs
Violations are defined by Sudanese law (2006) as a) any person who contravenes the 
provision of this act or any order or regulation made; and b) any civil society 
organization or foreign organization registered according to the provision of this act and 
violated its basic statute and regulations or the general policies. The Arabic version of 
the law (2006), Article 21 is read that any person or a group of people practice activities 
for non-registered voluntary organization will violate the law and will be penalized either 
by less than six month imprisonment or payment of fines determined by the court or 
both. The court, in addition, is allowed to confiscate available funds. The following 
penalties could be applied as the result of the violations and after the approval of the 
Commissioner: a) notice; b) warning; c) suspension for any suitable period; d) dismissal 
and dissolution of the executive committee and formation of a committee; e) cancellation 
of registration; f) evacuation, in case of foreign agency; g) confiscation of property and 
funds after accusation is proved by an authorized court. The process and who is taking 
decision of penalty and dissolution was unclear. According to the law Article 22 (2) that 
penalties such as notice, warning, suspension up to six months and cancellation of 
registration were given to the authority of the registrar upon the approval of the 
Commissioner. The circumstances, under which dissolution takes place, are not given.
The dissolution o f organizations in the Egyptian law (2005) is a decision approved by the 
minister of social affairs after consultation with General Union of Associations and after
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discussion in the organization’s general assembly. The decision of dissolution is taken 
under following circumstances:
1) Misuse of organization’s funds and allocation of funds for purposes not in 
accordance to its establishment;
2) Receipt of funds from abroad or sending funds to external body without the 
permission of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Such practices violate article 17 (2) 
of the law and article 58 of the regulations;
3) Severe violation of the law or public order;
4) Membership, participation or affiliation to external organization, club, and 
agency without informing and approval of Ministry of Social Affairs according to 
article 16 of the law and 55 of the regulations;
5) Purposes and activities of the organization are not permitted;
6) Fund raising that contradict article 17 (1) of the law and article 57 of the 
executive regulations.
The Egyptian law permits the Minister to take the decision of dismissing the board or 
cancelling the conflicting activity, instead of dissolution of the organization. The same 
action could apply in case the organization failed to organize its general assembly 
meeting over two years period.
The law allowed the organization to appeal the Minister’s decision to administrative 
court, without cost.
The differences between the Egyptian law number 153 of 1999 and the present law of 
2002 is that the former law allowed the dissolution of organization to be decided by the 
court and not by the Minister. Article 42 of 153/1999 NGO law states: “An association 
may be dissolved, upon the request of the administrative authority, by a decree of the 
competent court...”. 423 Political parties in Egypt, such as Tagammu party criticized the 
law: “ ...NGOs and political parties were joining efforts in an extended democratic battle
423 Towards Empowering the Civil Society in Egypt: The New Law 153/1999 for NGOs. Egypt Ministry of 
Insurance and Social Affairs, June 1999. Available at: www.ngolaw.org.eg. Accessed December 29, 2008.
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to defend the constitution rights of citizens and the right of social organisations to play a 
role in re-establishing a lost equilibrium between the individual and the state”. 424 The 
law in the two countries prohibited activities of a political nature. The law restricted 
NGOs from directly funding candidates or political parties. If that is all that is meant, this 
clause should be made more specific. On the other hand all aspects of social development 
programs including poverty reduction, human rights and social justice are people-centred 
and can’t be separated from day to day political efforts of CSOs.
6.3 Conclusion
This case study chapter has focused on the NGOs laws in the Sudan and Egypt. It began 
by giving background information on the establishment of the law. There are many well- 
known criticisms of the governments’ processes for regulating NGOs and civil society 
organizations. The criticisms suggest that the government bodies responsible for 
regulations are unduly restrictive, undemocratic and/or even arbitrary in their 
determination of whether to register an entity as an NGO. It is said that the process is too 
secretive and lacks transparency. Acceptance or denial of application for NGOs 
registration is political. The appeal process for a decision on registration, involves an 
appeal to the Commissioner of Humanitarian Aid or to the Minister, in the case of Sudan, 
and to Administrative Court, in the case of Egypt, which is a long process and 
inaccessible to most organizations.
In conclusion, there is a need for significant reform in this sector. There is a need for 
regular dialogue and consultation with those NGOs and civil society organizations that 
are affected by the regulations and laws. There is a need to incorporate all values related 
to freedom of associations and to voluntary sector which are clearly stated in the 
Constitution, into the law regulating NGOs. There is a need also to refer to the nature of 
the bill of rights in the Constitution and the commitment to respect and promote the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution: “it is the
424 Fighting for civil society. Mariz Tadros. Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, 6-12 June 2002, Issue 589. 
Available at: weekly.ahram.org.eg. Accessed December 29, 2008.
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cornerstone of social justice, equality and democracy in the Sudan; the State shall 
guarantee, protect, and fulfil this Bill; all rights and freedoms enshrined in international 
human rights treaties, covenants and instruments ratified by the Republic of the Sudan 
shall be an integral part o f this Bill” 425
Sudanese civil society organizations need legal means to protect and secure their 
empowered status against possible constraints by the state. A team of development 
practitioners representing the social actors from the NGO community, the private sector 
and the government, is required to undertake an independent study focusing on creating 
an enabling environment for NGOs. The purpose of the study is to coordinate and 
facilitate a broadly based consultative process amongst NGOs concerning their social and 
development role in promoting the establishment of an open, democratic, equitable and 
non-discriminatory society. Based on the findings of this study on the characteristics and 
constraints of the existing environment and the legislative, administrative and fiscal 
changes which might be necessary to promote an environment conducive for the NGO 
community, an NGO position paper should be drafted and submitted to government to 
motivate the enactment of appropriate legislation.
To sum up the chapter findings, one of the major lessons, which have not been learned, is 
the deliberate government policies of the neglect and lack of recognition to the 
contribution of the voluntary sector as one of sources of the Sudanese social capital. This 
lack of communication and consultation on issues, such as NGOs law, will certainly 
delay the whole process of strengthening capacity for both government and NGOs. 
Further findings and debate on issues of great value and contribution to the voluntary 
sector will be discussed in the coming final chapter.
425 The Interim National Constitution o f the Republic o f the Sudan. 2005, p. 13. Available at: www.sudan- 
embassv.de. Accessed 10 January 2009.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
7.1 Introduction
In Sudan people used to trust governments. They were active, during the democratic 
regimes, in time of election even in remote areas of the country. Media portrayed 
government that represented and spoke for societies. The state leaders have valiantly 
attempted to reinforce this image of the state as the natural spokesman for the people of 
the society. Note the ironic results of Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Mo 
Ibrahim is a Sudanese mobile phone magnate who wanted to promote good governance 
in Africa through the Index.426
“We are shining a light on governance in Africa, and in so doing we are making a unique 
contribution to improving the quality of governance. The Ibrahim Index is a tool to hold 
governments to account and frame the debate about how we are governed. Africans are 
setting benchmarks not only for their own continent, but for the world” 427
The results of the 2008 index have just been published and Sudan is listed as 45th of 49 
African countries for the quality of its governance, including its commitment to 
participation and human rights.428 For this latter indicator Sudan scored 12, compared to 
Chad 29, Ethiopia 40.4, Kenya 63.3, Uganda 61, Central African Republic 60.2 and 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 14.7.429 The lowest scores of both Sudan and 
DRC show the correlation between the political instability, the civil wars and the social
426Ibrahim Index o f African Governance. Available at: www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index-2008. The 
index is a comprehensive ranking o f Sub-Sahran African nations according to governance quality. It 
assesses national governance against 57 criteria. It was created in recognition o f the need for a responsive 
and quantifiable method o f measuring governance quality. The first Ibrahim Index was published in 
September 2007. The 2008 Index is based on data from 2006, the last year with reasonably complete 
available data for nearly all Sub-Sahran African countries.
427 Ibid, 2008
428 The 2008 index was published in October 2008.
429 Ibid, 2008.
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injustice and the weak civil and human rights records and poor participation in political 
life of the citizens of the two countries. Similar results were indicated by the World 
Bank’s Governance Indicators, which show Sudan’s low scores for voice and 
accountability. 430 The latter relates directly to the quality of government-civil society 
engagement.
In much of the issues related to the principles and values such as transparency and 
accountability, it has been typically assumed that the state and its agencies were the 
appropriate vehicle for guidance and direction. This assumption is no longer relevant and 
the government is no longer a model for the present and future generation. The vision of 
the state as principal protagonists in the process of nation building, unity and self- 
determined development in the post colonial period is eroded and for some people is 
completely vanished.
At first glance, the institutional landscape of Sudanese societies today confirms the 
impression rulers have sought to impart. The state institutions have penetrated local life. 
They have had a continuing, strong impact on people’s daily habits. The state has grown 
in sheer size and resources almost everywhere since independence. Its agencies and 
resources have become a major presence in the communities, collecting taxes, setting 
prices, organizing people to protect the state, and more.
The research experience is that the institutional building challenge is formidable. The 
social and political life in the country created bureaucrats all over the development 
community including civil society, government and donor agencies. These bureaucrats 
are confronted by participatory approaches in many ways: by setting up constituencies’ 
priorities, by engaging stakeholders in decision-making process, by making member 
organizations representative at all organization’s level, by sharing organization’s 
financial information and by negotiating matters affecting people life with government.
430 Governance Matters. Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2007. The six dimensions o f governance 
are: voice and accountability, political stability and absence o f violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory effectiveness, rule o f law, and control o f corruption. 2008. Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/sc countrv.asp. Accessed January 1, 2009.
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7.2 Strengths of Social Capital and Weakness of Literature
In the preceding chapters I have sought to show the growth and development of both 
traditional structures, NGOs, civil society organizations and the main political parties, on 
the one hand and the state on the other hand. In these chapters I have sketched an 
approach of state-society relations as well as an alternative strategy or a way out of the 
interactive relations between state and civil society. Building better governance requires 
joint efforts and interaction between state, citizens and civil society. As described by 
Blair: “helping to articulate needs, especially those of the poor, participating in policy 
formulation and particularly holding governments to account”.431 Both democratic and 
dictatorial regimes created and built into our political culture some normative constraints 
that say we only want the voluntary sector to go so far. This is clearly shown in the 
attitudes towards civil society, lack of recognition of its role and importance and the law 
regulated the work of voluntary sector. On the other hand NGOs in the country shift away 
from welfare and service delivery by building people’s capacities and strengthening 
social movements. My interest throughout these chapters was in the local institutional 
framework where the different social forces of state, NGOs, CSOs, private sector and all 
walk of societies perform jointly the development model if resources of these forces have 
been well utilized. Contrary to this joint commitment was the policy of exclusion and 
neglect, in most cases, shown by the governments and their irrational hostility towards 
the voluntary work, NGOs and civil society movement.
The study has touched on the importance of local capacity, indigenous knowledge and 
practices and on social cooperation such as communal labor known as Nafir and on 
possible reasons why these initiatives are eroding and expected to diminish in the near 
future. This evidence has been backed by the government neglect, marginalization and 
lack of interest in supporting local efforts. In the line of this tendency and lack of official
431 Alan Thomas, Whatever Happened to Reciprocity? Implications o f Donor Emphasis on Voice and 
Impact as Rationales for Working with NGOs in Development. In: A. J. Bebbington, S. Hickey, and D.C. 
Mitlin: Can NGOs Make a Differemce? The Challenge o f Development Alternatives. London and New 
York: Zed Books, 2008, p. 100
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recognition and appreciation, the authority hinders the development of these social 
institutions by the influence and effect o f its legislative, economic and monetary policies.
One of the purposes of this study is to examine the common or recurring organizational 
features and the internal dynamics of these traditional structures and community based 
organizations to ascertain which values and approaches appear to be associated with good 
performance and to suggest how Sudanese civil society organizations, government and 
donors can enhance these desirable development principles.
The study illustrates the roles of each development agent in the community and whether 
or not the community informal practices have been strengthened or undermined by these 
forces such as the NGO or the government authority. As Uphoff explains that: “Another 
way in which indigenous organizations are characterized is as informal. This means that 
they function according to shared understandings of common objectives, roles, 
expectations, responsibilities, sanctions, etc. rather than being determined by explicit, 
codified rules and regulations”.432 It is also not clear however the extent of the effect of 
external intervention on these local practices and whether they have been undermined or 
supported by NGOs. McAllisiter Patrick A. concludes that: “Many well-meant efforts at 
rural development have in the past brought more poverty than plenty, and more control 
rather than liberation. In the words of the American Anthropological Association’s Task 
Force on Involuntary Resettlement, there is a tendency for outside assistance to 
undermine indigenous and dynamic coping practices and thereby diminish, rather than 
enhance, the ability of the displaced to establish a more independent and self-sufficient 
life”. 433
432 1996. Preface in: Blunt, P., and Warren D. M., Indigenous Organizations and Development. London: 
Intermediate Technology.
433 McAllisiter, P. A., 1996. Traditional settlement, cultural identity and rural development in the Transkei, 
in: Blunt P., and Warren D. Michael 1996. Indigenous Organizations and Development. London: 
Intermediate Technology, p. 19.
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The striking observation is the minimal learning and sharing between NGOs in the North 
and civil society organizations in the South.in common issues such as poverty reduction 
and social justice. According to John Gaventa that: “Historically there is little sharing and 
learning between these groups [civil society in the North and NGOs and community- 
based organizations in the South] across the hemispheres”. 434 This also supported by 
Rajesh Tandon: “The creation of mutual learning and horizontal links also allows the 
possibility of building the trust and social capital necessary for collaboration across 
borders”. 435 Related to this is the neglect of the Western literature with respect to the 
role, participation and contribution of CBOs, NGOs and CSOs in Sudan. The 
overemphasis o f this literature on the work of INGOs challenges the intention and 
purpose of INGOs and hinders the capacity building process of these local entities.
Nevertheless, the informal institutions have difficulties handling management and 
leadership and the power that comes with it, like any other local groups. This, however, 
should not detract from the many positive features of social cohesion, solidarity and local 
integrity. The factors which make these local initiatives more successful and sustainable 
lie in their emphasis on addressing community needs and on the process and outcome.
Now, more than ever, the concern with community empowerment and democratic 
development has to take on concrete form as an alternative to the repressive regime’s 
approach. However, for community empowerment to become more than just a glib 
phrase, the need for social change must be analyzed against the continued violence and 
conflict in the country and the continued policy of political and social exclusion which 
provides the impetus for, and the biggest obstacle to, transformation.
7.3 Reluctant State vs. Peaceful Transformation
434 Crossing the Great Divide: Building Links and Learning Between NGOs and Coomunity-based 
Organizations in the North and South. In: Michael Edwards & Alan Fowler (ed): The Earthscan Reader on 
NGO Management. 2002. UK and USA:Earthscan Publication, p. 256.
435 Ibid, 2002: 269.
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The 1980s were not a happy decade for civil society movement in Sudan. With his last 
five years of military dictatorship, the Nimeiri regime announced the Sharia Law 
assuming that will protect his collapsing system. The turn was for democracy, within the 
Sudanese vicious cycle, on March/April 1985 when the political parties and civil society 
groups overthrew Nimeiri regime. The frustration soon shadowed the political life after 
the democratic election of 1986 and the three years of political indecisiveness over key 
issues of peace in the South. That was the time when the elected government and its 
fragile democratic institutions could not tolerate the freedom of media and the critical 
voices of the civil society organizations. The latter have drawn attention to the 
inefficiencies in management and allocation of resources, the discrimination against 
remote areas, and the wealth share injustice between central and marginalized areas. The 
state’s inefficiencies stem not merely from poor decisions, but from structures which 
prevent many groups in society from exercising influence over government’s decisions 
and from holding it accountable for its actions.
The increasing attention of the potential of NGOs and CSOs comes as a result of the 
abandonment of the state responsibilities for social services and subsidies. This tendency 
in the absence o f public sector and with some support from non-governmental 
organizations becomes rather a substitute but not a solution to the problems encountering 
local institutional development.
On the other hand there are still social forces and community-based organizations which 
have asserted themselves, notably the silent and peaceful revolt of Sudanese societies 
against official apparatus of injustice and instability. In other words the social capital in 
Sudan, its traditional forms and modem practices has been strengthened despite the 
frustration and hostile impact of different macro-political environments. Mutual co­
operation in the Sudanese history takes the form of a continuing struggle over the 
distribution of incomes and access to benefits and services, in which solidarity gives 
strength to those who have neither income nor assets.
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The research contributed to other studies of Sudanese politics by highlighting, in 
historical context, that the rise of Islamic movement can be viewed as part of the decline 
of local community as the center of social capital. Clearly, the Islamic movement has not 
brought into being the future envisioned by Sudanese. Moreover, in Sudan as elsewhere, 
once Islamic regime discourse is appropriated as the language of an authoritarian regime, 
its ability to serve as an agent for social change is surely compromised. With respect to 
the relation between state and religion, as one of the potential endangering issues in the 
Sudanese political, social and cultural life, it is the high time for the Islamists to 
recognize that the virtual realities which repeatedly being imposed by them can not 
succeed in a country that popular Islam is deeply rooted.
Concern over the intractable nature of many of these constraints has led to growing 
interest in the contribution that civil society organizations and NGOs can make to 
development, particularly areas of community participation, social justice, human rights 
and social inclusiveness. In particular, interest is clearly growing in the extent to which 
there are practical complementarities between NGOs and government, and which NGOs 
approaches might be incorporated into governmental programs. Much of the interest in 
and respect of NGOs has been driven from the communities where they find them 
practical, participatory and honest. On the other hand the lack of interest in NGOs, shown 
by the government, has been fuelled by a number of suspicions about their loyalty, 
political affiliation, and accountability. Despite these challenges, CSOs, NGOs and CBOs 
succeeded in creating strategies to work with the governments, at all level and in different 
settings both in urban and rural areas. The establishment of partnership and mechanisms 
of dialogue and communication, particularly with government technical departments, 
assure that even in absence of democracy and under brutal authoritarian regimes, NGOs 
can engage effectively and contribute to social and economic changes, particularly those 
affecting the marginalized poor communities.
The study reviews contemporary dialogue between the non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) and the state. The study combines both 
extensive and intensive analysis of the interface between NGOs/CSOs and the state in
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Sudan and focuses specifically on three case studies in Chapter Four (Organizational 
Cultures of Sudanese NGOs), Chapter Five (NGOs Relations with Governments) and 
Chapter Six (NGOs Laws: A Comparative Study between Laws in Sudan and Egypt) 
which provide the basis for the development practitioners’ conviction that the NGO-State 
interface is part of local institutional development framework and therefore must be part 
as well of a genuine learning process approach.
7.4 Case Study Chapter Four: Organizational Cultures of Sudanese NGOs
The key research question focused on the process of organizational cultures and capacity 
building of the Sudanese civil society organizations. The six areas of organizational 
cultures which have been identified by the research to give an indication of the 
effectiveness and the efficiency are as follows: 1) internal governance; 2) strategic 
planning; 3) financial management and resources; 4) service delivery; 5) human 
resources and management; and 6) external relations.
The changing social, political and economic context places a responsibility on civil 
society and NGOs to continue to engage effectively and efficiently within their own 
institutions and with other various stakeholders. Freire, for example, focused on the 
radical shift in building the capacities of people for transformation through the 
development of a collective consciousness of the links between local struggle and 
structural inequalities. The writings of Gandhi and Schumacher stress the need to 
empower the poor through direct action at the grassroots. This implies that capacity 
building processes need to empower not only at the level o f individual civil society 
organizations but of a constituency that is affected by marginalization and social 
injustice.
One key area of concerns, which has been spelt out by Robert Michels, in his book, 
Political Parties (1915), is the question of accountability and lack of democracy with the 
organizations. The behavior of leaders led Michels to despair about the prospects for
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genuine democracy. Norman Uphoff436 notes that, “Leaders became autocratic. They 
controlled the party or trade union press. They dominate meetings. They engrossed their 
organizations’ treasuries. Most alarmingly, they maneuvered to be succeeded by their 
sons or favorite supporters”.
The four organizations are quite visible to their constituencies and stakeholders, including 
government, donor agencies and NGOs. In the case of the two networks (HRLAN and 
SCSNAP) there is less visibility among their own members’ organizations. This is 
because the networks’ communication protocol with their own members is poor. The 
increasing number of HRLAN’S member organizations from 7 to 97 and SCSNAP from 
20 to 60 has not been treated as credit for the networks.437 On the contrary, the visibility 
and communication with these numbers created burden in terms of sharing information 
with them, inviting them for meetings and events or even updating them on the progress.
This analysis of internal democracy is relevant to our current situation in Sudan, which is 
how to increase democratic practices and accountability as well as to improve the 
performance of development civil society, particularly trade unions, political parties and 
NGOs. One implication of this digression on social history is that the more vulnerable, 
low status and less educated members, the more domination and predation of their 
leaders. This is not always true with grassroots organizations where leaders can be 
illiterate and at the same accountable to their community. According to Uphoff438, that, 
’’There is evidence for and against Michels’ propositions from the literature on NGOs and 
GROs [grassroots organizations], but unless we can refute or invalidate his ‘iron law’, 
the grassroots organizations which advocate greater accountability and want NGOs to be 
responsible are themselves least likely to be internally accountable to their own members.
436 Uphoff N. Grassroots Organizations and NGOs in Rural Development, 
in: Edwards, M. & Hulme, D., ed. Non-Governmental Organizations:
Performance and Accountability, Beyond the Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan.1996, p.21
437 HRLAN Annual Report, 2005: 3 and El-Mekki Evaluation Report on SCSNAP Annual Report, 2006: 6.
438 Uphoff N. Grassroots Organizations and NGOs in Rural Development, 
in: Edwards, M. & Hulme, D., ed. Non-Governmental Organizations:
Performance and Accountability, Beyond the Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan.1996, p.22
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The more power that outside agencies give to such organizations, the more benefits may 
be skimmed off for persons in leadership positions or for those whom they favor”. 
Despite some consultations, centralization has been a constant feature of the four 
organizations/networks’ bureaucracy building. Resources and decision-making power 
have been concentrated heavily at the director or/and executive committee level. Capacity 
at the members and branches level is generally weak and the latter are rarely able to 
undertake initiatives on their own. The result is usually further alienation of the 
organizations/networks from their constituencies. The struggle for improving internal 
governance and for democratic practices, however, is not only one of vertical conflict 
between a controlling state and civil society, but one also of horizontal struggles within 
civil society itself for its own further democratization and sustainability.
All four organizations suffer from the chronic syndrome of Sudanese civil society 
organizations of lobbying and gatherings for the preparation of new elected 
board/executive committee. The negative social networking and lobbying during the 
election time endangers the whole democratic processes by dividing two minority 
influential groups within the organization/network and the majority of inexperienced 
members found themselves part of this division by supporting one of the two election 
lists. In some cases the division was of political nature (reactive vs. progressive), 
(progressive vs. progressive) and most dangerously the ethnic division which was not 
totally excluded from these exercises. The general assembly meetings, given this 
background, were not expected to produce meaningful results in terms of rotation of 
leaders and the selection of new leaders. There was no policy established in terms of 
period limitation for board members. The diversity amongst the board members was not 
defined as a crucial problem in a country which has been characterized of its religious, 
ethnic and cultural diversity. The board members of the four organizations/networks 
consisted mostly from people of Northern Sudanese origin. This could be intentionally or 
un-intentionally way of selection but certainly it hinders the genuine direction of 
development and advocate for injustice and social exclusion.
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In terms of transparency and accountability, the level of information sharing with regard 
to the organizations’ internal governance, financial matters and other operations, is 
varied. In most cases the four organizations shared information related to internal 
capacity, policies and procedures with board members and senior staff members. The 
culture of transparency, however, is still missing and its extent of reach is limited.
Overall, the four organizations are not taking sufficient initiatives and did not create 
mechanisms with member organizations and other stakeholders to share information and 
to consult on matters related to them. Information on internal governance was provided in 
response and with limitations. Michael Edwards and David Hulme describe the 
phenomena of multiple accountabilities: "downwards to their partners, beneficiaries, staff 
and supporters; and upwards to their trustees, donors and host government. Multiple 
accountability presents any organization with problems, particularly the possibilities of 
having to over-account (because of multiple demands), or being able to under-account, as 
each overseeing authority assumes that another authority is taking a close look at actions 
and results”. 439 The experiences show that most of the donor agencies represent 
themselves as the only accountable bodies to whom the civil society organizations report 
to. In most of the cases that the four participating organizations are reporting twice to the 
general assembly meeting once in a year and reporting to various donor agencies based 
on the contracts and agreements with them.
The other important aspect is the roles of women in these four organizations, the gender 
present balance in the board and in the general assembly and to what extent women roles 
are effective and if the balance is reasonable. The policies of the four organizations have 
not developed towards achieving gender equality and gender equality has not been 
discussed as a priority for them. The gender mainstreaming and gender equality 
approaches are challenges facing NGOs and CSOs in Sudan. The concept of gender 
equality is not yet considered as a crosscutting theme as well as a focus. Specifically, it is 
anticipated that gender equality approach will result in that the Sudanese civil society
439 Edwards, M. & Hulme, D., ed., 1996. Non-Governmental Organizations: Performance and 
Accountability, Beyond the Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan, p. 9.
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organizations are more capable of addressing and promoting gender equality within the 
context of their activities of working with communities, grassroots organizations and 
government, and that they promote and address the strategic gender interests of Sudanese 
women and support the improvement in their position in Sudanese society.
This discussion on gender issues and diversity was inclining with Alan Fowler with Piers 
Campbell and Brian Pratt: “Often the formation of groups just because of gender hides 
the diversity of interest and needs of members, leading to very uneven motivation and 
limited cohesion. Organizational development needs to accommodate diversity of 
priorities of group members. It cannot be assumed that because a group is homogenous in 
terms of gender that it is coherent or unified in its members’ goals”. 440
The participating organizations/networks’ main service delivery projects were training 
sessions and workshops on issues related to poverty reduction, human rights, and 
environment. Most of these activities benefited the member organizations and staff 
members and NGOs. Given the fact the participating organizations/networks’ focus areas 
are advocacy, lobbying and policy influence, very little inputs has been directed towards 
these activities. El-Mekki writes: “The documents show that the thematic meetings and 
regional workshops were quite a success in terms of the quality of papers and discussions 
and level o f attendance. However, the common thread linking these activities is a clear 
academic tendency. There is also a clear lack of focus and strategic linkages between the 
themes”.441 For the most part, they have not been engaged in policy debates on a national 
level regarding poverty alleviation and policy influence issues. They have not been 
visible in analyzing, deliberating or lobbying the government on community level 
implications of macro policies, such as the adoption of economic reform and structural 
adjustment policies on the poor. John Clark writes about new skills and styles required 
for advocacy work: “For example, staff involved in advocacy should not be closely
440
Fowler, A., Campbell, P. & Pratt, B., 1992. Institutional Development & NGOs in Africa’, UK: Intrac, 
p.24.
441 El-Mekki, A., 2006. Evaluation Report Project Strengthening Civil Society in Sudan, Khartoum: 
Alternatives [Unpublished report], p.5.
291
identified with any anti-government factions and should appear politically mature”.442 In 
a recent confrontation, for instance, between the government and SECS on the intention 
of the government to sell Sunut Reserve Forest to a private company for tourist purpose, 
SECS raised its campaign to the court. The question is to what extent a politically mature 
person will help stop the collusion between the private sector and the government?
The four organizations depend mainly on external funding. They often perform poorly in 
the areas of financial systems, policies and procedures. The financial aspect is important 
sensitive and ethical issue and financial transparency is considered as one of main values 
in the organizations. One crucial issue in respect to transparency and accountability is the 
necessity for financial external evaluation. The classical financial audit used by the four 
organizations is no longer valid and it is unnecessary exercise. It is a routine work of 
private companies asked to prepare an audit report for general assembly meetings or 
donor agencies. Some donor agencies are keen to bring their own auditors which in most 
case a good learning exercise for the organizations. Organizations have to consider 
auditing as important aspect for the organizations’ own development, and accountability. 
As Kaplan describes: “We need to choose what is important, and prioritize and sequence 
accordingly. This needs a cool head, but it also needs understanding of the underlying 
principle and commitment to it”. 443
The main features characterize the organization’s financial systems, management, and 
reporting could be summarized in the following constraints: i) Absence of participation of 
member organizations in any stage of financial management; ii) Lack of consultation and 
missing mechanism of communication on financial matters within the organizations; iii) 
ambiguity of policies and procedures in terms of budgeting, availability of funds, update 
of cash flow from donors; iv) Training on financial matters often overlooked; v) Poor
442 Policy influence, lobbying and advocacy, in: Michael Edwards and David Hulme, ed 1996: Making a 
difference: NGOs and development in a changing world. London: Earthscan Publications, p. 192.
443 Leadership and Management. In: The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. 2002. Michael Edwards 
and Alan Fowler. London: Earthscan Publications, p 439.
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financial documentation and in most cases lack of accessibility to financial information; 
and vi) Lack of financial sustainable strategies and local fund raising is not a priority.
Overall the financial management and financial resources require a complex consultation 
process. The ambiguity of financial procedures and policies raised questions to be 
answered. Member organizations and staff members would be consulted for feedback and 
concerns. As Zadek, S. and Raynard P., note: “From this perspective, they would be able 
to highlight their own values and interest and to construct indicators to measure the 
organization’s performance on that basis” 444. The participatory consultative approach 
will allow the networks particularly, where there are many member organizations, to 
move towards new forms of transparency and accountability. The consultative approach 
is of great benefits for members and partners. Their interests wertaken more directly and 
the report on activities responds to their concerns. As Tandon Rajesh writes: “The 
concept of multiple stakeholders helps to further our understanding of NGO 
accountability”. 445
The issue o f the organizations’ financial resources will lead to the real threat facing the 
civil society organizations in the Sudan that rely on unpredictable external resources. The 
four participating organizations/networks, except of SECS, are depending on one or two 
donor agencies. Given the unpredictability of external donations, is there any way of 
breaking dependence on external funds? Why donors are not interested in strengthening 
the organizations’ financial sustainability? To what extent the organizations’ non-profit 
mandates contradict with investment and profit-making efforts? Experience in Sudan 
indicates that civil society organizations do not try to generate funds locally, except of 
limited private sector funding. According to Murray Gerald 446 that: “There is a 
widespread sense in the development community that a good project is one that will
444 Zadek, S., and Raynard, P., 2002. Accounting for Change: The Practice o f Social Auditing, in:
Edwards, M. and Fowler A. 2002. NGO Management. London: Earthscan, p.324.
445 Ibid, 2002: 13.
446 Murray, G.. A Haitian Peasant Tree Chronicle: Adaptive Evolution and 
Institutional Intrusion. In: Krishna, A., Uphoff, N., and Esman, M., eds., 1997,
Reasons for Hope. West Hartford: Kumarian Press. 1997,p.252.
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continue without any outside support after a specified period of assistance, and, to 
achieve this, subsidies must be kept to a minimum during the life of the project”. 447But 
what can apply on project does not apply on the organization which needs to be internally 
sustained to engage effectively in change, intermediation and social relation.
While a basic understanding of NGO internal capacity already exists in most countries, 
considerable ambiguity remains with regard to the situation of networks and alliances. 
The considerations raised in this conclusive chapter become even more complex when 
demonstrated in a network that brings together many member organizations. Much of the 
practical experience with the internal governance in the individual member organizations 
has been challenging and in some cases frustrating.
The networks’ experience in the Sudan, questioned the effectiveness of networking. The 
term of network, as Fowler writes: “has become so misused as to be virtually 
meaningless”448. Some of the people interviewed showed that many NGOs and CSOs are 
of the opinion that these coalitions and networks are effective in achieving some of their 
goals. It seems that the challenge in the Sudanese context lies not in the creation of new 
institutional bodies, for there are many, but in boosting their capacity and resources in 
such a way that would enhance their work and that the gap between them and their 
members is narrowed. Fowler continues: "This justifies an internal debate on what 
strategic alliances can be forged from existing networks, and what degree of autonomy of 
action can be relinquished in return for better performance, impact a quality".449
It is notable that despite the importance of allies, coalition and networking for the four 
NGOs, especially that they consider advocacy and policy influence areas of focus for 
them, efforts to engage in networks are often informal and are not institutionalized within
447 Murray, G., 1997. A Haitian Peasant Tree Chronicle: Adaptive Evolution and Institutional Intrusion. In: 
Krishna, A., Uphoff, N., and Esman, M., eds., 1997, Reasons for Hope. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 
p.252.
448 1992. Non-Governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization: An African Perspective,
International Development Journal, Vol. 5, No.3: pp. 325-339.
449 Ibid , 1 9 9 2 :3 2 5 -3 3 9 .
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the organizations or their plan of actions. The case studies show that the most serious 
barriers to expanding the development roles of civil society organizations may be the 
difficulty they face in working with one another. Competition and jealousies among them 
are often intense and prevent them from working together. Building and strengthening 
networks of Sudanese civil society is a key strategy for sustainable development. The 
approach to network building is based on shared learning, a solid understanding of 
contextual issues within which NGOs operate, and promotion of concerted and focused 
advocacy and communications with all sectors of society. Support for the institutional 
development of the networks also fulfils a strategic need, as it enhances the ability of 
civil society to engage other actors with a more coherent and stronger voice.
Stephen Biggs and Arthur Neame write:"What characterizes these cases is a history of 
negotiation, coalition, and change in NGO structure and behavior, in response to the 
interaction between the agency and its changing social and political context. One of the 
most significant observations of studies concerning NGO effectiveness has been that 
networking and coalitions with other NGOs, and with other public and private sectors, 
are often the key to results. If one views development as the articulation of a series of 
local struggles and processes, it is obviously vital to understand the means by which 
networking succeeds".450 Development experiences reveal the crucial but neglected 
importance of cooperation and networking among civil society that put the public interest 
first. This can include the protection of NGOs and CSOs, particularly when the political 
environment is hostile and not in favor. Though critical of some networks’ work 
elsewhere in this thesis, I acknowledge their contribution to advocacy and influence of 
policies. The need for joint efforts is often important for NGOs and CSOs that effectively 
engage in social inclusion and change.
450 Biggs, S., and Neame, A., 1996. Negotiating Room for Manoeuvre: Reflections Concerning NGO 
Autonomy and Accountability Within the New Policy Agenda, in: Edwards, M. & Hulme, D., ed. Non 
Governmental Organizations: Performance and Accountability, Beyond the Magic Bullet. London: 
Earthscan, 1996, pp.31-40.
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Mistakes are bound to happen in the capacity development and learning processes and in 
trying out innovative approaches to achieve effective results. It is important that these 
mistakes are quickly identified and appropriate adjustments made in the program based 
on lessons learned. The four participating organizations/networks however admit that 
mistakes occur; little has been achieved in terms of establishing a documentation process 
that will contribute greatly to the monitoring and evaluation of the development 
initiatives. These learning process strategies can well serve the NGO activities in the 
longer term and enhance understanding that development is not just a short term project 
but a long term process and commitment for all those concerned.
7.5 Case Studies Chapter Five and Six: State/Civil Society Relations
Ongoing civil society organizations experiences in negotiation, mobilization and 
advocacy to improve living conditions among the poor communities have brought about a 
shift in focus away from dominant government models towards dynamic action and 
reflection, built on the people’s own lives and environment.
A conscious and deliberate effort made by civil society and some governmental circles to 
recognize the needs of poor communities and to assume increasing responsibilities for 
solving their problems, thereby increasing their capacities to participate fully in the life 
by effective use of resources through joint efforts and full participation of the community. 
This latter approach has brought about methodological changes away from vertical 
models of externally implemented change towards more diversified forms of response to 
people’s needs and the causes of those needs. On the other hand, capacity development 
for those who affected by people’s life called for more than improving conditions in the 
community; it required a process of grassroots empowerment for the excluded to 
influence changes in the way society was being run by becoming organizationally visible 
and by advocating for their own rights and the rights of all the marginalized.
Chapter Five shows that the four organizations/networks have attempted to create a 
partnership with the state either by working directly with some of its technical
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departments on issues related to environment, street children, and poverty reduction or 
through provision of training on human rights and child protection, education, and water 
management.
The four NGOs have developed different strategies and approaches to maintain a 
relationship with the state. It is evident that the principal factors for such partnership 
continue to be both internal and external. This research has provided some examples of 
NGOs’ strategies such as the organization’s cooperation and collaboration with 
government technical units such as the Higher Council for Environment and Natural 
Resources, the Ministry of Justice, the National Council for Child Welfare, the Juvenile 
Court, the Ministry of Social Planning, and the Ministry of Education. The potentialities 
of continuing working with some technical units are promising. This cooperation could 
be through the delivery of services implemented by NGOs, for example for street 
children or through joint document aims towards national plan for environmental work.
The case study here gives evidence of the importance of the policy dialogue for 
sustainable development efforts. It also shows how well conceived and flexibly 
implemented activities can change social and economic environment in positive ways. 
Such results need to come simultaneously from above and below. The culture of 
participation of communities and civil society organizations in development initiatives 
has to be mainstreamed in government policies and strategies. As illustrated by Krishna, 
A.; Uphoff, N.; and Esman, M. that: “Rather, the process of policy change involves more 
experimentation and iteration than implied by the language of ‘policy dialogue’ a ‘big 
bang’ theory o f development” . 451
Such approaches invariably require understanding o f the implications and consequences 
of the results of joint efforts and contribution of the NGOs/CSO in enriching the dialogue 
and communication with the government. This learning work approach will help the
45]
Krishna, A., Uphoff, N., and Esman, M., 1997. Reasons for Hope: Instructive Experiences in Rural 
Development. USA: Kumarian Press, p.5.
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silent majority of civil servants understand the role of NGOs in development and will 
also contribute to change the attitude of government officials towards NGOs. On the 
other hand the image and attitude of NGOs/CSOs against government bodies will be 
changed and the relation between them will consolidate on this basis.
The curious paradox is the role of the state in development and its relation with NGOs 
and community organizations. As far as policy implications are concerned, a greater 
contribution to promote sustainable development may lie in maintaining peace and 
economic stability. This missing role affects the performance of other social forces both 
private and public in supporting long term development efforts. The implication is that 
voluntary sector national, local and international, donor agencies and government need to 
be more sensitive to local development efforts and take greater care to ensure that their 
development strategies and programmers complement or build upon them.
Chapter Six is a comparative study between the NGOs laws in Sudan and Egypt. The 
study illustrates the official side of the NGOs and government relation and shows the 
implicit conflicts between the NGOs/CSOs and government institutions. It is interesting 
to see the NGOs law in Sudan came in 2005 after three years of introducing the NGOs 
law in Egypt. The Sudanese law replicated the Egyptian one and added more restrictive 
measures particularly on the internal and external funding and on the authority of 
dissolution of the organizations. Both official mentalities in Khartoum and Cairo are 
governed by security and control over the voluntary work, while external and internal 
business companies have been offered free hand facilities without restrictions. 
Experience in Sudan and Egypt indicates that restrictive laws and procedures designed 
for the political control of NGOs clearly hamper legitimate NGOs. The struggle against 
the laws in the two countries is ongoing joint resistance initiated by the CSOs and NGOs. 
The latest news from Sudan confirmed that the civil society organization raised the issue 
to the Constitutional Court.
In most of developing countries the state is desperately keen to maintain rural and urban 
support and use a range of voluntary organizations to do this in the absence of strong
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government bodies. In Sudan the state seeks to be protected and maintained by law and 
through its own bodies and therefore there is little room for NGOs and CSOs to work 
independently The state-civil society relations in Sudan may be inline with Bratton when 
he describes two extreme approaches: “govemment-NGO relations are likely to be most 
constructive where a confident and capable government with populist policies meets an 
NGO that works to pursue mainstream development programmes... and most conflictual 
where a weak and defensive government with a limited power base meets an NGO that 
seeks to promote community mobilization”.452
In conclusion, it may be stated that the present informal initiatives, while not nearly as 
active as before, are still visible particularly in rural areas. The expectation of 
development practitioners that these practices would disappear rapidly have been proved 
wrong. Indeed, apart from the official intervention in voluntary work, inappropriate 
development policies, and the weaknesses of the communication and dialogue between 
NGOs/CSOs and the state, the technical relations have been strengthened and maintained. 
Highlighting this type of interface and the role of social cooperation as a capital in 
Sudanese communities may risk undermining the role of the political intervention which 
still continues to be significant. Along with tension and denial, the last two decades also 
brought new developments that give us hope for the future. Surely there were many 
setbacks. Hopefully there were startling breakthroughs toward the significance of 
traditional structures and understanding of the role of civil society in developing 
countries. Either way, the momentum has been established.
452 Bratton, M., The Politics o f Govemment-NGOs Relations in Africa, World Development, Vol. 17, 
No.4. 1989, pp. 569-587.
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Appendix A 
Research Instruments & Questions
1. Semi-structured interviewing
A checklist of questions related to each topic of interest is used. No formal questionnaire 
is used. Other different types of interviews include individual interviews, group 
discussions, focus group discussions and oral history.
12 people from each four participating organizations were interviewed. The people 
interviewed represent staff members, board, and representatives from the member 
organizations. The selection was gender sensitive. From the staff members, interviews 
were made with the key positions such as chairperson, financial officer and 
coordinators/project officers. Volunteers were also selected by some organizations to be 
interviewed.
The analysis of responses from semi-structured interviews requires a summary of each 
interview into main points raised and then creates a limited number of ‘categories’ of 
response which help to know the different and interesting views and opinions reflected by 
individuals and groups.
2. Focus Group Discussions
The number of participants range between 4 and 6 people. The use of this tool has been 
limited during the course of the research to four discussion groups.
3. Documents review
The research looks at some reports, mostly narrative six month, annual reports, reports 
mainly prepared for general assembly meetings, annual work plans and evaluation 
reports. Few financial reports were reviewed. Other documents received from the 
organizations are copies of organization’s constitution and provisions of regulation and 
internal laws, strategic planning sessions, newsletter, and publications.
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The documents reviewed which were collected from other sources are The Constitution 
of the Republic of Sudan, the protocols of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
NGOs Act Regulating Voluntary Work
4. Direct Observation
It is a relevant tool to observe objects, events, people’s behaviour or relationships. It is a 
good way to cross-check people’s responses or answers to questions. It is worth 
mentioning that the researcher has been working with international organizations in 
Sudan for more than two decades. My positions in these international organizations 
varied from program officer, operations manager, field monitor and accompanier which 
allowed me to observe the progress and development of CBOs, NGOs and CSOs in 
Sudan.
Research Questions:
The following steps were taken with regard to selection of the research questions:
Step 1: General
- In what areas do Sudanese NGOs need to enhance their capacity to become a more 
effective agent of development?
- What are the main weaknesses at present of Sudanese NGOs?
- What are the limitations of the current legal environment in Sudan with respect to 
independent NGO activities?
- What are the mechanisms by which Sudanese NGOs network?
- What are the tools and mechanisms by which they project their influence and advocate 
change?
Specific
- How does the current NGO law affect NGOs?
- What coping mechanisms do NGOs adopt to survive under the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) regime?
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- How do NGO and government representatives view their relations? What do they see as 
the strength and weaknesses of their relationships?
- How do NGOs view the capacity building support provided by internal donors?
Step 2: The single overarching question was:
- In what areas and how do the Sudanese NGOs need to enhance their capacity to 
become more effective agents for development?
The subsidiary questions are:
- What are the mechanisms by which Sudanese NGOs network?
- What are the tools and mechanisms by which they project their influence and advocate 
change?
- How do NGO representatives view their relations with the NIF government?
In terms of the organization’s capacity building the semi-structured questionnaire focused 
on the following four areas:
Financial capacity:
- Do you keep financial records?
-T o whom do you release your accounts?
- Are your accounts externally audited?
Internal Governance
- Is there a separation of board and executive responsibility?
- How and how regularly is the leadership rotated?
- How often does general assembly meet?
- Who is represented on the board and why?
Voice and Accountability
- Who do you represent?
- How do you organize and mobilize this constituency?
- How to you make the government accountable to that constituency?
External Relations/Networking
- Who are your key external partners (e.g. top five)?
- What are the main areas of cooperation?
- What are the main areas of tension or disagreement?
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Appendix B 
List of People Interviewed
(Interviews conducted in Arabic)
Human Rights and Legal Aid Network (HRLAN)
1. Yasir Salim, Chairman, 12/4, HRLAN office
2. Mutasim AL-Amir, Coordinator, 10/4, office
3. Laila Moohammed Salih, Member, 2/4, office
4. Lunba Khawaja, Finance Oficcer, 2/4, office
5. Mohammed Al-Hassan Abdelatif, Training Coordinator, 11/4, office
6. Husam Mohamed Osman, Member, 10/4, office
7. Asia Al-Amas, Member, 12/4, office
8. Aisha Rufai, Member, 9/4, office
9. Adam Salih, Member, 9/4, office
10. Anwar Bashir, Member, 9/4, office
11. Abdealla Bushra, Communication Coordinator, 11/4, office
12. Osman Husein Abubakr, Member, 16/4, organization office in Nuzha area..
Friends for Children Society (Amal)
1. Mohammed Gadalla, Chairman, office
2. Abdelkhaliq El-Nouri, General Secretary, office
3. Mahasin Sidiq, Coordinator for Alternative Families, office
4. Nefisa Sulieman, Coordinator for Social Centres Unit, office
5. Asma Abu Naib, Coordinator for Nyala Branch, office
6. Abdelazim Mohamed Ahmed, Deputy General Secretary, SECS office
7. Sahar Abu Shok, Psychologist, office
8. Ibrahim Abdelrahim, Psychologist, office
9. Iman El Hedai, Member, SCSNAP office
10. Hassan Abdel Ati, Member, Consultancy office
11. Yasir Salim, Member, HRLAN office
12. Idris Al-Nayel, Member, SCSNAP office
Sudanese Environment Conservation Society (SECS)
1. Sumaiya Al-Said, General Secretary, 17/4, SECS office
2. Adil Mohamed Ali, Member, 13/4, office
3. Ali Al-Khalifa, Coordinator for Environmental Rehabilitation, 14/4, office
4. Magda Hassan, Member, 22/4 , office
5. Sadeq Kara, Coordinator for Advocacy and Lobbying, 14/4, office
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6. Mohamed Al-Fahal, Finance and Adminstration Manager, 14/4, office
7. Mutasim Nimer, Member, 15/4, office
8. Asim Maghrabi, Member, 13/4, Consultancy office
9. Muwaia Shaddad, Chairman, 21/4, office
10. Mai Tareq, Member, 6/4, office
11. Tariq A1 Tayeb Haroun, Al-Rahad, office
12. Amal Abdelfadil, Member, 18/4, University of Khartoum
Sudanese Civil Society Network for Alleviation of Poverty (SCSNAP)
1. Al-Nagiya Al-Wasila, Member: Saba organization, 17/4, SCSNAP office
2. Khalid Hassan Idris, Member, 2/4, office
3. Zeinab Badereldin, Member, Alam Organization, office
4. Idris Al-Nayel, Chairman, office
5. Muwaia Shaddad, Member, SECS, 26/4, office
6. Abdelrahim Belal, Member, Consultancy office
7. Ata Al-Batahani, Member, University of Khartoum
8. Tahra Hamad Magzoub, Ex-Officer, 23/4, GCRT office
9. Asma Mohamed, Finance Officer, Amasar Organization, SCSNAP office
10. Huda Abdelgadir, volunteer, office
11. Huda Khojli, Member, office
12. Sahar , Secretary and Volunteer, office
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Appendix C 
Focus Group Discussions
1. Sudanese Environment Conservation Society (SECS):
Main Theme for discussion: Challenges facing Organization’s Institutional Strengthening 
Date: 19/4/2007 
Place: SECS office 
Participants:
1. Abdelrahim Belal, Member
2. Dalia Yacoub, Branches Coordinator
3. Mutasim Nimer, Member
4. Nasir Ahmed Bur, Member
5. Muawia Shadad, Chairman
2. Human Rights and Legal Aid Network (HRLAN)
Main Theme: HRLAN capacity and Member Organizations:
Date: 20/4/2007 
Place: HRLAN office 
Participants:
1. Anwar Bashir, Child Rights Institute
2. Abdelalla Hamid, Action Cultural Centre
3. Muawia Hassan, Nubian Heritage Organization
4. Aisha Rufai, Peace Bridge Association
3. Friends for Children Society (Amal) and Human Rights and Legal Aid Network 
(HRLAN)
Main Theme: Capacity in Networking:
Date: 29/4/2007 
Place: HRLAN office 
Participants:
1. Abdelkhalig Al-Nouri, General Secretary, Amal
2. Asma Al-Naib, Nyala Branch Coordinator, Amal
3. Abdelazim Mohamed Ahmed, Deputy General Secretary, Amal
4. Yasir Salim, Chairman, HRLAN
5. Mutasim A1 Amir, Coordinator, HRLAN
6. Asia A1 Amas, Member, HRLAN
4. Amal Members
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Main Theme: Members and Amal 
Date: 16/4/2007 
Place: SCSNAP office 
Participates:
1. Iman A1 Hedei, Member
2. Azhari A., Member
3. Faiza B., Member
4. Najla H., Member
Glossary
Aid Alhasad 
Aiad A1 aras 
A1 Bulug 
A1 Zakat 
Ansar 
Bagara 
Baramka
Bayt al Mai al Amm
Faza
Hakuma
Hakumas
Karton Kassala
Khalifa
Khatmiyyah
Maliki
Nafir
Rabitat Abna 
Sandug 
Sharia 
Sheikh 
Sot Al Mara
Harvest Celebration
Wedding
Adolescence
Taxes in Islam
Followers of Mahdi
Arab tribe in Western Sudan
Tea drinking ceremony
The General Treasury
Form of communal labor
Government
Governments
Camp for IDPs built by carton 
Mahdi’s successor 
Followers of Khatmiyyah sect 
King
Form of communal labor 
Tie that binds the sons 
Box: Form of rotating saving 
Islamic Law 
Community leader 
Voice for women
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